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ABSTRACT 
 
 The law (nomos) functions as a central piece of Paul’s argument in the second 
chapter of his letter to the community in Rome. Throughout his argument Paul’s 
references to nomos carry such complexity that there is significant disagreement about 
how to understand this nomos. On the one hand, scholars debate over the degree to which 
Greco-Roman conceptions of nomos shape the understanding of nomos present in 
Romans 2. On the other hand, Paul appears to have the Jewish law in mind, and there is 
no consensus about how Paul conceives of the Jewish law in his argument, given the 
similarities with Greco-Roman conceptions of nomos.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to explain the conception of nomos in Romans 2. I 
begin in chapter one by isolating three central components of Paul’s conception of 
nomos: (1) it is universal, (2) its instruction applies to Gentiles—they are capable of 
doing “the things of the law,” (3) it is somehow particularly Jewish. To explain this 
complex conception of nomos I propose to focus on explanations of the Jewish law found 
in Second Temple Diaspora Jewish literature which participates in a common political-
ethical discourse within the Greco-Roman world. Chapter two outlines a “grammar” of 
nomos among Greek and Roman writers, and it focuses on how expressions of universal 
and transcendent nomos grew out of problems with particular nomos. Chapter three 
discusses the relation between particular and transcendent nomos and the ethical claims 
that Greek and Roman writers made on the basis of the common nomos discourse in 
xvi 
 
order to elevate Greek or Roman ways of life as most virtuous. Chapter four investigates 
important Diaspora Jewish writers who participate in this common web of discourse in 
their attempts to explain and interpret the Jewish law and elevate it as the most virtuous. 
In chapter five I interpret Romans 2, arguing that Paul makes use of elements common to 
the Diaspora Jewish explanations of the law to argue that both Jews and Gentiles are 
indeed equal in that neither group lives up to God’s one universal nomos.       
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction to the Study: The Law in Romans 2 
“Romans 2…offers the greatest difficulties of any Pauline text in determining the 
meanings of nomos.” So wrote Douglas Moo nearly thirty years ago in his essay, “Law, 
‘Works of the Law,’ and Legalism in Paul.”1 Others have since acknowledged the 
problem of understanding the meaning of no/moj in Romans 2.2 The purpose of this study 
is to clarify the complex conception of no/moj in Romans 2 that causes so many 
difficulties for interpreters, both past and present. In so doing this study will also make a 
claim about the sort of perspective(s) with which Paul was in conversation in Romans, 
one of Paul’s most important letters for understanding the nature of Paul’s perspective on 
Judaism and the Jewish law.  
“Paul and the Mosaic law.” A little over a decade ago, one’s response to this 
phrase might have been keen interest because the topic was the center of significant 
debate. Today one’s response might actually question the ongoing pursuit of the topic, 
reflecting a scholarly weariness from going over the issue, or a sense of stability, that 
nearly everything has been said. Indeed, there is even reason to think that Pauline 
                                                             
1
 Douglas Moo, “‘Law,’ ‘Works of the Law,’ and Legalism in Paul,” WTJ 45 (1983) 80.  
 
2
 N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” in Paul and the Mosaic Law, ed. James D.G. Dunn 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001) 132: “Romans 2, for so long the Achilles heel of schemes on Paul and the 
Law.” See also E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 123-25; Heikki Raisanen, Paul and the 
Law; J.C. O’Neill, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Baltimore: Penguin, 1975) 48.  
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scholarship has moved on in the pursuit of new vistas.
3
 But this does not mean everything 
has been said about Paul and the law. The flurry of studies in the 1980s and 1990s probed 
the issue deeply and moved the discussion forward in important ways. Yet controversy, 
unanswered questions, and a need for further contextualization and clarification remain. 
Calvin Roetzel’s comments, written in 1995, remain valid today:   
While scholars have solved some problems (concerning Paul’s understanding of 
and relationship to the Mosaic law), overall the number of problems has 
multiplied while scholars have sought to untangle the nest of problems associated 
with Paul and the law. Discontinuities outnumber continuities. A bewildering 
mass of complexities, intricate and involved, remains snarled. Gordian knots 
abound.
4
 
 
It has been nearly twenty years since Roetzel wrote these words. In spite of a notable 
decrease in studies on the topic A. Andrew Das’ recent comments suggest that not much 
has really changed since Roetzel. Summarizing the present landscape, Das writes: “the 
controversy (about Paul and the law) shows no sign of abating.”5 In short, scholars 
                                                             
3
 Because of the centrality of the law for Paul, it is sometimes difficult to sort out where the law is 
a central topic of scholarly discussion and where it is not. An example of this may be seen in Stephen 
Westerholm’s Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), where the law is part of a complex of issues that relate to the “New Perspective on Paul.” 
Nevertheless, to find the most recent substantial treatment of the law in Paul’s letters (outside 
commentaries) we must turn to Preston Sprinkle’s 2008 Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 
in Early Judaism and in Paul (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). Prior to that one must go back to F. 
Adeyemi, The New Covenant Torah in Jeremiah and the Law of Christ in Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 
2006) and Kari Kuula’s The Law, the Covenant, and God’s Plan, volume 2: Paul’s Treatment of the Law 
and Israel in Romans (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003). One may include Westerholm’s 
aforementioned book, but with the caveat that the law is only one of several focal issues (Judaism, 
justification/ righteousness, grace). The decline in studies on Paul and the law is noticeable when one 
contrasts sporadic nature of published studies that focus on the law in recent years with those from the 
period of 1983 through 2003, where at least one book per year was published on the issue of Paul and the 
law (with the exceptions of 1991 and 1998; see bibliography for a more extensive list). Other topics have, 
on the other hand, flourished in recent times (though some are never completely distinct from the topic of 
the law): justification, Paul and empire, Paul and Scripture; Paul and Judaism; Pauline ethics.  
 
4
 Calvin Roetzel, “Paul and the Law,” 266-67. 
 
5
 A. Andrew Das, “Paul and the Law: Pressure Points in the Debate,” in Paul Unbound: Other 
Perspectives on the Apostle, ed. M. Given (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010) 99. 
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recognize problems still remain, but little ground has been broken by way of new 
research or new angles on the issue. 
Romans 2 is a key text where such controversy looms, unanswered questions 
linger, and where there remains need for greater contextualization and clarification. The 
word nomos plays a significant role especially in 2:12-29: 
12
 For however many sin lawlessly will also perish lawlessly; and however many 
sin in the law will be judged through the law, 
13
 for not the ones hearing the law 
are just with God, but the ones doing the law will be made just. 
14
 For whenever 
Gentiles, those not having the law by nature do the things of the law, these not 
having law among themselves are law, 
15
 such ones demonstrating the work of the 
law written in their hearts, their conscience testifying and the reasonings between 
one another accusing or even defending, 
16
 in the day when God judges the secrets 
of humanity according to my good news through Jesus Christ. 
17
 But if you are called “Jew” and if you rest upon the law and you boast in God 18 
and you know the will (of God) and you discern things of worth, having been 
instructed from the law, 
19
 being certain to be yourself a guide of the blind, a light 
of those in darkness, 
20
 an educator of the imprudent, a teacher of the immature, 
having the form of knowledge and truth in the law—21therefore the one teaching 
the other, do you not teach yourself? The one proclaiming do not steal, do you 
steal? 
22
 The one saying do not commit adultery, do you commit adultery? The 
one detesting idols, do you rob temples? 
23
 You who boast in the law, through the 
transgression of the law you dishonor God, 
24
 for the name of God is blasphemed 
on account of you among the Gentiles, just as it is written.  
25
 For on the one hand, circumcision benefits if you practice the law; but on the 
other hand if you are a transgressor of the law, your circumcision has become 
uncircumcision. 
26
 Therefore, if the uncircumcised keeps the requirements of the 
law, will not his uncircumcision be considered as circumcision? 
27
 And the 
uncircumcised from nature accomplishing the law will judge you the transgressor 
of the law through the letter and circumcision. 
28
 For it is not the Jew in the visible 
sense and not the circumcision in the visible sense in the flesh, 
29
 but the Jew in 
the inward sense, and the circumcision of heart in spirit not in letter, of whom the 
approval is not from humans but from God.
6
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
6
 Unless noted, all translations of ancient or modern texts are mine.  
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Over the course of these seventeen verses Paul uses the word no/moj (nomos), 
typically translated “law,”7 nineteen times.8 The nineteen uses of nomos draw the reader’s 
eye to the fact that any interpretation of Romans 2 depends on a clear understanding of 
nomos. The uses of nomos also suggests that Romans 2 stands as one of the most crucial 
sections for understanding nomos in Paul’s letters; whatever we might conclude about 
Paul’s view of the law, Romans 2 must be taken into account.   
It is predictably fitting that one of the most significant sections for understanding 
nomos in Paul’s letters is also one of the most difficult to understand. There is a two-fold 
problem when it comes to understanding nomos in Romans 2. The first part of the 
problem concerns the meaning and referent of nomos. Several questions drive the debate: 
Is nomos in Romans 2 just the Jewish Torah?
9
 Is it not also “law of nature” in verses 14–
15? Might it be both? If so, then how? Attempting to answer these questions affirms 
one’s suspicion that a singular concern with the “meanings” or referent of nomos in 
Romans 2 is to see the problem too narrowly. Even if one explains what nomos Paul has 
                                                             
7
 Throughout this study, I will use the Greek no/moj (plural: no/moi) when necessary, but otherwise 
I will use the transliteration nomos (plural: nomoi) instead of the English “law.” I do this to avoid easy 
assimilation of and confusion between modern understandings of the word “law” and ancient no/moj. Put 
briefly, no/moj in the ancient world signified much more than “legal command” or “law-code” if by that one 
means simply “commandments to follow.” While there is significant overlap between ancient and modern 
understandings of “law” I do not want to assume that they are the same, and by using the transliteration 
hope to draw attention to the specific nature of the usage in ancient Greco-Roman culture. As we shall see, 
the Greek no&moj signifies normative life for a particular people, and it holds together ethical, political, and 
religious elements.  
 
8
 Romans 2:12 (2x), 13 (2x), 14 (2x), 15, 17, 18, 20, 23 (2x), 25 (2x), 26, 27 (2x). This frequency 
in such a brief section is second only to Romans 7 out of the entire Pauline corpus. In Romans 7, the word 
occurs 23 times in twenty-five verses: Romans 7:1 (2x), 2 (2x), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (3x), 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23 
(3x), 25 (2x). 
 
9
 Cf. N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2.” Wright intends to deal with the problem of the law in 
Romans 2, but interestingly, or problematically, Wright’s essay does not really solve any of the problems 
with nomos itself, but more deals with issues of Paul and Judaism and the issue of justification. He too 
simply identifies nomos as “the Jewish law” without drawing attention to or dealing with the complexity 
involved. 
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in mind in various sections of the chapter, problems remain. For example, if one 
concludes that nomos refers to “law of nature” in 2:14–15, but the Jewish nomos in 2:25–
29, one must then explain how the two relate to one another. In a similar manner, how 
does the nomos in vv.14–15 relate to the nomos in vv.12–13? Or vv.17–20? Is the same 
conception of nomos operative in each of these places? In order to understand the 
meaning and referent of nomos in Romans 2 one must investigate the entire proverbial 
iceberg lying under the surface of the water. As we shall see, Paul does not refer to more 
than one nomos in Romans 2. At present, however, scholars have not clearly explained 
the contours of what lies beneath the surface. This is not because Paul is unclear, though 
from our 2,000 year removed vantage point this may seem so.  
The second part of the problem with nomos concerns identifying and elucidating 
the context—that which lies beneath the surface and supports what we see on the surface 
of the page. At the least, this means better explaining the Jewish conception of nomos to 
which Paul seems to refer. As Brian Rosner has pointed out recently, Paul’s view of 
nomos in Romans 2 is crucial for understanding the Judaism with which Paul interacted.
10
 
For Rosner, “Romans 2:17–29 is arguably the most extensive and illuminating text in the 
Pauline corpus concerning Jewish identity,” and it presents essentially the main text that 
describes how Jews understood and appropriated the law.
11
 Because of this Romans 2 
functions as Rosner’s starting point for assessing how, by contrast, Paul says that 
                                                             
10
 Brian Rosner, “Paul and the Law: What he Does not Say,” JSNT 32 (2010) 405–419. Before 
him Simon Gathercole also writes that “Paul gives us a crucial insight into the Judaism he is opposing in 
his description in Romans 2” (Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in 
Romans 1-5 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002] 26). 
 
11
 Rosner, “Paul and the Law,” 406. This identity, Rosner goes on to point out, is inextricably tied 
to the law (406).  
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believers should relate to the law. Rosner’s essay is one recent example of not only the 
importance of Romans 2 for understanding nomos, but also of the important point that 
Romans 2 stands at a crucial intersection between Paul’s understanding of nomos and 
Paul’s interaction with his Jewish context. In short: nomos in Romans 2 is a window into 
the Jewish context that is central for understanding Romans; at the same time this context 
is central for understanding the nomos at the center of Paul’s argument. Both issues 
remain debated; neither nomos nor the Jewish context have yet been clearly explained. 
In this study, I contend that beneath the words we read on the page lies a complex 
web of discourse which functions as the proverbial iceberg, giving existence to what we  
see on the page. I will argue that this web is made up of explanations of the Jewish nomos 
common in Diaspora Jewish literature. These explanations find their voice in 
conversation with a widespread Greco-Roman discourse wherein nomos is at the center 
of ethical-political discussions. This context not only provides the language and 
framework Paul uses to describe nomos, it also provides a window into the cultural 
discourses common to Paul and his contemporaries and in which they participated. When 
we see Paul’s statements about nomos in conversation with Diaspora Jewish 
interpretations of the Jewish nomos, we will also see Paul’s argument in a new light. 
Specifically, we will see that Paul was not arguing for the universalization of the law in 
the face of an opposing Jewish view that understood the law as exclusive and marking 
ethnic superiority.
12
 We will see, rather, Paul argues on the basis of universalizations of 
the Jewish nomos.  
                                                             
12
 As stated for example by James Dunn, Romans 1-8, 77; Mark Seifrid in “Natural Revelation and 
the Law in Romans,” Tyndale Bulletin 49 (1998) 120-25. 
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In the following pages, I will introduce the reader to the specific focal issues that 
any attempt to understand nomos in Romans 2 must address. Following this we will turn 
to past attempts to provide a context that will make sense of the conception of nomos. 
This will help us see how previous interpreters have made valuable points, but also where 
there is a need for more to be said. 
The Text and the Issues 
According to most interpreters, Romans 2 is the central argument of the larger 
section in Romans 1:18–3:20. For the majority of scholars Paul’s main point in this 
section is that all humanity exists under the power of sin (3:9–20).13 Some dissent, noting 
that Paul’s argument does not adequately demonstrate this point. For example, Klyne 
Snodgrass writes that interpreting Romans 1:18–3:20 as Paul’s argument to persuade his 
audience about the universal sinfulness of Jew and Gentile is a “distortion” of Paul’s 
argument.
14
 However one understands the main objective of the argument, Romans 2 
plays a central role in the development of the argument through a dialogue with an 
interlocutor, or dialogue partner, that progresses in three stages: 2:1–11; 12–16; 17–29.  
                                                             
13
 A short list of major scholars who interpret Romans 1:18–3:20 in this way include: Hultgren, 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) 85; Moo, The Epistle to the 
Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996) 91–94; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of 
Romans (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004) 105–06; Richard Bell, No One Seeks for God: An Exegetical and 
Theological Study of Romans 1:18-3:20 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998) 10–12; U. Wilckens, Der Brief 
an die Römer, teil.1: Röm. 1–5 (Zürich: Benziger, 1978) 93–94.  
 
14
 Klyne Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace—to the Doers: The Place of Romans 2 in the Theolo-
gy of Paul,” NTS 32 (1986) 76. See also E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983) 125; Stanley Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press, 1994)191–92; Kari Kuula, The Law, the Covenant and God’s Plan, volume 2: 
Paul’s Treatment of the Law and Israel in Romans (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003) 86–89. 
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In the first stage of his argument, Paul addresses his interlocutor as someone who 
judges those who commit the transgressions mentioned in 1:18–32: 
1
Therefore, you are without excuse, O man—everyone who judges—for in that 
which you judge the other, you condemn yourself; for the one judging, you are 
practicing the same things. 
2
 But we know that the judgment of God is according 
to truth upon the ones practicing such things. 
3
 But are you considering this, O 
man— the one judging the ones practicing such things and doing the same 
things— that you will escape the judgment of God? 4 Or do you despise the 
wealth of his goodness and forbearance and patience, being ignorant that the 
kindness of God leads you to repentance? 
5 
But you are storing up wrath for 
yourself according to your stubborn and unrepentant heart, on the day of wrath 
and of revelation of the just judgment of God, 
6
 who will give out to each person 
according to his works: 
7
on the one hand to the ones seeking glory and honor and 
immortality according to perseverance of good work—(he will give out) eternal 
life, 
8 
but on the other hand to the ones disobeying the truth out of selfish ambition, 
being persuaded by injustice—(he will give out) wrath and anger. 9 Tribulation 
and distress upon every human soul of those working evil, both of the Jews first 
and the Greek; 
10
 but glory and honor and peace upon everyone working good, 
both the Jew first and the Greek, 
11
 for there is no partiality with God.   
 
In challenging the one who judges, Paul states that God will judge the works of 
all people; no one is exempt. Not only that, but this judgment is impartial. Indeed, others 
have pointed out that the central theme in 2:1–11 is God’s impartial judgment of all 
humanity, a point Paul makes, saying that “[God] will give to each according to their 
works” (2:6) because “with God there is no partiality” (2:11).15 Even though at the end of 
this first section Paul has made an important point about God’s judgment, he has not yet 
clearly identified the measure of judgment—on what basis someone’s works (and 
ultimately life) will be judged “just” (di/kaioj) or “unjust” (a!dikoj).  
In the next stage of the argument, 2:12–16, Paul continues to develop the point 
about God’s impartial judgment:  
                                                             
15
 See J. Bassler, Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom, SBL Dissertation Series 59 
(Chico: Scholars Press, 1982). 
 
   9 
 
12
 For however many sin lawlessly will also perish lawlessly; and however many 
sin in the law will be judged through the law, 
13
 for not the ones hearing the law 
are just with God, but the ones doing the law will be made just. 
14
 For whenever 
Gentiles, those not having the law by nature do the things of the law, these not 
having law among themselves are law, 
15
 such ones demonstrating the work of the 
law written in their hearts, their conscience testifying and the reasonings between 
one another accusing or even defending, 
16
 in the day when God judges the secrets 
of humanity according to my good news through Jesus Christ. 
 
In these verses Paul writes of nomos for the first time in the letter, and provides in 
2:13 what he had not yet supplied in 2:1–11: the standard by which one’s life and works 
will be measured. He writes, “for (it is) not the hearers of nomos (who are) the just ones, 
but the doers of the law will be made just.” In this statement and the surrounding context 
Paul distinguishes between Jew and Gentile when he writes of those who sin “apart from 
law” and those who sin “in the law.” This is confirmed in vv. 14–15 when he writes that 
Gentiles are those “not having law.” At the same time, however, God’s judgment is 
impartial and the just or unjust status of all people is determined by one standard.
16
 This 
standard is described as no/moj. On the surface it appears to be the Jewish no/moj to which 
Paul refers.  
In 2:17–29 the argument focuses on claims made by the one who calls himself a 
Jew, the one who possesses the law in its physical form. Here the argument takes an 
interesting turn in light of what Paul had just said. Even though the Jewish nomos is a 
universal standard, Paul acknowledges that the Jew holds an important position because 
of possessing the law. Writing of this Jew, he says: 
17
 But if you are called “Jew” and if you rest upon the law and you boast in God 18 
and you know the will (of God) and you discern things of worth, having been 
                                                             
16
 E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 126; Stowers, Rereading, 138–39; Dunn, 
Romans 1–8, 98–100. 
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instructed from the law, 
19
 being certain to be yourself a guide of the blind, a light 
of those in darkness, 
20
 an educator of the imprudent, a teacher of the immature, 
having the form of knowledge and truth in the law … (Rom. 2:17–20) 
 
Paul recognizes the importance of possessing the law for the Jew. In spite of this, the Jew, 
like the Gentile, is under God’s judgment because of not keeping the commands. Paul 
reiterates a point made earlier, that it is doing the law that matters: 
21
therefore the one teaching the other, do you not teach yourself? The one 
proclaiming do not steal, do you steal? 
22
 The one saying do not commit adultery, 
do you commit adultery? The one detesting idols, do you rob temples? 
23
 You 
who boast in the law, through the transgression of the law you dishonor God, 
24
 
for the name of God is blasphemed on account of you among the Gentiles, just as 
it is written. 
  
In the last section of the argument, Paul reiterates that the uncircumcised non-Jew 
can indeed keep the law, that true “circumcision” is not necessarily contingent on 
possessing the written code, and that circumcision and possession of the law do not 
equate to being “just” (di/kaioj) before God:  
25
 For on the one hand, circumcision benefits if you practice the law; but on the 
other hand if you are a transgressor of the law, your circumcision has become 
uncircumcision. 
26
 Therefore, if the uncircumcised keeps the requirements of the 
law, will not his uncircumcision be considered as circumcision? 
27
 And the 
uncircumcised from nature accomplishing the law will judge you the transgressor 
of the law through the letter and circumcision. 
28
 For it is not the Jew in the visible 
sense and not the circumcision in the visible sense in the flesh, 
29
 but the Jew in 
the inward sense, and the circumcision of heart in spirit not in letter, of whom the 
approval is not from humans but from God. 
 
All of this moves Paul toward his overall point: all people, Gentiles and Jews, are 
accountable to God and will be judged impartially according to the degree to which they 
have followed the one standard of nomos. According to this situation, “no one is just” 
(Rom. 3:19–20).  
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The Issues: The Components of Nomos 
For Paul’s argument to carry any rhetorical weight, the referent of no/moj must be 
consistent throughout the entire argument.
17
 It is most probable that Paul refers to the 
Jewish nomos throughout.
18
 We have no reason to think that Paul shifts from one 
conception of nomos to another as the argument progresses, even in the infamous 
reference in 2:14–15. Nevertheless scholars have struggled to reconcile all of the 
references to nomos in Romans 2 into one understanding or conception of nomos.  
From the train of thought in the argument, we can isolate three interrelated 
components that compose the conception of the Jewish nomos in Romans 2. It is my 
contention that any interpretation of Romans 2 and any explanation of the conception of 
the Jewish nomos in this argument must address and make sense of these three 
components:  
1) it is a universal nomos which applies to both Jews and Gentiles;  
2) Gentiles can do what it says. This raises the question of how the commands of the 
Jewish nomos relate to Gentiles. The key here is that when writing about the “things of 
the law” Gentiles apparently observe, Paul does not discriminate between “Jewish” 
obedience and “Gentile” obedience;  
3) it is a particular and written nomos, the possession of the Jews. In spite of its 
universality, it remains the nomos of the Jewish people. 
                                                             
17
 W. Gutbrod, no&moj, etc., TDNT, 4:1070; H. Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975) 106; Raïsänen, Paul and the Law, 26.   
 
18
 Raïsänen, Paul and the Law, 26; Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 126; Stowers, 
Rereading, 138; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 98–100.  
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There is one final point: Paul relies upon this tripartite conception of nomos. He does not 
explain or justify these three elements; rather, they are taken for granted structural 
components of the conception of nomos in Romans 2. Our goal in this study is to offer a 
satisfactory context that provides a coherent explanation of this complex conception of 
the Jewish nomos, and to understand Paul’s argument in conversation with this. 
 In the next pages I will briefly draw attention to some of the issues and questions 
raised by scholars with regard to each of these components of nomos in Romans 2.  
A Universal Nomos 
The nomos of which Paul writes in Romans 2 functions as a universal standard of 
judgment for all humanity. Paul’s statement in 2:6 that God “will render to each 
according to his deeds” establishes the notion of one equal judgment of all. In vv.12–13 
Paul clarifies that “the doers of the law will be made just.” As noted above, Paul speaks 
of all humanity in these statements and does not offer different standards of judgment – 
different nomoi—for Jews and Gentiles. As Adolf Schlatter put it, “one and the same 
code applies to both parts of humanity without partiality.”19 This universalization of 
nomos is not just a means of condemning Gentiles, as is somewhat common among 
various Jewish writers.
20
 In other words, the application of the nomos to Gentiles is not 
limited to the fact that they are part of the universal humanity who will be judged by the 
standard of the law, but who are in a worse position because they do not possess it. Paul’s 
argument positively relates nomos to all humanity; it is somehow able to be kept by all 
                                                             
19
 Adolf Schlatter, Romans: The Righteousness of God, trans. S. Schatzmann [Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1995] 58.  
 
20
 See Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 114. 
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humanity.
21
 Paul states this clearly when he says that Gentiles can “do the things of the 
law” in 2:14–15, a point repeated in 2:26–27 when Paul challenges any reliance on 
circumcision because Gentiles (“the uncircumcised”!) are able to also keep the law.  
Paul does not specify that Gentiles keep the law perfectly. Nevertheless, all 
humanity is accountable to this nomos and there is no distinction between Jewish and  
Gentile obedience to this one ethical standard.  
Gentiles Can Keep the Law: But What Parts? 
Not only do we find Paul alluding to a general concept of nomos that is at once 
both universal and particular, but he also specifies in the details that Gentiles can keep the 
universalized Jewish law. This surfaces when Paul says in 2:14–15,  
14
 For whenever Gentiles, those not having the law by nature do the things of the 
law (ta_ mh_ no/mon e1xonta fu/sei ta_ tou~ no/mou poiw~sin)22, these not having 
law among themselves are law, 
15
 such ones demonstrating the work of the law 
written in their hearts 
 
What he says in 2:26–27 likewise assumes this:  
26
 Therefore, if the uncircumcised keeps the requirements of the law, will not his 
uncircumcision be considered as circumcision? 
27
 And the uncircumcised from 
nature accomplishing the law will judge you the transgressor of the law through 
the letter and circumcision. 
                                                             
21
 According to H. Lietzmann, vv.14–15 show “nothing other than that the Greeks know the law” 
(“nichts anders, als daβ die Heiden das Gesetz kennen”) (Römer, 41). It is important here to recognize an 
important point made by Stephen Westerholm that Paul does not necessarily come out and say whether or 
not and to what extent there are actually righteous Gentiles (Perspectives Old and New, 270 n.22).  
 
22
 There is a good deal of disagreement over whether the dative fu/sei (“by nature”) modifies 
“those not having the law” (ta_ mh_ no/mon e1xonta) or the verb “do” (poiw~sin). My translation is 
deliberately ambiguous. At this point the issue does not affect our point here about no/moj in any significant 
way. It only speaks to the means by which Paul says that Gentiles “do the things of the law.” However one 
comes down on the issue of the placement of “by nature,” one is still left with the puzzle of Gentiles 
knowing the Jewish nomos without possessing it, and of doing it as Gentiles. This goes to the point about 
whether or not the Gentiles are Christian or non-Christian Gentiles. This issue likewise does not have great 
significance here because the problem of the conception of the Jewish no/moj that allows such keeping of 
the law remains. We will address both points more fully in chapter five. 
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Given that the main referent is the Jewish nomos, it is inevitable to wonder: Is 
Paul referring to the Jewish law in its entirety, or just the Decalogue, or “moral 
commands” when he claims that Gentiles keep the law? Is there a conception of this 
universalized Jewish nomos that enables Paul to fairly hold Gentiles accountable to it?  
What Paul insinuates in these statements goes beyond the issue of a general 
knowledge of God communicated in Romans 1. Paul is writing about knowledge of and 
obedience to nomos, not awareness of the works of God. The language Paul uses to 
describe this varies: in 2:14 he says that they “do the things of the law” (ta_ tou~ no/mou); 
in 2:15 they “demonstrate the work of the law (to_ e1rgon tou~ no/mou) written in their 
hearts”; in 2:26 the “uncircumcised keep the decrees of the law” (ta_ dikaiw/mata tou~ 
no/mou); in 2:27 he writes of “the uncircumcised from nature completing the law” (to_n 
no/moj telou~sa). Nevertheless, we can agree with most commentators that these phrases 
refer generally to the same thing.
23
  
An important element of this is that in these statements Paul claims that Gentiles 
can keep the law as uncircumcised Gentiles (2:14–15, 26–27).24 If these Gentiles “do the 
things of the law” as Gentiles, then what version or understanding of the Jewish nomos is 
                                                             
23
 Bell, No One Seeks, 159; Byrne, Romans, 105; Moo, Romans, 170 n.21; Jeffrey Lamp, “Paul, 
the Law, Jews, and Gentiles: A Contextual and Exegetical Reading of Romans 2:12-16,” JETS 41 (1999) 
46; S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 298. 
 
24
 That Paul takes these points hypothetically cannot be the case, even if Paul may not or would 
not have acknowledged actual Gentile righteousness as some are quick to point out (so Westerholm, 
Perspectives Old and New, 270 n.22). Nevertheless, in vv.26–27 Paul seems to do more than recognize the 
theoretical possibility of non-Jews doing what the law says. If Paul did not consider these points to be 
realities, or assume that his audience would, his argument would not work. Similarly, that Gentiles 
fulfilling the law “are merely a means to an end” (Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 106) does not explain 
sufficiently that Paul assumes this as a reality.  
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operative? Does Paul refer here to some aspect of it? Or has Paul already selected certain 
elements of more importance, but not made it clear to us? (Why should he!) One would 
think that such a statement about Gentiles keeping the law would easily be exposed with 
a simple response, rendering Paul’s arguments ineffective: Paul errs in reducing the law 
to some “moral core,” or Paul simply overlooks key elements of the law, thereby 
misunderstanding it altogether. E.P. Sanders puts the problem very clearly:  
If we take the position that Paul did not compose 2:12–15 de novo, but used 
traditional material, we must admit that we do not know the contents of “the law” 
in the original setting of the passage…The law which Gentiles are to obey, and 
which is ascertainable by nature, cannot be the same as the Torah if one thinks 
concretely and in detail.
25
 
 
Sanders draws attention to the problem very clearly: “the law which Gentiles are to 
obey…cannot be the same as the Torah if one thinks concretely and in detail.” What if 
one thinks of the law otherwise? Is it possible to do so? Throughout Romans 2, nomos is 
consistent. Somehow the “law” that Gentiles keep is the same as the Jewish Torah.  
Scholars have yet to offer a sufficient explanation of how Gentiles keep the 
Jewish nomos. Simple recognition of the universal status of or universal knowledge of the 
Jewish nomos does not adequately explain this. An unnuanced appeal to Greek 
philosophical “law of nature” or “unwritten law” alone does not settle the problem of 
how the particularly Jewish nomos works in the life of the Gentile. We need an 
understanding of how the universality of the particular Jewish law was expressed and 
how the commands of the law were interpreted so that Paul can suggest that Gentiles can 
keep it as Gentiles. How we might the answer this affects how we understand the 
                                                             
25
 E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, 130. (italics mine) 
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particularity of the Jewish nomos. That is, if Paul works with a conception of the Jewish 
nomos that does not require circumcision for Gentiles, what is to be said of this central 
Jewish command and Jewish particularism based in the law? 
A Particular and Written Nomos 
In Romans 2, this nomos is not just a universal nomos; it is also a particular 
written nomos, the possession of a particular people (the Jews). This goes hand-in-hand 
with a division of the world into two groups that Paul also takes for granted—Jews 
( 0Ioudai~oi) and the nations/Gentiles (e1qnh)—expressed in 2:14 and implied in vv. 17–18. 
In other words, this universal nomos is also identified with Jewish customs, history, and 
tradition—all of which separates the Jew from the non-Jew. According to 2:17–24, the 
main section that expresses how this particularity is understood, the distinction to which 
possession of this nomos leads is understood in terms of ethical superiority: through this 
nomos the Jew knows God’s will and, “having the form of knowledge and truth in the 
law,” is a “guide to the blind, a light to those in darkness, educator of fools, teacher of 
infants” (2:17–20).26  
The emphasis Paul places on the written form of nomos plays a significant role in 
Paul’s argument, whether implied or explicitly stated as in 2:27. The written nature of the 
Jewish nomos was patently clear to all Jews and Gentiles. In 2:12 when Paul speaks of 
those “without the law” (a!nomoj) and those “in the law” (e0n no/mw|), it is not that Paul 
naively thinks Gentiles have no law at all. This claim would be ridiculous, especially 
                                                             
26
 The grammar of the sentence draws attention to the importance of the law. First, no/moj is used 
three times in vv.17–20. Second, the main clauses in both v.18 and in vv.19–20 have participial clauses 
with no/moj as the source of knowledge of the will of God and as that which has the form of knowledge and 
truth. See also B. Byrne, Romans, 97.  
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writing to Rome. Rather, the point seems to be more complex: Gentiles do not possess 
this particular yet universal no/moj in written form, whereas Jews do. Somehow this 
means that Gentiles are “law-less” (a!nomoj).27 In 2:27 Paul draws explicit attention to 
the written form of the nomos when he makes the point that the “uncircumcised” (Gentile) 
who keeps the law will judge the Jew who, possessing the “letter” transgresses it. In other 
words, it seems that no/moj is known in two ways. There are not two nomoi, but ultimately 
one nomos available and applicable to both Jews and Gentiles.  
This juxtaposition of the Jewish nomos as both universal and particular has been a 
point of question for some time. Stephen Westerholm puzzles over it when he writes, “in 
certain passages Paul maintains that the law was a peculiar gift to Israel, in others its 
domain appears to be universal. How are we to account for the inconsistency?”28 Heikki 
Räisänen draws out this point with regard to Galatians 2 and 3, but his comments apply 
equally to Romans 2. He suggests that  
Paul is thus tacitly operating with a double concept of ‘law’…(o)ne cannot avoid 
noticing ‘a strange oscillation of the concept of law in Paul’ – an oscillation 
between the notion of an historical and particularist Torah and that of a general 
universal force.
29
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
27
 Walter Gutbrod made a similar point in his article on no/moj: “So far as Paul was aware, there 
was no people which did not have a law (no/moj) of some kind.” It is that Gentiles “do not know the 
specific law of the OT” (TDNT, 4:1070). We should add, Gentiles do not know the specific law “in its 
written manifestation.” In this regard, the connection between not possessing the Jewish no/moj and being 
a2nomoj is very striking and will be explored later. 
 
28
 Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New, 412. 
 
29
 Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 18–23; quote from p.21. 
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An Already Existing Perspective on the Jewish Nomos 
The problem is not just that these three components are individually difficult to 
explain. Significant questions arise when they are set in relation to each other. Yet these 
components must be understood and explained collectively—as components of a coherent 
conception of the Jewish nomos. There is no sense that Paul is putting forth a multiplicity 
of statements about the Jewish nomos fittingly applied to the individual points Paul wants 
to make; that all three components are loosely related claims about the Jewish nomos.
30
 
In addition, the conception of nomos is not entirely sui generis; the conception of nomos 
is not the product of Paul’s creative mind. Paul makes these statements about nomos in 
such a way that requires no explanation; Paul assumes his readership understands him. As 
Neil Elliott states, Paul relies upon the statements he makes:  
Paul apparently expects this argument to be intelligible to his audience. He does 
not explain how, or whether Gentiles may be found who ‘do the things of the 
Law’, nor does he justify the claim that Gentiles who ‘by nature’ do the things of 
the Law show that they have the ‘work of the Law written in their hearts’. He 
does not treat any of these propositions as if they were controversial. Rather he 
relies upon them, and on the axiom in 2:11, to support the principle embodied in 
his indictment (2:1–6): No one is exempt from God’s judgment.31 
 
                                                             
30
 One objection to the main inquiry of this study is that Paul is not concerned with providing a 
full understanding of how Gentiles can keep the law, but rather to make the point that they keep the law in 
some way. Further, Paul does not emphasize the details of how Gentiles keep the law, but remains 
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Succinctly put, we need to establish a coherent conception of the Jewish nomos of which 
both Paul and his readers are aware; one that is part of a larger dialogue or web of 
discourse, which Paul works with in his argument.   
Excursus: Two Interpretive Problems in Romans 2:14 
Before going on, two key elements of Romans 2, raised in verse 14, need to be 
addressed: 1) the question of who keeps this nomos – Gentiles or Gentile Christians, 
and 2) the question of the means by which it is kept—fu/sei, “by nature,” or not. 
These have both been weighty issues of interpretation in Romans 2. While we will 
address these points more fully in chapter five, a few things should be said at this 
point.  
With regard to the first issue, one might think that the trend is to agree that 
Paul is writing about non-Christian Gentiles. But the actual work being produced by 
scholars recently suggests otherwise. There exist a number of scholars to argue that 
Paul is writing about Gentile Christians.
32
 It is important to note that there is not one 
particular stance on this issue that corresponds completely with interpretations that 
argue for use of Greco-Roman “law of nature” or those that argue against it. While it 
is true that the dominant tendency of those who argue for use of “law of nature” seem 
to also agree that Paul is writing about Gentiles, there are a number of interpreters 
who argue against any use of “law of nature” who agree that Paul is talking about 
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 Cf. C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 155–56; N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” in Paul and 
the Mosaic Law, 131–50; S. Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2:14–15 
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Gentiles and not Gentile Christians.
33
 In one respect, one’s position on this 
interpretive issue avails little in understanding the nature of the nomos to which Paul 
refers. Simon Gathercole, for example, supports the view that Paul is referring to 
Gentile Christians. He comments, “(t)he Gentile-Christian interpretation of these 
verses…sees the Gentiles who carry out the Torah as Christian believers, and thus to 
be justified on the final day.”34 For an interpretation such as Gathercole’s the 
unanswered question remains: what “law” do these Gentile Christians keep? Do 
these Gentiles (Christian or not) carry out the entire Torah, or just some of it? What 
conception of the Jewish nomos helps explain this? 
The second issue, about the placement of the Greek fu/sei, “by nature,” has 
been equally problematic. For the most part, scholars who argue that this modifies the 
verb poiw~sin (“they do [the law] by nature”) also argue that Paul makes use of the 
Greco-Roman concept of “law of nature,” or those who argue against any use of the 
Greco-Roman concept tend to also argue that fu/sei modifies ta_ mh no/moj e!xonta 
(“those not having the law by nature”). But, neither of these are necessary positions.35 
While this is a very important point of interpretation, one’s stance on this point does 
not solve the problems of the understanding of no/moj in Romans 2. Whether the 
people in Romans 2 “do not have the law by nature,” or whether they “do the things 
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of the law by nature,” the question still remains: what law is Paul talking about? At 
the root of Paul’s argument is the claim that some Gentiles who do not possess the 
Jewish law still do what it says; how they do this is secondary to understanding the 
nature of the nomos to which Paul refers.  
Previous Attempts at Explaining Nomos 
Our task is to identify the larger web of discourse that supplies a coherent 
conception of the Jewish nomos that may have been familiar to both Paul and his readers 
in Rome, a conception of nomos that sufficiently explains the three components that 
compose the understanding of nomos in Romans 2. While numerous articles exist on 
Romans 2, and while some of these address pieces of the puzzle of nomos outlined above 
(some to a greater degree than others), there currently exists no full study devoted to 
offering a context that sufficiently explains nomos in Romans 2.  
To set the context for how nomos in Romans 2 has been understood in prior 
scholarship, and to see where and why more work needs to be done, we will survey main 
lines of interpretation. In the following survey, I will focus on how scholars have 
attempted to account for the three components of nomos in Romans 2 and what context or 
“web of discourse” they have offered to explain the conception of nomos. Because the 
primary identifiable referent of no/moj in Romans 2 is the Jewish nomos, I will focus on 
those scholars who attempt to explain nomos in relation to already existing Jewish 
perspectives. Specifically we want to see how scholars explain how the particular, written 
Jewish nomos can be universalized, and how they explain the “things of the law” that 
Gentiles apparently keep. Do scholars offer a coherent perspective of the Jewish nomos 
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that fully accounts for these components, and that may have been known and used by 
Jews? 
This review will not be exhaustive, but will attempt to isolate basic trends by 
highlighting important interpretations. Among previous attempts, we can identify three 
main contexts that scholars have emphasized in their attempts to explain Paul’s 
conception of nomos: 1) the context of Jewish appropriation of Greco-Roman concepts of 
nomos; 2) the context of Jewish wisdom traditions which associate nomos with sophia 
(wisdom); 3) a general Jewish context that emphasizes neither appropriations of Greco-
Roman concepts of nomos, nor the law-wisdom context. It will become clear that these 
lines of categorization are more like dashed lines than solid lines, and that scholars who 
emphasize one context also sometimes and to varying degrees include elements of 
another. As we shall see, this is part of the problem. 
Jewish Appropriation of Greco-Roman Concepts of no&moj 
In this line of interpretation, the emphasis lies on understanding nomos within a 
larger cultural dialogue in which Jewish writers attempted to explain the Jewish nomos 
by relating it to Greco-Roman conceptions of nomos, most notably “natural law” or “law 
of nature.” There is no shortage of those who have drawn attention to the Greco-Roman 
concept of “natural law” in relation to Romans 2:14–15. These scholars understand that 
in Rom. 2:14 Paul writes of Gentiles who “by nature do the things of the law,” and that 
they “show the work of the law written on their hearts.” In addition the language of 
“conscience” is seen to allude to Stoic philosophical discourses related to the idea of 
“natural law” and the corresponding idea of the “wise man” who follows this universal 
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and transcendent law inherently.
36
 On the positive side, this sort of interpretation draws 
attention to the importance of the Greco-Roman context for understanding Paul’s 
statements about nomos in Romans 2. There is no doubt that Paul is drawing on concepts 
and language common to Greco-Roman ethical and philosophical discourse. The problem, 
however, is that these interpretations do not really address nomos as a whole in Romans 2, 
nor do they address in any developed manner how Jews would have understood their 
nomos in relation to this context.
37
 In contrast, our concern is not with Paul’s use of 
Greco-Roman concepts alone, but with identifying Jewish articulations of the Jewish 
nomos that can help us make sense of the nomos in Romans 2.  
C.K. Barrett 
In his 1957 commentary on Romans C.K. Barrett writes that in the universalizing 
statements, primarily in 2:14–15, Paul draws on Hellenistic-Jewish conceptions wherein 
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Hellenistic-Jewish writers adopted the Stoic concept of “natural law.”38 Barrett mentions 
the ancient distinction between “nature” (fu&sij) and no/moj—“nature” being the “inward 
nature of things” and no/moj being convention – and the Stoic development within this 
context which “taught that true law was rooted in nature.”39 In this environment, Barrett 
states, “the Jews had come to believe that their law was the ground and means of creation, 
so that the Hellenistic synagogue was able to adopt the Stoic doctrine of ‘natural law,’ 
with the further proposition that their (revealed) law was the supreme expression of 
natural law.”40 While Barrett references the rabbinic Pirke Aboth 3.15, the clearest 
expression comes from Philo of Alexandria, specifically De Opificio Mundi 3:  
The world (ko/smoj) is in harmony with the law (no/moj), and the law with the 
world, and…the man who observes the law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen 
of the world (kosmopoli&thj), regulating his days by the purpose and will of 
nature (fu/sij), in accordance with which the entire world itself also is 
administered. 
 
Barrett also mentions Philo’s argument that the patriarchs were “living laws” who 
followed the divine law before it was given in written form (De Abrahamo, 5).
41
 Barrett 
concludes, “it can scarcely be doubted that this Stoic-Jewish use of nature was in Paul’s 
mind, though he makes of it something different from what Philo made of it.”42   
For Barrett, the “things of the law” which Gentiles keep are “not the detailed 
precepts of the Mosaic code.” Yet, Paul “never distinguishes between ‘ritual law’ and 
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‘moral law’” either.43 Rather, the “things of the law” refers to “believing obedience.”44 
Commenting on the obedience of the Gentile in 2:27, he acknowledges that “it is possible 
to neglect so weighty a command as circumcision—and fulfill the law.” To explain this 
he writes, “this is not Rabbinic Judaism, or any other orthodox kind of Judaism.” Rather, 
it seems to be just Paul’s radical new understanding.45 Barret’s Stoic-Jewish context 
gives us a starting point, but we lack a fuller understanding of the points of connection 
between the Jewish nomos and “natural law” arguments. This context is also not 
developed enough to explain how it would have made practical sense with regard to how 
uncircumcised Gentiles can be said to keep the law. Moreover, there is no clear 
explanation as to how this understanding related to Jewish claims to superiority based in 
the law. 
E.R. Goodenough 
Before his death in 1965, Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough had written the majority 
of an essay titled “Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity.”46 With this essay he began 
to turn his sights toward Paul and early Christianity after a long career of working with 
Philo and “Hellenistic” Judaism. Goodenough garners an understanding of the Jewish law 
in Romans 2 via Philo who, according to Goodenough, exemplifies Hellenistic 
Judaism—the Judaism which Paul knew. Though Goodenough’s essay on Romans 
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appeared in the 1960s, he thoroughly articulated an understanding of the law in 
Hellenistic Judaism thirty years prior in his book, By Light, Light.
47
 Because of the 
crucial importance of Goodenough’s book for understanding the view of the Jewish 
nomos that “is carried over directly” into Paul’s writing,48 we will spend a brief time 
sketching the main lines of the conception of nomos held by Hellenistic Jews that is 
articulated in this book.
49
  
One of the main points of the book is to show how “Hellenistic” (Diaspora) 
Judaism by the time of Philo had become a “mystery.” He means by this that Judaism had 
participated in a larger tradition in the Hellenistic world in which rationalistic concepts of 
ancient Greek religious and philosophical traditions blended with Oriental mysteries, and 
the Oriental religious traditions adopted Greek philosophical language and concepts. This 
led to the transformation of the central goal of both of these traditions, expressed as “the 
path to Reality, Existence, Knowledge, Life, of which Isis or Attis (or Zeus, etc.) is the 
symbol.”50 For Goodenough, Judaism transformed by means of expressing itself in terms 
of this goal. The Jewish nomos, within this general framework, is understood in terms of 
its relationship to physis (fu&sij) and logos (lo&goj), which were identified with true 
reality and meaning. Philo, the main voice of Jewish engagement with this context, gave 
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significance to the Jewish nomos in the Platonist and Pythagorean manner according to 
which “written law (as) only a reflection or image of the Idea-law.”51 Within the larger 
mystical framework, “as one goes up in the mystic flight, he learns that the written laws 
are not for him.”52 Nomos is a means by which the individual progresses toward his 
mystic goal of union with the One.  
Drawing on this context, nomos in Romans 2 has “two meanings”—the Jewish 
law and the natural law. Goodenough paraphrases 2:14–15 saying, “when the gentiles do 
by nature what the Jewish law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do 
not have the Jewish law. For what the universal law requires is written on their 
hearts…”53 He goes on, “clearly a gentile never had the Jewish law, the Mosaic code, 
“written in his heart,” but a few righteous gentiles have known the natural law, the real 
law…and have obeyed it.”54 The Jewish law exists “in addition to” the natural law and its 
commands point to or reflect natural law.
55
 Concerning the statements in 2:27–29 
Goodenough writes, “clearly there are two laws, the law of the spirit and the law of the 
letter, i.e. the law written down, the law in nouns and verbs.”56 For Goodenough, Paul is 
writing about “natural law” in these statements, which it is somehow related to the Jewish 
nomos. But it is not the Jewish nomos itself which is claimed to be universal. 
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In this interpretation the ethical element takes a back seat to the mystic element. 
While there is a clear relationship between Jewish nomos and “natural law,” 
Goodenough’s interpretation does not clearly address what the “the things of the law” are 
and how they relate to this mystical conception of the law. Goodenough implies that there 
is some relationship to the Decalogue and to the way in which Philo allegorized the 
Jewish law to relate to “higher principles of morality.”57 But how this connection is made 
and whether it is something known to Paul or his audience is not clear. 
For Goodenough the Jewish nomos remains a thoroughly particular nomos, but 
finds its significance in its relationship with “natural law.” The Jewish law was the 
revealed version, or “incarnation” of this true nomos.58 The patriarchs of Judaism, by 
living righteous lives, “revealed the higher law directly and before there was any written 
code.”59 By drawing on a Platonic framework, Philo asserted that the Jewish law revealed 
through Moses was the truest revelation of the law of nature. He writes: 
According to Philo, the great advantage of the Jew with his Jewish tradition and 
scripture was not that the letter of the law was revealed to him, but that Moses, the 
supreme incarnation of the law, had made verbal the true law and that the Jew had 
access to it in the persons of the great patriarchs.
60
  
 
Since it is only in the Jewish nomos that the natural law is concretely revealed, the Jew 
could legitimately claim in some way that through the Jewish nomos, he is a teacher to 
the world, “a light for those in darkness.” Concerning 2:17–24 Goodenough writes: “in 
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addition to this natural law available to all men, the Jews have had the Jewish law, which 
is a wonderful revelation but which they have not kept (vs. 12f., 17ff.).”61  
 The problem with Goodenough’s interpretation is two-fold. First, it is not 
necessarily the case that Goodenough’s Greek mystery framework was the only context 
by which to understand nomos in the ancient world. Such a mystical discourse probably 
existed in the Greco-Roman world, and perhaps Diaspora Jews did draw on this. The 
pervasiveness of this, however, is probably overstated. Second, Goodenough’s treatment 
of Diaspora Judaism revolves around Goodenough’s interpretation of Philo. 
Goodenoughs’ investigation of other Jewish writers is determined by the terms of Philo’s 
engagement with this context; they are discussed on their own terms. As one reviewer of 
the book wrote about Goodenough’s discussion of other Jewish writers, “(t)hese writers 
are not allowed to speak freely for themselves, but are closely categorized for testimony 
for or against the mysticizing interpretations of Philo. Where that testimony is not clear 
or considerable, the author sometimes proceeds to argue from silence.”62 The question, 
then, is whether non-Philonic Jewish literature interprets the Jewish law using 
frameworks other than Goodenough’s mystery framework. Also at issue is whether 
Romans 2 reflects an engagement with Goodenough’s Philonic-mystery context or with 
something else. Paul never seems to allegorize the commands of the law in the way that 
Philo does, and Paul’s argument doesn’t seem to presume two different nomoi—“natural 
law” and the Jewish nomos as Goodenough claims. While Goodenough offers a thorough 
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construction of a framework according to which we can understand Diaspora Jewish 
articulations of the law, it is not entirely satisfying. 
Ulrich Wilckens 
 Ulrich Wilckens was one of the first to write a multi-volume commentary on 
Romans.
63
 For Wilckens, nomos in Romans 2 is the Jewish law which stands as the 
measure for judgment of both Jews and Gentiles.
64
 Paul confronts the Jew with the real 
possibility that “Gentiles do by nature what the law demands.”65 To explain how Paul 
reached this possibility of Gentile obedience, Wilckens draws attention to the Greco-
Roman no/moj-fu/sij contrast and, like Barrett, points to Philo’s adaptation of the Greek 
association of nomos with physis. According to Wilckens, Philo adapted the concept of 
living in accordance with the universe by merging the Stoic fu/sij with the Jewish God, 
which allowed him to equate the Jewish law with the Greek universal no/moj.66 The result 
of this is that the guidelines of the “law of nature” are of “identical content with the 
commands of the Torah, but are accessible to all people through reason, so that the law-
abiding Jew is identical with the Stoic world-citizen because both align their actions with 
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the will of nature.”67 According to Wilckens Paul says “the same thing of Gentiles” and 
of the law in Romans 2.
68
  
There does not seem to be any clear sifting of what of the Jewish law actually 
applies to Gentiles in Wilckens’ interpretation. On more than one occasion he 
communicates that the things of “nature,” or the morality known via the Greek concept of 
natural law, are “identical” (“identisch”) with the commands of the Torah.69 But 
Wilckens avoids pursuing more precision noting that “it is of no concern to Paul…to 
identify the concrete fulfillment of the law on the part of the Gentiles.”70  
In his interpretation, Wilckens appeals to a similar context as Barrett and 
Goodenough. Yet he diverges from Barrett and Goodenough on a few points. First, the 
Greco-Roman context within which Philo (and “Hellenistic Judaism”) understood the 
Jewish nomos is not that of Goodenough’s mystical religious environment, and more like 
Barrett’s suggestion. Unlike Barrett, however, Wilckens does  not make a reference to 
creation. Second, according to Wilckens Philo associates the Jewish law with natural law. 
There is no sense of “two laws” here, unlike Goodenough. Wilckens adds the possibility 
of the role of the context of Jewish wisdom speculation about the law, but if and how this 
may be part of the same context as Philo’s adaptation of “natural law” is not spelled out. 
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Finally, Wilckens, unlike Barrett and Goodenough, suggests that the commands of the 
Jewish nomos were “identical” with “natural law.” This association, if it is correct, 
requires more explanation, especially since uncircumcised Gentiles keep “the 
requirement of the law.”  
Thomas Tobin 
Thomas Tobin continues this tradition of associating the Jewish law with Greco-
Roman concepts.
71
 Furthermore, he constructs a Jewish framework of thought within 
which to situate Paul’s understanding of nomos. According to Tobin, Paul’s audience 
consisted of a community rooted in the Diaspora synagogue in Rome, and “Hellenistic 
Jewish thought” in general.72 Describing Hellenistic Jewish thought, Tobin writes that 
there was  
a widely known and long-standing distinction made…between the ethical 
commandments of the law, on the one hand, and all other regulations, on the other, 
especially dietary and purity regulations of the law. The purpose of this 
distinction for Hellenistic Jewish writers was to emphasize the superior ethical 
standards of the Mosaic law in comparison with the laws of other peoples. While 
Jews were still to observe these other regulations of the law, their observance was 
not because of their inherent value. Rather, their observance was to be maintained 
because they pointed to or symbolized some significant ethical value.
73
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In his interpretation of Romans 2, Tobin asks important questions, the second of 
which seems to question Goodenough’s interpretation that there are “two laws”:  
how can those “without the law,” that is, Gentiles, do by nature what the Law 
requires and even have the reality of the Law written in their hearts? Is he using 
the term “law” in two very different senses, one in the sense of the Mosaic law 
and the other in the sense of some sort of “natural law?74  
 
To answer these questions Tobin draws on Hellenistic Jewish thought such as that 
he describes and draws attention to “some strands of Hellenistic Judaism,”75 primarily 
Philo for whom “the law was explicitly revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai,” but “was 
also reflected in the structures of the universe.”76 Consequently, Philo identified the 
Mosaic law with Greco-Roman concept “the law of the world” and the “law or laws of 
nature.”77 According to Tobin, and similar to Wilckens, “the two laws (the Jewish nomos 
and the “law of nature”) are ultimately identical.”78 Because of this, (Jews like) Philo can 
say that there are people who “apart from the explicit commandments of the Mosaic 
law…are nevertheless “embodied law” (no/moj e1myuxoj) by their observing “unwritten 
laws” (no/moi a!grafoi).79  
Tobin’s interpretation does not dwell on how the details of the Jewish nomos 
might apply to Gentiles. And while he suggests that Hellenistic Jews emphasized the 
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ethical commands, how these applied to Gentiles is not developed in any detail. Tobin’s 
overall interpretation draws on a framework similar to that described by other scholars 
such as John Collins, who writes of a “common ethic” in Diaspora Judaism.80 He also 
stands in line with Barrett and Wilckens. At the same time, Tobin brings in concepts 
other than just “law of nature” which causes one to wonder about the relationship. Tobin 
also says that the Mosaic law is “identical” to law of nature. This appears to be saying the 
same thing as Wilckens. Wilckens, however, says that the “commands” are “identical.” 
This raises a question of whether Second Temple Jews, like Philo, were asserting that the 
Jewish law was identical to forms of Greek nomos in nature or intent, or in the details of 
the commands themselves. This is a distinction worth noting, and one in need of 
clarification with regard to what the Jewish writers were saying about the Jewish noms. 
In other words, there are still details that need further explanation as far as how Jews 
might have articulated the relationship between the Jewish nomos and Greek concepts of 
nomos.  
Douglas Moo 
With Douglas Moo we encounter a different sort of complexity in understanding 
how Paul refers to nomos. Initially Moo states in his commentary that Paul uses no/moj to 
refer to the Mosaic law in Romans 2.
81
 When Moo comments on how the law is 
universally known in vv.14–15, however, nomos becomes “law in the generic sense” 
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related to the “God’s moral demands.”82 Initially this appears to be distinct from the 
Mosaic law, though it is not clear how.
83
 Helpfully, Moo develops his thought, writing 
that Paul is making use of “a widespread Greek tradition…that all human beings possess 
an “unwritten” or “natural” law—an innate moral sense of “right and wrong.”84 In a 
footnote he expands, noting that “Hellenistic Jews, like Philo, used (“natural law” or 
“unwritten law”) to demonstrate the universal applicability of the Mosaic “moral” 
standards.”85 Like these Jews, Paul uses the Greek idea in conjunction with an 
understanding of the Mosaic law, but without “the philosophical baggage that 
accompanied the conception…in an untechnical way.”86  
The “things of the law” for Moo are “those requirements of the Mosaic law that 
God has made universally available to human beings in their very constitution.” This 
includes things like obedience to parents, refraining from murder and robbery.
87
 But, 
when he comments on vv.26–27 which is about the uncircumcised person obeying the 
law, no/moj refers to the Mosaic law as a whole with no clear sense of such distinctions.88 
Concerning the statements in vv.17–24, Moo writes that everything Paul says of the Jew 
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and the law “can be paralleled in Jewish literature of the time”89 and more particularly, 
“Paul’s description (of the Jew and the role of the law in 2:17–20) uses language drawn 
particularly from Jewish propaganda directed to the Hellenistic world”—particularly 
Paul’s Diaspora context.90 The law elevated the Jewish people in the Gentile world in a 
way not unlike Sibylline Oracles 3:194–95.91   
Moo’s interpretation provides a good example of how potentially confusing it can 
be to explain nomos in Romans 2. Moo carries the torch of previous scholars: Paul uses 
conceptions like those in Judaism where the Jewish law is associated with Greek 
conceptions. Differently, however, Moo does not focus only on “law of nature.” Moo 
raises also the question of how philosophically technical Paul’s conception of nomos was, 
perhaps distancing Paul from dependency on his Greek environment. Yet, one wonders: 
does the conception of nomos used by Paul in Romans 2 reflect a good degree of 
philosophical sophistication, or is such correspondence with more robust philosophical 
understandings minimal? Moo suggests the possibility of more than just “law of nature,” 
but it is not clear how different Greek conceptions are related and whether this affects 
Jewish understandings of the law. Moo does push in the direction of trying to describe 
“the things of the law” by suggesting some general commands that Gentiles keep. This is 
intriguing, but Moo does not strongly develop the relationship of this to the ways in 
which Jews universalized their law.    
 
                                                             
89
 Ibid., 159.  
 
90
 Ibid., 162.  
 
91
 Ibid., 162. 
 
   37 
 
Conclusion  
We have seen how the context of Jewish appropriation of Greco-Roman concepts 
of nomos has been offered by important interpreters to explain nomos in Romans 2. 
Positively, these interpreters reckon seriously with the ways in which Jews adapted 
Greco-Roman language and concepts, and heartily engaged in the larger Greco-Roman 
discourse. There is a need for further clarification, however. 
 First, explanations of how Jews universalized the law are diverse in that thery 
reflect more than one way to explain the relationship between the Jewish nomos and 
Greco-Roman conceptions. Questions arise: Is the connection being made between the 
Jewish nomos and “law of nature,” or some other Greco-Roman concept (“unwritten 
law”)? Is there a difference between these Greek concepts, and might this difference 
affect how the Jewish law is understood? Furthermore more clarity is needed with regard 
to how the Jewish nomos related to Greco-Roman concepts. Is the Jewish nomos was 
“identical” with law of nature? Or do Diaspora Jews see any distinction between the 
Jewish nomos and Greek concepts, as Moo suggests? What is the distinction and how 
does it affect interpretations of the law?  
Second, the above interpreters do not give a clear description of what parts of the 
Jewish nomos Gentiles were expected to keep and why, even though this is a significant 
part of the conception of the law in Romans 2. One assumption seems to be that “the 
things of the law” are something similar to the expectations of “natural law.” This needs 
more explanation, however. How do the particular commands of the Jewish law relate to 
the expectations of “law of nature” or other conceptions of Greco-Roman “higher law”? 
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This is particularly important, since most of these conceptions lacked any clear 
“commands.” Moo represents one interpretive move that isolates the Decalogue, but he 
gives no clear explanation as to whether or how Jews might have come to this 
understanding of the commands of the law. Other scholars, however, would not agree 
with such a separation of the Decalogue. C.K. Barrett’s claim that Paul does not 
distinguish between moral and ritual law is one example.
92
 This all suggests a need for 
closer investigation of how Jewish writers articulated these expectations for Gentiles in 
relationship to the ways in which they also universalized the Jewish nomos.  
A third problem is that while these interpreters isolate Diaspora Judaism as the 
context for understanding, in reality Philo is the main voice used to express the 
universality of the Jewish nomos. This reliance on Philo as the main voice that explains 
the universality of the Jewish nomos is problematic. With regard to how this might affect 
our understanding of Romans 2, we might ask whether did Philo’s particular 
understanding of the law influenced Paul. Philo wrote not very long before Paul.
93
 While 
it is not inconceivable that Paul knew of Philo, it is highly unlikely, and probably the 
above scholars would agree. Some of the scholars above would probably suggest that 
Philo is exemplary of certain interpretive moves that were more common among 
Diaspora Jews. This requires more investigation, however. If Philo’s interpretations of 
the Jewish nomos are to be of value, then we need to be sure that Philo was not an 
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anomaly, that his associations of the law with “law of nature” are more common to 
Diaspora Judaism. We know that other “Hellenistic” Jewish writers interpreted the law in 
ways similar to Philo, but more needs to be said on this point. We must be cautious of 
turning Philo into a representative of Diaspora Jewish thought.
94
 If there are other Jewish 
writers who related the Jewish nomos to “natural law” or “unwritten law,” closer 
investigation of how they did so would be fruitful. Such an investigation seems to be 
needed if we are to understand more clearly the nature of the Jewish explanations of the 
law that Paul engages.   
Jewish Wisdom Traditions 
Another way many scholars have explained the conception of nomos in Romans 2 
is through appeal to Jewish wisdom speculation. According to this context, as explained 
by these scholars, Jewish writers associated the Torah with wisdom (sophia), sometimes 
connecting it with God’s creative wisdom or with wisdom present at creation. Through 
this connection Jewish writers could give the law universal status and thus make Gentiles 
accountable to it because the law is part of the foundations of the world. Several of these 
scholars attempt to emphasize this wisdom context apart from Jewish use of Greco-
Roman concepts of “natural law” or “unwritten law.” This context provides a helpful 
balance because these scholars largely emphasize non-Philonic Jewish writings. At times, 
however, this goes along with various levels of opposition to any use of Greco-Roman 
conceptions of nomos.  
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Eckhard Schnabel 
Eckhard Schnabel’s thorough study, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul, 
stands as a significant work and thus a good starting point.
95
 Schnabel’s objective is to 
investigate associations of law (no/moj) and wisdom (sofi/a) in Second Temple Judaism 
and draw out important lines of thought that developed throughout Second Temple 
Judaism with regard to the connection between law and wisdom. His investigation begins 
with associations of law and wisdom found in Ben Sira, dividing Jewish literature into 
Palestinian, Diaspora, and post-70 C.E. categories. At the end he concludes that each of 
the writers shows a development of the association that began in a new way with Ben 
Sira
96
 and that “the identification of law and wisdom, which had been carried through 
most explicitly by Ben Sira was known, presupposed, implied, and stated explicitly” by a 
number of Second Temple Jewish writers.
97
  
According to Schnabel, Romans 2:17–20 gives us “a clear proof that Paul was 
familiar with, and prepared to apply, the correlation of law and wisdom” common to 
Judaism.
98
 According to Schnabel these verses represent “the only explicit occurrence of 
this correlation in the Pauline corpus.”99 There are particular statements Schnabel 
emphasizes: that in the law the Jew possesses “the form of knowledge and truth” (2:20), 
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and that the Jew, because of the law, is “the Torah teacher of the non-Jewish world” and 
“a light to those in darkness.”100 Were one to press and ask how Paul construes the 
relationship between wisdom and law Paul in Romans 2, a clear answer would not follow. 
This uncertainty emerges when Schnabel, commenting on the universality of the Jewish 
law in Romans 2:14–15 writes, “we do not know exactly in what matter Paul shared this 
view” (of Torah as a “cosmic and creational principle…as a result of its correlation with 
wisdom”).101  Schnabel acknowledges that “Paul knew of the reality of a no/moj 
a1grafoj or no/moj fu/sewj among the pagans (Rom. 2:14–15),” but this is not really 
brought into conversation with the association of law and wisdom.
102
 In spite of this, 
Schnabel goes on to state that the wisdom tradition provides the explanation of a “norm 
of behavior” to which non-Jews are bound: “as the normative, divinely revealed Torah 
found expressions in the orders of the world and in the orders of intact life—resulting 
from the fact that the Torah is identical with (divine, cosmic, and ethical) wisdom—these 
orders are also, essentially normative.”103  
Schnabel’s interpretation does not explain “the things of the law”—what they are 
or how this wisdom-law interpretation might help us understand this. But, from what 
Schnabel offers, we can infer that all of the Jewish law would have been binding on non-
Jews. This appears to be different than what Paul suggests in Romans 2, and certainly 
different than the suggestions of Wilckens, Tobin, and Moo above.   
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Schnabel gives us one of the more thorough discussions of the ways in which 
Jewish writers associated law and wisdom, and as such it provides a thick context within 
which to understand nomos in Romans 2. One of the main problems with his construction 
of the Jewish framework, however, is that the Jewish book Ben Sira is the chronological 
and analytical starting point of Schnabel’s analysis. It functions as the primary keystone 
that determines what wisdom language is in later books, and it also sets the framework 
for how he identifies a wisdom-law correlation. In fact, Schnabel rules Philo out of his 
investigation on the grounds that Philo’s correlation of law and wisdom is different than 
Ben Sira’s.104 This is problematic, however, and raises the issue of why and how 
Schnabel can determine that books like Aristeas or 4 Maccabees or Wisdom of Solomon 
are sufficiently different from Philo and like Ben Sira so as to warrant their inclusion.
105
 
Moreover, Schnabel’s use of Ben Sira is not unlike Goodenough’s emphasis use of Philo 
to construct a Jewish view of the law. Whereas in Goodenough’s work Philo determined 
the nature of the ways that the Jewish nomos was conceived, with Schnabel the book Ben 
Sira sets many of the parameters of the ways to describe the “identification” or 
“correlation” of law and wisdom. 
In his work Schnabel sets up two basic trajectories of thought that stem from Ben 
Sira’s association of law and wisdom—Palestinian and Alexandrian. But more needs to 
be said. We may see the problem particularly by addressing his treatments of Aristeas 
and 4 Maccabees. Concerning Aristeas he writes that “the identification of law and 
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wisdom which was taught and presupposed in the Palestinian wisdom and scribal schools 
had started to exert a significant influence in Alexandria too.”106 With Aristeas, Schnabel 
does not really address in any fullness the very real possibility that the concepts and 
language concerning law and wisdom in Aristeas come equally, if not more, from Greco-
Roman philosophy, and not Ben Sira’s circle.107 In his treatment of 4 Maccabees, 
Schnabel states that the law-wisdom connection makes use of both Palestinian and 
Alexandrian streams of thought.
108
 He is able to do this in part by leaving the provenance 
of 4 Maccabees ambiguous—it could equally be either Antioch or Alexandria. But, very 
few scholars seriously entertain the suggestion that it was written in Alexandria.
109
 
Whether or not one accepts a provenance other than Alexandria, however, the 
interpretation of the law in 4 Maccabees is different enough from Aristeas to suggest that 
4 Maccabees was engaged with voices other than Alexandrian or Palestinian associations 
of law and wisdom. With both Aristeas and 4 Maccabees we have examples where more 
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needs to be said in order to be clear on how these Jewish writers understood the Jewish 
law in relation to wisdom, and this affects how we understand the sort of perspective on 
nomos that undergirds Romans 2. Part of this problem is that it is difficult to think that 
many of the Jewish writers did not engage with, and even make competent use of Greco-
Roman concepts and language while also correlating law with wisdom. Schnabel’s 
analysis does not really clarify this integration, but given the previous group of 
interpreters, it is difficult to avoid this concern.  
Peter Stuhlmacher 
 Continuing the Torah-wisdom interpretation is German scholar Peter Stuhlmacher 
in his commentary on Romans.
110
 Stuhlmacher writes that “the main thoughts of the text 
(of Rom. 2:12–16) have been prepared for by Jewish tradition.”111 He refers specifically 
to “the equation already known to us of the creative word, wisdom, and the law” by 
which “early Judaism accepted the philosophical thesis of the Stoics that the truly wise 
person has no need of any written Law when he or she follows the unwritten Law of 
nature, which rules through reason.”112 With this Jewish context in mind, Stuhlmacher 
writes of the Gentiles in Romans 2 that “by virtue of their having been created according 
to the standard of wisdom (which according to Sirach 24:23ff. is manifest in the Law), 
they themselves can by all means declare what is good and evil.”113 In other words, they 
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know the law of God well enough to keep it or not keep it. For Stuhlmacher, in addition 
to the Ben Sira passage cited above, 2 Baruch 57:2, Testament of Judah 20:3, and 
Rabbinic literature are strung together to create a general perspective that related law to 
creation / nature. He also refers to Wisdom of Solomon which associated wisdom with 
creation. Interestingly David Winston offers a different understanding of the association 
of wisdom with nomos in Wisdom of Solomon.
114
 Stuhlmacher’s interpretation offers no 
real explanation as to what parts of the Jewish nomos Gentiles actually could be expected 
to keep, and one assumes that the whole of the Jewish law is in mind.     
Richard Bell 
In 1998 Richard Bell continued the Torah-wisdom interpretation with a bit more 
detail and vigor, especially in the attempt to distance the Jewish context from the Gentile 
context.
115
 Bell specifically raises the key questions surrounding the universality of the 
Jewish law, like Tobin before, but with very different answers:  
what precisely is the relation of this law (the one Gentiles do) to the Torah of the 
Jews? Is it “qualitatively the same law as that which had been given to the Jews” 
or is it just an “Analogie”? Or is Paul thinking of “natural law”?...Or is this law 
“nur durch logischen Rückschluß aus den konkreten Taten verifizierbar” (only 
verifiable through logical conclusions from concrete actions)?
116
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In explaining the conception of nomos in Romans 2, Bell is adamant that there is 
no “direct pagan influence” and that “natural law” is not present. Rather he cites passages 
from what he calls a “rich Jewish background” to point out how Jews viewed the law 
universally, and he focuses on a few second temple Jewish writers to point out how they 
connect the Torah with creation and wisdom.
117
 He states his case clearly:  
I believe the background for Paul’s thought concerning the law in Rom. 2:14–15 
is to be found in Palestinian Judaism which, as Hengel has conclusively shown, 
had undergone a process of hellenization during the Hellenistic era. During this 
time…an ontological view of the Torah developed and the cosmic function of 
wisdom was passed on to the law. So in Paul’s time it is most likely that the Torah 
was viewed as pre-existent and as involved in the creation of the world.
118
 
 
Bell, drawing on Hengel, claims that this connection between the Torah and wisdom, 
“came about because of the encounter with Hellenistic thought. So the view in Stoicism 
of the relation between law and nature influenced the view found in Ben Sirach 
concerning the link between law and wisdom.”119 According to Bell “the ontological 
view of the Torah which developed during the time of hellenisation, where the cosmic 
function of Wisdom was passed on to the law, is important for Rom. 2:14–16.”120 The 
Jewish writings that serve to illustrate this perspective include Testament of Judah 20 and 
Rabbinic literature.
121
 While Bell recognizes Jewish interaction with, or perhaps reaction 
to, Hellenistic culture, Bell’s interpretation of Paul’s understanding of nomos does not 
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allow for “law of nature” or other Greek concepts. In passing, he mentions some Jewish 
texts which “(refer) to a sort of natural law which, while not perhaps directly influencing 
Paul, do show that Jews were saying roughly similar things.”122 These texts include: 
Testament of Judah 20, 2 Baruch 57:2, Philo (De Abrahamo, 175–76; De vita Moses, 
2,51; De Spec. Leg., 2.13) and 4 Maccabees.
123
 Yet, in Bell’s interpretation these writers, 
especially Philo and 4 Maccabees, did not have any influence on Paul. This is quite 
different from Schnabel who also espouses a wisdom-Torah connection, for whom both 2 
Baruch and 4 Maccabees are part of the Jewish context that does associate Torah with 
wisdom and presumably, influenced Paul. In short, Bell is going to lengths to argue for 
Palestinian Jewish influenced wisdom-law connection, rather than any Diaspora Jewish 
or Greco-Roman influence, primarily because “Paul the Pharisee would probably find 
Philo’s Alexandrian theology alien or even heretical.”124 And as with those before him, 
Ben Sira plays a significant role in determining the nature of the association of law and 
wisdom.  
Bell is not clear on the relation of this view of the Torah with Gentile 
obedience—what of the Jewish nomos Gentiles do. In one place he asserts that “it is not 
the body of commandments given to Moses; neither is it some core of the law such as the 
decalogue.”125  In his conclusion, he states that  
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in Rabbinic Judaism, as well as in wisdom literature and in “Hellenistic Judaism”, 
the torah was seen as a “Weltgesetz”, valid in different ways for Gentiles and 
Jews. Such ideas about law therefore form an important background to Paul’s 
argument in 2:14–16.126 
 
The problem, other than his dependence on Rabbinic literature, is that he is not clear what 
he means that the law is “valid in different ways.” He briefly alludes to the “seven 
commands given to Noah” and agrees that the Gentiles “have far fewer commands than 
the Jews.”127 Most scholars recognize that such “Noachic” laws emerge later than Paul, 
and Bell does not offer any solid textual support among Jewish writers for explaining this 
interpretation.  
 It is tempting to either conclude that Bell is correct and others are misguided in 
their arguments that find influence of Greco-Roman conceptions, or to conclude that 
Bell’s arguments should be dismissed because of his emphasis that there is no influence 
of Greek conceptions on Paul. But it is more complex than this. Bell raises the issue of 
influence on Paul and which strains of Jewish interpretations of the law were more likely 
to shape Paul’s thought. With Bell we encounter an emphasis on what Paul said and what 
sort of perspectives had “direct influence” on Paul’s thought, rather than on the Jewish 
perspectives with which Paul might have been in dialogue. This makes a significant 
difference in Bell’s interpretation, as it allows him to rule out certain Jewish perspectives 
because their direct influence on Paul is not likely. Apart from the fact that the direct 
influence argument is very difficult argument to prove, our procedure in this study will be 
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to try and draw attention to the sorts of explanations of the law with which Paul was 
likely in conversation.     
Conclusion 
The Torah-wisdom connection does offer a way of explaining the universalization 
of the Jewish nomos. The association of law with wisdom is an important, and as 
Schnabel points out, widespread way of understanding the Jewish nomos among Second 
Temple Jews.  
There are two categories of problems, however, with this line of interpretation. 
First, there are general problems with the wisdom-Torah framework—at least as it has 
been articulated by the above interpreters. Even though the law-wisdom correlation is 
widely used, Ben Sira plays a formative role for how this is understood by other writers. 
Furthermore, there is no clarity on the Jewish writers who may play a role here in setting 
the context. Schnabel’s study leaves open the possibility that writings such as 4 
Maccabees or Aristeas may play a role, while Bell explicitly rules them out. The 
questions need to be asked more precisely with regard to the conception of nomos 
articulated in Romans 2. Second, there is a general assumption that the wisdom tradition 
interpretation is a more “Jewish,” that is, it has no influence of Greco-Roman concepts. 
At the same time, however, many of these scholars cannot avoid mentioning some 
relationship with Greco-Roman concepts. Of course none of the above scholars would 
agree that Judaism was not affected by Hellenism. But in terms of their interpretations of 
how Paul universalizes the Jewish law, they tend to favor the ‘less-Hellenized’ 
explanation. The problem is that it is very difficult to explain Paul’s statements in 
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Romans 2 without some understanding of Greco-Roman discussions—particularly ethical 
and philosophical—as well as some conceptions of nomos common in the Greco-Roman 
world. This is not to say that any Jewish traditions that associate law with wisdom are not 
viable. It is to say that the wisdom-Torah context needs to reckon more fully with 
Judaism’s engagement with Greco-Roman discussions. 
The second problem concerns more specifically how this interpretation explains 
the components of nomos in Romans 2. While this interpretation, as mentioned above, 
does explain the universalization of the Jewish nomos, it does not give us a clear 
understanding of how the Jewish nomos applied to Gentiles, even though it suggests 
some sort of relationship. Different than the scholars who argue for the Jewish adaptation 
of Greco-Roman concepts, these interpreters generally stress the unity of the Jewish 
nomos, so that it seems that what is expected of Gentiles is the entire law. The difference, 
for example, between Moo and Bell is too strong to ignore. This issue needs to be 
clarified, as Paul’s statements in Romans 2:26–29 rule out that circumcision is required to 
define obedience to the law.   
General Jewish Background 
Some scholars have suggested a more general Jewish context for understanding 
the view of the law in Romans 2. These interpreters are clear that neither “natural law” or 
other Greco-Roman conceptions nor Torah-wisdom associations take center stage. This 
interpretation offers important insights, as it gives us a wider net of ways in which Jews 
understood their law. But again this interpretation reflects the difficulty in making sense 
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of what Paul says about the Jewish nomos and points to a need for fuller investigation and 
explanation of how Jews understood their law. 
Ernst Käsemann 
In his important commentary
128
 Ernst Käsemann writes that he is concerned with 
“bring(ing) out the specific understanding of the apostle.”129 At times this ventures into 
insinuating that what Paul says about the Jewish nomos is entirely unlike anyone else of 
his time: it is neither Jew nor Greek. Käsemann explains the universalization of the 
Jewish nomos with the claim that in Romans 2 the Mosaic Torah “is so identified with the 
divine law that there is no overall species no/moj.”130 The Jewish nomos is to be 
understood as the law and not limited by its particularity, as “one law among others.” It 
“reaches out in a distinctive way beyond the sphere of Israel to the world.”131 Yet, when 
he comes to 2:14–15 his interpretation reflects the problem posed by these verses. 
Käsemann suggests that there is another nomos when he writes that Gentiles “have an 
analogue to the grafh/” to which they are accountable. This nomos, interestingly, is not 
related to “natural law.”132 What is in view is something like the Greek no/moj 
a!grafoj—a “universal obligation” for all humanity, but “on Jewish premises.” It is not 
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“unwritten law, but law written in a special way.”133 It is a conception of law that is, it 
appears, unique and defies categories that would make it comprehensible in the first 
century.  
The “things of the law” which Gentiles do are not moral commands, since Paul 
does not so restrict the law. Rather, Gentiles “experience the transcendent claim of the 
divine will.” For Käsemann this is something other than the “Adamic or Noachic 
commandments” one finds among some Jewish writers who hold Gentiles accountable to 
the Jewish nomos.
134
 It refers to “the concrete act demanded by the law in a general 
sense.” Confusingly, when he comes to vv.25–29, Käsemann states that the requirement 
of the law refers “to the whole Torah, defined by legal statements.”135 At this point, it 
seems that there is a conflict between what he said about the “things of the law” and the 
“work of the law” on the one hand and the dikaiw/mata in 2:26 on the other. To make 
some sense of this Käsemann states that “Paul is probably following the spiritualizing of 
cultic matters in the Diaspora synagogue.”136 
In his comments on vv.17–24, Käsemann relates Paul’s statements to Diaspora 
Jewish formulations about the universal appeal of the Torah, specifically from Wisdom, 
Josephus, and Philo. In these statements, Paul, he says, “is using existing formulations 
taken from the Diaspora synagogue.”137 Rather than specify these writers’ use of Greco-
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Roman “natural law” or an association of wisdom with Torah, he specifies that these 
Jewish writers appealed to a different discourse in their attempts to claim the superiority 
of their Jewish nomos: “no/moj could even mean the book of the law, which in the 
Diaspora was read from the standpoint of divine paideia.”138  
Käsemann’s interpretation is suggestive but very vague. This goes back to his 
concern to find the specific and unique thought of the apostle Paul. He offers no precise 
context or explanation for how we should understand the universalized conception of the 
Jewish nomos. Paul for Käsemann speaks and thinks in ways that bear similarity to his 
environment, but remains distinct. One wonders if the connection with “unwritten law” is 
stronger than he allows; he uses language of “divine law” but what this means is not 
explained; his appeal to Diaspora Judaism’s association of nomos with “divine paideia” 
is an intriguing possibility, but this needs more explanation, especially in relation to how 
the Jewish nomos might have been understood in a universal way and how “the things of 
the law” may be understood in this context.139  
James Dunn 
In James Dunn’s 1988 commentary we find another voice trying to make sense of 
the conception of nomos in Romans 2.
140
 Among other things, Dunn’s commentary is a 
groundbreaking effort to interpret the entire letter from the vantage point of a post-E.P. 
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Sanders “new perspective” lens.141 According to Dunn, Paul’s objective in Romans 2 is 
to universalize the understanding of the law in a way that erases social distinction 
between Jew and Gentile.
142
 In other words, Paul’s point is to argue that the law, rather 
than being a possession of the Jews alone, is a “standard of judgment” for Jew and 
Gentile alike.
143
 Paul’s point is expressed over against what Dunn refers to as an 
interlocutor who “is envisaged as a Jew.”144 This Jew is one who maintains strict social 
boundaries between Jews and Gentiles, and the possession of the law is at the root of 
these distinctions.  
According to Dunn, Paul universalizes the Jewish law in Romans 2 by setting it as 
a “standard of judgment” for all humanity. Following the Jewish nomos happens through 
a vague “moral awareness” which loosely relates to the Jewish law.145 Dunn contends 
that Paul is not drawing on Greco-Roman conceptions, that this moral awareness is not 
“natural law as such,” nor is it “universal” or “unwritten law.”146 Rather, Dunn asserts 
that Paul has in mind the Jewish law in contrast to such concepts and instead posits a 
“moral sensitivity which one would sooner expect to find in the people of the law.”147 
Dunn also suggests that Jewish wisdom traditions supply the “possibility of a broader 
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view” in their “identification of universal divine wisdom with the law.”148 But he does 
not clearly emphasize this as the main context. 
The “work of the law” which Paul says Gentiles do is explained in terms of this 
“moral sensibility.”149 It refers to a “widespread sense of the rightness or wrongness of 
certain conduct.”150 Problematically, we are not given an understanding of how this moral 
sensibility relates to circumcision, dietary laws, or other more particularly Jewish laws. 
The problem with this is that in part of his exegesis Dunn makes an implicit distinction 
within the law by separating the command of circumcision from the rest of the law as an 
“identity marker.” Thus, Dunn can say that Paul’s point  
is that the Jew who truly approves the business of the law (v.15) should recognize 
the acceptability to God of those who meet the demands of the law (apart from 
circumcision and other “works of the law”). Such a non-Jew who lacked only the 
physical mark of the covenant was surely in reality the equivalent in God’s eyes 
to the full member of the covenant people. Paul’s object, of course, in pressing for 
such agreement is precisely to undermine the assumption that the distinction 
between those within and those without the covenant…cannot be determined 
except by reference to the rite of circumcision. The rabbis would not have 
accepted the line of argument, but Paul could expect his Roman audience to be 
more sympathetic to the point.
151
 
 
The difficult thing about Dunn’s statement is that he sees Paul making a distinction 
within the law, between certain commands of the law. But Dunn offers no conception of 
the Jewish law that clearly explains why or how Paul can claim without explanation that 
circumcision should not be understood in terms of the more general “moral sensibility.”  
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According to Dunn the Jewish particularity is one that is linked with a sort of 
“nationalistically exclusive” claim on the basis of possession of the law.152 Dunn writes 
that Paul’s point is to “undercut the assumption that Israel and the law are coterminous, 
that the law is known only within Israel and possible of fulfillment only by Jews and 
proselytes.”153 At the same time, however, Dunn finds a universalizing view of the law 
reflected in the statements in 2:17–24 that resonates most with Diaspora Judaism, “that 
what everyone of gravitas aspires after has been given to Israel in the law.”154 Dunn 
points out that Paul’s point is to emphasize the universality of the Jewish nomos, in 
contrast with the more particularistic view of the law. If this is the case, then again is it 
not clear how the more universal claims about the Jewish nomos for which Paul argues, 
and which seem to be reflected in 2:17-24, relates to the particularistic view Dunn 
attributes to Paul’s interlocutor. How is circumcision to be understood? Can it be 
understood universally, or is it a command that distinguishes Israel from the Gentiles? 
And how might Paul’s attempt to universalize the law deal with commands such as 
circumcision? Paul addresses this in 2:25-29, but is there a certain conception of the law 
upon which Paul makes his argument?  
Dunn’s analysis presents mixed conceptions of the Jewish law. On the one hand, 
Paul is engaging with the “nationalistic” Jew who maintains social (ethnic and national) 
boundaries on the basis of the law. On the other hand, Paul seems to be participating in 
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another discourse, presenting a conception of the law that stresses universality. Do these 
two conceptions of the Jewish law relate to one another? Or are they from different 
worlds? Although Dunn’s interpretation finds dueling conceptions of the law meeting in 
Romans 2, his comments on the particularity of the Jewish nomos raise an important 
point in drawing attention to the ethnically exclusive nature of the superiority based in the 
law. This is an important element not yet addressed by the scholars previously discussed 
in this review. Dunn’s interpretation falls short, however, in explaining how this 
ethnically exclusive conception relates to an understanding of the Jewish nomos that is 
also universal. We also do not find in Dunn’s analysis an explanation of how the things 
of the law that Gentiles keep relate to Dunn’s Jewish exclusivist view of the law—
specifically the “particularly Jewish” commands and the central “identity marker” of 
circumcision.
155
 
Stanley Stowers 
In his book A Rereading of Romans,
156
 Stanley Stowers states that in Romans 1 
and 2 Paul assumes Gentiles are “potentially knowledgeable of the Mosaic law,”157 and 
that Jews and Gentiles will be judged according to the same standard—the Mosaic law.158 
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Stowers is clear that he does not think “law of nature” is the best explanation since it was 
not necessary for Jews to turn to natural law. For Stowers “Paul assumes” that “with or 
without explanations, many Jewish writings assume that the law of Moses was given 
publically and continued to be a publically available body of teachings.”159 To explain his 
point Stowers presents a loosely connected stream of Jewish claims about Gentile 
accountability to the Mosaic law. He begins with the claim that “the Hebrew Bible, the 
LXX, and most later Jewish writings simply assume that the non-Jewish peoples know 
what God expects of them and are responsible for their disobedience.”160 Stowers refers 
to passages from the Old Testament which seem to assume accountability of non-
Israelites to God’s standards.161 This is important, but as Richard Bell notes, it is worth 
inquiring into later development of these passages in their own milieu.
162
  
Stowers then points out ways in which second temple Jewish literature describes 
Gentile accountability to the Mosaic law. He cites Sibylline Oracles book 3, Aristobulus, 
Eupolemus, Philo, and Josephus—all of whom address “the universal knowledge of 
God’s law.”163 He appeals to these writers’ attempts to establish the antiquity of the 
Jewish law, stating that “in supposing the law of his own people to be the foundation of 
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truth and reality imperfectly mirrored in other cultures, Paul has entered the larger 
transcultural exchange of the ancient Mediterranean world.”164 This transcultural 
exchange meant that the second temple writers did not have to use “natural law” but 
argued for the superiority and universality of the Jewish law by claiming that Moses was 
the first lawgiver and thus the source of other laws. They assimilated Greeks and Romans 
into their “master narrative,” claiming Jewish origin for Greek or Roman ways of life.165 
In doing this, Stowers concludes, the Jewish nomos was given universal status, and 
Gentiles must therefore know enough to live in accordance with the law. Stowers offers 
an important context, yet it is important to note that this assimilation into the Jewish 
“master narrative” and dialogue with this “larger transcultural exchange” alone does not 
necessarily equate to a universally known and universally binding Jewish nomos. Most 
clearly, this only is an argument for the antiquity and superiority of the Jewish nomos, 
but not necessarily its universality. The universality of the Jewish nomos may be a part of 
this interpretation of the Jewish nomos, but Stowers does not clearly explain how 
universality figures into this dialogue. 
Stowers concludes his entire discussion on a vague note:  
The most likely explanation for Paul’s assumption that gentiles can know the truth 
about God and are morally responsible to the law comes from a commonsense 
reading of the Hebrew scriptures and the long-established claims that the gentiles 
derived their knowledge of righteousness from the Jews. Rom 1–3 treats some 
such explanation as a basic assumption shared between writer and audience.
166
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In light of his entire argument, one still wonders: what is the explanation? Stowers makes 
a clear point that Paul assumes Gentile accountability, and that this assumption draws 
upon already existing claims made about the Mosaic law by Jews contemporary to Paul 
and before him. But the reader gets no clear articulation of which perspective Paul 
assumes, other than it is not some Jewish appropriation of “natural law.” Because 
Stowers’ explanation lacks precision, it is difficult to determine how Paul was in dialogue 
with it. Second, as previous scholars have shown, at least for some Jews some 
appropriation of “natural law” of other Greco-Roman conceptions was used to 
universalize the Jewish nomos. The problem with Stowers’ work is his assumption that 
use of “natural law” would imply that Gentiles are held to a different nomos than the 
Jewish nomos.
167
 He states, “Paul so obviously places gentiles in a relation to the Jewish 
law that one has difficulty imagining a role for the law of nature.”168 At the least, the 
interpretations of Goodenough, Barrett, Wilckens, and others suggest things are more 
complex.  
Certain aspects of Stowers’ work moves things forward, however. Stowers draws 
on Philo and Josephus, and while acknowledging Philo’s use of “natural law”169 he draws 
attention to “another way” in which these Jews explained the importance of their nomos, 
even if what Stowers refers to does not immediately transfer to an argument for 
universality. Stowers’ point begs us to go a bit deeper to see what larger cultural 
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discussion about nomos Jews engaged in, and to reckon with the complexity of discussion 
about nomos in antiquity.  
Conclusion  
These more general interpretations suggest ways to understand nomos without 
emphasis on “natural law” or wisdom traditions. Where the natural law interpretation 
specified Diaspora Judaism and Philo specifically, and the wisdom-law interpretation 
drew on a broader spectrum of Jewish writings, these scholars present a more loosely 
defined Jewish context. This sort of interpretation opens up possibilities and raises 
questions. If Paul uses, as Käsemann suggests, an understanding of the Jewish nomos that 
is “like” the Greco-Roman counterpart of “unwritten law,” but “on Jewish premises,” can 
we explain this more precisely? Dunn’s interpretation brings an interesting element into 
this discussion when he draws attention to the way Paul is dealing with an ethnic 
exclusivism and superiority. Is this part of the conception of the Jewish nomos upon 
which Paul draws to make his argument against such an exclusivist view? Or is Paul 
developing a new way to understand the Jewish nomos in Romans 2, but with little 
explanation? Stowers’ explanation also has some merit in suggesting that Jews may have 
tapped into a larger cultural dialogue that includes more than just “natural law.” But does 
this mean a rejection of any use of such Greco-Roman concepts or Jewish wisdom 
traditions? 
Conclusions to Entire Review 
This review of scholarship has discussed three different contexts offered by 
scholars for understanding nomos in Romans 2: 1) a “natural law” or “unwritten law” 
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interpretation that emphasizes Jewish adaptations of Greco-Roman concepts of no/moj; 2) 
a wisdom tradition interpretation that argues that nomos is best understood in light of 
Jewish wisdom literature which associated the law with universal wisdom and creation; 3) 
a more general interpretation whose common basis is that Paul uses neither Greco-Roman 
adaptations nor wisdom traditions. One thing is clear: there is no winner. Each of these 
interpretations brings an important voice to the conversation; none of them fully explains 
all three components of the conception of nomos in Romans 2. In addition, as is clear 
from the survey, each of these interpretations offers not only a different understanding of 
the Jewish nomos, but also potentially a different Judaism that lies behind the conception 
of the Jewish nomos with which Paul seems to be in dialogue.  
All of this points to the need for a more thorough and precise investigation of how 
Second Temple Jews understood and explained the Jewish nomos in terms of its 
universality and how its commands apply to Gentiles. It is clear that Second Temple Jews 
universalized the Jewish nomos; it is clear that they did so in a context where other 
conceptions of nomos were common. What needs to be done? The above review shows 
that to achieve a clearer understanding of the conception of nomos in Romans 2 we need 
a fuller understanding of how Second Temple Jews universalized the law, why they did 
so, what language and concepts they used to do so. The above review suggests that we 
would not do justice to the question if we were to argue for one or the other of the above 
contexts for understanding the law. The question is not whether Greco-Roman concepts 
are employed, but how are Greco-Roman concepts employed? It would be naïve to think 
that appeals to Greco-Roman concepts cannot co-exist with Jewish wisdom traditions. 
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The question is how. It would also be too simplistic to think that the matter is as simple 
as Jewish adaptation of Greco-Roman concepts.  
To remind of the basic issues: nomos in Romans 2 consists of a complex web of 
three main claims about the Jewish nomos: 1) it is universal; 2) it is particular to Jews; 3) 
there seem to be things of this law that Gentiles can do, that they keep its commands. 
Additionally, in Romans 2 Paul says these things in such a way that requires no 
explanation. To return to Neil Elliott’s statement: 
Paul apparently expects this argument to be intelligible to his audience. He 
does not explain how, or whether Gentiles may be found who ‘do the 
things of the Law’, nor does he justify the claim that Gentiles who ‘by 
nature’ do the things of the Law show that they have the ‘work of the Law 
written in their hearts’. He does not treat any of these propositions as if 
they were controversial. Rather he relies upon them, and on the axiom in 
2:11, to support the principle embodied in his indictment (2:1-6): No one 
is exempt from God’s judgment.170 
 
Scholars have not yet supplied a context or larger discourse within which Paul’s 
statements about the Jewish nomos can be understood collectively. Until this happens 
there will remain a degree of “we’re not sure exactly where the conception of the law in 
Romans 2 comes from” among scholars.  
Proposal 
In the following chapters, we will attempt to provide a context that explains the 
conception of nomos with which Paul was in dialogue in Romans 2. We will focus par-
ticularly on Diaspora Jewish explanations of the law. The main reason for this is that the 
context of the community at Rome is that of Diaspora Judaism. This is not to say that 
Paul was not influenced by Jewish thought outside of this spectrum. But my concern in 
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this study is to understand what sort of perspective about the law Paul would have pre-
sumed of his audience since his statements about the law are made in such a way that 
suggests that Paul thought that his audience knew what he was talking about.   
The question of “audience” is more complex today than it used to be, when for 
example C.E.B. Cranfield wrote his commentary in 1975 and argued that the Roman 
community to which Paul wrote was a mix of Jews and Gentiles.
171
 For Cranfield the 
matter was one of determining the physical make-up of the people to which Paul wrote. 
In his book A Rereading of Romans, Stanley Stowers represents a more complex way of 
addressing the issue. Stowers, drawing on literary theory, writes of three types of audi-
ence: (1) the empirical readers, (2) the encoded explicit readers, and (3) the encoded im-
plicit readers.
172
 The “empirical readers” are those who are the actual audience in the 
Roman church(es). The “encoded explicit” readers are “the audience manifest in the 
text.”173 This audience is basically a construct of internal cues in the letter itself. The “en-
coded implicit” audience is known as the “ideal readers.” These are also constructed from 
the text. The difference between the “encoded explicit” and the “encoded implicit” is one 
of identity and understanding. If one wants to identify the “encoded explicit” audience, 
one asks, who does Paul identify as his audience? This audience may be identified as Jew 
or Gentile. The “encoded implicit” audience is explained in terms of what things Paul 
assumes his audience will understand: ideas, practices, and values/beliefs. Stowers ex-
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plains that one can “conceptualize” the “encoded implicit” audience by asking: “what as-
sumptions, knowledge, frame of reference, and horizon of expectations does Romans im-
plicitly assume in order to be well or fully understood?”174  
Attempts to describe both Paul’s “empirical audience” and his “encoded explicit 
audience” often alternate between positing an ethnically mixed audience of Jew and Gen-
tile or an entirely Gentile audience, made up of those less sympathetic to Judaism and the 
law and those who are. When it comes to understanding what perspectives about the Jew-
ish nomos Paul might think his audience knew, however, such ethnically driven attempts 
to identify the audience do not help us. From what we know of first century Judaism in 
Rome, an ethnically Jewish audience does not preclude Jews from thinking in Greco-
Roman philosophical frameworks or using Greek conceptions to express elements of 
Jewish faith and practice. Likewise, Gentiles (“smypathizers” or “God-fearers”) who 
knew well and lived according to Jewish custom and norms – nomos – is well known.175 
In other words, ethnic identity does not get us very far. This means that when it comes to 
understanding what Paul assumes of his interlocutor in Romans 2 we want to focus on the 
“assumptions, knowledge, and frame of reference” of Paul’s “encoded implicit” audience, 
and not necessarily the ethnic identity. Even if we assume that Paul is addressing only 
Gentiles, or that Paul is addressing a mix of ethnic Jews and ethnic Gentiles, such de-
scriptions to not carry with them inherent “nomos-ologies.” As Thomas Tobin succinctly 
puts it: “the fact that the Roman Christian community was made up largely of Gentiles 
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with a minority of Jews does not automatically tell us anything about their beliefs and 
practices.”176  
All of this means that the “encoded implicit” audience is the one that interpreters 
must finally reckon with as having most heuristic potential for understanding Paul’s audi-
ence, what perspectives Paul may have attributed to his interlocutor, and ultimately, 
Paul’s argument itself. Because of the way that the interlocutor functions rhetorically, the 
point of connection with the addressee(s) must be at the level of ideas and beliefs. No 
doubt these ideas and beliefs are social. Runar Thorsteinsson makes a good point that 
whereas many letters in antiquity are addressed to individual recipients, Paul’s letter is 
addressed to a community.
177
 This is an important point, and we need to keep in mind 
that the epistolary interlocutor in Romans represents not just an individual’s perspective, 
but one with which the larger group would be familiar, even if rhetorically an individual 
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is addressed. Paul’s use of this device in a letter written to a community suggests that Paul 
is not addressing a particular individual, but rather with a certain perspective or position 
that Paul thinks is known to or to be identified with his readership.
178
 This means that in 
order to get at the conception of nomos in Romans 2, the question we need to ask is: what 
context or web of discourse will provide us with the most plausible set of “assumptions, 
knowledge, frame of reference, and horizon of expectations” about nomos that Paul 
would expect his audience to hold?   
Whether the “encoded explicit” audience may have been ethnically Gentile as Das 
and others argue,
179
 or a mix of Jew and Gentile,
180
 from the standpoint of ethical living 
and conceptions of nomos, many of those in the Roman community likely adopted their 
ethical outlook and their understanding of no/moj from Diaspora Judaism.181 It is well 
known that the early “Christian” community in Rome, if not still part of, emerged out of 
the Diaspora Jewish community in Rome.
182
 Runar Thorsteinsson writes that “it is evi-
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 In light of this, those studies that claim Paul is arguing with a specific individual “teacher” in 
Romans 2 may rightly present the perspective with which Paul is in dialogue, but wrongly understand the 
function of the form of the diatribe and use of the interlocutor (see Francis Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the 
Gentiles, 197–205; 215–16; Campbell, The Deliverance of God, 559–71. Stowers also focuses on an indi-
vidual “teacher” but in a slightly more complex manner in that the teacher is representative to some degree 
[Rereading, 143–65]). 
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 A. Andrew Das, Solving the Romans Debate; Neil Elliott, The Rhetoric of Romans; Stanley 
Stowers, A Rereading of Romans; R. Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor, 34–46; Fitzmyer, Romans, 25–36; 
Hultgren, Romans, 7–11; Dunn, Romans 1–8, xliv–liv. 
 
180
 So e.g. Richard Hays, “Power of God,” 35–41 and most other scholars. See Douglas Moo, Ro-
mans, 9–13; while acknowledging the strength of the Gentile-only argument). 
 
181
 See Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 16–46. 
 
182
 Cf. R. Brändle and E. Stegemann, “The Formation of the First “Christian Congregations” in 
Rome in the Context of the Jewish Congregations,” in Judaism and Christianity in First-Century Rome, ed. 
K. Donfried and P. Richardson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 117–27; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 34–44; 
Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 173–74. Much of Francis Watson’s overall argument presupposes 
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dent that Paul was writing not to gentiles at large but to a certain group of gentiles whose 
knowledge of Jewish writings and experience of Jewish ways of life was substantial. Eve-
ry aspect of Paul’s message in Romans must be read in light of this particular audi-
ence.”183 A Diaspora Jewish context seems to be the best starting point as a fitting context 
for unearthing the “knowledge, frame of reference, or horizon of expectations” of the in-
terlocutor and thus also Paul’s audience in Romans 2, and also the perspective on no/moj 
Paul relies upon in his argument. As an additional point, Paul from Tarsus was likely well 
versed in not only the Greco-Roman world, but also the world of Diaspora Judaism, and 
by the time he wrote Romans he had been living and working among Diaspora Jews for 
close to twenty years.  
How will we accomplish reading Paul in conversation with Diaspora Jewish 
views of the law? As we move ahead, chapters two and three will address the larger 
Greco-Roman context for understanding nomos. In these chapters we will provide a 
framework for understanding nomos in the ancient Greco-Roman world. This is 
important because Diaspora Jews were not isolated from the cultural discourses in the 
world around them. Indeed, as we shall see, Diaspora Jewish writers made use of the 
Greco-Roman discourses in their attempts to interpret and explain the Jewish nomos. In 
chapter two we will describe elements of a “grammar” of nomos based on a wide 
spectrum of Greek and Roman writers. That is, we will describe common and important 
issues related to nearly any discussion of nomos in the political-ethical matrix of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a connection with the synagogue community in Rome, and Paul’s argument is meant to distance the Chris-
tian community from the Jewish community (Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 175–88; 214–16).  
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 Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor, 122.  
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Greco-Roman world. Our particular focus will be on particular nomos and its relationship 
to conceptions of transcendent nomos. We will focus on the ethical, political, and 
inherently theological elements related to this discourse in the context of important socio-
political developments. In chapter three we will investigate how this “nomos-discourse” 
shaped ethical living and related to ethical and political concerns of Greek and Roman 
writers. We will see in particular how these ethical debates and the “grammar” of nomos 
enabled writers to make claims about Greek and Roman ways of existence. In short, we 
will at the end of these chapters have a good sense of how nomos functioned as an 
important piece of political, ethical, and religious concerns of ancient writers. 
 In chapter four we will conduct an investigation of Diaspora Jewish 
interpretations of the Jewish nomos. We will investigate the ways in which Jews 
explained the law in conversation with this complex Greco-Roman context. We will 
analyze how Diaspora Jewish writers universalized their nomos, how they explained the 
commands of their nomos, and how they asserted the importance of the “Jewishness” of 
the law. We will especially be concerned to explain these elements in conversation with 
the Greco-Roman web of discourse described in chapters two and three, and to see how 
their explanations and views both affirm and challenge elements of this discourse. At the 
end of this chapter we will have a sense of common elements of the various Diaspora 
Jewish interpretations of the Jewish nomos. Within this we will also find diversity, not 
only in expression but also in more weighty matters of understanding.  
In chapter five I will turn to Paul’s argument in Romans 2:1–29. I will pay 
particular attention to the way that the use of the interlocutor impacts what Paul says and 
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how he says it. We will focus particularly on situating what Paul says of the Jewish 
nomos in relation to Diaspora Jewish articulations and explaining how he works with 
these views. This will also necessitate paying attention to the ways in which Paul engages 
with the larger Greco-Roman discussion. Our goal is to interpret Paul’s argument as one 
participating in this larger web of discourse.  
Finally, a concluding chapter will reflect on how the interpretation offered helps 
us better understand the Judaism Paul was dealing with in Romans and offer some 
suggestions for how this study might bring new light to the issue of the law in Second 
Temple Judaism, the problem of the law in Paul’s letters, and the issue of Paul’s ethical 
instruction. 
Issues of Method 
Overall Method: History Construction 
 In this study I seek to apply no new “cutting edge” methodological concepts or 
insights. This study is both historical and exegetical in nature. I find Kavin Rowe’s point 
regarding “method” a welcome reminder: “an exegetical work is most compelling when it 
moves actual exegesis up from an after dinner mint to the main course of the meal.”184 
Rowe’s point is that one’s method should be clear from the work itself, and need be 
explained and mapped out only to the extent that is helpful for the reader. Any more than 
that is distraction from the exegetical task at hand: explaining the text.
185
 Put simply, this 
study will be concerned with reading ancient literature (Greek, Roman, Jewish, and Paul), 
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 C. Kavin Rowe, Early Narrative Christology: The Lord in the Gospel of Luke (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2006) 9. 
 
185
 See Rowe’s brief discussion and engagement with Hans Frei and Clifford Geertz on this point 
(Early Narrative Christology, 9–10). 
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attempting to make sense of what ancient writers are saying about nomos, and placing 
them all in conversation by trying to situate them all on a common field of discourse. 
Our goal in this study may be put in terms of history construction. I say 
“construction” because I have been persuaded by Udo Schnelle and others that all such 
attempts at making sense of Paul’s first century context are not reconstructions, but 
themselves are attempts at constructing history and the meaning of ancient texts from 
pertinent data.
186
 We all create our own connect-the-dot pictures, not simply drawing the 
lines between dots we have to uncover, but to some degree establishing the dots as well. 
As N.T. Wright puts things, Biblical scholars are in the business of offering hypotheses 
constructed from the data of ancient texts and history, and the best hypothesis given to 
explain a text is the one that best accounts for the data and issues involved. The strength 
depends on what data is used, what is left out, how it is put together and construed, and 
above all, its explanatory power.
187
  
Not “Origin” or “Sources” of Thought: Paul in Conversation with His Contexts 
Sometimes stating what something is not helps better clarify what it is. This study 
is not an exercise in “history-of-religions” in a strict sense. By this, I mean that I am not 
trying to determine the extent of direct influence of the Greco-Roman or Jewish worlds of 
thought on Paul, assuming a one-way path of influence.
188
 I do not turn to Greco-Roman 
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 See Udo Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology, trans. E. Boring (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2003), 26–32 and the literature cited there.  
 
187
 N.T. Wright, Christian Origins and the Question of God, Volume One: The New Testament and 
the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) 31–46. 
 
188
 On this description see Werner Georg Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the 
Investigation of its Problems, trans. s. MacLean Gilmour and H. Kee (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972) 206–25. 
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or Jewish perspectives on law in order to supply Paul’s “background” or the “source” of 
his thought.  
This study will be concerned with how Paul’s statements about nomos in Romans 
2 are in conversation with his contexts. Abraham Malherbe states the perspective well 
when he writes, “it is potentially fruitful, and certainly more realistic” to interpret Paul in 
the context of discussions of his time.
189
 While Malherbe speaks of discussions among 
Greek and Roman philosophers, the point equally applies placing Paul in conversation 
with his Jewish contemporaries, or all of the above. Calvin Roetzel makes an important 
point in this regard: “Paul’s theology must be viewed as an emergent theology and not a 
systematic theology, as an interactive theology rather than just a proclaimed theology, 
and as a product of a dialogue rather than a monologue.”190 So, we are asking not how 
Paul came to his conclusions or viewpoints about the law; nor are we assuming that Paul 
had a clear and stable understanding of nomos. He may have, but to determine that is not 
our concern here. Our concern is with how Paul worked with already existing 
perspectives to make his arguments or explain his points. In this case our focus is the 
Jewish law. What this means is that what we learn about Paul’s view of the law is to be 
understood not as a static view, but a view that is explained within a particular context, as 
part of a conversation within a larger web of discourse in which Paul participated. What 
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 Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” in ANRW 2.26.1, ed. W. Haase 
(Berlin: DeGruyter, 1992) 299. This perspective is carried forth in three recent and important publications: 
Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide, edited by T. Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 2001); Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, edited by J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg: 
Trinity Press International, 2003); Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor 
of Abraham J. Malherbe, edited by John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003). 
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 Roetzel, Paul: The Man and the Myth (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999) 4.  
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Paul says in Romans 2 (and ultimately the rest of Romans), because it is in conversation 
with a particular set of ideas about the Jewish nomos, may very well be different than 
what he says in other letters. The emphasis lies on how Paul articulates his arguments in 
conversation with the likely conceptions of his readers, and not on what Paul’s own view 
of the law is—though this certainly may be derived from his argument. 
In relation to this, our task will be not to understand Romans 2 as drawing on 
either Greco-Roman or Jewish backgrounds or contexts, but both. Judaism and 
Hellenism both contributed to make the ancient world what it was. Each no doubt 
brought its own backgrounds and traditions to make “Hellenistic” culture what it was, but 
at the same time they “all liv(ed) within the comprehensive mix of Hellenistic culture.”191 
Paul, and Judaism for that matter, cannot be removed from the fabric of the society they 
inhabited. Not only that, they were parts that constituted the ancient world, “coplayer(s) 
within a shared context.”192 With this in mind we will investigate both Greco-Roman and 
Diaspora Jewish perspectives on nomos, and we will attempt to give some shape to the 
discourse about nomos in which they participated. We will then interpret Paul’s argument 
in Romans 2 in conversation within this web of discourse. Our task as Troels Engberg-
Pedersen has very clearly put it is “to extract (meaning) from the comprehensive cultural 
web in which (in our case Diaspora Jewish interpretations of nomos) had (their) occurrent 
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 Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide,” 2. 
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place and that it took its overall meaning, not primarily from its cultural root, but from its 
place within the contemporary cross-cultural web.”193  
                                                             
193
 Ibid., 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE GRAMMAR OF NOMOS IN THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD 
Introduction 
It is stating the obvious to say that Diaspora Jewish literature reflects significant 
interaction with the language and thought of Greco-Roman culture and philosophy.
1
 
Many writers engaged with it head-on, even adopting many of its premises and co-opting 
them to defend, explain, or shape their own understanding of Judaism and the Jewish 
nomos.
2
 Although this is widely accepted, the contours and details of this engagement 
                                                             
1
 For two different perspectives on the nature and degree of Diaspora Judaism’s interaction with 
Greco-Roman philosophy and culture see John Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in 
the Hellenistic Diaspora, 2
nd
 ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000) and John Barclay, Jews in the 
Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE–117 CE) (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996). One would also do well to consult Erich Gruen’s Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks 
and Romans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). It is now ubiquitous that such interaction with 
Greco-Roman culture holds true for Palestinian Jewish writings as well (Martin Hengel, Judaism and 
Hellenism [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981]). In spite of the attempts by previous and current scholars to 
minimize or even erase altogether a distinction between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism (see e.g. Frank 
Thielman, Paul and the Law: A Contextual Approach [Downers Grove: IVP, 1994] 31–33), one should not 
overlook the differences that exist (Collins, Between Athens, 1–18; Barclay, Jews, 4-9, 82–91). The claim 
made by W.D. Davies that there should be no “dichotomy” between Palestinian and Diaspora Judaism is 
true (Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology [London, 1948. 4
th
 edition: 
Mifflintown: Sigler Press, 1998] xli). Yet, it would be a mistake to think that by erasing a “dichotomy” we 
should also erase any sense of difference, even significant difference. One example of the difference is that 
we have no Palestinian writings in which a Jewish author writes under a Gentile name (cf. Collins, Between 
Athens, 16–18). On the one hand, this may appear to be relatively cosmetic: the Jewish author is just trying 
to broaden a Jewish message that could also have been promoted by a Palestinian Jewish writer. But, on the 
other hand, this phenomenon speaks volumes about how these Diaspora Jews saw themselves and their 
particular strains of Judaism.  
 
2
 Doing this seems to accomplish several things. Jewish writers could articulate an element of 
Judaism on the playing field of the broader culture. This enables Jews to stake a claim in various debates or 
discussions in order to communicate the significance of Judaism in cultural milieu, even if the target 
audience were other Diaspora Jews. The reasons and motivations behind this are no doubt complex, but it 
seems that in part the effort was to explain things to a largely acculturated Diaspora audience. It is likely 
76 
and its effects on Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the Jewish law have not been 
examined on a larger scale.
3
 Furthermore, there is some disagreement about the nature 
and degree of Jewish writers’ use of these Greco-Roman concepts when writing about the 
Jewish law. We saw this in the review of interpretations in the previous chapter.
4
 While 
our ultimate interest is in understanding Paul’s references to nomos in Romans 2 and 
placing him in conversation with Diaspora Jewish views on nomos, we first need to push 
toward further clarification about how Diaspora Jews worked in conversation with Greek 
and Roman discussions about nomos. In order to accomplish this we need to first 
familiarize ourselves with the landscape of the more widespread Greco-Roman discourse 
about nomos.     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that Greco-Roman ideas about nomos and ethical living were imbedded enough in Jewish life and thought 
that such explanations of the Jewish law were not really all that “un-Jewish.” It should not be ruled out, 
then, that many of these Jewish writers were themselves well versed in the Greco-Roman dialogue that it 
just formed their understanding of nomos.    
 
3
 For steps in this direction, see the following: Gregory Sterling, “Universalizing the Particular: 
Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish Ethics,” in Studia Philonica Annual 15 (2003) 64–80; H. Najman, 
“A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?” in SPhA 15 (2003) 54–63; ibid, “The 
Law of Nature and the Authority of the Mosaic Law,” SPhA 11 (1999) 55–73; Reinhard Weber, Das Gesetz 
im hellenistischen Judentum: Studien zum Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora von Demetrios bis 
Pseudo-Phokylides (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000); and Das Gesetz bei Philon von Alexandrien 
und Flavius Josephus: Studien zum Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora bei den beiden Hauptzeugen 
des hellenistischen Judentums (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001); John Martens, One God, One Law: 
Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
 
4
 This can be seen by comparing the ways that the following scholars interpret how these Jewish 
writers conceived of the Mosaic law in light of Greco-Roman concepts:  Eckhard Schnabel, Law and 
Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985), who finds some limited interaction with and 
use of Greco-Roman ideas; Richard Bell, No One Seeks for God (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1998) 173–82, 
who finds nearly no need to posit use of Greco-Roman ideas; C. Marvin Pate, The Reverse of the Curse: 
Paul, Wisdom, and the Law (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 2000), who sees limited and cautious use of Greco-
Roman ideas; Weber, Das Gesetz, who finds that Diaspora Jewish writers use Greco-Roman ideas freely 
and frequently.    
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I want to state at the outset that a complete overview of the Greco-Roman 
perspectives on nomos cannot be undertaken here.
5
 To set parameters for our discussion 
of nomos in the next two chapters, we will focus on three main elements which emerge 
from the conception of nomos in Romans 2.
6
 First, we will focus on nomos as it was 
understood within what we will call the political-ethical matrix within the emerging 
Greco-Roman world.
7
 It is important to draw attention to the fact that our focus is on the 
                                                             
5
 The topic is quite vast in terms of its scope among ancient writers, and there are many facets to 
any discussion of ancient law. As a testimony to the insurmountability of the topic nomos, there exists no 
one comprehensive treatment of it. There are a handful of books, the scope of which is limited to “early” 
law during the pre-Hellenistic era of classical Athens: Michael Gagarin, Early Greek Law (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1989); The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, ed. Michael 
Gagarin and David Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Douglas MacDowell, The Law 
in Classical Athens (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to 
Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986). It is difficult to find significant treatments on the topic of theory of law in the Hellenistic 
period. Many of the treatments on the topic of Roman law focus less on how law was understood, and more 
on the details of the types of Roman law, the variety of laws put into place by Rome, and how Roman law 
was carried out as a system within the Mediterranean world (D. Johnston, Roman Law in Context 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]; J.A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C.–A.D. 212 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967] ). One general and more theoretical treatment is H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law, 2
nd
 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).   
 
6
 An additional point to note is that our focus will largely be on more-or-less well known writers 
of Greco-Roman antiquity. We will not consider in any detail such things as inscriptions or papyri. These 
may illuminate what we know about nomos, but such data would increase the length of this chapter. Some 
may think that there is some dichotomy between the more literate elite writers and what we find in 
inscriptions and papyri. This may be true to a limited degree. But it is not so clear that what we read from 
the more literary sources does not reflect what is common in society at the time, either. We do not have the 
evidence to assume that, even if certain expressions found in philosophical writers might possess a more 
technical nature, the ideas and general frameworks of thought were not commonly known. To my mind it is 
more reasonable to think that the discussions about nomos and ethical living we will encounter in the next 
two chapters were known more widely than to just a privileged few of the educated philosophers. 
 
7
 By “political” I mean that which concerns matters of civic life in a community, whether that 
community is thought of as the polis or even the kosmos. Political discussions were concerned with how the 
larger community can best flourish. According to Aristotle, political discussions were basically discussions 
of a social nature (Eth. 1.2.7). In Aristotle’s case the social context was the polis. For later writers and 
thinkers, the context was broader than this: the kosmos. Alexander the Great and a number of Hellenistic 
philosophers, for example, wanted to promote the idea of a one-world polis, a kosmo-polis. Much of the 
literature in the wake of this understood political matters also in terms of this idea of a world community. 
The language “political” includes a number of things that affect the community. Our focus will be on the 
social-cultural elements as they relate to ethics. We are not specifically concerned with political theory in 
the sense of government and rulership, thought these also find their way into the discussion at points and 
cannot be completely separated.         
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emerging Greco-Roman world. This is important, since there is also much to say about 
“law” with regard to Ancient Near Eastern culture and civilization. Addressing this is 
well beyond the scope of this study, though it is not insignificant. An investigation of 
how ANE conceptions of “law” might have interacted with or even informed Greek and 
Roman conceptions would certainly be fruitful.
8
 But for this study, our scope is limited to 
the how nomos was understood in the formation of the commonly termed “Greco-Roman” 
world of Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity.  
Explaining this matrix as “political-ethical” is essentially a way of bringing into 
clear focus the important point that ethical concerns nearly always corresponded with 
political life and its social and cultural elements.
9
 As a consequence, I will not be 
focusing on narrower “legal” aspects of discussions about nomos—the various laws 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The word “ethics” comes from the Greek word h1qoj, or “character.” Broadly defined, “ethics” is a 
branch of thought (or philosophy) concerned with practical living. It concerns the “scope and justification” 
of human actions (Paul Barry Clarke, “Ethics,” Dictionary of Ethics, Theology, and Society, ed. Paul B. 
Clarke and A. Linzey [New York: Routledge, 1996] 307. Julia Annas states that ethics concerns “how we 
live and what we do” (“Ethics and Morality,” Encyclopedia of Ethics, vol. 1, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and 
Charlotte B. Becker [New York: Routledge, 2001] 485). One may simplify ethical discussion into two main 
issues: (1) what is one’s purpose? And (2) how does one get there? According to Annas, ethics for Aristotle 
concerned “the notion of our having a final good, an inclusive and unifying aim that structures what we do” 
(“Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness,” in Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays, ed. Nancy Sherman [Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999] 36; see also Eud. Eth., 1214B). As an example of the marriage between 
ethics and political matters, according to Aristotle political science (the study of politics) is concerned with 
both justice and moral good within the polis, ordaining what people should and should not do (Eth., 1.2.7). 
Bruno Blumenfeld puts it in terms of the particular (ethics) and the general (politics) (The Political Paul: 
Justice, Democracy, and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework, JSNTSup 210 [London: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2001] 46), though the relationship, I think, is more complicated than Blumenfeld suggests. 
 
8
 Lawcodes in the ANE certainly predate evidence about law in early Greek thought and society. 
There certainly is more than enough to warrant another book on the topic. Particularly of interest is whether 
and, more probably, how, understandings of the function and significance of law in ANE literature provide 
earlier predecessors for how Greeks and more generally the Hellenistic or Greco-Roman world conceived 
of law.  
  
9
 According to Diogenes the 4
th
 century B.C.E. philosopher, “it is impossible for society to exist 
without nomos; for without a city no benefit can be derived from that which is civilized. But the city is 
civilized, and there is no advantage in nomos without a city; therefore nomos is something civilized” 
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 6.72).  
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themselves and the legal matters involved in carrying them out. As we shall see, this 
political-ethical matrix is inherently theological. In other words, in a variety of ways, the 
political and ethical discussions we encounter in Greek and Roman writers assume a 
divine basis; discussions of nomos and ethical living, as well as political concerns are 
regularly associated with divinely ordained expectations for humanity, whether that is 
expressed as God, Zeus, or “nature” (fu/sij). The reason we want to identify and focus 
on this political-ethical aspect is because nomos in Romans 2 concerns ethical living and 
its intersection with the Jew-Gentile relationship and God’s expectations for human life.10  
Second, we will focus on the issues that revolved around the relationship between 
particular nomos and concepts of “transcendent” nomos within the political-ethical matrix. 
I will highlight central challenges put to particular nomos, the development of alternative 
understandings of nomos—what has been called “higher law” or “transcendent law”— 
and describe in general the contexts of these developments. Our goal is to highlight 
important and common understandings of particular and “transcendent” nomos that 
emerged over time and how these were broadly understood. This will not only illuminate 
the general atmosphere of how nomos was understood, but it will also give us a sense of 
the language used to talk about nomos. Illuminating this larger discussion will be helpful 
                                                             
10
 Implied here is that the Jew-Gentile relationship is somehow “political.” This is based on an 
understanding of “political” as I stated above: that which concerns matters of civic life in the community, 
whether the polis or even the kosmos. The Jew-Gentile issue was, in light of this, quite political in that it 
concerned matters of the Jewish and Gentile communities, and how they were to function and get along, 
within the context of both the early Christian community in Rome and the kosmos. In Romans 2, nomos 
plays a key role in this dynamic, as many scholars have rightly drawn attention to. I am not opposing this. I 
suspect that what we refer to as “social” pertains to what ancients would have thought of as “political.” The 
distinction, on the one hand is very slight. Yet, with regard to the issue of nomos, it is meaningful. Nomos 
in the ancient world was not simply a social regulation, but rather was understood in relation to larger 
political distinctions and ordering. It related to various social distinctions, but these were the consequences 
of it being related to larger political structures and realities. As we will see, “law of nature” concepts found 
their meaning by positing a universal standard over a worldwide political community, and not just a social 
contract. 
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since the understanding of nomos in Romans 2 straddles the line between particular and 
universal, and the widespread Greco-Roman discourse plays an important role in how 
particular nomos could find meaning on a universal stage. 
Third, in the next chapter I will highlight the ways Greek and Roman writers 
expressed the relationship between particular and transcendent nomos and how the 
purposes of nomos merged with certain ethical and philosophical understandings. We will 
attempt to describe how the discourse about nomos could enable claims of superiority 
with regard to the traditions, manners, and laws of particular communities. In other words, 
we will investigate the social and cultural effects of the larger ethical-political dialogue 
about nomos. This will draw attention to a phenomenon that seems to have emerged as 
particular or written nomos, understood in terms of a particular community’s way of 
living, collided with various understandings of transcendent, universal nomos. This 
phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the claims made by Greek and Roman writers 
about the cultural and ethical superiority of Greek or Roman ways of living over the rest 
of the e1qnoi, sometimes referred to as o(i ba/rbaroi (the barbarians)—a term more often 
than not used in a derogatory fashion to describe the “unvirtuous” or those who did not 
abide by the manners of life advocated by a particular writer and his community. As a 
result of this we will have a broader canvas and important points of comparison by which 
to understand how Jews explained the superiority they claimed to possess on the basis of 
their nomos.  
This overview will provide us with a “grammar” of nomos in the Greco-Roman 
world. That is, we will have a sense of the “ABCs” of nomos—the fundamental elements 
of how nomos was thought about and of how it functioned. It is within this “grammar” 
81 
that we will situate Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the Jewish law, which was a 
written no/moj, but universalized and used to promote the ethical superiority of the Jewish 
people. This will help us situate Paul in conversation with his Diaspora Jewish context, a 
context in which Paul grew up, and with which Paul engaged throughout much of his 
ministry.
11
   
Nomos in the Greco-Roman World 
Introduction 
As a topic, no/moj (lex or ius for writers who wrote in Latin) was very much in the 
air of the Greco-Roman world.
12
 The topic is widely attested. First, many Greek and 
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 Without taking too much space in the text, I want to address the work of John Martens, since his 
work overlaps considerably with what I propose to do in this chapter. In his book, One God, One Law: 
Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (Leiden: Brill, 2003), Martens addresses how 
Philo made use of Greco-Roman concepts of “higher law” to validate the Jewish law. As part of his study 
Martens explores the intersection between particular nomos and Greco-Roman “higher law” (One God, 
One Law, 1–66). Martens explores how conceptions of “higher law” were described in ways that rendered 
particular nomos “superfluous” (One God, 2). Martens is careful to note that this result is only occasional 
and limited, nevertheless the study includes little discussion of the wider political issues involved, and no 
investigation of alternatives to the conclusion  that “higher nomos” left particular nomos “superfluous.” 
From my reading, Martens seems to rely too heavily on Stoic frameworks in his understanding of “higher 
law” and on the concept of “living” or “animate” law, which results in an emphasis on certain 
understandings of living in accord with nature that stress the uselessness of particular law. His conclusion, 
then, is that “Philo, though he has adopted the language and the conceptual framework of Greek legal 
thought which could potentially undermine the law of Moses, adapts these potentially troubling Greek 
concepts of higher law, and by so doing strengthens the place of the law of Moses” (159). But, as I hope to 
show, there is more to the Greco-Roman discourse on nomos. Rather than rendering particular nomos 
“superfluous,” it was a much more complex discourse that actually could be used to affirm the nomoi of 
particular communities. Philo did not just draw on a cultural dialogue that could by its nature “potentially 
undermine” the particular Jewish law. Philo and other Diaspora writers were able to say what they did 
about the Jewish nomos because the wider Greco-Roman discourse provided the grammar or framework to 
strengthen particular nomos, even while creating conceptions of “higher law” that transcended particular 
nomos. 
 
12
The prevalence of discussions on no/moj has been noted by New Testament scholars, though less 
acknowledged than by classicists and historians. The application of this widespread topic to New 
Testament study is minimal in comparison. Major works (or significant sections in major works) written on 
the issue of “Paul and the (Mosaic) Law,” surprisingly or not, scarcely mention the topic of no/moj among 
Greco-Roman writers: E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (London: SCM Press, 1983); T. 
Schreiner, The Law and Its Fulfillment: A Pauline Theology of Law (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1993); F. 
Thielman, Paul and the Law: A Contextual Approach (Downers Grove: IVP, 1994); J.D.G. Dunn, ed., Paul 
and the Mosaic Law (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001;orig. published Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996); idem, 
The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 128–61; 625–69; A. Andrew Das, Paul, 
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Roman writers wrote about nomos in writings focused on political or ethical topics, but in 
a variety of genres including poetry, history, hymns, and many speeches or essays. 
Secondly, a number of philosophers devoted treatises specifically to the topic of law, 
commonly titled PERI NOMOU (typically translated, “Concerning Law”). Many of 
these actual treatises are no longer extant, though we have records that they were 
written.
13
 Each of the various approaches to discussing nomos that will emerge in the 
following investigation will giving us a sense of the pervasiveness of the topic.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Law, and the Covenant (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2001); S. Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on 
Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) 297–340; J.D.G. Dunn, The 
New Perspective on Paul, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Two books that address the issue in 
only a very minor way include Hans Hübner, Law in Paul’s Thought, trans. James Greig (Edinburgh: T & 
T Clark, 1984), but see p.41 n.99; Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 2
nd
 ed., WUNT 29 (Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1987); but see his essay, “Paul’s Word-Play on no/moj: A Linguistic Study,” trans. David E. Orton, 
in Jesus, Paul, and Torah: Collected Essays (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992): 67–94 (German 
original: “Sprachliches zum Spiel des Paulus mit no/moj,”in Glaube und Gerechtigkeit: In Memoriam 
Rafael Gyllenberg [Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1983]: 131–54. In the preface to Jesus, Paul, and 
Torah Räisänen notes that he drew on the research of this essay, but only in a very piecemeal manner, it 
seems (Jesus, Paul, and Torah, 7–8). Most all of the above works focus more on the relationship of Paul’s 
view of the Jewish Torah, and so one could say that drawing on Greco-Roman perspectives on the law is 
not necessary. But, this presumes on some level that both Paul and Jews of his day articulated their 
perspectives on the law in ways that did not take up elements of nor would resonate with their Greco-
Roman milieu. Sonntag’s statement is correct: while scholars easily turn to Paul’s Greco-Roman context to 
fill out understandings of many other elements of Paul’s thought (Sonntag uses the examples of 
anthropology, ethics, “Sakrementstheologie,” rhetoric, and social history), when it comes to understanding 
Paul’s view of the law there is a curious hole (NOMOS SWTHR, 1–2). Exceptions include: H.D. Betz, 
Galatians, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979). Betz writes concerning Galatians 3:19–25: “we 
should expect the apostle to enter into the discussion of the subject “On the Law” (peri no/mou~), a topic 
common for the philosophers and theologians of the Greco-Roman world” (162). He continues to refer to 
such discussions throughout his exegesis of this section (164–66; 177–78). See also the statements by John 
Martens, The Superfluity of the Law in Philo and Paul: A Study in the History of Religions (McMaster 
University PhD Dissertation, 1991) 4; F. Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1998) 57; Holger Sonntag, NOMOS SWTHR: Zur politischen Theologie 
des Gesetzes bei Paulus und im antiken Kontext (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2000) 1–2; most recently Niko 
Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
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 According to Diogenes Laertius in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, a number of philosophers 
wrote treatises titled “Concerning (the) Law” (Peri_ tou=] no&mou): Crito (Lives, 2.121); Simon, who took 
notes of “all that he could remember” from Socrates’ instruction (2.122); Demetrius, the student of 
Theophrastus (5.80); and Zeno (7.4), to name a few. 
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The Foundations of Nomos 
Our focus is on no/moj understood as denoting a standard for political-ethical life 
in the emerging and developing Greco-Roman world. Use of no/moj as a political-ethical 
standard has a long history. In fact, one could argue, nomos is foundational to Hellenistic 
political and ethical life. Rosalind Thomas writes that “Greeks in the classical period 
identified the Greek polis with the rule of law and looked askance at imaginary or real 
communities of non-Greeks who lacked law.”14 There are three main components 
understandings of nomos that seem to have been common.
15
 What I say here may not 
have applied to all writers in every instance where they write of no/moj, but these three 
components do, as we will see throughout this study, significantly shape how it was 
understood and how writers reflected upon it.       
First, in its role in the early political development of the 6
th
-5
th
 centuries B.C.E., 
nomos was often seen as the partner of “justice,” even sometimes defining justice.16 The 
laws of Solon, for example, were highly regarded laws because they established justice, 
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 Thomas, “Writing, Law, and Written Law,” 42. 
 
15
 Michael Winger identifies seven components of no/moj on the basis of usage in Paul’s letters, 
which bear some similarities to what I point out here. His components are: 1) no/moj is verbal; 2) it is a 
standard for judgment; 3) it is a guide; 4) it controls; 5) it is tied to a particular people; 6) it has a source; 7) 
people put themselves under it (that is, under its authority) (By What Law? The Meaning of No&moj in the 
Letters of Paul (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992) 21–49, 197. He moves beyond Paul, if only briefly, to 
corroborate this multifaceted understanding of nomos with other Greek and Roman writers (89–108). 
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 See e.g. Xenophon, Memorabilia, 4.4.12: “what is just is lawful.” Though, as we will see, 
Xenophon’s Socrates explains nomos in terms of not only particular nomos but also as divine “unwritten 
nomos.” Cf. Gottlob Schrenk, “di/kh, di/kaioj, dikaiosu/nh, dikaio&w, dikai/wma, dikai/wsij, 
dikaiokrisi/a,” TDNT, 2:178–79, 182–83, 192–93, where the various dik* words all relate closely with 
no/moj. See also Josiah Ober, “Law and Political Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek 
Law, 394–96; James Luther Adams, “The Law of Nature in Greco-Roman Thought,” JR 25 (1945) 97–99. 
The close association between no/moj and dikaiosu/nh, di/kh, or di/kaioj has resulted in some confusion 
about how exactly they are different, and whether “natural law” is the same thing as “natural justice” (See 
G. Striker, “Origins of the Concept of Natural Law,” 82–89).  
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creating a way of living that benefited the rich and poor alike.
17
 Aristotle defined justice 
and injustice in relation to nomos in a way that held currency among many writers and 
thinkers who followed. In his Rhetoric he writes that “justice (dikaiosu/nh) is a virtue 
which assigns to each man his due in conformity with the law (kai\ w(j o( no/moj); 
injustice (a)diki/a) claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law (ou)x w(j 
o( no/moj).”18     
Second, nomos had an authoritative and foundational role in the political 
community that involved more than defining “justice.” Nomos defined the very way of 
life for a particular community. While prescriptive, the commands or instructions of 
nomos also defined and described life for a political community. In other words, as 
Martin Ostwald describes it, nomos expressed “the ‘way of life,’ ‘mores,’ and ‘customs’ 
of a people.”19 Ostwald goes on to note that “although the term e1qoj took on some of 
these elements, nomos never really relinquished them.”20 Law was an attempt to bring 
order and definition to a political community. Helmut Koester sums up the point well: 
““Law” (no/moj)…does not designate just any law or rule one might find somewhere; but 
“law” also is a realm, the world of human beings and their activities, customs, morality, 
and deliberate efforts of ordering.”21 The best thing for all people in the polis was to 
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 See Rosalind Thomas, “Writing, Law, and Written Law,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Ancient Greek Law, ed. M. Gagarin and D. Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 46. 
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 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1366B. 
 
19
 Martin Ostwald, “Was There a Concept a!grafoj no/moj in Classical Greece?”, 96. See also 
Michael Winger, By What Law?, 93: “The association of a no/moj with a people is thus standard.” 
 
20
 Martin Ostwald, “Was There a Concept a!grafoj no/moj in Classical Greece?”, 96. 
 
21
 Koester, “Natural Law (No/moj Fu/sewj) in Greek Thought,” in Paul and His World: 
Interpreting the New Testament in Its Context (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007) 128. 
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follow nomos because the polis and its nomoi upheld one another. To disregard one was 
to disregard the other. This is illustrated in the account of Socrates in Plato’s Crito. 
According to Socrates the nomoi create a binding agreement between the citizens of the 
polis and the polis. Disregarding nomos is equal to treason against the polis and is 
potentially disastrous for everyone. It would be an act of disowning one’s polis and 
ancestors—the very way of life of the community of which one was a part and which 
defined one’s identity.22  
A third important component was that people believed that nomos possessed a 
divine quality. This may be because nomos came directly from a deity or from a lawgiver 
guided by and given authority from a deity.
23
 Heraclitus illustrates this relationship 
writing in the early part of the fifth century B.C.E. that “all human nomoi (oi9 
a0nqrw/peioi no/moi) are nourished by one nomos, the divine one (u9po\ e9no\j tou~ 
qei/ou).”24 But, this is where the potential exists for tension between nomos of the divine 
realm and nomos of the human realm. As later writers would point out, human nomos 
may have been associated with some conception of divine nomos, but the two were not 
the same. As we shall see, difficulties with particular human nomos and changes in 
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 Plato, Crito, 50c–53a. The laws, in an imaginary dialogue with Socrates, state: “he who is a 
destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men.” Likewise, 
for Heraclitus, nomos upheld the existence of the polis and things such as “insolence,” an unlawful vice are 
more of a threat to the existence of the polis than fire (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9.2). The above cited 
reference in n.8 to the 4
th
 century philosopher Diogenes, quoted by Diogenes Laertius is also important: “it 
is impossible for society to exist without nomos; for without a city no benefit can be derived from that 
which is civilized. But the city is civilized, and there is no advantage in nomos without a city; therefore 
nomos is something civilized” (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 6.72). 
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 Many scholars have pointed out nomos was often for Greeks related to a deity. See W.K.C. 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 3:56; Harold Remus, “Authority, consent, law: Nomos, physis, 
and the striving for a ‘given’, SR 13 (1984) 5–6. 
 
24
 Frag.114 in Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, ed. G.S. Kirk [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962] 48). 
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worldview led to a distancing of human or particular nomos from the divine. At the same 
time, however, this did not terminate the attempt to continue to relate nomos to the divine. 
These three are important components that undergirded nomos: it stood as the 
regulating norm for ethical living, defining “justice” in the polis; its significance was 
socially and politically bound; it was related to a higher power and authority. These 
central components do not really change over time. What changes are the contexts in 
which this complex understanding of nomos functioned, and this made all the difference 
for how Greek and Roman writers when they wrote about nomos and its importance. 
Written Nomos 
We begin with the beginnings of ancient Greek life and culture, which  historians 
commonly define with the founding of the Olympic games and the slow but gradual 
development of a “polis-society” as Joseph Bryant puts it.25 According to Bryant, 
important foundational elements of what became Hellenistic culture begin to take shape 
during a period he refers to as “Archaic Greece,” the beginnings of which may be 
identified with the Olympic games in 776 B.C.E., and the end of which can be identified 
with the Persian invasion in 490 B.C.E.
26
 During this period we have the earliest 
evidence of written law among Greeks from Dreros on the island of Crete around 650 
B.C.E.
27
 The weight and significance of written nomos, however, took some time to 
develop and it is not until the sixth century and the early fifth century that written nomos 
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 Joseph M. Bryant, Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece: A Sociology of Greek 
Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and Stoics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 11. 
 
26
 Bryant, Moral Codes, 41. 
 
27
 R. Thomas, “Writing, Law, Written Law,” 43. 
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really had a large-scale effect on how nomos was understood, when what came to mind 
when one spoke or wrote about nomos was the written code of the polis. 
28
   
Although the normative form became written, we should be cautious of reducing 
nomos to mere written command. Nomos continued to be understood in terms of the 
policies, manners, and customs which defined and determined the way of life of a 
particular community. To act “as it is written” was to act according to the particular 
expectations and manners of a particular people solidified in authoritative writing.
29
 The 
purpose and significance of nomos continued to be found in its authority to maintain 
justice and define good and bad behavior.
30
 Putting nomos in writing only solidified its 
fixedness and enforced its authority, a point affirmed by the ancients.
31
  
The written form of nomos also reinforced its political ties. It is no coincidence 
that the emergence of written nomoi as a significant element of Greek political life 
occurred at the same time that individual poleis were asserting their independence and 
developing more formal political identities.
32
 In such circumstances, putting nomos into 
written form was part of the attempt by political communities to define who they were.
33
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 Ibid., 44. 
 
29
 According to Rosalind Thomas, the phrase “as it is written” or “in the writing,” or referring to 
written nomos simply as “(what is) written” were relatively familiar in sixth-fifth century Greek writers 
(“Writing, Law, and Written Law,” 48–50).   
 
30
 “By the latter part of the fifth century, written law was increasingly identified as a necessary 
factor in providing justice for all (in the polis)” (R. Thomas, “Writing, Law, and Written Law,” 42; 
parenthetical clarification mine). 
 
31
 “When the laws are written down, then both the weak and the rich have equal justice” 
(Euripides, Suppliants, 430–34); “written laws are the guardians of justice” (Gorgias, Palamedes, 30 in H. 
Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1951–52) 82, 11a 30.  
 
32
 Thomas, “Writing, Law, and Written Law,” 42–43.  
 
33
 Ibid., 55–56.  
88 
Putting nomos into written form was not just an attempt to create a clearly expressed set 
of rules to be followed, but to put into writing clear markers of expectation for political 
communities, and to do so in a way that solidified distinction from other communities. It 
was an attempt to define and solidify an identity and an ethic for a particular community. 
Some communities, however, continued without putting their nomoi in writing.
34
 
Initially this was not a problem, for it was not for nearly a century that a conceptual 
distinction between written nomos and unwritten nomos became clear.
35
 In other words, 
written and unwritten nomoi, understood as the unwritten customs of a community, 
existed alongside one another to prescribe the way of life for a particular polis. Putting 
nomos in writing was more of a way to draw attention to the significance of the law and 
issue a greater level of stability to it.
36
 During this time, nomos—both written and 
unwritten—existed for a common purpose. It represented that which was constitutive to a 
particular ethic or way of living for a particular community and that community’s 
understanding of the good or telos for human life and the polis. Martin Ostwald sums up 
well the job of the lawgiver: “the lawgiver…must not merely issue written commands 
and prohibitions which can be enforced by the magistrates and the courts, but he must 
also inculcate a way of life which will make the citizens better men.”37    
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 Ibid., 44–45.  
 
35
 By this, I mean that for a short time, written and unwritten nomoi referred generally to the same 
thing, only different in form. The first clear distinction we find is in Sophocles’ Antigone, 450f., where 
Creon’s nomoi, the example of which in the story is a verbal decree, are contrasted with the “unwritten 
laws of the gods.” On this see below.  
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 Thomas, “Writing, Law, Written Law,” 46–47.  
 
37
 Ostwald, “a!grafoj no/moj,” 96. 
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Nomos Challenged 
In spite of its significance for the polis, nomos as it had been understood did not 
go unchallenged. During the fifth century B.C.E. significant challenges to social custom 
and to nomos began to rise. While some were taking steps to solidify nomos in writing, 
others were beginning to question the foundations of its authority. At this time, a number 
of things were happening to disrupt the political and ethical systems that had been 
established, and it is difficult to isolate all of the issues here.
38
 W.K.C. Guthrie has drawn 
attention to two important issues.
39
  
First, some people began to question the role and importance of the gods in 
human affairs. This happened primarily in conjunction with a shift in how people 
understood the physical world. While it may be common to associate changes in 
cosmological perspective to “the dawn of the Hellenistic period,”40 I suggest that, even if 
not a unified picture, this new cosmological perspective had been making significant 
waves before Alexander and the Hellenistic period. W.K.C. Guthrie has pointed out that 
the cosmological-theological shift and the “new cosmology” that served as part of the 
foundation of Sophistic criticisms of nomos was known to Plato.
41
 An image of the earth 
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 As W.K.C. Guthrie states, “the causes of the reasoned rejection of tradition which marked the 
middle of the fifth century were exceedingly complex, and, even if the inflammable mixture can be 
analyzed, it may remain difficult to see why the spark was applied to it just when it was” (The Sophists, 
17). 
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 Guthrie, The Sophists, 14–26.   
 
40
 Martin, Hellenistic Religions, 7. 
 
41
 In Plato’s Republic 10.616B–617D there is a description of the heavens that depends not on a 
three-tiered system commonly associated with the ancient world, but rather one that involves planetary 
revolutions in circular patterns. In this description, which is by no means intended to be a purely scientific 
or astronomical, we nevertheless discern a certain understanding of the “heavens” that involves more 
“natural” movement and involvement of intermediary figures (Necessity, Sirens, and the three Fates) than 
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surrounded by concentric planetary spheres was elaborated on as early as the fourth 
century B.C.E. by Plato’s student Eudoxus (390-340 B.C.E.).42 According to Luther 
Martin, the philosopher Anaximander (611-547 B.C.E.) “suggested that the earth was an 
unsupported cylinder suspended in the middle of the universe.
43
  
These shifts were making waves as early as the Sophists, and the waves were 
slowly washing away what had been stable: God/the gods were being considered by some 
as more distant.
44
 According to Guthrie, there was a division between those “piously 
inclined” and the “rationalists.”45 Physical events or “natural” phenomena were seen as 
just that—“natural” phenomena—rather than divinely ordained. Direct divine 
involvement in the sustaining and ongoing operation of the polis could not be assumed.  
The second issue point is that interactions between political communities, each 
with their own nomoi and understanding of the gods and world around them, also had an 
effect on perceptions of nomos. It was becoming widely recognized that “the customs and 
standards of behavior which had earlier been accepted as absolute and universal, and of 
divine institution, were in fact local and relative.”46 It was not a huge leap to draw the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
some concept of a “god.” Before Plato, the Sophists had begun to question the gods of the Olympic court 
(W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists, 14–26).  
 
42
 Martin, Hellenistic Religions, 7. 
  
43
 Luther Martin, Hellenistic Religions, 7. See also Wendy Cotter, “ Cosmology and the Jesus 
Miracles,” in Whose Historical Jesus, ed. W.E. Arnal and M. Desjardins (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1997) 118–31. Cotter draws attention to how ancients began to describe the kosmos as an 
“orb within an orb.” The earth was in the center surrounded by an outer orb where the gods dwelled, which 
was a place of peace away from the disturbances of earthly life (120–21). 
 
44
 See also Antonia Tripolitis, Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2002) 9–16. 
 
45
 Guthrie, The Sophists, 15.  
 
46
 Ibid., 16.  
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conclusion that each community’s expression of nomos was in reality only a particular 
expression of justice and was more like a localization of that which should be universal. 
This need not be seen negatively, but the consequences of this were noted by many: 
nomos was not itself necessarily universal or authoritative.  
 These words, universal and authoritative, sum up a two-fold problem that 
emerged from this context. Does nomos prescribe something universal? How does nomos 
in its particular forms carry any real authority? The problem of universality seems to have 
centered on the recognition of various other nomoi which all had differences, as well as 
the growing suspicion that the God/the gods might not be directly behind the laws of the 
polis as many had assumed. Gisela Striker puts it this way:  
laws differ greatly from one society to another. What counts as right and 
just in one country, may count as wrong and unjust in another. So there 
can be no universally valid, objective answer to what is just? Justice will 
be a matter of custom or convention, depending upon the consensus of a 
community.
47
 
 
The different nomoi of different communities represented potentially competing ways of 
living and existing in the world. This was because nomos at its core represented more 
than just sets of commands to follow or transgress. As we have suggested, nomos 
prescribed a manner of life. A famous statement by Herodotus, writing at the time of the 
unsettled fifth century, illustrates the problem well:  
For if one were to propose to all humans that out of all nomoi they select 
the best nomoi, all, after examination, would choose their own—all are so 
convinced that their own nomoi are by far the best.
48
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 Gisela Striker, “Origins of the Concept of Natural Law,” in Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. J. Cleary (New York: University Press of America, 1987), 82. 
In this paraphrase Striker is drawing on Plato, Theaetetus, 172B and Laws, 889E. Striker emphasizes that 
the problem was one of “objectivity” (82). I see the problem of objectivity as a key component, but it seems 
that the problem of universal applicability was the real issue for the ancients.  
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 Herodotus, Histories, 3.38.  
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Herodotus illustrates what was becoming a common truth: nomos was not truly universal. 
It stood for what was particular and conventional, identified with this community or that. 
Because of cosmological, theological, political, and social changes, nomos was no longer 
seen as establishing justice or common life for all humanity, but rather was often seen as 
limited to describing competing systems of living.  
Herodotus’ statement also draws attention to the other problem: authority. The 
universality of nomos was limited and thus it was becoming clearer that the authority of 
nomos was also limited to the particular community who recognized its authority. A 
divine source could not be assumed as it had been. Plato, in spite of his preference for 
written or particular nomos, makes it clear that nomos can be deficient when he explains 
that there is a “divine nomos” (qei=oj no/moj) which stands behind the particular, written 
nomos and asserts that God is “the measure of all things.” Ultimately, according to Plato 
good nomoi are those “like” (o9/moioj) God (and God’s nomos), and justice judges or 
rewards those, including lawgivers, who either follow or do not follow the divine 
nomos.
49
 While Plato’s point is to establish a basis for good nomoi, the implication is that 
nomos—particular and written—can be deficient and thereby lack authority. If the nomos 
which had defined justice and life for a particular community was human, representing 
human convention, and not inherently universal or divine, from where did it have any 
authority to define justice and virtue? Guthrie writes, “A code of laws drawn up by a 
human lawgiver whose name was known…could not be accepted in the old way as part 
of the everlasting order of things.”50     
                                                             
49
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In relation to this two-fold problem of universality and authority, many observed 
that nomos inconsistently or infrequently brought about justice.
51
 It became a common 
criticism that the various nomoi fed the concerns of the human authorities and powers. 
For most of the ancient Greeks, this was related to the problem of authority; nomoi 
written up by human lawgivers, naturally would result in a manner of living that fell short 
of a higher standard and would not produce “justice.” Other related criticisms leveled 
against particular nomos included: the human authority behind particular nomos meant 
that it enslaved people to human convention
52
, and it divided people.
53
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 The Cynic Heraclitus chastised the Ephesians, saying that the nomoi, “the things most seeming 
to be symbols of justice” (ta\ ma/lista dokou~nta dikaiosu/nhj ei]nai su/mbola) are “signs of injustice” 
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than wild beasts—savage and evil. He uses the Scythians as an example, who he calls nomads, a people 
without law and justice (a!neu no/mou kai\ dikai/ou) (6). Inferior judges and nomoi (dikastai\ kai\ no/moi) 
results in this people who are in poor condition morally and ethically: they are full of factions (sta/seij), 
injustice (a0diki/ai), arrogance (u#breij), and impiety (a0se/beia) (6). These people do not know that they are 
in such condition, but think they are just fine because “they consider that the (written) nomoi are sufficient 
for them” (nomi/zousi tou\j no/mouj au0toij i0kanou_j ei]nai pro_j tou~to tou_j gegramme/nouj) for the 
purpose of living justly and virtuously. In other words, they have mistakenly held to the authority of nomos 
without recognizing its human downfalls.   
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 According to Callicles, who was not a Sophist, living according to physis is the ethical goal of 
humanity. The animal world demonstrates that what is “natural” for humans is for the stronger to rule over 
the weaker. In relation to this the nomoi of the polis are an attempt by the majority—the “weak”—to tame 
the natural impulses of the stronger few (Gorgias, 483b). This attempt to deprave one’s desires is contrary 
to nature (491E–492A; 494C), and to impose nomos upon one’s life would be the equivalent of becoming a 
slave (492B). He says that those under the nomoi are hampered by chains, imprisoned, and enslaved 
(483b). In contrast, those who act in service of their true human nature are free. Dio Chrysostom criticizes 
written, human-made nomoi in his discourse “Concerning Freedom” (PERI ELEUQERIAS). True freedom 
is not gauged by following human nomoi, but it is living in accord with higher things. He speaks of living 
in obedience with written nomoi in terms of slavery (7). The freedom of which Dio writes is that of the 
philosopher, who is free to do as he pleases, and free to keep the nomos of Zeus, rather than being bound to 
finite, human written norms. 
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 Epictetus, in a remark critical of slavery, states that the deed of slavery is something that 
pertains to “these wretched nomoi of ours, the nomoi of the dead.” Those who endorse slavery “are not 
looking to the nomoi of the gods” (tou\j talaipw/rouj tou/touj no/mouj tou\j tw~n nekrw~n, ei0j de\ tou\j 
tw~n qew~n ou0 ble/peij) (Diss., 1.13.5). The basis of his judgment is that all people, by virtue of reason, are 
kin, brothers by nature. The practice of slavery is one based on life lived according to the human rather than 
the divine nomos, and this results in a division of humanity into such categories as slave and free. 
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It is traditionally pointed out that the Sophists stood behind these initial 
challenges and questions posed to nomos.
54
 The Sophists, within the context of ancient 
Athens, called attention to these various problems with nomos and claimed that “nature” 
(physis; fu/sij) rather than nomos was the only true norm for life because it was 
universal—applicable to everyone, everywhere.55 “Nature” also held greater authority, 
and thus was the one true standard for human life. But the Sophists were not the only 
ones raising questions about nomos. 
Excursus: Physis (fu/sij)         
 The concept of “nature” has the potential to be misunderstood. It would be a 
misunderstanding, for example, to think that the Sophists and later Stoic writers such as 
Cicero were both saying the same thing when they asserted that nature is the universal 
standard for human life. To be sure, the meaning of physis is very complex, and there is 
no singular definition or understanding of physis, even among Stoics. While we cannot 
go into all of the complexities of physis here, we can say a few things about it for this 
study. First, its meaning, like that of any word, was not static. It evolved and was adapted 
to chronological and contextual change. While it could have different referents, it seems 
to have denoted generally 1) the origin of something, and 2) the constitution of 
something.
56
 Something’s origin affects how its constitution is understood, which in turn 
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 The best treatment of the Sophists’ positions on nomos remains W.K.C. Guthrie’s chapter 
entitled “The ‘Nomos’-‘Physis’ Antithesis in Morals and Politics,” in his book The Sophists (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971): 55–134. See also Sarah Broadie, “The Sophists and Socrates,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, 73–97. 
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 The one exception to this is the Sophist Protagoras, for whom “nature,” while the common 
denominator of humanity, was not a desirable state of existence. I discuss Protagoras more fully below. 
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 “fu/sij,” in A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th ed. With supplement, ed. Henry Liddell, Robert Scott, 
and H.S. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 1964–1965; H. Koester, “fu/sij, fusiko&j, 
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affects what is expected as “natural” for said thing. Perhaps we can say that physis 
connoted what should be normative, which is derived from a particular understanding of 
origin and constitution.
57
 This is not to say that there is a “basic meaning” of physis. It is 
to say, however, that however physis was used, the origin or constitution of a particular 
entity was in view. The specific usage, however, wherein the meaning of the word is 
determined, could and often did differ from one writer to another with regard to how 
“normative” was explained in relation to that to which physis referred.58               
 This leads to the second point: to understand what physis denoted, one must be 
clear about the object of physis. In other words, we must ask “the physis of what?” Physis 
did not pertain only to the abstract; ancient writers are concerned to speak of the physis of 
something in particular. This is where the understanding of physis can get quite complex. 
It was first put forth as a contrast to nomos, which was seen as an external standard for 
ethical living that was created by human minds and served the interests of a limited group. 
Physis in this context, then, stood for an ethical standard unrestrained by such 
conventions. The Sophists, the main proponents of this, drew on a particular view of 
human physis based on what they observed about what was “natural.” They understood 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
fusikw~j,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, trans. and ed. 
G. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964)  9:251–277; A.A. Long, “Law and Nature in Greek 
Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, 412. 
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 “fu/sij is everything which by its origin or by observation of its constitution seems to be a 
given. To call it “given” is already to go beyond the sphere of naive description and implies a judgment on 
its actual constitution or true nature” (Koester, “fu/sij, fusiko&j, fusikw~j,” TDNT, 9:254). As this 
explanation of physis suggests, there is a degree of overlap between what is connoted by to physis and 
nomos.  
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 Cf. Koester, “fu/sij, fusiko&j, fusikw~j,” 9:254–58. 
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physis in both a constitutional
59
 and an ethical sense.  The Sophists determined that 
humans were not made to be restrained by convention or social concerns because social 
convention, nomos, was not physikos, or “natural”; it often opposed what the visible 
world makes clear. Thus, humans should not be concerned with others’ needs or the 
social structures of the polis, but rather with their own self-preservation. Ethical living 
was understood as an outgrowth of this. For some this meant that following physis 
was living life unharmed and unhindered. It could involve the good of the polis, but did 
not need to.
60
 For others, following physis was something like a pre-Darwinian rule: the 
strong survive. This way of living was based on the way that the universe operates, and 
so was physikos—“natural”—for life.61 For still others following pure physis understood 
in this way was negative—the equivalent of chaos. To live according to physis, that is, 
according to “natural” human desires, was not to be desired. Instead, the goal of human 
life was to live in harmony with one another—contrary to the inclinations of physis, 
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 I do not mean “constitutional” in the legal or political sense, but in the sense of the constitution 
or inherent make-up of something, in this case the human person.  
 
60
 As an example, the Sophist Antiphon found that nomos had severe inadequacies relative to the 
individual good. Because the laws exist as part of a social pact, keeping them in the presence of others 
maintains social stability — he even identifies this as “justice” which he understood as “not breaking the 
laws of the people.” When others were not present, however, priority went to nature — looking out for 
one’s self. Physis for Antiphon denoted the nature of the individual. Antiphon made a distinction between 
the individual and the community, stressing that physis related to the individual’s pursuit of justice, which 
was elevated above the polis (see Guthrie, The Sophists, 107–113).  
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 The Sophist Callicles goes further than Antiphon in understanding physis in terms of the good of 
the individual. In Plato’s Georgias he opposes nomos to physis and accuses Socrates of wrongly 
assimilating the two (483A). According to Callicles, as the animal world demonstrates, what is “natural” 
for humans is for the stronger to rule over the weaker (from whom we get the common phrase “might is 
right”). The nomoi of the polis are an attempt by the majority—the “weak”—to tame the natural impulses 
of the stronger few (483B). Therefore, laws actually work in opposition to human physis, not only on the 
level of the individual, but at the level of the polis as well. To argue for ‘justice’ in the sense of not taking 
advantage of one’s neighbors is contrary to nature. Those who posited that justice has to do with concern 
for the well-being of others and the ordered function of the polis had not correctly understood “justice.” To 
deprave them ones desires would be contrary to nature (491E-492A; 494C). To impose nomos upon one’s 
life would be the equivalent of becoming a slave (492B).  
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which was seen in a more negative light because humans were inclined toward 
savagery.
62
     
 Shortly after the Sophists, Aristotle articulated his understanding of physis as the 
end product or the telos of the development of something.
63
 For Aristotle physis was both 
ethical and political. Individual humans achieved their “natural” purpose by fully 
applying and integrating themselves into the full functioning and good of the polis.
64
 As 
Stoics later took up the concept and used it, they applied it not to the polis, but to the 
entire kosmos. We will address this in more detail later. But, generally speaking, 
according to most Stoics to live according to physis was understood as aligning one’s life 
with one’s human physis understood in terms of rationality and submission of passions 
(ethical); it was also aligning one’s life with the physis of the entire kosmos and its 
overall good (political). This was something quite different than the Sophists’ 
understanding.   
 The important points we want to keep in mind about physis for now are: 1) physis 
was initially understood as a contrast to nomos; 2) it was not limited to “nature” in the 
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 In Plato’s Protagoras, the Sophist Protagoras argues that virtue—excellence within the polis—
can be taught. To make his point Protagoras tells a “myth” (mu=qoj). According to the myth, humans 
originally existed without the moral attributes necessary to function together in a society. They were in 
essence no different than the animals. In response to the human need, Hermes at the behest of Zeus gave to 
humanity two characteristics: justice (dikh/) and respect for others (a1idwj) (322c). The reasons for the 
myth are two: first, Protagoras wants to claim that virtue is intimately related to social living; the goal of 
human life is a social one realized within the polis. Second, he wants to claim that humans need to be 
taught this virtue since it is not “by nature” (322c-324a). That is, human physis is an animal state, and they 
must rise out of this primitive state. Protagoras goes on to say that the laws (nomoi) of the polis serve to 
instruct those within the polis toward this virtue. 
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 Aristotle, Politics, 1252B: “every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships 
so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each 
thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a 
horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good.”   
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 See Aristotle, Politics, 1253A–B. For Aristotle, the polis is “by nature” (fu/sei) and “man is by 
nature a political animal” (o( a!nqrwpoj fu/sei politiko_n zw~|on).  
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sense of the natural workings of the universe; 3) it was related to ethical living when used 
in the context of discourse about nomos; 4) it represented something transcendent of the 
traditional social and political limitations imposed by nomos and could be used in 
conjunction with the divine; 5) importantly, it denoted not just the standard opposite the 
(written) nomos of the polis that regulated and determined ethical and political life, but 
also the desired goal or purpose of human life. 
The Challenge to Nomos: Beyond the Sophists 
It appears that the Sophistic criticisms of nomos, for various reasons, left the 
greatest impact. But criticisms of nomos came also from other sectors. In Sophocles’ 
Antigone we find a criticism of nomos that is not based on a contrast with fu/sij. When 
Creon accused Antigone of breaking his nomos
65
 against honoring traitors, she responds: 
Yes, for it was not Zeus who proclaimed that edict to me, 
Nor did Justice who dwells with the gods below  
lay down such nomoi (no/mouj) for humanity; 
And I did not suppose that your decrees had such power that you, a mortal 
Could outrun the gods’ unwritten and unfailing rules (a!grapta ka0sfalh~ qew~n 
no/mima). 
 
In this passage the contrast is not with “nature” but with Zeus and “justice” (di/kh), which 
at that time was not just a virtue but a personified, even divine, being.
66
 The main point in 
the passage is that human laws are inferior in relation to those of the gods, which are 
“unwritten.” While we cannot say exactly how Sophocles’ criticism related historically to 
the Sophists’, we can say that Sophocles gives evidence that at an early stage things were 
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 In 449 Creon refers to his edict as “laws” (no/mouj). 
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 Cf. Gottlob Schrenk, “di/kh, di/kaioj, dikaiosu/nh, dikaio/w, dikai/wma, dikai/wsij, 
dikaiokrisi/a,” TDNT, 2:178-79. According to J. Rufus Fears, “justice” among other virtues continued to 
have divine-like qualities and was even worshipped as a personification of certain divine benefits for 
Greeks well into the period of the Roman empire (“The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology,” 
ANRW 17.2, ed. W. Haase [Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1981] 827–948).  
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more complex than just a contrast between nomos and physis (“law” and “nature”). 
Helmut Koester correctly assesses the complexity of the issue when he writes that what 
ensued from the Sophists’ challenge (and the challenges of the fifth century) was not a 
conflict “of particular laws and a “law of nature,” but rather…conflicts between the law 
of the polis and the law of the gods or between written and unwritten law.”67 While 
Koester’s point is correct, his phrasing could be clarified. The contrast is not just between 
written and unwritten law, but between particular and transcendent nomos. The laws of 
the polis, as we have seen, could be both written and unwritten. The problem concerned 
not just the form of nomos, but how nomos was regarded. 
What the Sophists and Sophocles reflect is an ongoing discussion that began in 
the fifth century continued through the next several centuries. It was an ongoing 
discussion in which philosophers and other Greco-Roman writers attempted to establish 
an understanding of no/moj that was meaningful for ethical and political life, while 
navigating the issues with nomos that were brought to the surface. In particular, the 
discussion was one of attempting to articulate an understanding of nomos that was not 
hampered by the problems of authority and universality. It was a discussion that tried to 
strike a balance between particular nomos and a standard that transcended particular 
nomos. As this discussion spanned many centuries, it was accordingly shaped by 
changing circumstances.  
The Larger Socio-Cultural and Political Context: The Development from Polis to Kosmos 
Over the course of these next centuries, the social, political, and religious contexts 
of the ancient Mediterranean world would experience significant change. According to a 
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 “Natural Law (No/moj Fu/sewj) in Greek Thought,” 127. 
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number of scholars these changes occurred in association with Alexander the Great and 
his mission.
68
 John White itemizes that these changes were: 1) the move away from 
“autonomous city-states” toward a universal world kingdom as a result of Alexander the 
Great’s conquests; 2) a cosmological revolution which brought in a “new cosmology” 
which contributed to 3) the distancing of the gods.
69
 We have seen above that two of 
these changes—the shift in cosmological understanding and its effects on how people 
understood the gods— had been in process before Alexander the Great and the rise of the 
Hellenistic era. To be sure, the cosmological shift and distancing of the gods did not 
pervade all people everywhere. But as Wendy Cotter argues, explaining and 
understanding divine involvement in the world and in human affairs was a far more 
complex endeavor than it had been.
70
 A wanting for divine involvement continued, and it 
is likely that a need for divine involvement within this new cosmological-theological 
perspective had an effect on how Alexander and later Hellenistic rulers understood their 
role, replacing the direct rule of the gods with the rule of divinely inspired rulers.
71
 The 
world was no longer subject to direct divine rule, but a divine rule mediated by (semi-
divine) human rulers.
72
 Changes in cosmological-theological outlook may have had their 
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 Cf. Luther Martin, Hellenistic Religions: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987) 4–10; John White, The Apostle of God: Paul and the Promise of Abraham (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
1999) 94–95. 
 
69
 John White, The Apostle of God, 94–95. 
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 Cotter, “Cosmology,” 122. 
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 According to Antonia Tripolitis, the questioning of the traditional view of the gods contributed 
to a need for a more “personal” representation of the divine, which led to an attempt to “replace the 
traditional city-gods in whom the populace had lost confidence” (Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age, 
15).  
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 White, Apostle of God, 95.The information we have of Hellenistic (Pythagorean) kingship 
theories also suggests that the king and the concept of the king as “living” or “animate” law (no&moj 
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origin prior to the Hellenistic era, but their influence was still felt, and perhaps the effects 
were felt on a larger scale. 
The more significant change in the Hellenistic era was that the stage upon which 
people understood their existence expanded from the polis to the kosmos. During 6
th–4th  
centuries B.C.E., the polis was the shaping context even though some of the theoretical 
and philosophical structures that supported it were questioned. In the Hellenistic period, 
by contrast, the importance of the polis itself as the main social, political, and ethical 
institution was relativized. Bruno Blumenfeld writes, “while the poleis declined in 
importance externally and deteriorated internally, the ideal of the polis remained 
undiminished.”73 That is, although the polis remained an important means to identify 
social community, it no longer held the significance and even authority it once did.
74
 
Alexander the Great’s conquests and his push for a universal kingdom played a role in 
the change in the significance of the polis.
75
 According to Luther Martin,  
(t)he goal of this young student of Aristotle was to transform the diverse local 
peoples (of the Mediterranean basin)…into a universal empire, unified by Greek 
language and culture. His empire irreversibly altered the sociopolitical world of 
the Greeks by replacing the local world of the polis, the Hellenic model of the 
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independent, democratic city-state, with an internationalizing vision of the entire 
world as a polis.
76
 
 
 Alexander’s dream of political unity may not have been fully achieved, if by that we 
mean the idea of one unified kingdom. His kingdom was quickly divided, nearly the day 
after his death.
77
 Nevertheless, something of his dream was achieved. The world became 
a Greek world, at least culturally, socially, and in some ways ideologically. Politically 
speaking, the once autonomous polis became one among many which all had to reckon 
with and find their place under a larger power and authority and within a larger world 
community.
78
     
It has been argued that this change in the significance of the polis resulted in a 
lack of confidence with regard to traditional religion and even morality, which “drove 
men inward on themselves.”79 Peter Green writes that the disruption of the political 
stability and breaking of “old certainties, the subversion of traditional patterns and values, 
in particular those associated with the world of the polis” “compelled men to seek self-
sufficiency.”80 This may be a valid interpretation of the events of the 4th century B.C.E., 
but there is another side. These changes did not just lead to a situation of “everyone for 
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themselves” or of people scrambling to make sense of place in a vast and unstable world. 
They also moved some to find their significance as part of something bigger than the 
particular polis. 
As we have seen, the Sophists questioned nomos and promoted life in accordance 
with physis. But they never really promoted the idea of a universal kosmopolis. This did 
not happen until the gradual shift away from the centrality of the polis in the wake of 
Alexander. According to Plutarch, Alexander hoped that Greeks would “consider as their 
fatherland the whole inhabited earth” and that foreigners would not be those who are not 
Greeks, but those who are “wicked” (tou\j ponhrou/j).81 According to this dream 
humanity as a whole should  
not distinguish between Grecian and foreigner by Grecian cloak and targe, 
or scimitar and jacket; but the distinguishing mark of the Grecian should 
be seen in virtue, and that of the foreigner in iniquity; clothing and food, 
marriage and manner of life they should regard as common to all, being 
blended into one by ties of blood and children.
82
 
 
There are a few elements of this passage worth pointing out. First, it shows a view 
according to which the traditional identity markers that correspond with political and 
social distinctiveness (“Grecian cloak and targe”) are not dismissed, but are no longer 
seen as defining markers. Rather, the focus is on a manner of life common to all people 
that somehow transcended traditional distinctions. Second, this perspective envisages a 
political community, as the language of “foreigner” suggests. This political community 
was envisioned as one which united humanity, in contrast to the many poleis which 
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existed. Third, the passage envisions one common manner of life—a common nomos—
for this community.  
Plutarch goes on to state that Alexander the Great “desired to render all upon 
earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as 
one people.”83 Plutarch’s report has its problems, especially that he seems to place 
Alexander after Zeno, which is not possible since Alexander died at least two decades 
before Zeno began to teach as a philosopher.
84
 Nevertheless, the passage gives us an 
important link that contributes to the move from a view of life that was polis-oriented to 
one that was kosmos-oriented. Karl Galinsky draws attention to the related phenomenon 
of the “oikumenē” (oi)koume/nh): 
Oikumenē literally means “the inhabited world.” The concept had been 
enunciated before Alexander but took on new meaning in the wake of his 
conquests. They were a watershed: the windows of the Greek world were 
opened up as never before, and there was no turning back to previous 
horizons. Oikumenē came to denote not only the changed geography, 
which included the Middle East and parts of Asia, but also its social, 
political, and ethnic dimensions. A cosmopolitan variety of peoples and 
cultures lived under the aegis of a ruling power. Even though that power 
was fragmented soon after Alexander’s death into three major Hellenistic 
successor states, the cultural and physical reality of the oikumenē 
persisted.
85
 
  
Plutarch’s statements are significant in that they illustrate the political, ethical, and ethnic 
shifts that, whether or not they fully became a reality, were part of the mission of the 
Hellenized world and became the dominant lens through which the world was viewed. 
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The challenges and possibilities opened up by Hellenization contributed to a concern to 
find unity and human significance on new level—not just turning “inward” for meaning 
and significance. We see the first real seeds of this with the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope. 
Eschewing tradition (nomos) and the idea of being identified with a particular polis (and 
its particular ways of identification), he proclaimed “I am a citizen of the world” 
(kosmopoli/thj).86 This idea was taken up by a onetime follower of early Cynicism and 
founder of the Stoic school, Zeno of Citium (334–262 B.C.E.). According to Plutarch’s 
account of Zeno’s Republic, Zeno proposed a dream  
that all inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by 
their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but 
that we should consider all people to be of one community and one polity, 
and that we should have a common life and an order common to us all, 
even as a herd that feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common 
field.
87
 
 
Zeno desired that all traditional elements of the polis—those things which set one polis in 
contrast with another—should be abolished.88 We should not think that this was out of a 
desire for some form of anarchy, but rather out of a desire to move past the constraints of 
the polis. According to Katja Vogt’s treatment of the passage, Zeno’s concern is not that 
people abandon their particular poleis or that they seek some form of lawless existence, 
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but that people should “not consider (themselves) to be citizens of these cities.”89 
According to Vogt, Zeno is not claiming that all people are in fact citizens of a common 
city, but that “actual cities and peoples should not be our point of reference in how we see 
ourselves and others” and that people should “relate to everyone as we do to those who 
belong to the same city and people.”90 One of the important elements of the passage 
concerns the different notions of “rules of justice” and that all people have a “common 
order.” It is with particular regard to this matter of ethical living that Zeno wants people 
to have common life. In other words, Zeno seems to be promoting an understanding of 
political existence that centers on a certain understanding of ethical living. The decline of 
the ideal of the polis opened up to new ways of imagining human political and ethical life 
on a more universal scale.   
 This sort of idea of a universal world polis informed Roman-era writers as well. 
On the one hand, this idea of the known world as one great community continued in 
philosophical and political writers. For example Cicero comments in his Laws 1.23 that 
the great achievement of the “mind” is to realize that it “is a citizen of the whole universe, 
as it were of a single city.” On the other hand, the rise of the Roman republic, and later 
the Roman empire, was one of fusing many cultures into one.
91
 There is no questioning 
the fact that the Roman empire which emerged after Augustus had subjected all of the 
Mediterranean world—the oikumenē of the time—under its authority as one massive, 
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even if diverse, polis, united politically, economically, and culturally, and socially.
92
 The 
idea became a reality.  
Let us sum up the situation. During the 6
th
–4
th
 centuries B.C.E. political life was 
articulated in terms of the polis and situating the individual within the good of the polis. 
As the transition into the Hellenistic period there developed (not overnight), there also 
developed a tendency to place the individual and her community as well as ethics on a 
larger stage. The ideal was not just to be a just citizen of one’s particular community, but 
to think in terms of one worldwide polis, a perspective which informed also the 
understandings of Roman-era writers and even the mission of the Roman empire. The 
starting point for how ethical living was understood became the entire inhabited world, 
not the particular polis or ethnic community.
93
 The marks of this community to which all 
people belonged, in theory at least, were not defined by being Athenian, Spartan, Greek, 
Egyptian, or Jew, but good and evil or just and unjust. The entry point for how 
differences were understood focused less on ethnic and more on ethical. To be sure, 
ethnic distinctions did not entirely dissolve. Even in the midst of this there existed 
tensions, as ethnic identities and concerns related to particular political or social ways of 
living could not be completely dismissed. As Günther Bornkamm points out, “the ancient 
power of the political understanding of existence, though freed from its concrete political 
associations, is never quite extinguished by a view of the world and God dominated by 
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the ideas of individualism and cosmopolitanism.”94 In other words, these changes in 
perspective did not result in some universalistic utopia. This one world city idea still 
involved defining people in terms of citizenship and other modes of identity marking. For 
Alexander according to Plutarch’s account, the virtuous community was still defined 
according to Greek conceptions of virtue and a citizen of this universal polis lived 
according to Greek ideals. For some Roman writers the epitome was Roman life, which 
may have looked very Greek, but was nevertheless defined on Roman terms under the 
Roman rule. We will address these issues more in the next chapter. At this point it is 
important to recognize that the ideal of one universal polis became the dominant lens 
through which political and ethical living was understood. 
When we relate these changes to the discussion of nomos, it becomes clear that 
understandings of nomos would have to adapt to these changes. As it was with the ancient 
religions which experienced some change as they became “aspects of a common 
Hellenistic religious system rather than expressions of historically discrete traditions,”95 
how people understood nomos also experienced change. But as Luther Martin expresses, 
and as we will see, it is far too simplistic to think that changes in thought with regard to 
nomos were merely “responses…to the cultural situation.”96 In some ways changes in 
how the significance of nomos was understood were indeed responses to the surrounding 
environment; but in other ways it is difficult to pry the changes in thought about nomos 
apart from the surrounding political and social changes. They often happened 
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simultaneously and were equally parts of one grand symphony of ongoing change in the 
ancient world. It was part of the constant struggle between the local or particular and the 
universal. To confine the positive value of nomos to the polis simply would not do if it 
were to continue to have any significance in defining ethical and political life. As a result, 
concepts of a universal nomos developed quickly and diversely. The ability of nomos to 
transcend the particularity and relativity attached to it was necessary for its survival, both 
if it were to continue to have any significance or value, and if the nomoi of particular 
communities were to have any real meaning and not become useless or arbitrary.  
A Transcendent Nomos 
Concurrent to and developing from the problems surrounding particular nomos 
and the changes in the socio-political landscape, ancient writers devised alternative ways 
of thinking about nomos. These alternatives to particular or written nomos trace a parallel 
path in terms of thinking about something that could be universal and unite humanity 
under something common. These alternative conceptions of nomos took various forms 
and are known to us by more than one expression. The main commonality among these 
expressions was in the way they tried to define nomos in a way that addressed the issues 
of universality and authority that caused many to question particular nomos. But these 
were not just attempts to articulate a universally authoritative standard or to overcome the 
problems with particular nomos. The expressions of transcendent nomos point to a 
collective concern and effort to maintain the rule of nomos and to bring a sense of the 
transcendent into personal interaction with human life.  
In his monograph One God, One Law, John Martens identifies three types of 
“higher law” that emerged in antiquity: “unwritten law” (a!grafoj no/moj), “law of 
110 
nature” (no/moj fu/sewj), and the Pythagorean ideal of “living law” (no/moj e1myuxoj).97 
In addition, there existed the concept of “universal law” (koino/j no/moj).98 According to 
John Martens, the result of this was that the various types of “higher law” rendered 
particular law “superfluous.”99  
In what follows we will write of “transcendent” nomos rather than “higher law.” 
The difference is in part mostly one of preference. But there is another reason. In using 
the word “transcendent” I wish to draw attention to the way that these conceptions of 
nomos attempted to transcend the limitations identified with particular nomos with regard 
to universality and authority. I also want to state in an anticipatory way that we will find 
that while Martens’ point about rendering particular nomos “superfluous” may be true in 
some cases, the relationship between particular nomos and transcendent nomos is more 
complex. We will see that conceptions of transcendent nomos, understood on a broader 
canvas, became drawn into a larger discourse whereby they actually provided stepping 
stones for writers to assert universality and authority to particular nomos. In addition, 
articulations of transcendent nomos allow us to see how Greek and Roman writers 
continued to find a place for nomos as a concept and what shape nomos would have to 
take if it were to remain meaningful. Our overall goal in this section is to highlight the 
ways in which these expressions universalized the concept of nomos which by its very 
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nature had denoted that which was particular and local.
100
 In what follows I focus on how 
conceptions of transcendent nomos overcome the problems voiced against particular 
nomos as it had been understood in the ancient world. To what do writers appeal in order 
for these understandings of nomos to overcome the limits of particular nomos? What 
language or frameworks are used? How is the transcendent nomos described? Our goal 
here is not to give comprehensive explanations of all the facets of these conceptions of 
transcendent nomos, but rather to focus on important examples that illustrate patterns and 
distinctive elements of the various types of transcendent nomos. 
Unwritten Law (a!grafoj no/moj) 
The idea of “unwritten law” (a1grafoj no/moj) seems to have been one of the 
earliest attempts to communicate a conception of nomos that transcended social and 
political limitations. Evidence suggests that it emerged around the same time as the 
challenges to no/moj in the 5th century.101 The idea continued to find use well into the first 
century C.E. Over this span of time, there is no strong evidence to suggest that one 
singular and defined concept a!grafoj no/moj ever existed. This is especially true in the 
early stages of its development.
102
 It could be understood variously as ancestral custom, 
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unwritten ordinance, or a transcendent norm.
103
 If there is one aspect that unifies the 
various uses of the phrase it is that its primary significance is as a contrast to written 
nomos.
104
 Given this point, there still could be variety in how writers would describe its 
relationship to written nomos. The contrast could be one of opposition (as in the passage 
from Sophocles below), supplementary,
105
 secondary,
106
 or transcendent to particular 
nomos.
107
 While one should not assume that a1grafoj no/moj by default refers to 
transcendent nomos wherever it is found, our focus in this section will be to understand 
how writers used the concept or language to express a nomos that transcends particular or 
written nomos. How do writers use the phrase in a way that exposes or overcomes 
problems with written or particular nomos? It will become clear that the various ways of 
expressing the contrast are not all that distinct from one another. 
Pre-Hellenistic References 
The first clear mention of the concept as referring to a nomos that transcends 
particular nomos is found in a passage from Sophocles’ Antigone which we’ve already 
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encountered.
108
 One of the central themes of the play is that “divine law is superior to 
human law.”109 Antigone’s famous statement comes in response to Creon’s accusation 
that Antigone broke his nomos
110
 against honoring traitors. I cite the passage again here 
for convenience: 
Yes, for it was not Zeus who proclaimed that edict to me, 
Nor did Justice who dwells with the gods below  
lay down such nomoi (no/mouj) for humanity; 
And I did not suppose that your decrees had such power that you, a mortal 
Could outrun the gods’ unwritten and unfailing rules (a!grapta ka0sfalh~ qew~n 
no/mima).  
 
The problem with Creon’s nomos is that it violates a sense of what is just—in this 
case Antigone’s right to bury a family member. The appeal to unwritten no/mima111 is an 
appeal to a standard of justice that exists apart from written human law, that transcends 
the human decree of a particular political community. Whereas Creon maintains that his 
decrees are no/moi (481) Antigone calls them kh/rugma (454).112 There is a sense here that 
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what is at stake is not just written vs. unwritten nomos. In fact, the play appears to 
question over whether Creon’s edict should really be called nomos, and the issue at stake 
rather is one of defining what is true nomos.  The play itself illustrates “the conflict 
between two fundamental concepts of the order of the world,” where “Creon stands for 
the world of man-made politics, and Antigone for that of divine guidance and order.”113 
Where the human laws conflict with divine nomoi, the human laws fail to truly be nomoi. 
The contrasting option to the human and inferior nomoi is expressed as unwritten nomos 
and nomima. 
In this passage, the universality of nomos is expressed through an appeal to the 
gods. Because a!grafoj no/moj is divine, its commands appeal to all people, regardless 
of political or ethnic affiliation. The point seems to be to give a universal idea of what is 
just and expected of all people, especially with regard to what the gods have established 
for humanity.   
We find another important example of the concept in the fourth century writer 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia in a dialogue between Socrates and the Sophist Hippias. In 
response to Socrates’ declaration, “I say that what is lawful is just” (4.4.12), the Sophist 
Hippias says that the nomoi of the polis are of no account in explaining justice because 
they are merely covenants among people which are often disregarded. Socrates responds 
that the issue is beside the point—the nomoi of the polis when kept lead to harmony and 
agreement amongst the people and also to justice (4.4.15–18). As if anticipating a rebuttal 
by Hippias, Socrates brings up “unwritten nomoi” (a0gra/fouj no/mouj) as a way of 
supporting the claim that keeping nomos results in justice. These unwritten nomoi are not 
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made by humans, but by gods, and are observed in every country (4.4.19). They even 
have a certain content: the first is to “fear the gods”; then “honor parents”; there are 
nomoi against incest; and nomoi concerning the returning of good deeds (requiting 
benefits). As the discussion proceeds, these “unwritten nomoi” are referred to as 
pantaxou= (“all encompassing”), and “nomos of God” (qeou= no/moj). As “nomoi 
ordained by the gods” (tou\j u9po\ tw~n qew~n keime/nouj no/mouj) they exist in some 
tension with those ordained by humans, not only because they are universally observed, 
but also because particular nomoi can be transgressed with no retribution (4.4.21–24). 
These laws can reinforce the laws of the polis, even while they transcend them.  
 This passage gives us a short list of commands of “unwritten nomos.”114 
Interestingly, this short list of commands includes things that would show up in many 
particular or written lawcodes. These commands are isolated because in the view of 
Socrates (or Xenophon?) they are the laws that all communities should follow. What 
stands out is that these unwritten nomoi, being divine, do not fall prey to the problems of 
the particular nomos. The point in the discussion between Socrates and Hippias is to 
identify a nomos that is valid for all people and is taken seriously; even if the human 
written law can be transgressed without any punishment, the unwritten cannot. The claim 
made in the dialogue is that “obedience not only to the laws of men but also to those of 
the gods makes a man no/mimoj and di/kaioj.”115 The claim made in the dialogue is that 
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“obedience not only to the laws of men but also to those of the gods makes a man 
no/mimoj and di/kaioj.”116 
Both Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) and the political orator Demosthenes (384–322 
B.C.E.) write on the cusp of the Hellenistic era. Both of them write of “unwritten nomos” 
in a similar fashion. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric he writes of “unwritten nomos” as a species of 
koino/j no/moj (“universal law”). As a type of “universal law” the “unwritten nomos” 
signifies a standard that transcends political bounds and applies to all people.
117
 Because 
he frames it this way, we will defer treatment of this passage until the next section on 
koino/j no/moj.  
In his On the Crown 274–75, Demosthenes writes about various punishments for 
an individual who sins. It is assumed, it seems, that a “sin” is a violation of nomos. A 
person who sins willfully should receive punishment; a person who sins unintentionally 
should receive pardon; a person who fails at a task approved by all in the polis, yet 
without “sinning,” should not receive reproach, but condolence. Such distinction, 
according to Demosthenes, is “found not only in the laws, but also nature herself has set 
(it) in the unwritten laws and in human customs (a)lla_ kai_ h( fu/sij au)th_ toi~j 
a)gra/foij nomi/moij kai_ toi~j a)nqrwpi/noij h!qesin diw&riken).”118 Interestingly, 
Demosthenes uses the same word that Sophocles used when writing about the “unwritten” 
nomos: no/mimoj. This may be coincidence, or it may be that Demosthenes is taking the 
idea used by Sophocles and expanding on it. In Demosthenes’ use of the phrase, nomos is 
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universal by means of a connection with “nature.” This connection will receive further 
comment in the section on associations of nomos and physis. Demosthenes’ universalized 
“unwritten” nomos seems to be something that exists in addition to the laws of the polis. 
It is a concept used to substantiate the idea of a standard that exists as a regulation greater 
in authority than the written laws of the polis.  
Hellenistic References 
The Pythagorean writing attributed to Archytas,
119
 titled peri_ no/mou kai_ 
dikaiosu/nhj (Concerning Law and Justice), mentions the “unwritten laws of the gods, 
which are opposed by the laws of wicked custom.” These “unwritten laws” are “the 
fathers and guides of the written laws and teachings which men enact.”120 In this 
Pythagorean text the unwritten laws are given universalization through their divine origin. 
They are “opposed by the laws wicked custom,” but a guide for the particular nomoi. 
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Here there seems to be a sense in which the concept exists on its own. It is not just a set 
of commands that all communities follow, but rather is the gauge by which to determine 
good and bad particular nomos. It is important to note that the “laws of wicked custom” 
oppose the unwritten law, and not the other way around. In other words, the unwritten 
laws are the starting point, not the contrast. The main point seems to be to express a 
universal standard that not only contrasts, but rules over human nomos.     
One of the significant points that Bruno Blumenfeld draws attention to is that the 
Pythagorean writings give “a significant cross-section of the popular political, ethical, 
and religious feelings of the urban Hellenistic liberal individual.”121 Given that the 
Pythagorean writings present an “eclectic” sort of philosophy,122 the reference shows that 
the concept of “unwritten law” may demonstrate a popular idea in the Hellenistic world.  
Roman Era References  
The first century political orator and philosopher Dio Chrysostom (40–120 C.E.) 
writes about unwritten nomos in his discourse titled “On Custom” (PERI EQOUS). He 
says that  
Custom (e1qoj) is a judgment common to those who use it, an unwritten law 
(no/moj a!grafoj) of a people or city, a voluntary principle of justice…an 
invention made not by any human being, but rather by life and time. 
 
According to this reference, unwritten nomos is also called “custom.” One might argue 
that Dio is not really writing about a!grafoj no/moj as a transcendent nomos but rather 
“custom” instead. I suggest that Dio is applying a common understanding of a!grafoj 
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no/moj to the idea of “custom” (e1qoj). This becomes clear as the discourse proceeds. 
“Custom” in the rest of the discourse takes on attributes very much like “unwritten nomos” 
as it has been used by previous writers. According to Dio, it stands in opposition to 
written nomos and is universally “accepted by all” whereas written nomos are only the 
“opinions of the majority” (76.1). While Dio seems to limit its scope of unwritten law as 
custom to a particular people or city, what he says later in the discourse suggests that its 
scope is broader. He writes that the unwritten nomos as custom applies in times of war, to 
matters of burial of the dead (cf. Sophocles!), and he gives an example of the Spartans 
(Lakedaimo/nioi) who violated “custom” when they killed the messengers of the king of 
Persia. These examples suggest that unwritten nomos as “custom” still applies across 
time and across political boundaries. Dio also suggests that it has the authority of time 
and experience, giving it a sense of divine authority. Those who transgress it are punished 
by the gods, as Dio suggests was the case for the Spartans who transgressed the custom 
concerning “heralds” when they killed the heralds who came from the king. According to 
Dio, transgression of this “custom” which is “unwritten nomos” resulted in punishment 
“by the divine power itself.”123 Overall, Dio’s statements resonate with what we have 
seen from Xenophon and even from Sophocles, suggesting that Dio is using ideas 
common to “unwritten nomos” and applying them to shape his understanding of “custom.” 
 The example of Dio Chrysostom suggests that the ideas given expression through 
the concept unwritten nomos seem to have remained part of the undercurrent of discourse 
about nomos well into the first century C.E. It continued to refer to an idea of nomos that 
is universally valid and to which the gods hold all humans accountable, in spite of 
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political distinctions. In other words, it is a loosely articulated way to express a 
transcendent standard to which all people are accountable. Though Dio clearly is 
educated and reflects relatively sophisticated philosophical knowledge, his speeches also 
reflect common thought and were given for a popular audience of the many cities he 
travelled.
124
 While Dio is just one example, we can reasonably surmise that what he said 
had some currency in the general culture of the first century as seems to have also been 
the case with the Pythagorean reference. This popular sense of the term and the ideas 
behind it may owe themselves to its early use in Sophocles’ Antigone. 
Conclusion 
What shall we say about a!grafoj no/moj? First, understood as an expression of 
transcendent nomos, it presented a “challenge and claim.”125 It challenged the 
understanding of the particular norm (no/moj), while simultaneously laying claim to an 
alternative norm—also referred to as no/moj. As an appeal to something transcendent and 
universal, unwritten nomos enabled writers to assert some norm of justice or virtue that 
particular written nomos failed to reach. In doing this, writers did not necessarily appeal 
to anything strikingly different than what one would have found in particular nomos; it 
was more a way to lay claim to the universality and authority of certain ethical 
expectations. Those laws or expectations considered universally binding were called 
a!grafoj no/moj. Second, it is a loosely defined phrase and not limited to one system of 
thought or literary genre. As Victor Ehrenberg has shown, this concept of unwritten law 
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as divine and transcendent has a popular origin, and there is no clear evidence that it 
originated with one particular thinker; rather it reflects more a popular idea.
126
 As such, it 
cannot quite be called a “technical term” or really a stable concept. Rather, it gives 
expression to a common idea of a universally applicable, divinely ordered, standard. 
Third, the relationship of unwritten nomos to particular, written nomos was not just one 
of opposition.
127
 For Xenophon it was a way of not only claiming a nomos that was 
universally just, but also a way of confirming certain nomoi one might find in particular 
lawcodes. Even in the pseudo-Archytas’ passage, there is no stark opposition between 
written and unwritten nomos; the opposition is to “wicked” laws, not to all particular law. 
In fact, unwritten law can be a guide for particular nomos. It asserts a norm that is both 
universal and authoritative, not linked with fu/sij, but with the divine. 
Universal Law (koino/j no/moj) 
A second important way that Greco-Roman writers would express the idea of 
transcendent nomos is koino/j no/moj.128 This concept is often encountered in early Stoic 
writers, and according to some scholars the concept of koino/j no/moj may have been a 
forerunner to the Stoic “law of nature.”129 Its close ties to “law of nature” have 
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unfortunately resulted in the concept receiving minimal attention on its own. My own 
research has led me to the conclusion that it deserves fuller treatment as its own concept. 
Though the two types of transcendent nomos (universal law and law of nature) sometimes 
occur in similar and at times the same contexts, we should not quickly conflate them into 
one idea. As John Martens has noted, koino/j no/moj “existed as a concept beside nature, 
closely related, but not yet fully integrated with (law of nature).”130  
Pre-Hellenistic References 
There are not many references to koino/j no/moj in the pre-Hellenistic era. One 
important reference to the idea, however, is found in a well known discussion in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric about making a case for or against unjust and unvirtuous actions. He 
begins by defining justice and virtue as in accord with no/moj.131 Injustice, by contrast, is 
defined as “voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law” (para_ to_n no/mon).132 But 
what is the “law”—the no/moj—of which he writes? Aristotle divides nomos into two 
categories: particular (i1dioj) and “universal” (koino/j). Particular nomos is understood as 
that “according to which, having been written, people are citizens (kaq 0 o$n gegramme/non 
politeu/ontai),” while koino/j no/moj refers to “whatever unwritten (laws) which appear 
to be confessed by all” (o#sa a!grafa para_ pa~sin o(mologei~sqai dokei~). In other 
words, koino/j no/moj finds its meaning by contrast with the political limitations of 
particular nomos. 
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As this passage from Aristotle attests, early conceptions of koino/j no/moj are not 
too clearly distinguishable from unwritten nomos. This is likely because of Aristotle’s 
social and political context. Aristotle was still writing during the period when the polis 
was the central social and political organizational structure. Conceptions of transcendent 
nomos did not yet exist as entities on their own, but more as contrasts to particular nomos. 
As we noted above, “unwritten nomos” was not yet clearly distinguished from particular 
nomos. For Aristotle, the difference between a!grafoj no/moj and koino/j no/moj seems 
to be that koino/j no/moj provided language to express the concept of a nomos that 
transcended both the written and unwritten nomoi of the polis, whereas unwritten nomos 
could represent those laws of the particular community that are unwritten, as well as 
those laws that all people recognize. In other words, for Aristotle, “unwritten nomos” 
refers more to the form and not the identity of the nomos. This seems to be the best 
understanding given Aristotle’s later comments in Rhetoric 1373B where he returns to 
define nomos a second time, using the same two general categories of “particular” and 
“universal.” The particular are “those established by each people in reference to 
themselves” (to_n e9ka/stoij w(risme/non pro_j au(tou&j) and he divides these into 
“written and unwritten.” By contrast, the koino/j no/moj is “according to nature” (kata_ 
fu/sin).  
The emphasis for Aristotle in his expression of koino/j no/moj lies on the point 
that it transcends the limits of particular written nomos which is limited to the 
administration and defining of the polis. There is no sense of any association with the 
divine that sets the universal nomos apart here. His mention that universal nomos is 
“according to nature” should not be taken to refer to a divine or pervasive source of 
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existence. It is, as I pointed out above, a way or referring to the goal or purpose of 
humanity. In other words, this universal nomos represents those common expectations 
which all people hold in common, regardless of one’s political citizenship, because it is in 
accordance with the purpose or goal of human life. The basis of the concept for Aristotle 
in these passages was the concern to find a rationale for actions, decisions, and practices 
that was shared by people across political and social lines; it pertained to what was 
defining of human-ness, rather than to what was defining of political identity. 
Demosthenes also mentions “universal” nomos in his Against Aristocrates. We 
find the reference in a section where Demosthenes discusses a written law concerning 
“lawful homicide.”133 As part of his argument he asks, “is it not manifestly contrary to 
law (parano/mon)—not only contrary to written law, but also contrary to the universal 
(law) of all humanity (ou ) mo/non para_ to_n gegramme/non no/mon, a)lla_ kai_ para_ to_n 
koino_n a(pa/ntwn a)nqrw&pwn)—that I should not be permitted to defend myself against 
one who violently seizes my goods as though I were an enemy?”134 John Martens sees 
this as an example of “unwritten law” based on the contrast with “written law.”135 But a 
contrast with written law does not necessarily imply “unwritten law.” In this instance the 
concept is not clearly set in contrast to or opposition to written nomos. It is a nomos to 
which Demosthenes appeals to enhance the gravity of the issue at stake. The word 
Demosthenes uses is koino/j, and the parallelism of the phrase suggests that he has, in 
fact, koinos nomos in mind: ou ) mo/non para_ to_n gegramme/non no/mon, a)lla_ kai_ para_ 
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to_n koino_n  (no/mon). Demosthenes’ use here suggests that the identifying mark of 
universal nomos is that it is valid for all humanity. There is again no clear divine 
connection here, but rather a sense of what is common or universal because some sort of 
agreement on what is a given for human life. Nomos is universalized through the 
adjective koinos, which attributes an authority to nomos as that which determines what is 
right on the basis of a universal, or common, humanity.    
Hellenistic References 
Early Stoic references to koino/j no/moj, articulated in new contexts, give the 
concept slightly new meaning. The early Stoic Cleanthes gives us an important example 
in his Hymn to Zeus. In the hymn koino/j no/moj is that by which Zeus is “governing all 
things.”136 It is an ethical standard for humanity: the evil ones of the earth “neither see 
nor hear God’s universal law” (ou!t 0 e0sorw~si qeou~ koino_n no/moj ou!te klu/ousin), 
obedience to which leads to the good life.
137
 The ultimate goal for humanity, stated in the 
closing of the hymn, is for humans and gods to “always praise the universal nomos in 
justice” (koino_n a)ei_ no/mon e0n di/kh u9mnei=n).138  
Here we find a strong theological component; the idea of koino/j no/moj is 
understood as a transcendent nomos by which Zeus governs all things. It is not set in 
contrast to written nomos, rather it is a concept of nomos that exists on its own and 
pervades the universe. It is the one norm for all humanity, and Cleanthes divides 
humanity according to whether they follow this law or not. Regardless of whether or not 
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they follow particular or written nomos, evil people are those who do not follow God’s 
koinos nomos.  
In Cleanthes’ use we find a clearer sense of how one follows this transcendent 
nomos. The behaviors or actions that define those who do not follow koinos nomos 
include being without good (a!neu kalou~), seeking glory (do/ca), advantage 
(kerdosu/naj), and the pleasures of the body (sw/matoj h9de/a e1rga).139 By contrast, 
good people follow God’s law (again no concern for following particular nomos) and it 
leads them to the good life. Cleanthes associates the “universal nomos” with “justice” 
when he prays “grant that (human beings) obtain the insight on which you rely when 
governing all things with justice” (34-35).  
With Cleanthes, we see that the concept takes on a fuller meaning than with 
previous writers. It is the main way that Cleanthes describes the ethical standard for all 
humanity, and humanity is divided not according to ethnic or social lines but according to 
those who keep koinos nomos and those who do not. Like Aristotle, Cleanthes defines 
this nomos broadly in relation to justice and virtue, and negatively explains it by pointing 
out the vices of those who do not follow it. Here, however, there is a clear connection 
with the divine and a more robust universalization of nomos.
140
 
An additional component in Cleanthes’ understanding of universal nomos is 
lo/goj. At the beginning of the hymn, Cleanthes says that Zeus “govern(s) all things” 
through no/moj (v.2). Later, Cleanthes states that Zeus directs the universe with 
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“universal reason” (koino_n lo/gon; v.12), which, like the universal nomos, permeates all 
things. Both the lo/goj and no/moj function as ways by which Zeus guides or directs the 
universe, and it appears that the two are related, and that both apply universally to all 
humanity. This connection of nomos with logos appears to suggest that Cleanthes is 
working with the Stoic concept “law of nature.” It is important, however, that logos and 
nomos are not explicitly identified with each other, and the universal nomos is not 
identified with Zeus. As Johan Thom importantly states, “Cleanthes distinguishes Zeus 
from his “modalities” no/moj, kerauno/j, lo/goj, and gnw/mh; in the Hymn, Zeus as king 
controls and uses these to create and maintain order in the universe.”141 A fuller 
expression of “law of nature”—at least in the Stoic usage—does not allow for such 
distinctions. In spite of the Stoic affinities of the author, it has been observed that “there 
is nothing particularly Stoic” about Zeus and that in the Hymn “very little technical 
terminology is used that is demonstrably Stoic (other than koino_n lo/gon and koino_n 
no/mon and the statement about reason “permeating everything” [dia_ pa&ntwn 
foita~|]).”142 Much of the thought in the hymn is in fact more “traditional” or common 
philosophical language that had not yet developed into what many identify with fuller 
expressions known in Stoic thought.
143
    
After Cleanthes, the Stoic Chrysippus (280-206 B.C.E.) associated universal 
nomos with “logos” in a slightly different way, and more closely with “nature.” He wrote: 
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the goal (te/loj) may be defined as life in accordance with nature, in other words, 
in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe; a life in 
which we refrain from every action forbidden by the universal law (o9 no/moj o9 
koino/j), that is to say the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical 
with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is.
144
  
In Chrysippus’ statement nomos is identified with the cosmic logos “which 
pervades all things.” By connecting nomos to logos the koino/j no/moj becomes not just 
some external standard given by God; it refers to an inner principle that unites humanity 
to nature and the kosmos. What is “common” or universal to humanity is the shared 
possession of logos, and so the universal nomos is also identified with “right reason.” 
This association also provides a very close connection between nomos and physis in that 
living in accordance with universal nomos is the same thing as living in accordance with 
physis. We will postpone discussion of the significance of Chrysippus’ association with 
physis until the next section. For now, it is important to recognize that for Chrysippus 
koino/j no/moj gives nomos universal scope in a new and more complex way through 
association with an all permeating lo&goj and an association with fu/sij. Moreover, it is 
not an association with physis that is like Aristotle’s; rather, Chrysippus’ association 
incorporates a more cosmic understanding of physis. For Chrysippus, koinos nomos is not 
just set in contrast with particular or written nomos. It is, as with Cleanthes, its own full 
independent ethical standard. 
Roman Era References 
In Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ Antiquitates Romanae, we encounter a “a law 
universal to all” which is “of nature” (fu&sewj ga_r dh_ no/moj a#pasi koino/j) and which 
time cannot destroy.” This law “ordain(s) that superiors shall always govern their 
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inferiors.”145 The nominative use of the words no/moj and koino/j suggests we are dealing 
with the concept of koino/j no/moj. Dionysius’ understanding of the concept universalizes 
nomos by appealing to its ability to transcend time; from generation to generation, from 
one political community to another, this law is valid. Dionysius writes this in defense of 
the subjection by the Romans over others. For Dionysius koinos nomos supports Roman 
dominance; the principle espoused is a nomos that all people over time share in common. 
The relationship of the genitive fu/sewj (“nature”) to the rest of the phrase, no/moj 
a#pasi koino/j, is difficult to define. It appears that this “universal nomos” to be 
identified with “nature.” But from this passage alone we are not certain as to how 
Dionysius understands “nature.”   
Another passage in Dionysius’ Antiquitates helps clarify this. This time the idea 
of koino/j no/moj occurs in a speech attributed to the Alban Fufetius, which is addressed 
to his fellow Albans before battle with the Romans. Fufetius exhorts the crowd by 
stressing that their fight with the Romans is an attempt to “restore to its original force the 
compact which the Romans have violated…that fathers shall rule over and give just 
commands to their children, and mother-cities to their colonies.”146 This “compact” 
according to the passage is “the universal law of both Greeks and barbarians” (o( pa/ntwn 
koino_j  (Ellh/nwn te kai_ barba&rwn bebaioi~ no/moj) and is a law “human nature has 
established” (fu&sij h9 a)nqrwpei&a katesth&sato). In the speech, Fufetius goes on to 
contrast this law with the Roman imposition, with the resulting indictment that the 
                                                             
145
 Dionysius of Halicarnassius, Antiquitates Romanae, 1.5.2.  
 
146
 Dionysius of Halicarnassius, Antiquitates Romanae, 3.23.19.  
130 
Romans are positing “the law of man above that of heaven.” As a consequence of 
violating the koino/j no/moj the Romans have also brought the anger of the gods.    
While this law is associated with “nature” the emphasis lies on seeing it as a 
divine and universally transcendent law as opposed to a human law which is represented 
by the Roman enslavement of the Albans. The emphasis is on the universality of the law 
for all people. It may be that the use of “nature” in this speech is intended to mock 
Roman claims than it is an actual part of the understanding of koino/j no/moj in this 
speech. It is held in tension with his understanding of universal nomos in the passage 
from Antiquitates. What is important is that physis refers to “human nature.” It is the 
emphasis on what is common to humanity that makes this universal nomos a heavenly 
(divine) law. By contrast the imposition of the Romans is opposed to the heavenly nomos 
and reflects an attempt to impose a human rule over that of the gods because it violates 
what is “natural” or constitutive of humanity.  
Conclusion 
Like a!grafoj no/moj, through the concept koino/j no/moj writers attempt to 
express a standard that transcends social and political bounds. The concept does not exist 
just an antithesis to particular nomos. The emphasis with koino/j no/moj lies on the way it 
appeals to common humanity. This comes across in two shades. On the one hand the 
concept exists as a standard that unites humanity into a common people, united by one 
manner of life. On the other hand, the concept is expressed as a standard that necessarily 
issues from the premise of a common humanity, rooted in what is “natural” for humanity. 
The way that this nomos is understood as part of the intrinsic fabric of what it means to 
be human, it is also transcendent and even “divine.” The logic seems to run both ways: 
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because it is divine it appeals to what is “natural” to humanity; or because it defines what 
is “natural” or intrinsic to human existence it is thus divine. Like unwritten nomos this 
law has no clearly defined content. It is identified by association with justice, and more 
loosely with various virtues, and it is contrasted with vices in Cleanthes’ Hymn. 
Whatever the koino/j no/moj expresses, all humanity is accountable to it, and to violate it 
is to violate common human expectations, and even the gods in some circumstances. It is 
a concept that seems to have existed for some time, finding currency in multiple schools 
of thought, even though it also had close ties to early Stoic references and as a forerunner 
to “law of nature.” It does find use in connection with appeals to fu&sij, as we have seen, 
but the situation is more complex than to say that koino/j no/moj and “law of nature” are 
the same. It is to associations of no/moj and fu/sij we now turn. 
Law in Accord with Nature 
Some may consider the concept “law of nature” the capstone of approximations of 
transcendent nomos.
147
 In one way it is, since the phrase no/moj fu/sewj brings together 
what was initially kept apart: nomos and physis Yet, it would be a mistake to think that 
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that all other conceptions of transcendent nomos were moving toward “law of nature,” or 
that they find their “fulfillment” in this concept, or even that there is one singular 
understanding of “law of nature.” For one, opposition to physis was not the only criticism 
of nomos. The problems with nomos are more complex than a simple opposition to physis 
and bringing nomos and physis together does not necessarily “complete the circle.” In 
addition, we have just seen other attempts to articulate a transcendent norm that need not 
by necessity have any significant appeal to “nature”; where it is associated with another 
expression of transcendent nomos, it seems to be a secondary or supplementary addition. 
Rather than thinking of “law of nature” as the capstone of transcendent nomos, we should 
consider it as one of a number of ways by which Greco-Roman writers articulated a 
transcendent nomos.     
When we are talking about “law of nature” what are we talking about? The 
origins of the concept and how we should understand the “true” expression of the concept 
has been a topic of significant discussion and debate.
148
 Helmut Koester has shown that 
the actual Greek phrase no/moj fu/sewj occurs very infrequently in Greek writers before 
Philo, that it is found “not even half a dozen (times) in all extant Greek literature of pre-
Christian times.”149 According to Koester this is because,  
Stoicism has not overcome the deep-rooted antithesis of no/moj and fu/sij. 
Neither does nature ever have the status of a divine legislator…nor could law lose 
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its connotation of existing by “thesis” (i.e. by enacted agreement and contract) 
and thus it does not quite agree with all things that exist by fu/sij.150 
  
Koester argues that one does not really find the concept “law of nature” (no/moj fu/sewj) 
even in Stoicism. Rather, “Philo was its creator, at least insofar as the evidence from the 
Greek literature is in question.”151 In making this conclusion, Koester has focused his 
sights on the terminological juxtaposition itself—no/moj fu/sewj. So, as far as this goes, 
Koester seems to be correct. But there are two problems with Koester’s statement, 
problems which suggest that it may not be the most fruitful to think in terms of the phrase 
no/moj fu/sewj or a singular conception of “law of nature.” First, Koester states that law 
could not lose its connotation of existing by “thesis.” By this he seems to mean that law 
always connotes some sort of established or agreed upon contract of commands to which 
people are bound. This may be true to a degree with regard to particular nomos, but as we 
have seen, expressions of transcendent nomos which had been popular for some time, 
suggest that nomos connoted more than just “thesis.” This suggests that particular nomos 
does connote the idea of “thesis” to a good degree, but it does not allow for nomos as a 
concept to be categorized in this way and thus that nomos by definition is opposed to 
physis. Second, a number of scholars have pointed out that there is more to the issue of 
“law of nature” than the terminological connection of nomos and physis. They have 
argued that there is a long process of development of the idea, and that the key 
components of the idea may be found earlier than Philo.
152
 These scholars make 
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important points, and press us to make an important distinction between the actual phrase 
no/moj fu/sewj and other positive conceptual associations of nomos and physis.153 Even 
though the actual phrase uniting no/moj and fu/sij may not be found until later writers, 
we should not think that the concept behind the actual phrase no/moj fu/sewj suddenly 
emerges at a certain point in the history of the development of nomos.
154
  
But then where does one draw the line to determine where one association of 
nomos and physis is not properly “law of nature” and where another is? We have read 
some writers already who positively associate nomos with physis. Have we encountered 
in these texts “law of nature” or just a less developed association of nomos with physis? 
This is not an easy question to answer. If there is an “ideal” expression of the concept, 
where would it be found?
155
 Approaching the topic with the intent of finding the “ideal” 
or “pure” articulation of the concept tends to minimize the significance of other 
formulations in light of the “pure” formulation, however it might be conceived. One 
might reply that the association of nomos and physis made by Stoic writers, an 
association that includes the unifying logos, is where the true idea of “law of nature” is to 
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be found. But the problem is that even Stoics express the concept in various ways. Which 
is the correct one?  
There are also Greek writers who positively correlate nomos and physis, but 
without the accessory understanding of logos or Stoic conception of God or nature. If 
certain expressions are not “law of nature” proper, what are they? Alternatively, there are 
some formulations that include the accessory Stoic elements but do not actually use the 
phrase no/moj fu/sewj. Is there evidence to suggest that the later expression no/moj 
fu/sewj points to the same thing as earlier formulations that lack the phrase? Is it the 
phrase no/moj fu/sewj that we should be looking for, or something else?  Or should we 
think of a “spectrum within a spectrum” that defines the “true” idea of “law of nature” as 
distinct from other associations of nomos and physis? 
Rather than describe a definite singular concept of “law of nature,” I suggest that 
what we have among ancient writers is a series of approximations whereby writers 
positively link nomos and physis: ‘law corresponding to nature,’ or as Alan Millar has put 
it, “the Follow Nature doctrine.”156 The associations made between nomos and physis by 
some Stoic writers may be more developed expressions, but only from the perspective of 
thinking that the inclusion of logos and an association of physis with Zeus make it so. 
Another way to see things is that expressions within the Stoic sphere of thought represent 
a set of related associations along a wider spectrum which includes other non-Stoic 
associations of nomos and physis. Seeing things in this way, I think, is more helpful for 
understanding the concept on the larger landscape of the Greco-Roman nomos discussion. 
This also will help us make sense of the concept with an eye on situating how Diaspora 
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Jewish writers and Paul may have associated nomos with physis, if they did at all. Our 
concern in this section, then, is with the various ways that writers positively related 
nomos with physis as a way of giving transcendence to nomos, and as a way of giving 
nomos a universality and authority that is not subject to the limits of particular nomos. 
Pre-Hellenistic References  
As we have seen, the term physis was generally opposed to nomos in the fifth 
century. But the opposition was not simply terminological in nature. As A.A. Long points 
out, both nomos and physis could be used to denote normative status of something. 
Furthermore, Long points out that if the problem were inherent in the words themselves, 
we would have never seen them being brought together. Rather, the nature of the 
opposition or contrast had to do more with the social and contextual limitedness of no/moj 
as it had been understood in the 6
th
–5
th
 centuries B.C.E. and the conviction that fu/sij 
transcended such social constraints.
157
 The relation of nomos and physis is also 
complicated by the fact that physis took on slightly different meanings for different 
writers. Asking ‘the physis of what?’ question and inquiring into how a certain writer 
understood and applied this concept makes a difference in how it might have been set in 
relation to nomos. The early Sophists understood physis in contrast to nomos. But, this 
contrast was not always negative or one of opposition.
158
 For those writers for whom 
there was a positive connection between nomos and physis, it was that physis provided a 
basis upon which they could claim that nomos is transcendent and universal.  
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In Plato’s Gorgias we find a reference to “law of nature” in a dialogue where 
Callicles discusses those who triumph and show their strength over “weaker” people 
enslaved by nomos. He makes the claim that “justice consists in the sway and advantage 
of the stronger over the weaker” (483D). He goes on to say that those who fulfill this 
truth  
act according to nature—the nature of (what is) just (kata_ fu/sin th_n tou~ 
dikai/ou), according to the law, indeed that of nature (kata_ no/mon ge to_n th~j 
fu/sewj)—though not, dare I say, according to the one we have set in place…but, 
when someone arises with a nature of sufficient force, that one shakes off all that 
we have taught, bursts the bonds and breaks free; he tramples underfoot our 
written codes (ta_ gra/mmata) and juggleries, our charms and laws (no/mouj), 
which are all against nature (tou_j para_ fu/sin a#pantaj)…and here the full 
light of that which is just by nature shines forth (e0ce/laymen to_ th~j fu/sewj 
di/kaion).159 
 
 For some scholars this passage is cited as an example that is not actually a 
reference to “law of nature.”160 This may be true if by “law of nature” we have in mind 
the idea of a nomos based in physis understood as an all-encompassing ethical system. In 
Callicles’ statement nomos is understood as that which regulates what is normative and 
just for humanity. For Callicles, nomos is both in accord with physis and contrary to it. 
The difference is the character of the nomos to which he refers. The emphasis on 
Callicles’ formulation lies on the contrast with the particular and socially constructed 
nomoi of the polis. The nomos that is understood in terms of the written codes does not 
reveal true justice. It is nomos in accord with physis that does this. By “nature” he means 
that of the individual living in full accord with one’s desire and strength. The nomos 
according to physis is an attempt to give expression to a standard that is in accord with 
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natural human desires and inclinations, specifically for the strong to rule over the 
weak.
161
 It is not a universal ethical standard found in the very workings of the entire 
kosmos, but an expression of a standard intended to oppose and transcend the constraints 
of the nomos of the polis. It is the basis for ethical living in that it is his starting point for 
how a person should conduct their life. In Callicles’ expression, there is no real sense of 
the content of this transcendent nomos; but this is not the point. It is a nomos—a 
standard—which is just in that it realizes the proper functioning of the human person. As 
such, for Callicles, it was a nomos that all humanity should strive toward as that which 
would free humanity.  
We find a slightly different expression in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1373A–B, a 
passage we have already encountered. In this passage Aristotle writes of universal nomos 
(koino/j no/moj). This type of nomos, he claims is “according to nature” (kata_ fu/sin).162 
This is based on Aristotle’s idea that “there is, which all people surmise, by nature a 
common/universal (idea of) just and unjust (fu/sei koino_n di/kaion kai\ a!dikon), even if 
there is neither communication nor agreement between them.”163 Because there is such a 
conception of justice according to nature, there must also be such a conception of nomos, 
for justice and injustice are defined in relation to nomos, a point he made earlier in the 
discourse.
164
 This “universal law” “prescribe(s) what is naturally just in the sense of 
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being a necessary part of the order of any human community.”165 This law, being in 
accord with nature, transcends any ways that particular customs might express what is 
just and unjust. By associating nomos with physis, Aristotle finds a universal human basis 
for koino/j no/moj. This is not just a nomos common to all people, but it is part of human 
physis—it is in accord with the ideal purpose of humanity.       
Gisela Striker comments that the connection to nature in this passage is different 
from the later conception “law of nature” because these laws of which Aristotle writes do 
not represent an entire “system of law that defines right conduct.”166 This is an important 
point. We may also add that “nature” for Aristotle is not quite the same thing as it is for 
later writers. For Aristotle, “nature” is best understood in terms of the proper ethical-
political telos of humanity, like Callicles. However, it is the complete opposite of how 
Callicles’ understands this. But, like Callicles, physis has little to do with the entire 
kosmos as some vast principle that should regulate all life. Nevertheless, for Aristotle 
these laws are universal because they prescribe what belongs to the physis of humanity as 
he understood it. This universal nomos therefore is properly kata_ fu/sin.167 This is not 
the origin of “law of nature.” Neither is it necessary for us to posit that Stoics developed 
their concept from Aristotle. It is simply one approximation of a transcendent nomos 
wherein Aristotle’s notion of physis forms the basis for what he defines as just.  
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Hellenistic References 
An important change that affects associations of nomos and physis in Hellenistic 
formulations is, as we saw above, “a turn to the cosmic at a time when the civic no longer 
framed the ambit of meaning and purpose.”168 This affected writers’ understandings of 
physis in that some common understandings of physis move toward a more cosmic 
concept that is greater than simply the goal of human existence.  
The founder of the Stoic school, Zeno of Citium (334 B.C.E.–262 B.C.E.) was 
naturally the first of the Stoics to begin to frame ethics and politics within such a cosmic 
framework. There is some difficulty piecing together his views because we are dealing 
with scattered statements in different authors. From what we can gather, according to 
Zeno the telos of life was to live according to physis. In his Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers Diogenes Laertius records that  
Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end 
‘life in agreement with nature’ (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same 
as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us.
169
 
  
From the passage, physis referred to human nature, which was to be a rational, just, and 
virtuous being.
170
 For Zeno what stood in contrast to civic convention was rationality 
(logos) which united all wise people and demonstrated their communion with physis. 
This is where Zeno differs from Aristotle. For Zeno and many Stoics after him physis, 
logos, and God were one and the same. There was a “divinity of Nature” as A.A. Long 
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puts it.
171
 Long goes on to say that Aristotle “did not conceive nature as a rational agent” 
and “by setting nature/God within the world, (the Stoics) have united under a single 
principle functions which Aristotle kept apart.”172 At the same time, however, this 
understanding of fu/sij reflects a more widespread attempt to continue to associate a 
transcendent standard for living with the divine realm. 
According to Zeno, one lived in accord with physis by cultivating one’s logos, 
because physis itself was rational. According to Anthony Long, for Zeno “correct reason 
is…sufficient by itself to fulfill the function of (particular) law” and “because it is the 
function of normative human nature, its scope is universal or common. Hence natural law 
simply is the correctness of reason that any human being, in principle, can achieve and 
act on.”173 Zeno does not use the word nomos here, but in Plutarch’s account of Zeno’s 
Republic humanity possesses all things “common” and there is an ideal of a “universal 
nomos” that governs all people.174 Nevertheless, from what we can surmise Zeno begins 
the process of a development of a way of universalizing nomos through an appeal to 
physis.   
It is with Chrysippus that we have a fuller statement connecting nomos with 
physis. We have already considered this passage above. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
Chrysippus held that: 
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Our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. And this is 
why the goal may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or in other words, 
in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in 
which we refrain from every action forbidden by the universal law (o9 no/moj o9 
koino/j), that is to say the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical 
with Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of 
the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the 
harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who 
orders the universe.
175
  
 
The nomos to which Chrysippus refers is common to humanity by virtue of the 
logos which pervades all people and all things. Diogenes draws attention to an important 
distinction when he says, “by the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, 
Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, 
whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be 
followed, without adding the nature of the individual.”176 Nomos here is equated with that 
which is in accord with both human physis and cosmic physis which are united to Zeus 
through the concept of logos. From the overall content of the statement, nomos functions 
as the standard of justice and injustice which defines the existence of those who lived as 
part of common humanity. As Phillip Mitsis writes, “the cosmos itself is viewed by the 
Stoics as having a political structure which is administered by Zeus’ divine reason and 
whose natural laws provide the basis for moral values and a life in accord with nature.”177 
Chrysippus’ formulation most clearly presents the key ingredients for what many 
scholars refer to as natural law proper: a nomos that is not external to, but rather 
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identified with the universe itself, physis and her ways, which ultimately is God, united 
with the human individual via logos.   
A central element of the association of nomos and physis for these Stoics is 
lo/goj. For most Stoics, the divine lo/goj ordered things and produced harmony in the 
world.
178
 It not only issued from Zeus, as we saw in Cleanthes’ Hymn, but could also be 
identified as Zeus as we find in Chrysippus’ statement. This logo/j which permeated the 
universe also was constitutive of humanity; it was the way that the physis of the kosmos 
was united with the physis of the individual human.
179
 There was a logic, it seems, to this 
way of understanding things. By possessing logo/j all people possessed something of 
God and of nature. Living according to lo/goj was understood in terms of complying 
with the divine no/moj that ordered the world, and this was living according to not only 
the fu/sij of the kosmos, but also of one’s own humanity.180 To do this, humans are to 
follow logos because the distinctive element of human life is rationality; just the same, 
following physis for a horse is to eat hay.
181
 This central place of logo/j solidified an 
“inner” element to what otherwise was a transcendent no/moj independent of the human 
person.
182
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This connection of nomos and logos is a crucial element for Stoic formulations 
that universalize nomos via a connection with physis. The “law” in accord with physis 
within this system designates “the perfected rationality of the Stoic sage, whose 
disposition enables him infallibly to ascertain the natural course of action in every 
circumstance, rather than with a system of legislation or code of moral rules.”183 This, 
according to Vander Waerdt, is how early Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus 
understood the concept. They, in a sense, redefined nomos.
184
 Nomos became not just a 
transcendent norm, but something constitutive of the universe itself and of God, 
sometimes even identified as God.  
Not all associations of nomos and physis from the Hellenistic period onward, 
however, were necessarily Stoic in this sense. We also have evidence of what appears to 
be a less technical association from during this period in the Orphic hymns.
185
 The 
Orphic hymns are a collection of eighty-seven hymns written to gods or divine figures in 
the ancient world—some more obscure than others. They seem to reflect not one 
consistent school of thought even though according to Thomas Taylor, “they are full of 
Greek philosophy.”186 It is difficult to precisely date these hymns, which most likely do 
not come from Orpheus. The general date assigned to them spans from the 4
th
 century 
B.C.E. to the 4
th
 century C.E., though many believe that the perspectives in these hymns 
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come from the earlier side of this spectrum.
187
 In this collection hymn 64 is titled: No/mou. 
The first few lines read: 
The holy king of Gods and men I call, 
Celestial Law (ou0ra/nion no/mon), the righteous seal of all; 
The seal which stamps whate'er the earth contains, 
Nature's firm basis (fu/sewj to_ be/baion), and the liquid plains.188 
Here the hymn associates nomos with physis, but it is not the same sort of association we 
have found in Stoic writers. The writer of this hymn gives nomos a divine status, and 
even says something very similar and common among other Greek philosophers going 
back to Pindar that nomos is “king of gods and men.” The association with physis seems 
rather to suggest that nomos is the “firm basis” of physis, which is understood as the 
natural world, and not some cosmic principle that can be identified with Zeus or 
associated with human logos. Nevertheless, this nomos is still related to human ethical 
living. The hymn goes on to say: 
For thy command and alone, of all that lives 
Order and rule to ev'ry dwelling gives: 
Ever observant of the upright mind, 
And of just actions the companion kind; 
Foe to the lawless (a)no/moij), with avenging ire, 
Their steps involving in destruction dire. 
This divine nomos which is the basis of nature also orders human life; it is the 
“companion” of “just actions” and opposes the lawless and injustice. 
Roman Era References 
With the Roman era, some suggest that we find a major turn in how “law of 
nature” was understood. According to Joseph Bryant, “universalistic social elements 
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implicit or latent within the Stoic system…were for the most part made explicit only with 
the Middle and Late Stoa, in conjunction with Rome’s expanding suzerainty over the 
Mediterranean world.”189     
For some scholars, Cicero provides the most frequent use of the expression of 
“law of nature”, especially as regards a consistent use of the phrase lex naturae.190 
According to one statement in Cicero’s De Legibus, we can see that he follows squarely 
in the steps of some of his Greek Stoic predecessors: “Law is the highest reason, 
implanted in nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. 
This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is law.”191   
In his earlier writing, Republic, we encounter perhaps one of his fullest 
articulations of law in relation to nature: 
True law (lex) is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, 
and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands 
or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the 
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal 
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from 
its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an 
expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at 
Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable 
law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and 
ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its judge, and 
lawgiver. Whoever is disobedient is turning from himself and denying his human 
nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he 
escapes what is commonly considered punishment.
192
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There are a few important elements of Cicero’s formulation. This “true law” is 
one that not only unites humanity, but it transcends all particular laws of various political 
and national communities. Its basis is in the idea of the universe as one single polis and 
the unity of humankind within this kosmo-polis.
193
 This law is authored by god, who 
sustains and unites all things, who is the “founder, judge, and lawgiver.” Further, this 
“law” is the basis of the unity of humanity and the one standard by which right and 
wrong are determined. To transgress it, then, is to threaten the unity and justice of 
humanity; to follow it is to live in accord with Cicero’s idea of the fulfillment and well-
being of humanity and the kosmos.     
Richard Horsley draws attention to an important change in Cicero’s understanding 
of law of nature: God is distinct from this nomos in Cicero’s thought. This is a return of 
sorts to an earlier formulation that we find in Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, as well as earlier 
writers such as Plato where law issues from God but is not God.
194
  According to 
Horsley’s study, this can be linked to “middle” era Stoics in conjunction with Platonic (or 
Middle-Platonic) influence. Specifically, Horsley suggests Cicero followed his teacher 
Antiochus of Ascalon, who attempted to return to earlier positions under the influence of 
Stoics influenced by Platonic teaching, namely, Panaetius and Posidonius.
195
 These 
thinkers set their work within a framework which expressed God as transcendent above 
and separate from the cosmos, not identified with it as we find in earlier Stoic writers. 
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This results in a “significant shift in meaning” for how “law of nature” was 
understood.
196
      
Two other Roman-era writers present slightly different variations on nomos in 
association with physis: Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus. Dio Chrysostom discusses 
written lawcodes in contrast with the “law of nature” in his discourse “On Freedom.”197 
According to Dio, the “law of nature” (o( th~j fu&sewj no&moj) is the law which ought to 
be followed by all people. This law is referred to as the “the law (which is) true and 
authoritative and manifest” (no/mon to_n a)lhqh~ kai_ ku&rion kai_ fanero_n). That is, as a 
divine nomos, and unlike the human written nomos, it has true authority. Dio stresses this 
point, calling it “ordinance of Zeus” (Dio_j qesmo_n) and “laws of Zeus.” Rather than a 
law that constrains humans in accord with a human lawmaker’s inferior desires, this 
nomos brings freedom.
198
 The association with “nature” here is not clearly part of a 
system that involves logos; rather “nature” refers to the purpose for which humanity 
exists: not to be constrained by human and thus inferior nomoi, but to be free to live in 
accord with the universal standards ordained by Zeus.   
In Epictetus’ discourses we find frequent appeal to a “higher” nomos that should 
govern all people. In Discourse 1.26, titled “What is the nomos of life? (Ti/j o( biwtiko_j 
no/moj;), he writes that “the most important law of life” is “to act (in accord with) nature” 
                                                             
196
 Horsley, “The Law of Nature,” 52–53. 
 
197
 Dio Chrysostom, 80.4–7. The phrase “law of nature” occurs in 80.5. In his article, Horsley 
associates Dio Chrysostom with Cicero, Philo, and Arius Didymus as another example of the same kind of 
law of nature argument (“The Law of Nature,” 38). This, however, is not clearly the case. In Dio’s 
expression, there is no reference to logos or “right reason” that is associated with this law in accord with 
nature.  
 
198
 Dio Chrysostom, 80.7. 
  
149 
(th|~ fu/sei pra&ttein). Elsewhere he appeals to a “higher” law for ethical living, writing 
of the “law of God” (o( tou~ qeou~ no/moj) and calling it also “a law of nature and of God” 
(no/moj th=j fu/sewj kai\ tou= qeou=) which is the “most good and most just” (kra/tisto/j 
e0sti kai_ dikaio/tatoj).199 He makes this appeal in the context of arguing that this law of 
“nature” is that the better should prevail over the worse— that the strong should rule over 
the weak. Epictetus takes this common sentiment and reinterprets it to mean that the 
“better” are not the stronger but those who are just and virtuous.200 While Epictetus is a 
Stoic, and he makes a connection between “law of nature” and the “law of God,” the law 
of nature here seems to be distinct from God. It is not: “a law of nature, which is also 
God.”201 The “nature” to which he appeals here is not clearly an all encompassing cosmic 
principle identified also as “God.”202 “Nature” refers to the common understanding of 
humanity that all humans are in some way equal as rational human beings and as 
“offspring of Zeus.”203 It is interesting in light of this that Epictetus’ understanding of the 
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Guide to Life [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002] 142–85). 
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telos of humanity is not to “follow nature” as earlier Stoics had put it, but rather “to 
follow God” who seems to be distinct from nature.204   
One important result of these variations is that “law of nature” should not be tied 
down to one strict “Stoic” conception. The concept is more “eclectic” and it could be 
adapted to changes in thought and worldview, even within the broad spectrum of Stoic 
thought and ideas. As Horsley puts it, the natural law argument was handled differently 
by writers in “a genuine and creative search for new combinations of ideas, for 
intellectual solutions to live issues of the day for which the answer of any particular 
doctrine from the traditional philosophical schools no longer seemed adequate.”205 Cicero 
and Dio Chrysostom both have knowledge of Stoic ideas and use them well. Epictetus is 
a Stoic, but like Cicero, distinguishes God from physis in a subtle way. Thus, nomos in 
accord with physis is understood slightly differently.  
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above discussion of nomos in accord with physis we can make 
a few points about how associations with physis served to universalize nomos. First, 
associating nomos with physis serves to express a nomos grounded in a transcendent 
reality in order to emphasize common human ties rather than social or political 
differences. The main distinction here from koinos nomos is for some the use of physis as 
that which unites humanity, and for others the attempt to use the concept of physis as a 
way of rooting nomos in something transcendent of human limitations. An individual 
could live in accord with the law of nature wherever they were, and whoever they were, 
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and it was something to which all humanity could and should be held to account. This is 
because this nomos governed humanity on the basis of a shared physis, whether that 
relates to what is natural and just for human life, a shared lo/goj, or some intangible 
embedded in the inherent fabric of the kosmos itself. Second, the concept could differ 
depending on how one conceived of physis. This is not just a distinction that evolves 
chronologically—that is, it became more “developed” as time went on. Differences in 
how “law in accordance with nature” was expressed are often the result of differences in 
socio-political location and philosophical frameworks. For some earlier Stoics nomos was 
essentially redefined to refer to the disposition and actions—the logos—of the wise man 
in unity with physis. For others like Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, the cosmic unity of 
logos, physis, and God is not there, and the appeal to all humanity is stronger and more 
explicit. The law is not necessarily limited to the actions of the wise man in accord with 
physis, but rather is a universal standard to which all people should be held accountable.  
Let me make a final point about the relative popularity of the association of 
nomos and physis. While earlier formulations may have been more peculiar to the Stoic 
school, later associations of nomos and physis very likely held a wider appeal. According 
to Runar Thorsteinsson, Stoicism, particularly in the Roman era, had become very well 
established as “the most favored philosophical school in Rome” and likely supplied that 
basis for much political-ethical thought and deliberation among those with little interest 
in Stoicism or adherence to particular philosophical sects.
206
 The diversity in expression 
and application of associations of nomos and physis, both before Stoicism and during its 
                                                             
206
 Runar Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of 
Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 13–16. 
 
152 
development, as well as the later popularity of Stoic ethics, all make a difference when 
one asks whether or how Diaspora Jews may have used the concept of “law of nature.” It 
still remains to be seen if, how, and to what degree Diaspora Jews may have associated 
nomos with physis, but this discussion should help see things on a broader horizon, and 
see how associations of nomos and physis stand in relation to other attempts to express 
transcendent nomos.  
Excursus: The Concept of “Living” Law (no/moj e1myuxoj) 
The reference to unwritten nomos in Pseudo-Archytas above is related to another 
important concept: no/moj e1myuxoj. According to the treatise attributed to Archytas there 
are two types of nomos: animate law (no/moj e1myuxoj), which is the king, and the 
inanimate, written law. The king who is the most just and virtuous ruler of his people 
embodies justice and the unwritten nomos. The king “is himself not only a law, but the 
vivid representation to men of the law, that will of the gods to which all local state law 
must conform.”207 The term no/moj e1myuxoj has been variously translated as “animate 
law”208 or “living law.”209 According to John Martens, no/moj e1myuxoj is its own version 
of “higher law.”210 While the concept certainly seems to have had a great deal of 
significance, especially with regard to matters concerning Hellenistic kingship, it is not 
fully a stand-alone expression of transcendent nomos on the same level as unwritten 
nomos, “common” or “universal” nomos, or “law of nature.” An important distinction 
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must be made between a concept of transcendent nomos, and the embodiment of it. 
Simply put, the king is not himself the transcendent nomos; he is the embodiment of it. 
The Greek word e1myuxoj suggests the idea of something having life or animate as 
opposed to lifeless or inanimate.
211
 Thus, the concept pertains more to the form in which 
transcendent law is manifest than to a species of transcendent law itself.     
An important point in this regard is that the king himself can transgress unwritten 
nomos, a point that suggests a distinction between the king and the unwritten nomos. The 
author “Archytas” goes on to say: 
Law is primary; for with reference to it the king is lawful, the rulership fitting, the 
ruled are free, and the whole community happy. But when the law is transgressed, 
the king is a tyrant, the rulership unfit, the ruled are slaves, and the entire 
community wretched.
212
 
 
The ruler, according to the author “must be lawful” and “the best ruler would be the one 
who is closest to the law.”213 In his interpretation of the fragment, E.R. Goodenough 
points out that we have here “an additional form of unwritten law…that of the monarch, 
who is himself not only a law, but the vivid representation to men of the law, that will of 
the gods to which all local state law must conform.”214 The ruler is a “form” of the 
unwritten nomos, not the transcendent nomos itself. It is the ruler’s conformity to 
transcendent unwritten nomos that is the key point.
215
  
                                                             
211
 Cf. “e1myuxoj,” LSJ.  
 
212
 Adapted from Goodenough, “Political Philosophy,” 59.  
 
213
 Goodenough, “Political Philosophy,” 60.  
 
214
 Ibid., 61.  
 
215
 Goodenough points out that the ruler is weighed according to his conformity “to higher natural 
law” (“Political Philosophy, 61). Here Goodenough uncritically merges unwritten nomos with “natural 
law.” His intention seems to be that both unwritten nomos and “natural law” both represent “higher law” in 
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The important elements of this idea are those of representation and imitation. The 
king is a representation of the transcendent unwritten nomos, embodying the divine will 
to humanity. A statement in the writing attributed to the Pythagorean Diotogenes 
verbalizes this point well: the ruler is to “begin by fixing in his own life the most just 
limitations and order of law.”216 According to Plutarch, writing in the late first century or 
early second century, the idea continues, but in modified form. The ruler is to possess the 
divine logos and thus embody the divine nomos.
217
 As such, rulers present a manner of 
living that makes available to all people the divine nomos that they might follow it and be 
governed by it.          
As one can see, the association of the ruler with law appeared in ancient writers in 
a variety of ways and occurred in “an impressive range of philosophical systems.”218 
Depending on the philosophical system, the ruler could be said to embody nomos, 
possess the logos in the most perfect way, or even embody the divine essence. It was not 
a version of transcendent nomos in itself, but depended on other conceptions, whether 
“unwritten nomos” or the idea of the logos as part of formulations of law in accordance 
with nature. According to Chesnutt, however, all of these expressions communicated the 
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same basic idea: it was an attempt to bring god’s “cosmic order” “down to earth” and 
thereby bring “salvation” to the people.219 This concept was a way to address the problem 
of particular nomos, as well as the problem of the gods being removed from earthly 
matters. In this potential state of chaos and meaningless existence, the ruler embodied for 
the people the expression of the higher standard that sustained political-ethical life. 
Conclusions to the Discussion of Transcendent Nomos 
 
The distinctions notwithstanding, the various expressions of transcendent nomos 
represent attempts to articulate a nomos that is universally authoritative and transcendent 
of human political and social limitations. This was to overcome the traditional 
understanding of nomos which was marked by its human finitude and particularity. In 
short, the common link is the attempt to “transcend the mundane and arbitrary” of written 
and particular law.
220
         
There were, to be sure, more technical understandings and expressions of these 
concepts. Each one seems to have its own distinctive traits, even if not consistently. 
“Unwritten nomos” appealed to a standard that was, in a sometimes vague way, greater 
than what particular nomos could achieve because of its limitations. Rather than being 
bound only to one particular polis or community, this nomos consisted of those things 
which apply to all people. “Universal nomos” was quite similar to “unwritten nomos” but 
had a greater emphasis on common humanity. On the basis of a vague idea that humanity 
shared something in common, these laws provided an ethical norm or standard for this 
common human community. This form of nomos was in some writers linked with the 
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logos commonly found in early Stoic conceptions of nomos in association with physis, 
but should not be completely identified with it. Associations of nomos and physis 
appealed also to a common humanity, but in a more complex way than “universal nomos.” 
The appeal to physis was variously understood. For some writers this was the “nature” of 
humanity understood in terms of how a writer conceived of the goal or purpose of human 
life. For others, however, physis had a more cosmic scope, being the physis of the entire 
universe, even identified with God, but even then not all writers went this direction.  
There seems to have been also some fluidity in the various expressions. This 
fluidity was such that the various formulations bled into one another. Some writers used 
more than one expression with little sense of distinguishing among them. We saw this 
with the combination of “unwritten law,” “universal law” and “nature” in Aristotle. We 
also saw this in the way that “universal law” merged with articulations that associated 
nomos and physis, in the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassius, as well as the diversity 
in the writings of Cicero, Dio Chrysostom, and Epictetus. From the examples of these 
writers, this fluidity suggests that all of these various expressions of transcendent nomos 
were attempts to articulate a common concern to establish a political-ethical standard for 
humanity. The fluidity among expressions also allowed for particular expressions to exist 
outside of particular philosophical frameworks or to be applied to a writer’s particular 
concerns and contexts. As Richard Horsley stated with regard to the “law of nature” 
formulation, this is a result of a creative eclecticism, or as Troels Engberg-Pedersen puts 
it, “genuine creativity.”221      
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There are three particular points worth noting about these conceptions of 
transcendent nomos. First, as an attempt to formulate a universal conception of nomos, 
many of these formulations are related closely with God. In other words, with few 
exceptions, the discourse maintains a theological aspect. This seems to be a response to 
the issue of the authority of no/moj. With these expressions of transcendent nomos, the 
understanding of the deity likewise takes on a universal tone. Though Zeus is often 
specified, he was not singled out as the god of the Greeks, for example, but the God of 
the whole universe whose nomos applies to all people. And it is not necessarily an 
impersonal divine connection, either. From the earliest stages through the Roman era a 
concept of “divine providence” was important.222 Many philosophers held to some 
understanding of the “existence of cosmic order and design, the benevolent intervention 
of the divine order in worldly and human affairs, and even God’s paternal care for the 
world and man.”223  
Second, transcendent nomos pertains to all humanity, not just a particular polis or 
community. Often this is clear in the way that the conceptions of transcendent nomos are 
set in contrast to particular and written nomos. In doing this Greco-Roman writers 
attempt to solve the problem of universality. All people are accountable to transcendent 
nomos, and in theory at least, all people have the chance to follow it.  
Third, there is often no concrete itemization as to the content of transcendent 
nomos as one might find in particular written lawcodes. There is the language of 
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command and prohibition in a few writers. There are also a few instances where certain 
commands or expectations are mentioned, such as in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. 
According to Phillip Mitsis, some elements of universal law are quite fixed which have 
no exceptions. These include “unjustly dishonor(ing) one’s parents or…act(ing) 
imprudently.” There are “no circumstances in which such actions are to be chosen.”224 
More often, however, transcendent nomos defines an ethical standard that fully 
encapsulates justice and virtue.  
A Grammar for Nomos 
At this point in our study, we can begin to describe some of the elements of a 
“grammar” for nomos in the ancient world. It is clear that no/moj was a complex concept. 
As a foundational understanding of nomos we can put forth that it denotes a normative 
standard that influences and establishes expectations for ethical and political life. The 
commands or prohibitions of nomos prescribed the way of life for a particular community. 
If we think of this metaphorically in terms of a grammar of nomos, we might say that the 
first inflection of nomos refers to the manner of life which is limited to a particular 
community defined in terms of traditional political, ethnic, or social distinctions. In this 
inflection, nomos often distinguished one community from another. Problems with this 
understanding of nomos in the 5
th
 century B.C.E., the ongoing changes in the Greco-
Roman world, and shifts in the nature and scope of how people saw their community 
evolve from polis to kosmos led to the development of a new inflection of nomos.    
This new inflection of nomos addressed problems of universality and authority 
that plagued particular nomos and it quickly became normative. As an alternative to 
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particular nomos, this new inflection denoted something universal, transcendent, and not 
written—signaling that it is not bound to human limitations of justice or particular 
communities. The basic idea of nomos remained: it was an authoritative ethical-political 
norm for a community. But the new inflection was a way to enable nomos to be used in 
new phrasings—to be applied to a broader community and possess a wider scope of those 
over which it reigned and to have real, lasting authority for ethical-political life.  
This new inflection could be declined in a few different ways: unwritten nomos, 
universal nomos, and nomos in accord with nature were the main ones. Each of these had 
their own particularities. But, as part of the grammar of nomos, they all signify a way of 
providing language to articulate a political-ethical standard for a larger, trans-political 
community. While the specific concepts of transcendent nomos are important, it is also 
important to see the more complex conversation about nomos of which these conceptions 
of transcendent nomos are a significant part. As we saw above, all of the conceptions of 
transcendent nomos undergo some change and modification over time and even differ 
from one writer to another. But they each remain attempts to articulate a universal and 
authoritative basis for ethical and political life. These new forms of nomos did not result 
in the demise of the original idea of nomos. Rather, they represent new ways to apply 
nomos to more complex phrasings—even possibilities for continued use of the first 
inflection, particular nomos.  
At the end of this chapter, we have a sense of the development of nomos in the 
ancient world and main components of how nomos was understood. This provides us 
with the important larger context into which Jewish writers spoke when they wrote about 
nomos. There is more to this, however, for we have not seen how writers dealt with 
160 
particular nomos and ways of living that constituted particular communities within this 
framework. We have seen a new inflection of the concept nomos as a way of adapting the 
general concept to new circumstances. But the first inflection—nomos as representative 
of the way of life of a particular community—remained meaningful. In the next chapter 
we will take a look at how particular expressions of nomos, many in written form, 
continued to find significance on the basis of and in relation within this larger discourse.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE GRAMMAR OF NOMOS AND THE PURSUIT OF VIRTUE 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed nomos as it was understood within the 
political-ethical matrix of the Greco-Roman world. At the end of the chapter I outlined a 
‘grammar’ of nomos which highlights important components of how nomos was 
understood by Greco-Roman writers. We saw that nomos defined an ethical-political 
standard of expectation for people within a set community. It was closely identified with 
socio-political identity: nomos was what so-and-so did.
1
 On the one hand this was 
because there were multiple nomoi, related to different communities, each claiming 
authority. As we have seen, over the course of developments in the Greco-Roman world 
particular or written nomos and the contexts in which it held authority experienced 
change. Particular nomos was seen as inadequate to the task of prescribing ethical living 
within a vast Hellenistic world where the idea of a universal, common humanity became 
more widespread. The socio-political ramifications of this were such that particular 
nomos often was seen as dividing rather than uniting humanity under one political-ethical 
standard. As a contrast or alternative to particular nomos, conceptions of transcendent 
nomos grew in importance. 
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To write or speak about nomos from the fifth century B.C.E. through the first 
century C.E., was to enter into a widespread discourse about nomos that centered around 
the attempt to define and give expression to a universally authoritative standard for living. 
To write or speak of no&moj was to say something about the question: which no&moj?2 This 
question was not just inquiring about which particular nomos was best; it was also a 
question that brought to the surface the tension between particular and transcendent 
nomos. Conceptions of transcendent nomos gave nomos new life, universalizing a 
concept that once was hindered by its finitude and lack of universal authority. They also 
brought a new complexity to how nomos could be understood. These conceptions 
demonstrate that in order to speak of nomos in a meaningful way one had to think in 
terms of a universal standard for political-ethical life to which all humanity was 
accountable and which would lead to the realization of justice and virtuous life for all, to 
which all people should be accountable. 
Competing No/moi or Complimentary No/moi? 
One important realization about this discourse is that the concept no/moj 
continued to be meaningful. In other words, the various expressions of transcendent 
no/moj remained no/moj. They did not displace nomos itself, but rather they displaced or 
challenged a type of nomos. One way to put it is that writers and thinkers did not abandon 
nomos in favor of fu/sij, dikaiosu/nh, or a)reth/. As formulations of transcendent nomos 
became more normative in use, it became commonplace to use the unmodified Greek 
word nomos to refer to such concepts; transcendent nomos was simply no/moj. One thing 
that this demonstrates is an attempt to salvage the concept of nomos; nomos held ongoing 
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importance in the Greco-Roman world. This also created a problem of potentially 
competing understandings of nomos.    
In his article “Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory,” C. Carey writes that in the 
time of Aristotle, it was not common to see written and unwritten or transcendent nomos 
in competition with one another. We may extend Carey’s point to include the entire 
period from the fifth century B.C.E. to the first century C.E. As the worldview developed 
from polis to kosmos, and as alternatives to particular nomos developed, there grew the 
potential” for the two types of nomos—the particular and the transcendent—to be 
“competing sources of authority.”3 While this was certainly is a possibility, more 
complexly understood, the two conceptions of nomos more often functioned as 
“interlocking parts of a system of constraint which makes civilized society possible.”4 To 
conclude that transcendent nomos automatically rendered particular nomos useless or 
superfluous would be an incomplete conclusion. People and particular communities in the 
ancient world could not just abandon their own nomos! The two could be in competition, 
but they also could be complimentary. The second century Roman jurist Gaius wrote in 
his Institutes that 
All peoples who are ruled by laws and customs partly make use of their own laws, 
and partly have recourse to those which are common to all men; for what every 
people establishes as law for itself is peculiar to itself, and is called the Civil Law, 
as being that peculiar to the State; and what natural reason establishes among all 
men and is observed by all peoples alike, is called the Law of Nations, as being 
the law which all nations employ.
5
  
 
                                                             
3
 C. Carey, “Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 116 (1996) 40. 
 
4
 Ibid., 40. 
 
5
 Gaius, Institutes, 1.1.  
 
164 
As we shall see, Gaius’ statement reflects a real possibility in the centuries prior to him. 
Let me offer two ways in which particular nomos continued to carry significance in 
relation to transcendent nomos.  
First, it was a matter of course that the particular nomoi—the customs, ways of 
life, and commands—of particular political groups could not go away. This would result 
in a state of anarchy in the ancient world. Even attempts to situate the ruler as the 
embodiment of transcendent nomos had to reckon with nomoi and traditions of particular 
political communities. James O’Neil’s gives evidence of this interplay in his article 
“Royal Authority and City Law under Alexander and His Hellenistic Successors.”6 
According to O’Neil, philosophical theories of ancient Hellenistic kingship, which as we 
have seen promoted the king as “living law,” did not necessarily displace and replace the 
particular nomos of the polis. One example given by O’Neil is when Ptolemy I liberated 
the people of Cyrene and then began to establish new laws, the authority of which came 
from his kingship. But, Ptolemy did not completely dispose of the current laws of the 
people. They remained only “in so far as they did not conflict with his own decree.”7 
O’Neil cites an edict that states that where there is no explicit royal edict (dia/gramma) 
then the city laws (politikoi_ no/moi) are to hold authority. While it is clear that the king’s 
law was superior to the city law, it did not abolish it or render it superfluous.
8
 Keeping in 
mind that the “living law” ideal was in some way a form of transcendent nomos, this 
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example illustrates that transcendent nomos and particular nomos could stand together, 
even if in some tension, because they both retained ongoing significance for ethical and 
political life. While in theory transcendent nomos was the supreme ruler, in practice 
particular nomos still governed in local places and could not be dismissed completely.   
The second way particular nomos continued to have significance is that 
transcendent nomos was a difficult concept not only to grasp, but also to live in 
accordance with. It was really for only a select few that written or particular nomos was 
actually optional. The Stoics and Cynics were the ones who most vigorously championed 
the idea of an individual who did not need particular manifestation of nomos. But they 
did so for quite different reasons. Stoics traditionally held to the concept of the “wise man” 
who lived in harmony with the logos and thus in harmony with the nomos that was 
according to physis.
9
 This individual needed no exterior nomos for his own life, because 
this person, through the logos, lived in harmony with physis. Some Stoics, it seems, 
thought more in terms of a progression than a static state.
10
 Even so, there were few who 
actually carried this out, even though it was the desired goal of Stoicism.  
Cicero, who was not strictly a Stoic but “an Academic by inclination as well as by 
choice” who drew on Stoic concepts,11 recognizes that the true ideal of the wise man 
rarely, if ever, existed. For Cicero, not even some of the greatest Romans of the past can 
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be considered “wise” in the fullest sense. They only bore a “likeness” to true wise men. 
Furthermore, every-day people must live up to the moral standard that they can 
comprehend and put into practice.
12
 Not only was the perfect sage rare, there was enough 
lack of clarity that it was a source of difficulty.
13
       
The Cynics—the fifth century Sophists in a new context—also contended that 
they did not need to follow any law, but lived according to their own desires, which they 
often referred to as physis. Theirs was a system bent on rejecting social norm in favor of 
individual nature. Joseph Bryant writes that the “Cynic call to virtue was basically devoid 
of positive content, as primitive naturalism and a mocking antinomianism did not go far 
in providing a constructive guide to moral conduct.”14 Like the Stoic view, the Cynic 
understanding of ethical living did not provide much guidance for people. 
This difference between the Stoic and Cynic views led some to actually turn to 
particular nomos as a solution. As we saw above, the Stoics reconceptualized physis in 
terms of a “cosmic totality” or an “all embracing cosmic order.”15 In contrast with the 
Cynic idea, Stoics understood physis not in extreme contrast to the polis and to 
convention, but rather in a way that united the individual with the overall purposes of the 
universe, which included the functions of the polis. According to Joseph Bryant, this 
resulted in “an ethical axiology that succeeded in moderating Cynic extremism while still 
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safeguarding the individual from all “external” disturbances.”16 The problem with the 
Cynics’ apparent antinomianism lead Cicero, who otherwise was a proponent of no/moj 
fu/sewj, to actually argue in favor of the efficacy of particular customs and conventions 
for pursuing the virtuous life in accord with nature: 
But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance with the 
established customs and conventions of a community; for these are themselves 
rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of supposing that, because Socrates 
or Aristippus did or said something contrary to the manners and established 
customs of their city, he has a right to do the same; it was only by reason of their 
great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special 
privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is 
inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, 
nothing morally good.
17
 
 
Cicero’s statement does not just refute the Cynic way of thinking. Cicero also implicitly 
makes the claim that not everyone possesses “great and superhuman virtues.” It would 
not be unrealistic to think that Cicero may have also been guarding against the possibility 
that people who misunderstand Stoicism will, in their attempt to claim to follow physis, 
disregard all sense of morality. In other words, for the non-sage, following particular 
nomos is the best or only alternative.  
One of the central pieces of the problem with the idea that one could live without 
particular nomos was that the details of these forms of “higher” nomos—the “commands” 
if there were any—were not itemized or clearly known. According to Raymond Bellotti, 
“natural law” provides for Cicero “a secure foundation for moral and political 
judgments.”18 At the same time Cicero also appealed to “social traditions, customs, and 
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practices.” This is largely out of Cicero’s concern to give some substance to the sorts of 
actions that “flow from natural law.”19 Why would he do this? Because 
reliance upon natural law as the supreme authority for normative judgments is 
spectacularly problematic. Reliance upon…objective standards of morality which 
are allegedly part of the structure of the universe seems mysterious and dubious to 
critics of natural law.
20
 
 
The idea alone could be an open door to antinomianism. This was a problem especially 
for the majority of the Greco-Roman world who held on to the importance of particular 
nomos as the glue that held political life together. 
The overall point here is that there was great potential for particular nomos to 
have significance, even among writers and thinkers who otherwise attributed a greater 
value to forms of transcendent nomos. It was not just an issue related to Stoic and Cynic 
moral systems, either. The Epicureans, for example, held that following the laws was not 
necessarily inimical to natural justice.
21
 For the majority of the Mediterranean world 
particular nomos remained important for ethical and political matters. At the same time, 
however, the discourse about transcendent nomos was too pervasive and it was difficult 
to overcome that particular nomos lacked universal authority on its own and could fall 
short of transcendent nomos. But, at the least, the ‘grammar’ of nomos does not include 
the complete demise of particular nomos.      
Articulating the relationship between particular and transcendent nomos was 
tricky. There are good particular nomoi and bad particular nomoi. Cicero is one of the 
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few who seems to reflect an attempt to provide a more studied proposal of how particular 
law related to “law of nature.” In De Legibus, Cicero stated that a nation or state can only 
be called so if they have law and he does not eschew crafting laws for the ideal state that 
are in accord with that community’s character as the ideal community.22 However, in 
order to be called a nation, particularly a good state or nation, the laws must be good — 
in accord with nature.
23
 To be called “law” they need to be in the service of the safety of 
the people, preservation of the states, tranquility and happiness of life. Ultimately this law 
must be in accord with what is just and true (2.12). While law is important to a nation or 
state, the laws themselves can be abrogated if they are not in accord with the eternal law, 
which cannot be abrogated.
24
 As we shall see in more detail later, Cicero applies this 
basic idea of “true law” to Roman law. According to Elizabeth Asmis, in his Laws Cicero 
“attempts to frame the best code of laws by using a conception of natural law.” She goes 
on, “To the surprise of Cicero’s interlocutor in the text, as well as the modern reader, 
Cicero’s laws coincide very largely with the ancestral laws of the Roman state.”25  In part, 
according to Asmis, Cicero tried to give some substance to the actions commanded by the 
law of nature, especially for imperfect humans who do not fully understand the 
commands of law of nature.
26
 But Cicero was also a Roman citizen who valued the 
significance of legal prohibitions and commands of Roman law. This finds its way into 
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his writing, and he finds Roman law and ways of life the best example of “law of 
nature.”27 
The Goal of Nomos and the Pursuit of Virtue 
Cicero more systematic connection between particular and transcendent law is 
rare. Asmis and others even question the degree to which Cicero had really thought 
through his theory. Expressions of relationship between particular and transcendent 
nomos was more vague and less systematic in other writers. This is largely because, as 
the early Stoics seem to have believed, “Zeus’s law is not a law-code, given with divine 
authority.”28 In other words, there are no clear commands; it is more of an innate ethical 
standard referred to as nomos. As such, it cannot easily be embodied in commands and 
prohibitions. We saw this reflected in many of the writers we discussed in the previous 
chapter: concepts of transcendent nomos never reached the point of development wherein 
its commands were itemized. At the same time we saw that some writers in a very limited 
way described transcendent nomos in terms of certain actions. In Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, unwritten nomos was given some content in terms of a few more or less 
traditional commands: fear the gods, honor parents, do not commit incest, equity. 
Cleanthes itemized several behaviors—virtues and vices—related to Zeus’ koino/j no/moj. 
But not all writers did this. More often than not, concepts of transcendent nomos 
functioned to support the idea of a transcendent and universal ethic, while they placed 
elaborating on the details of that universal ethic on the back burner. Epictetus, for 
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example, writes that the truly educated person who follows God’s law is the one who 
knows what piety (eu0sebe/j) is, what is holy (o(si/oj), and what is just (dikai/oj).29 
According to O’Neil, the both the king’s decrees and the particular nomoi of the 
community should be “based on general criteria of justice and equity.”30    
To understand the relationship between transcendent nomos and particular nomos 
it will be helpful if we consider how writers would comment on written or particular 
nomos in light of transcendent nomos. There are two ways this helps us. On the one hand, 
often we get lists of virtues or behaviors that particular nomos should lead to. Just as 
transcendent nomos embodied these things, if particular nomos was to have any appeal it 
too had to point to these. On the other hand, we find writers critiquing particular nomos 
for falling short of various virtues and behaviors. If the problems were identified with 
certain vices or falling short of virtue and justice, then the alternative transcendent nomos 
embodied the opposite.   
Excursus: Common Understandings of Virtue (a)reth&) in Relation to Ethical-Political 
Discourse 
The concept of virtue (a)reth&) in the ancient world is complex, even if we focus 
the sphere of use to ethical discourse.
31
 I cannot give a full description of these words and 
their nuances here, but I do want to highlight what scholarship has shown are at least 
common understandings that we rely upon in this chapter.  
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Virtue (a)reth&), has a complex history of use. In earliest instances, it pertained to 
“excellence” in a general sense. This “excellence” could vary, however, like physis, 
depending on that to which one ascribes “virtue.” According to Christoph Jedan, when 
we encounter aretē, it can mean one of two things, generally: “the overall excellent state 
of a human being,” or it can be a “generic term of which virtues like courage or justice 
are species.” Jedan continues to note that this distinction is more of a modern scholarly 
one, and “it is possible that (ancient philosophers, Stoics in particular) failed to see (this 
difference).”32 According to A.W.H. Adkins virtue in the 5th century B.C.E. concerned 
“excellences deemed most likely to ensure the success, prosperity, and stability of the 
group” which, in the 5th century was the polis.33 According to Diogenes Laertius, in his 
discussion of Zeno, virtue is “the perfection of anything in general”34—a statement which 
is more “common Greek usage” by the time of Diogenes than it is anything specifically 
Stoic.
35
 There is some evidence that for some Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, it 
concerned excellence in rationality, since the essence of human nature was possession of 
logos. But later Stoics and many other philosophers held to a more “inclusive” 
understanding that was not “directly defined” or limited to rationality.36   
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From the Hellenistic period through the 1
st
 century C.E., “virtue” language was 
standard to refer more to ethical life, but not without political or social implications. This 
“excellence” was understood in terms of fulfilling or exemplifying certain individual 
virtues. Plato influentially itemized four “cardinal” virtues in his Republic: “wisdom” 
(sofi/a), “temperance” (swfrosu/nh), “courage” (a)ndrei&a), and “justice” 
(dikaiosu/nh).37 While Plato prized “wisdom” as the main virtue encompassing all others, 
“the number, identity, hierarchy, and meaning of the virtues in the canon were subject to 
a considerable amount of variation throughout antiquity, depending on the differing 
views or objectives of particular individuals of philosophical systems.”38 Cicero 
highlighted “justice” as the greatest virtue in De Officiis 1.7. In addition to Plato’s four 
cardinal virtues, lists often would include: “practical wisdom” (fro&nhsij), “piety” 
(eu)se/bia). Other virtues could be in addition to, or subordinate to other cardinal or major 
virtues.
39
 Particularly, the subordination of other virtues allowed writers to bring more 
substance to what were otherwise quite abstract ethical-political concepts that were 
supposed to inform human action.       
“Virtue,” in distinction from individual virtues, represented the overarching 
concept that referred to moral living, and the attainment of certain characteristics. In 
some writers, it was interchangeable with “justice” as representing the full human ethical 
and political goal. These were then often broken down into a number of individual 
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“virtues” which were desirable ethical traits. These traits were part of the individual 
pursuit of the “good life” or of right ethical living. But they were also understood socio-
politically as well in that pursuit of “virtue” and the virtues was part of one’s overall 
contribution to either the polis or the universe. As Joseph Bryant notes, the pursuit of 
aretē in the Greek system of education was “primarily moral, though no less “civic” in 
orientation: to instill in each succeeding generation a resolute commitment to the twin 
ideals of devotion to the polis and excellence as a citizen.”40 Naturally, as the locus of 
these discussions expanded from the polis to the kosmos, the understanding of virtue also 
adapted.     
Positive Associations between Particular Nomos and Virtue 
The Sophist Protagoras
41
 provides an early example of positively associating 
particular nomos with justice and virtuous behavior. While acknowledging the limits of 
particular nomos, he found good in it because it educated in justice and a deterrent for 
injustice.
42
 He states this in response to Socrates’ question as to whether “virtue” can be 
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taught. To argue that virtue—excellence within the polis43—can be taught, Protagoras 
tells a “myth” (mu=qoj). According to the myth, humans originally existed without the 
moral attributes necessary to function together in a society. They were in essence no 
different than the animals. He goes on to say that because virtue is not inherent in physis 
(nature), nomoi are crafted to restrain nature (lest people live like savages), and to 
educate in virtue. Protagoras describes this in terms of learning justice (dikaiosu/nh), 
temperance (swfrosu/nh), and piety (o3sion) (324e–325a). Expanding on their 
educational role, he states that nomoi act as “paradigms” (para/deigma) for proper 
behavior in the polis and undergird the instruction of the youth (326C). He compares the 
written no/moi to the patterns of writing given in school for students to learn, and states 
that the polis puts these laws in writing (u(pogra/fw) (326D) for the education of people. 
According to Protagoras, the most “unjust” person brought up “in nomoi” is a “just” 
person in comparison with those lacking “education,” “courts of justice,” and “nomoi”—
all of which function in the pursuit of virtue.
44
   
In his Rhetoric Aristotle relates nomos to the pursuit of “justice” by noting that 
injustice is “voluntarily causing injury contrary to the nomos” (para ton nomon).45 In 
Rhetoric 1.9.1–13 while discussing virtue and vice (peri\ a0reth=j kai\ kaki/aj)—how one 
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attains the one and avoids the other—he defines the components of virtue, namely, justice 
(dikaiosu/nh), courage (a0ndri/a), and self-control (swfrosu/nh) in relation to nomos:  
Justice is w9j o9 no/moj (“as the law [assigns]”) 
Courage is w9j o9 no/moj keleu/ei (“as the law [assigns]”) 
Self-control is w9j o9 no/moj keleu/ei  
 
A passage from Nicomachean Ethics also relates nomos more generally to promoting 
virtue and hindering vice:  
the actions that spring from virtue in general are in the main identical with the 
actions that are according to law, since the law enjoins conduct displaying the 
various particular virtues and forbids conduct displaying the various particular 
vices.
46
 
 
It is not immediately clear from this passage whether Aristotle is referring to particular 
nomos (i1dioj no/moj as he called it in Rhetoric), or universal nomos (koino/j no/moj). 
Both types of law held value for Aristotle and the value of both was that they led to virtue 
and away from vice.   
In Dionysius of Halicarnassius’ Roman Antiquities, Romulus’s laws are 
considered a high achievement, and lead to justice and virtue for people. Dionysius’ 
voluminous writing had political and cultural intentions, and were not pure 
historiography.
47
 A primary concern was, in the footsteps of earlier writers such as 
Isocrates, to embrace “cultural universality” and to apply the Greek ideals found in 
Isocrates to Rome, placing the growing Roman rule within the framework of a universal 
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Greek polis.
48
 He views the laws established in the early Roman republic in light of this. 
The laws established by Romulus, one of the founders of the Roman people according to 
popular lore, served the interests of piety and virtue.
49
 He praises Romulus’ laws because 
“he recognized that good laws and the emulation of worthy pursuits render a state pious, 
temperate, devoted to justice, and brave in war.”50 This all begins with worship of the 
Gods, especially but not limited to Roman Gods, though in legislating such he followed 
in the customs of the Greeks while eschewing the “myths” of the Greeks that are not 
“useful” to humanity. In 2.74 he remarks that one of the purposes of law is to create 
bounds which keep people from becoming too greedy, and he goes on to state the benefit 
of Romulus’s laws was that they brought “moderation” (swfrosu/nh) and “justice” 
(dikaiosu/nh) to the polis (2.75). Diodorus of Sicily records a speech of an Athenian 
named Nikolaüs, who says that the application of the laws of the Athenians “advanced” 
the manner of living of humanity from “the savage and unjust existence to a civilized and 
just society.”51   
Negative Evaluations of Particular Nomos in Relation to Virtue 
Just as writers would positively relate nomos to justice and virtues, it could also 
be related negatively. In his Histories, the second century BCE writer Polybius writes 
that laws and customs set the minds of the people to desire what is just and forbids the 
opposite. When the laws and customs are good, then the individual people are good, as is 
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the whole polis.
52
 He judges the laws and justice of Crete in this way: they and their laws 
are reckoned unjust because they are full of “lust of wealth…constant broils…murders, 
and civil wars.”53 Likewise in an epistle attributed to the Cynic Heraclitus the Ephesians 
are chastised because the nomoi, “the things most seeming to be symbols of justice” (ta\ 
ma/lista dokou~nta dikaiosu/nhj ei]nai su/mbola) are actually “signs of injustice” 
(a)diki/aj tekmh/rion).54 Even while being curbed by the nomoi, the people act wickedly. 
In his treatise “Concerning Virtue” (PERI ARETHS)55 Dio Chrysostom acknowledges 
that without nomos and justice, men are no different than wild beasts—savage and evil. 
He uses the Scythians as an example, who he calls nomads, a people without justice and 
nomos (a!neu…no/mou kai\ dikai/ou).56 But it is not that they do not possess nomos at all; 
rather, their nomos—their norm for living—results in such a poor state. He explains this 
by making the point that inferior judges and nomoi (dikastai\ kai\ no/moi) results in a 
people—in this case the Scythians—who are in poor condition morally and ethically: 
they are full of factions (sta/seij), injustice (a0diki/ai), arrogance (u#breij), and impiety 
(a0se/beia).57 These people do not know that they are in such condition, but think they are 
just fine because “they consider that the (written) nomoi are sufficient for them” 
(nomi/zousi…tou\j no/mouj au0toij i0kanou_j ei]nai pro_j tou~to tou_j gegramme/nouj) 
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for the purpose of living justly and virtuously. In other words, they have mistakenly held 
to the authority of their nomos without recognizing its downfalls. Dio does not quite 
criticize the laws because they are particular laws. Rather he uses the language of justice 
and virtue / vice to criticize the laws of a particular people as bad laws.    
 The examples from these writers give us a sense of the desired universal ethical 
goals by giving examples of those sorts of vices and behaviors to avoid. The association 
between nomos and virtue and justice became normative enough that when we come 
around to articulations in which nomos is positively related to nature (physis), it is 
expressed in terms of the pursuit of virtue and justice. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
“living consistently with nature is living in accordance with virtue, since nature leads us 
to virtue.”58 Much of Cicero’s Laws is devoted to describing how living in accord with 
“true law” which is accord with nature is a life of virtue.59 In short, the sort of life that 
resulted from living in accordance with transcendent nomos, fu/sij, or even no/moj 
fu/sewj was ultimately a just and virtuous life.60      
Through these examples we see that, explicitly or not, universal conceptions of 
virtue, and avoiding certain behaviors, provide the goals to which nomos leads—both 
transcendent and particular. The above passages focus on typical virtues, but they also 
move beyond them in describing behaviors that each writer (and their communities!) 
finds either laudable or reprehensible. Transcendent nomos was not inherently something 
put in competition to particular nomos. Neither did it render particular nomos 
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“superfluous.” The relationship is more complex. In some cases particular nomos may 
have been rendered superfluous, there is no doubt. But, it seems that a major result of this 
larger discourse is that transcendent nomos was the nomos that fulfilled these purposes 
perfectly, and all the time. The importance for particular expressions of ethical living was 
that they should align with or serve the universal language and ideals of virtue and justice, 
and the avoidance of vice and other immoral behaviors.  
To end this section, I draw attention to Dio Chrysostom’s 75th discourse, 
“Concerning Law” (PERI NOMOU ) which provides an important first century 
perspective on the importance of nomos. Dio’s discourse encapsulates the image of 
nomos as that which guides an individual and an entire people toward virtue and justice. 
This discourse is also significant because in this eulogy to nomos Dio moves easily 
between particular and transcendent nomos, so that it is difficult to determine which is 
which.
61
 In other words, Dio does not see a real tension between the two types of nomos, 
but rather sees them both working in unison as nomos. In his introductory statements he 
writes that “Nomos is a guide for life, a universal overseer of cities, and a just standard 
for affairs toward which it is necessary for each person to direct his way of life; otherwise 
he will be crooked and wicked.”62 Dio associates this nomos with the cosmos, and sets 
this above the gods. He cites Pindar here: “the law…has been called king of men and 
gods.”63 All that is necessary is “to learn from the laws (para_ tou_j no/mouj 
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punqa/nesqai)” when one has a question concerning certain matters64; he also says that 
nomos “plainly puts forth all things (a(plw~j a#panta a# prosh/kei) which are related to 
those in need.”65 This is in particular response to oracles which can be misunderstood and 
is a description more characteristic of particular nomos than transcendent. Those keeping 
the law have “salvation” (swthri/a) and those who live kata_ to_n no/mon reach their 
proper end (75.8–10). The law is above human guidance, and determines that which 
exalts virtue (75.8). In verse 9, Dio calls nomos a dida/skaloj neo/thtoj (“a teacher of 
youth”) and in verse 10 he writes that a city without the law is without “salvation”(po&lin  
d 0ou)k e!ni swqh~nai tou~ no/mou luqe/ntoj) and will “be brought to a state of utter 
madness and confusion.”   
The above examples of positive and negative evaluations of nomos show an 
important point. The purpose and good of nomos among most writers was determined by 
the degree to which it led people in or educated toward the pursuit and cultivation of 
virtue, understood in both ways described in the excursus above. The implied point is that 
commands of particular nomos, then, were under this microscope and the value of 
particular commands would have to be described on these terms. 
Nomos, Philosophia (filosofi/a) and the Pursuit of Virtue 
I want to briefly draw attention to another component we find in ancient writers 
who engage in this discourse. It is not uncommon to encounter writers associating the 
pursuit of philosophy (philosophia; filosofi/a) with the ideals of virtue and justice, just 
as nomos was associated with these things. This is not surprising, since at its root, the 
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entire nomos discourse, though focused on ethical and political matters, had been 
conducted within a broadly philosophical framework. In his book A Short History of 
Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre draws a direct connection between the problems raised by the 
nomos discourse, wherein the question asked was “what shall be the no/moj by which I 
live?”, and the realm of philosophia—particularly understood in terms of moral 
philosophy.
66
 Beginning with the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, moral philosophers and 
the task of philosophia was to address the pursuit of a)reth/ and dikaiosu/nh—to answer 
the question, “how shall I live?” Engagement in moral philosophy and its pursuits 
provided a way to answer the question that could transcend the bounds of particular 
nomos.
67
 
A number of writers witness to what MacIntyre describes and make associations 
between “philosophy,” the pursuit of wisdom (sofi/a), and the pursuit of virtue—all 
bearing some relation to the larger nomos discourse. For such writers, living a life in a 
manner to which “nature” calls humanity, or in accord with virtue, is not just related to 
nomos; the life that achieves the universal ethical goals of humanity is also achieved 
through philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom.  
Philosophia was not understood in exactly the same way by different writers. 
Etymologically the word denotes the “love of wisdom.” Owing its development to the 5th 
century B.C.E., philosophia concerned the “reflection and investigation in relation to 
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ethical knowledge.”68 It pertained to ethical and political action for Plato and related to 
the pursuit of “higher” things and of God for the good of the polis.69 For Aristotle 
understood “primary” philosophia concerned investigation of the divine, and “secondary” 
philosophia the investigation of physical reality.
70
 In the Hellenistic period, philosophia 
becomes the domain of the educated philosopher upon whom the wider public was 
dependant. It takes on different forms within specific schools, but not with loss of the 
main objective: to grasp reality and to live ethically good lives.
71
 The Stoics associated it 
with the suppression or extermination “passion” or “desire” (e0piqumi/a), which was 
associated with the pursuit of life in accordance with logos and nomos in accord with 
physis.
72
 For Middle-Platonists, the importance of philosophia is “likeness to God.”73 
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Interestingly, and very likely not accidentally, for Plato the one who is “like” God 
follows the divine nomos!
74
 Most importantly, this connection points out that the 
discourse about philosophia and the nomos discourse overlapped significantly, to the 
point that they can be considered components of one large, widespread ethical discourse.   
There is also a striking phenomenon wherein many writers make statements about 
philosophia using language that also resonates with statements made about nomos—both 
particular and transcendent. Some speak of philosophia in terms of “knowledge of human 
and divine things.”75 This is also a way that some writers defined “wisdom” (sofi/a), 
which was not clearly distinct from philosophia. Cicero is a prime example of this when 
he writes that  
those who seek after (wisdom) are called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing 
else, if one will translate the word into our idiom, than “the love of wisdom”. 
Wisdom, moreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is 
“the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which those 
things are controlled.”76  
 
Seneca attempts to make a distinction between wisdom and philosophy writing that 
“wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind; philosophy is the love of wisdom and 
the endeavor to attain it.”77 Philosophy is defined just as Cicero had defined it. Seneca 
goes on to say that “philosophy does the going, and wisdom is the goal.”78 Nevertheless, 
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in spite of Seneca’s distinction, he admits to the fact that many people in his time and 
before him fail to make such a distinction.
79
 For Seneca, philosophy and virtue cannot 
exist apart from one another, and wisdom stands as the climax of the virtue-seeking path 
of philosophia.
80
 As we saw in the previous chapter and in our discussion of connections 
between nomos and the pursuit of virtue in this chapter, nomos was seen in this same 
manner. A number of writers we have discussed attributed to nomos significance in 
relation to human affairs, by insinuating that nomos communicates knowledge of god or 
god’s expectations for life, even if they have not used the exact definitions of philosophia 
or Sophia we have just seen.
81
 The telos of both transcendent and particular nomos is 
concerned, like the pursuit of philosophia and Sophia, with the pursuit of virtue. 
Plutarch’s The Education of Children provides a significant example of how the 
concerns of philosophia merge with what we have seen in our descriptions of the nomos 
discourse. According to Plutarch’s treatise, philosophia is the highest good for 
humanity—the goal of paideia. From philosophia one attains  
knowledge of what is honorable and  what is shameful, what is just and unjust, 
what, in brief, is to be chosen and to be avoided, how a man must bear himself in 
relation to the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, 
with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; 
that one ought to reverence the gods, to honor one’s parents, to respect one’s 
elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one’s 
friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be 
overbearing with slaves; and most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success 
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or over-distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute with pleasures, nor impulsive 
and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the 
advantages which accrue from philosophy.
82
  
 
All of the things Plutarch attributes to philosophia have elsewhere been associated 
with nomos, both particular and transcendent. Plutarch does not remove nomos from this 
equation to any great degree, as philosophia achieves that to which obedience to the 
particular laws lead. In other words, pursuing philosophia for Plutarch here achieves that 
which following transcendent nomos also achieves. Likewise, according to Seneca, an 
important representative of first century Stoic philosophical thought, the goals of wisdom 
and philosophy are knowledge of the good and the bad, instruction of the mind.
83
 Even 
more pointedly, philosophy is identified with “the law of life” which is ultimately akin to 
life in accordance with physis.
84
  
Our purpose here is not to unite nomos and philosophia as one and the same. The 
important point is that nomos, philosophia, and the pursuit of Sophia all inhabited a 
common discourse of the pursuit of virtue and ethical living. There is a sense in which 
philosophia was the means of a connection with “nature” or the way in which one 
understood right living, divine things, and even lived in accord with transcendent nomos. 
This evidence suggests a relationship between philosophia and the nomos discourse, that 
both discourses overlapped considerably with regard to the ethical goal of the pursuit of 
virtue in the ancient world. While for some writers it seems that philosophia, like 
                                                             
82
 Plutarch, On the Education of Children, 10. Epictetus also reflects very similar statements in 
Diss., 2.11 (“What is the Beginning of Philosophy?”).   
 
83
 Seneca, Epistles, 13. 88; 14.90.26.  
 
84
 Seneca, Epistles, 15.94.39. 
 
187 
transcendent nomos, supplanted particular nomos. Yet, for other writers all of these 
concepts are used together in the pursuit of ethical virtue.    
Nomos, the Pursuit of Virtue, and Particular Political Entities 
As we have seen, the grammar of nomos and the pursuit of philosophia are 
concerned with the attainment of virtue and express concerns of ethical and political life 
in the ancient Mediterranean world. Situating the value of particular and written nomos in 
terms of its relation to acknowledged virtues and vices, justice and injustice, and good 
and evil opened up into a larger web of discourse. There was the lofty goal of virtue and 
justice toward these discourses generally pointed; there were ways to speak of a 
transcendent ethical-political standard that encapsulated virtue; and there were particular 
ways to express the ethical standard. I now will draw attention was the way that this 
complex web of discourse made it possible for claims about the superiority of particular 
ways of life. In short: because particular or written nomos was set in relation to 
universally accepted standards, and because written law by its nature was socially and 
politically situated, writers could claim some leverage or superiority on the basis of their 
laws by associating particular ways of living or particular nomoi with either desired 
virtues or a form of transcendent nomos. This was the natural result of the inevitable need 
to demonstrate what was just and virtuous, the high value transcendent nomos held in this 
context, and the importance of nomos for the particular community. It revolved around 
the central question with which we opened this chaper: what manner of living—which 
nomos—best leads to virtue, justice, and wisdom?  
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Greek Paideia: Virtue for the World 
For many Greek writers, paideia represented much of Greek life and culture. The 
concept of paideia (paidei/a) is a complex one. In his three-volume study on the concept 
Werner Jaeger points out that for Greeks paideia played a key role in the development of 
humanity. It referred primarily to education—the formation of humanity in accordance 
with an ideal.
85
 It, like nomos, concerned both individual and political moral development; 
it was the ideal of the human as a “political being.”86As Jaeger puts it, “Greek education 
(paideia) is not the sum of a number of private arts and skills intended to create a perfect 
independent personality.”87 It is intended to create the just and virtuous society, and by 
extension, universe.   
For Greeks, paideia denoted not only “education” but also Greek life and culture 
itself. Along with the attempt to turn the known world into one vast Greek polis in the 
wake of Alexander there was an attempt to establish one “shared cultural identity” which 
was Greek.
88
 Most Greeks held to the belief that their ways of life, their institutions, and 
their laws not only provided but indeed embodied paideia—the essential moral and 
political formation of humanity.
89
 This is because for most Greeks paideia encompassed 
all of Greek life—its history, its heroes, and its nomoi—and education into this would 
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produce a virtuous humanity.
90
 Tim Whitmarsh rightly notes that “paideia can never 
escape from its Hellenocentric orbit: it is fundamentally and incorrigibly bound up with 
the articulation of Greek superiority.”91 This is not just the case for the early development 
of the concept. Graham Anderson points out that in the period of the second sophistic 
(1
st
-3
rd
 centuries CE), defining the concept of paideia includes  
the values that go with (education) to make men civilized, as in the case of ‘the 
Humanities’ in English. It presupposes someone who has read the approved canon 
of classical texts and absorbed from them the values of Hellenism and urban-
dwelling man alike, and who applies those values in life.
92
 
 
Ultimately, paideia was instruction in virtue for the whole known world—the 
oikumenē. It may have been the privilege of mostly the elite, but its purposes and goals 
were universal.
93
 Paideia was embodied in the possession of virtue. Plutarch, for example, 
feels perfectly comfortable drawing attention to the limits and shortcomings of certain 
Roman individuals, for whom paideia did not really exist, on the basis of their lack of 
paideia. In his treatise on Caius Marcus Coriolanus, the 5
th
 century B.C.E. Roman 
general, Plutarch writes that Coriolanus is a good example of how someone of “a 
generous and noble nature” can turn out fruitless and without virtue if paideia is 
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lacking.
94
 For Plutarch, part of the criticism is directed at Roman understandings of virtue. 
They missed the mark not by attributing certain virtues (e0gkrati/a and dikaiosu/nh and 
a)ndrei/a) to Coriolanus, but equating virtue with a)ndrei/a, and in thinking this means to 
be warlike and succeed in military conquests.
95
 Not all Roman writers would have agreed 
with Plutarch, but this is precisely the point. Plutarch is attempting to uphold the 
superiority of Greek paideia through criticizing an ancient Roman ruler and Roman 
understandings of virtue; understandings with which he finds fault because they are not 
informed by Greek paideia. But as Simon Swain writes, this is not necessarily “anti-
Roman” either. Plutarch had a subtly different emphasis, a view “commonly held by 
educated Greeks that there was only one culture worth pursuing in the ancient world—
not the modern notion of a unitary Greco-Roman culture, but the Greek idea of Hellenic 
culture that Greeks were more likely to possess than Romans.”96    
 There is one significant expression of the way that paideia may have been 
popularly understood by the time of the first century C.E. We find this expression in the 
Tabula of Cebes, a “moralizing dialogue” attributed to the Pythagorean Cebes of 
Thebes.
97
 The Tabula records a discussion about a tablet in the temple of Cronus which 
had “an unusual painting with peculiar fables” (1.1). A certain “old man” comes up to 
some people gazing at the tablet and explains its meaning to them. According to the old 
man, the tablet portrays a journey to “the dwelling place of the happy”  because “all the 
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virtues and happiness spend their time here”(17.3).  The picture communicates to those 
who understand it, “the kind of path (people) must take if they are to be saved in life” 
(4.3).    
In this moralizing dialogue, there are a few significant elements to note about 
paideia. First, paideia stands at the gate of the “dwelling place of the happy” also 
referred to as “life”.98 In other words, paideia stands as the main entry point into true life. 
Second, paideia gives gifts of virtue to those who come to her and are “purified,” having 
the diseases of vice and other evils cured by her. Through paideia people receive a host 
of common virtues: knowledge (e0pisth/mh), courage (a)nredi/a), justice (dikaiosu/nh), 
goodness (kaloka)gaqi/a),  moderation (swfrosu/nh), orderliness (eu)taci/a), freedom 
(e0leuqeri/a), self-control (e0gkra/teia), and gentleness (prao/thj).99 In short, paideia is 
the key that allows the evil and non-virtuous to turn and become virtuous and just, and 
enter into the beautiful (eternal) dwelling of the happy.   
It is striking that much of what is associated with paideia was also associated with 
nomos and the pursuit of philosophia. This, I think, is no coincidence. The ideal of 
paideia had, in essence, become significant as a means toward achieving the ethical-
political ideals that stood as the goal of nomos and the pursuit of philosophia. At the 
same time, however, paideia represented particularly Greek life. 
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Paideia and Nomos 
In his article on Greek nomos, C. Carey notes that one way Greeks separated 
themselves from barbarians was respect of nomos.
100
 According to Werner Jaeger, the 
Greek idea of a legislator was compared with a sculptor, who through education (paideia) 
shaped the lives of people toward the ideal.
101
  
The idea of paidei/a, understood as “education,” had been associated with nomos 
from an early point.
102
 In relation to the norm of “justice,” Plato gives particular nomos 
the role of “instructor.” It teaches justice and curbs injustice for both good people who 
need instruction in the best course of action, as well as those “who have gotten away 
from education” (paidei/a) and have no way to prevent being overtaken by wickedness 
(kaki/a).103 In Laws, 870A–E Plato states that the failure to educate (paideu/w) the 
individual leads to not only the destruction of the individual, but also to the damage of 
the polis. This education comes through the laws.  
Other writers share in this trajectory, associating paideia more thoroughly with 
Greek life and culture. According to Jonathan Hall, many Greek writers distinguished 
their Greek ways of life from other peoples, often referred to as barbarians, on the basis 
of paideia. Moreover, insofar as nomos signified the ways and manners of a particular 
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people, Greek life had in effect become identified with universal nomos. When it came to 
defining the best life for humanity, and in distinction with all other peoples, the Greeks 
were generally of one accord: Greek culture was the surest path to the most just and 
virtuous life.          
In Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War, Pericles praises Athens as the paideusis 
of Hellas — the educator of Greek life.104 Prior to this statement, Pericles had stressed the 
greatness of Athens’ laws and customs — both written and unwritten. These laws and 
customs are not those of other peoples, and are far superior, and an essential part of the 
way Athens educates.
105
 A bit later than Thucydides, Isocrates, in a famous statement in 
his Panegyricus, asserts that Athens is the paideusis of the entire Greek world:    
And so far has our city distanced the rest of mankind in thought and in speech that 
her pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world; and she has brought 
it about that the name Hellenes suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and 
that the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those 
who share a common blood.
106
  
 
Commenting on Isocrates, Werner Jaeger’s states:  
In Isocrates, national feeling is that of a culturally superior nation which has 
realized that the efforts it has made to attain a universal standard of perfection in 
all its intellectual activities are its highest claim to victory in competition with 
other races — since these other  races have accepted the Greek forms as the 
absolute expression of civilization.
107
 
 
 The first century writer Plutarch, as we saw above, emphasized that the goal of 
philosophia was the attainment of virtue. Plutarch also associates the role of the lawgiver 
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with paideia and virtue.
108
 According to Plutarch the Spartans of ancient times, under the 
laws of Lycurgus, were the most virtuous people, an example for later generations. The 
laws of Lycurgus meant not only that the Spartans were the most virtuous, but that all 
others lacked in this training (a0paideu/twn).109 In short, the best laws educate in virtue. 
The above writers reflect the sentiment expressed by Jaeger that Greeks had a sense of 
one divine law for all humanity and “tried to make their life and thought harmonize with 
it.”110 
Not everyone agreed with these claims about paideia. But in their disagreement, 
certain writers demonstrate the pervasiveness of this sort of perspective. In his 28
th
 epistle, 
the Cynic Diogenes chastises the Greeks for their failure to live justly. They are evil and 
without reason. What’s worse, their nomoi demonstrate no greatness among the people 
because they continue to live as animals and practice evil.
111
 He goes on to say that their 
paideia does not train people in justice, but only in the basic arts.
112
 He concludes by 
turning the tables and calling the “so-called Greeks” (oi9 kalou/menoi   #Ellhnej) 
“barbarians,” since the barbarians who have no paideia are “more refined” (xarie/steroi/) 
in their way of life (tro/poj) than the Greeks, and this in spite of the fact that the Greeks 
claim greatness over the barbarians because of their laws and paideia.
113
 Epicurus also 
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gave a negative assessment of Greek paideia in a manner similar to the way Sophists and 
Cynics talked about being free from nomos. He encouraged people to seek true freedom 
from the constraints of Greek paideia.
114
 
Paideia and Philosophia 
 As we have suggested, the promotion of Greek paideia could also be related to 
the pursuit of philosophia. According to Isocrates, Athens brought order and justice to all 
of the world, bringing law to the lawless and subduing the barbarians. Athens brought 
virtue to the world, as well as philosophia, “which has educated us for public affairs and 
made us gentle towards each other.”115 What is striking here is the interconnection 
between paideia, nomos, and philosophia. The passage from Plutarch’s On the Education 
of Children cited above is another important example. Plutarch creates a direct series of 
connections between paideia, philosophia. For Plutarch paideia and philosophia are 
nearly one and the same. If there is a distinction, it seems that Greek paideia educates the 
individual (and humanity) in philsophia, leading to virtue and behaviors commonly also 
associated with the purpose of nomos.  
These examples show how Greek writers made use of the larger discourse about 
nomos to champion their claims about paideia, which defined Greek life and culture. 
What we see is that the Greeks drew upon the basic contours of the wider discourse about 
nomos and used this framework to the advantage of promoting the superiority and 
universality of that which was particularly Greek. There seems to have been a general 
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interest in promoting Greek life and culture, and this was achieved through associations 
that are related to, and perhaps even dependent upon the widespread nomos discourse.   
Rome’s Law and the Nomos Discourse 
With the rise of the Roman empire, life in the Mediterranean took on new changes. 
Two ways in which the Roman empire most affected the world were political domination 
and economic domination.
116
 Yet, as many have noted, the ancient Mediterranean was 
defined in terms of borrowing and adapting Hellenistic culture.
117
 Thus, in spite of 
Roman domination in some ways, much of the ancient Mediterranean culture remained in 
many other ways Greek well after the rise of Rome.
118
  
The Greek culture and thought that pervaded the cities and towns, even the ideal 
of paideia, provided a shared platform on which various people could express their own 
traditions and ways of life and also evaluate their relative worth. This borrowing and 
adapting, however, was often not benign. Rather, it could be used in an attempt to claim 
superiority at many levels: ethical, political, religious, cultural. In this interaction Greek 
aspirations and even Greek language had a lot of mileage. As Martin Goodman aptly 
states, “(t)he adoption of Greek culture provided opportunities for…people not to 
abandon their native traditions but to express them in different ways.”119   
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When it comes to nomos and the Roman borrowing of things Greek, we have 
quite a happy marriage. Greek philosophers and writers had established a widespread and 
complex discourse on in which nomos played a central role. Romans did not have to 
borrow from this discourse; it provided a foundation upon which Roman ideology could 
build. Much of the basis of the identity of the Roman empire was “law.” We see this in a 
frequently cited passage from Virgil’s Aeneid which proclaims rule according to law as a 
key part of the mission of Roman rule:  
Remember, O Roman, to rule the nations with your power—these shall be your 
arts—to crown peace with law, to spare the humbled, and to tame in war the 
proud!
120
 
 
This passage is a prophecy through the mouth of Aeneas’ father speaking from the 
underworld: Rome, in the rhetoric of Virgil’s poetic masterpiece, is destined to fulfill this 
mission. The emphasis Roman writers placed on Roman law was slightly different from 
the Greeks. James Luther Adams puts it,  
the Greeks had laws…the Romans had law. Greek law had retained the character 
of primitive law in that it was “uncertain with respect to form” and was lacking in 
“uniformity of application.” Roman lawyers (and Roman law), on the other hand, 
came into contact with philosophy in the transition from strict law to the stage of 
equity. Hence “the Stoic creed (of law of nature) was better adapted for Rome 
than for the land whence it first arose.
121
  
 
Adams’ point may be a bit overstated, and I think he dismisses Greek law too 
simply, but nevertheless there is truth to his point about Roman law. Roman life had a 
rootedness in law. In Rome’s early days jurisprudence even was a flourishing 
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profession.
122
 It had a well defined and organized system of law, with clearly identified 
categories of law for different aspects of life. We may say that where Greeks emphasized 
paideia associated it with the discourse on nomos, Rome had law.  
Virgil’s Aeneid illuminates our points. In its perspective and style it exhibits both 
the borrowing of Greek things and the triumph of Rome and its law. In varying degrees, 
the Aeneid quickly became known and widely used outside of the circles of the literary 
elite. It had enough “canonical standing” by the time of Nero that Neronian writers could 
make use of it and adapt the praises and prophecies about Augustus to Nero.
123
 
According to some, the Aeneid is a “Roman national epic” with an emphasis on 
promoting the national superiority of Rome.
124
 As such, one main purpose of the Aeneid 
was not just to imitate the great Greek epics of Homer, but to even “supercede” them.125 
According to Karl Galinsky, the Aeneid claims that the Roman rule brought “to fruition” 
all that Alexander and the Greek world had set in motion.
126
     
The main character, Aeneas, upon whose actions Rome is established and who 
prepares the way for the rise of Roman rule, embodies justice and piety and shows 
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Rome’s existence as divinely sanctioned by Jupiter, ruler of all.127 Rome was not just 
another kingdom. They were a nation who fulfilled the highest aspirations of humanity, 
even if these aspirations were framed by Greek thinkers. Part of the way the Aeneid 
expresses the future hope of Roman rule is by speaking of a ruler who would arise to rule 
a “race” (genus), that is Rome, and “bring beneath the entire world under its law.”128  A 
bit later his father Anchises speaks from the underworld about the manner the future 
rulers who would come from Aeneas. The text is illuminating in how Virgil 
communicates his understanding of Rome and Roman rule:  
Look now turn your eyes, behold this people, your own Romans; Here now is 
Caesar and all Julius’ seed, destined to pass beneath the sky’s mighty vault; This, 
this is he, whom you so often heard promised to you, Augustus Caesar, son of a 
god, who shall again set up the Golden Age amid the fields where Saturn once 
reigned.
129
 
 
The passage communicates that Caesar Augustus’ rule is the coming of the “golden age.”  
According to the philosopher Posidonius, the “golden age” was a time of good and 
perfect rule, a time of complete justice, peace, and security. There was no abuse of power. 
There was “no inclination, or the excuse, to do wrong, since the ruler ruled well and the 
subject obeyed well.”130 This “golden age” was viewed as a time before human 
wickedness. According to Posidonius, a decline in humanity began when “vice stole in” 
and “a need for laws arose” (90.6). Posidonius praises the early laws of Solon and a 
number of others who were “renowned for their wisdom” and ability to craft just laws for 
                                                             
127
 Wallace, Gospel, 116–17. 
 
128
 Virgil, Aeneid, 4.231; ac totum sub leges mitteret orbem. See also Klaus Wengst, Pax Romana 
and the Peace of Jesus Christ, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 37.   
 
129
 Virgil, Aeneid, 6.789–94.  
 
130
 Seneca, 90.5.  
 
200 
people of particular poleis (90.6), laws that were necessary correctives after the fall from 
the golden age. These laws maintained justice and order as best they could, but it was no 
“Golden Age.” In Seneca’s account of Posidonius’ description, the “golden age” was a 
time of perfect rule and of justice. It was a time when there was no need of law.
131
 As 
part of ushering in this “Golden Age” Virgil stresses the rule by law. The passage cited 
above states that Rome’s rule would “crown peace with law” (6.851–53). The point of the 
passage from the Aeneid is that the rule and order of the Roman empire bring an end to 
the moral decline of humanity and restore the “golden age” of humanity.132 In other 
words, Roman rule, including specifically Roman law, would represent a return to perfect 
rule and perfect law, in contrast to admirable, but human, attempts to maintain justice on 
earth. 
Other writers also associate and promote the centrality of establishing universal 
law in association with Roman rule in ways that build upon the larger web of discourse 
we have established that is related to nomos. Ovid’s Metamorphoses refers to Caesar 
Augustus as one who will rise to rule the entire earth: “all the barbarous lands and nations 
east and west by ocean's rim…Whatever habitable earth contains shall bow to him, the 
sea shall serve his will!”133 This portent from Jupiter continues to mention the laws of 
Augustus: “With peace established over all the lands, he then will turn his mind to civil 
rule and as a prudent legislator will enact wise laws. And he will regulate the manners of 
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his people by his own example.”134 This emphasis on a return of peace and justice 
through law dovetails with the reference of the return to the Golden Age in Virgil’s 
Aeneid. There is reference to Roman law, but it is not necessarily only a written law; 
rather the universal law is embodied in the manner of life of the good ruler who would 
enact wise laws for the entire world. 
Writers after Virgil during the Neronian period referred to a second Golden Age. 
It had become clear that the previous Caesars did not quite bring to fruition the hopes of 
Virgil and others. The minor poet Calpurnius Siculus writes that with Nero “the Golden 
Age springs to a second birth.” This is described in terms of the coming of “peace in her 
fullness” and that “laws shall be restored; right will come in fullest force; a kinder god 
will renew the former tradition” (referring to the time of Augustus).135     
These writers suggest that without Rome, the state of the world was “without law” 
(in the Apostle Paul’s terms—a!nomoj). It is not that no law existed for humanity before 
Rome’s rule. But whatever nomoi were in place were not the perfect universal law 
necessary to maintain justice and peace on earth. For these writers the Roman empire 
brought to fulfillment what Greeks held as their ideal: they turned lawlessness into justice, 
and barbarians—the nations (ethnoi)—into good citizens of the world. This is achieved 
through the establishment of Roman law, which is understood as the perfect law that 
embodied virtue and the aspirations of Hellenism and signaled the dawning of the Golden 
Age. Arthur Dewey writes,  
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in these poets (Virgil and Ovid), one finds an intimation of reconciliation, wherein 
the destiny of Rome carries with it the renewal of nature as well as of convention. 
Moreover, the attempts at an interpretive understanding which takes in universal 
issues now become concretized in the relentless unfolding of the Roman 
tradition.
136
  
 
According to the record of Dionysius of Halicarnassius Tullius established laws 
that secured justice both for the common people as well as for the more powerful.
137
 They 
had the intention of being mindful of the equality of all (th~j a9pa/ntwn i0shgori/aj). In 
this instance, the laws given by Tullius are an example of Greek universalism. According 
to his own words, Dionysius is writing “the history of the polis which defines the things 
right and just for all.”138 That is, his history is about Rome, the great polis that set that 
standards of what is right and just for all humanity. The Roman empire’s law set 
universal norms for living because the Roman empire encompassed the world. This 
worldwide rule was also expressed by Virgil, who wrote that the limits of the Roman rule 
were prophesied to be “amid the fields where Saturn once reigned…past Garament and 
Indian, to a land that lies beyond the stars, beyond the paths of the year and the sun, 
where heaven-bearing Atlas turns on his shoulders the sphere, inset with gleaming 
stars.”139  
As we have seen, Cicero drew on the political-ethical nomos discourse to 
associate Roman law and ways of life with “law of nature.” Cicero is not only an 
important representative of “law of nature”; he is also an important representative of the 
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importance of Roman law and Roman life. Cicero, putting things differently, made an 
equally bold case for the universality and near-transcendence of Roman law and Roman 
life as his poet contemporaries. Cicero made a clear and conscious attempt to deal with a 
concept of universal nomos, and relate it to Roman law and justice. Explicitly and 
implicitly, throughout his Laws Cicero makes a case for the superiority of Roman law—
that is, the commands, prohibitions, and customs that regulated not only Roman life, but 
the entire world. Raymond Bellotti describes Cicero’s aims well: 
Cicero did not aspire to advance a new philosophical system. His primary 
motivations are clear: to introduce a Latin vocabulary to philosophy; to use 
contemporary Roman examples to animate Greek philosophy; to evaluate Roman 
customs and traditions in light of philosophical insight; to unite philosophy with 
rhetoric; to aid fellow citizens in living fulfilling lives (lives “according to 
nature”); to provide a moral guide, especially to youth…Cicero made himself a 
source “of an enlightened and human outlook, the Roman spirit at its best”.140 
 
According to Cicero, Roman law is the best, though imperfect, route toward 
virtue and life in accordance with nature, God’s universal law (1.20; 2.23; 3.14).141 This 
is in contrast to the many other laws which inconsistently point the individual and the 
community to justice and virtue.
142
 In his De Legibus Cicero is concerned “with the 
actual laws applicable to a real city of empire”, and “he sees the combination of reason 
and concrete realism as the mark of Roman philosophy.”143 In other words, Cicero the 
Roman philosopher excels in providing more than just abstract theory about following 
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“true law” or “nature” and pursuing virtue and philosophy. Reason, identified with 
“nature” and intimately related with justice and virtue, unites the entire universe into a 
community of gods and men (people).
144
  Humans are thus “born for justice” and 
virtue.
145
 For Cicero, “law” is that which leads the individual and the community away 
from vice and toward virtue. In a fascinating passage from De Legibus, Cicero explains 
the purpose of law in a way that encapsulates law, virtue, wisdom, and philosophy: 
Law ought to be a reformer of vice and an incentive to virtue, the guiding 
principles of life may be derived from it. It is therefore true that wisdom is the 
mother of all good things; and from the Greek expression meaning “the love of 
wisdom” philosophy has taken its name. And philosophy is the richest, the most 
bounteous, and the most exalted gift of the immortal gods to humanity.
146
  
 
Cicero’s dialogue partner expects him to explain laws that are “laws of life and a system 
for training (read: paideia) for both nations and individuals.”147 Even though he responds 
with some trepidation over whether he can “adequately” accomplish this task (1.22), 
there is a sense in which the laws given in De Legibus, as we will see, are up to the 
task.
148
 As he goes on, it is his devotion to the study of wisdom that will make it possible 
for him to describe laws that best fulfill the true law of nature. His system begins with the 
recognition of one god over all and turns then to the unity of all humanity (2.2.4–5). Any 
human laws must therefore, encapsulate eternal wisdom and be able to rule the entire 
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universe (2.4.8). It must be in conformity with “nature” and lead all people toward justice 
and a “happy life” (2.5.11–13).149 The laws Cicero intends to put forth are just of this sort, 
which “cannot be repealed” and up to the task of educating in and leading to virtue 
(2.5.14). As it turns out, in the laws Cicero puts forth in De Legibus books 2 and 3 
“Cicero looks to the Roman constitution as a framework to which he must fit his laws and 
takes the bulk of his laws from Roman political experience.”150 The Roman laws upon 
which Cicero models his laws and Cicero’s laws themselves are akin to “natural law” in 
such a way that modern scholars find in Cicero’s program a nearly unreconcilable 
tension.
151
 It should be repeated that Cicero never understood his laws or Roman law and 
ways of living were the same as “law of nature.” Nevertheless, “by testing his laws 
against natural law, as best as he understands it, (Cicero) hoped to produce a body of 
constitutional law that would be permanently valid.”152 And it was distinctly Roman.  
As with Greek writers who wrote about paideia the above writers utilize the wider 
nomos discourse to elevate the superiority of Roman law and life. They stress that Roman 
law and Roman life fulfilled universal ideals of virtue and brought to realization 
transcendent ethical-political goals for all humanity. Not only that, for some Roman rule 
represented a return to a time when particular nomoi were not needed because perfect rule 
                                                             
149
 In De Natura Deorum, Cicero applies the Greek conception of law of nature to Roman law 
when he states that even Chrysippus “identify(ed) Jupiter with the mighty law, everlasting and eternal, 
which is our guide of life and instructress in duty” (1.15.40).   
 
150
 Asmis, “Cicero,” 26. See also Atkins, “Cicero,” 501. 
 
151
 So Asmis, “Cicero,” 26–30; Atkins, “Cicero,” 499–502: “To claim universal appropriateness 
for the laws of Classical Rome ultimately fails to convince even on Cicero’s own terms” (501). Asmis is 
more intersted in explaining this tension than Atkins. For Atkins, Cicero may have intended to return to this 
problem, but never had the opportunity (“Cicero,” 501–02). 
 
152
 Asmis, “Cicero,” 31. 
206 
had been established. The claims of these Roman writers is one that elevates Roman 
law—which was still a particular law—to the status of universal and transcendent law. 
Because the Romans possessed and established this law, bringing it to the world, they 
were superior to all others. In fact, the sentiments of these writers is that all of humanity 
is in need of Rome and its law. These writers’ claims are supported and enabled by the 
possibilities afforded by the widespread nomos discourse and the larger ethical web of 
discourse that prized virtue and following transcendent and universal ethical-political 
standards. 
Conclusion 
While law (no/moj; lex) could be seen in a negative light because of its 
particularity and limitedness, the attempt to articulate a universal and authoritative 
ethical-political standard remained a concern. As writers tried to do this, the general 
concept of nomos was never abandoned completely. It always stood for the commands, 
prohibitions, customs, and norms of a particular community. The nomos that was of 
supreme significance changed from particular and limited to universal and transcendent. 
 We saw also that the nomos discourse is not a self-contained discourse. Writers 
who wrote about nomos—both particular and transcendent—did so in ways that merged 
and overlapped with the pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of philosophia and wisdom. For 
some writers, to pursue one is to pursue the others. This complex web was aptly utilized 
by writers who promoted the superiority of both Greek and Roman culture and life. On 
the one hand, Greek writers associated Greek paideia and participating in Greek life and 
culture with the pursuit of virtue and philosophia. By doing this Greek ways of life—
Greek nomos and customs—become universal and serve the purpose of living in accord 
207 
with universal nomos and virtue. Writers promoting Roman life and culture and law did 
not change much other than that they inserted Roman law where Greek writers 
emphasized Greek paideia. Indeed, in some ways the Roman laws were no less Greek in 
substance. But again, the main point is the use of the larger discourse in the ancient world, 
a discourse rooted in the struggle between particular political-ethical standards and a 
universal political-ethical standard for all humanity. Both Greek and Roman writers made 
claims about how Greek life or Roman life and law brought humanity closer to these 
ethical goals by uniting all humanity—or attempting to unite all humanity—under one 
way of life.    
One important point is that the nomos discourse by no means resulted in 
diminishing the particular identities of various ethnic or political communities, or their 
customs and laws. In fact, the opposite seems to have happened. Particular ways of living 
in particular communities could find universal significance and thus authority by linking 
to the language of transcendent nomos and the ideals of virtue and justice to which they 
led. The various conceptions of transcendent nomos, in their attempts to carve out a 
concept of nomos that is transcendent of political particularities, all essentially are doing 
the same thing. It is this: they all are attempts to articulate a means toward an end—the 
just and virtuous life and ultimately a just and virtuous kosmos.      
Must someone become “Greek” or “Roman” in order to live in accord with 
transcendent nomos or to be just or virtuous? This is a complex question with no easy 
answer. There is no doubt that for some writers, not being Greek or Roman, or at least not 
participating fully in Greek or Roman manners of living resulted in a “lesser” quality of 
existence—being a “barbarian.” The associations of particular customs and ways of 
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living, as well as connections to particular deities, even if placed on a universal stage, 
brought with it often a rejection of other claims to providing the best path to virtue. But 
there was room within the larger discourse to include other claims. There remained the 
ideal of one nomos—one universal standard—that stood above particular nomoi and 
particular attempts to express the political-ethical goal of humanity. The claims of 
superiority were claims of possessing the best life for all humanity. This was often 
understood in terms of some form of transcendent nomos, “the good life,” “life in accord 
with nature,” “justice,” or “virtue.” 
One way to understand this is in terms of “social engineering.” In an insightful 
article that dovetails significantly with what we’ve argued in this and the previous 
chapter, F. Gerald Downing draws attention to this way of understanding discussions 
about nomos in the ancient world. The phrase “social engineering” refers to the way 
Greek and Roman writers interpreted nomos in terms of “community-building 
practice.”153 The main concern in the discussion of nomos is not with following 
“individual bits of legislation” but “with practice in matters divine and human, the 
inculcating of a practice that has character formation as its main aim, with communitarian 
gain implicit.”154 When writers wrote of nomos they were not narrowly concerned with 
“superficial observance” or with “winning divine or social favour” but the pursuit of 
virtue and political justice.
155
 The overall idea of “social engineering” according to 
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Downing is the cultivation of a just and virtuous society in accordance with a certain 
ideal.
156
 We may apply this idea of “social engineering” to our description of the nomos 
discourse where the tension between particular and transcendent nomos fostered attempts 
to express a universal ethic for all humanity. These Greek and Roman writers were 
indeed arguing for the superiority of Greek or Roman ways of life. The purposes of this 
related to the attempt to define an ethic—to design or engineer a manner of life—that led 
to the cultivation and attainment of an principles and ideals that transcend traditional 
social and political particularities, and often to a manner of life that was in accord with 
the divine.  
At the end of this chapter two things should be clear. First, I have attempted to 
finish out the ‘grammar’ of nomos in the ancient world. In this chapter I highlighted the 
ways that nomos, having been portioned into two distinct inflections (particular and 
transcendent), serves purpose of ethical virtue for most ancient writers. The usefulness of 
nomos is largely defined in relation to this. Secondly, I have taken this grammar and 
widened the scope to include ways in which ancient writers wrote about the pursuit of 
virtue in the ancient world. By doing this we have seen the connections between nomos 
and philosophia, and then also the widespread ideal of paideia which influenced the 
thought not only of writers espousing Greek culture and ways of life, but also writers 
advocating for Roman ideals and Roman law.  
As we shall see, all of this intersects with the problem of nomos in Romans 2. In 
Romans 2, Paul’s argument and the understanding of nomos upon which he relies 
emphasizes a particular nomos—that of the Jewish people—and its ability to function as 
                                                             
156
 Ibid., 220–27.  
210 
a universal ethical standard. Additionally, this Jewish nomos, because of its dual role, 
becomes a platform upon which the Jew can identify him/herself as not just superior to 
others, but as having a sort of educational responsibility. The Jew, according to Paul, is 
paideuth_n a)fro&nwn, dida&skalon nhpi&wn—“an educator of the foolish, a teacher of 
children” (Rom. 2:20). When Paul says this about the Jewish perspective on the Jewish 
nomos, he has not teaching other Jews in mind, but the whole world, since in the law is 
found “the form of knowledge and truth.”   
This widespread Greco-Roman discourse provides an important framework within 
which to understand not only Paul in Romans 2, but also the Diaspora Jewish writers who 
attempt to universalize the Jewish nomos. This discourse was pervasive enough that it 
would be foolish to think that Diaspora Jews were not aware of its basic contours, if not 
even some of the more technical aspects. If Diaspora Jewish writers were to explain the 
importance of their nomos, what we have discussed in these chapters provides the 
unavoidable playing field upon which they did so.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
NOMOS IN DIASPORA JEWISH LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters we have described in some detail the complex web of 
discourse that is important for understanding nomos in the Greco-Roman world. This web 
of discourse provides an important context within which any discussion about nomos in 
the Greco-Roman world needs to be placed.  
It is often recognized that Diaspora Jewish writers participated in or made use of 
various elements of the larger web of discourse, and to varying degrees.
1
 It still remains, 
however, to see if we can be more clear about the complex ways in which Diaspora 
Jewish writers interacted with this web of discourse. It is likely that Diaspora Jewish 
explanations of nomos mirror the complexity of their Greco-Roman counterparts and how 
we should interpret Jewish interaction with the Greco-Roman discourse. John Barclay has 
offered at least a starting point to analyze this interaction with his categorical system for 
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measuring varying degrees of assimilation, acculturation, and accommodation.
2
 While 
Barclay’s categories are helpful for their heuristic value, an interpreter who finds that a 
particular Diaspora writing possesses assimilationist tendencies might disagree with 
another who interprets the details of that particular writing differently.
3
 Diaspora Jewish 
literature displays a varied and complex relationship with the Greco-Roman environment, 
often falling somewhere between rejection and comfortable acceptance.  
With this in mind in this chapter I ask the question: What did Diaspora Jews mean 
by the word no/moj? And to what did it refer? As an initial answer to these questions, I 
want to make it clear that it would be deceptive to think that one could easily say 
Diaspora Jews meant “the Mosaic law” or the Jewish Torah when they wrote of no/moj. 
In his commentary on Sibylline Oracles book 3, Rieuwerd Buitenwerf writes: 
Instinctively, one might be inclined to think that whenever a Jewish author uses 
the phrase “law of God,” he refers to the specifically Jewish, Mosaic law. In the 
third Sibylline book, however, this interpretation is untenable. According to III 
599–600 and 686–687, pagans will be rebuked for their disobedience to the law of 
God. This criticism would be undeserved if by “law of God” the Mosaic law was 
meant. How could a pagan know the law which had been given exclusively to the 
Jews? In other words, in these passages, “law of God” must refer to an ethical and 
religious law known to all people.
4
  
 
Even though Buitenwerf writes specifically about the phrase “law of God” (no/moj qeou~), 
he highlights an important point. For most Diaspora Jewish writers, the word no/moj was 
related to a complex web of thought even though they may have had the Mosaic law as 
the primary referent. In this chapter we will investigate this complexity. Our central 
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question is this: how do Diaspora Jews interpret and articulate the significance of the 
Jewish law so that it universally applies to all people, while also bringing out its 
importance as something particularly Jewish?  
Nomos in Its Diaspora Jewish Contexts 
We know that the Jewish nomos was acknowledged by both Gentiles and Jews as 
something that was a particular written law. Often its commands were ridiculed as quite 
different. According to some, the ridicule focused on such laws as dietary laws, marriage 
laws, the law of circumcision, and Sabbath observance.
5
 For at least a few Diaspora 
Jewish writers criticisms of these commands provided the basis for their explanations of 
the Jewish nomos.
6
 But, as we saw in the previous chapters, such criticisms of particular 
nomoi was somewhat standard fare. Any particular nomos was fair game for being 
criticized as deficient, strange, or unvirtuous in relation to universal standards of virtue or 
transcendent nomos. As part of the Greco-Roman discourse, this was a way of 
distinguishing one way of life from another as the most virtuous.    
 Related to this is the fact that the Jewish nomos did not receive only criticism. 
There is evidence of positive evaluations of the Jewish nomos.
7
 This seems to have come 
primarily from non-Jews who found elements of the Jewish nomos salutary in relation to 
their own conceptions of virtue and justice. In other words, the same general conceptions 
                                                          
5
 Cf. John Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 219–20; Louis Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient 
World, 125–31. 
 
6
 Cf. Gregory Sterling, “Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish 
Ethics,” SPhA 15 (2003) 64–65. As we shall see this is the reason for the explanations of the law in 
Aristobulus, Let. Aris., and 4 Macc. 
 
7
 Cf. Louis Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993) 201–87; Thomas Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 27–30.  
 
214 
that fueled criticisms of the Jewish nomos also led some to find value to parts of it. All 
this is to say that while the Jewish nomos may have been ridiculed, this was not done in a 
vacuum, nor was it a one-sided tirade against Judaism; it was part of a common discourse 
about nomos. Likewise Diaspora Jewish writers drew on Greco-Roman concepts 
common to this larger discourse as they explained and interpreted the significance of 
their nomos. Many scholars seem to suggest that the concept “law of nature” was the 
main way that Jews explained the law.
8
 While this is true in some instances, three points 
suggest a moderate amount of caution is necessary. First, we should be cautious of 
assuming that “law of nature” is the main way by which Diaspora Jews explained the 
significance of the Jewish nomos. As we saw in the introduction, scholars have argued 
that Jewish writers make use of other conceptions or explanations in their attempts to 
give the Jewish nomos universal scope with no use for “law of nature.” Second, as we 
shall see, the word fu/sij is not used by some Diaspora Jewish writers. This should raise 
some uncertainty about how widely the concept was employed in Diaspora Judaism. 
Finally, as we have seen in chapter two, “law of nature” was not the only way one could 
speak of nomos in a universal, transcendent sense. It would result in a very narrow 
understanding of Diaspora Jewish explanations of the Jewish law if we assumed either 
the dominance or singularity of either a technical Stoic idea of “law of nature” or even a 
looser association of nomos with physis. There were other ways to universalize the 
Jewish nomos.    
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Part of the problem is that we have few robust evaluations of how Diaspora Jews 
universalized the law in conversation with Greco-Roman conceptions of nomos.
9
 Only 
some of the current commentaries on Diaspora Jewish literature address the issue, and 
beyond that we really only find the topic seriously addressed in relation to Philo.
10
 In the 
previous chapters, we saw that the widespread nomos discourse is part of a more complex 
web of discourse by which Greco-Roman writers explained and defined ethical and 
political life. We saw that this discourse was largely an attempt by ancient writers to 
relate the particular to the transcendent and universal. While I do not want to reinvent the 
wheel in this chapter, we need to cover the pertinent Jewish literature in detail to 
ascertain how Jewish authors explained, defended, or otherwise understood the Jewish 
nomos within this larger context.       
 The central issues surrounding nomos in Romans 2 remain our starting point: 1) 
Paul seems to give the Jewish nomos universal authority; 2) not only are Gentiles 
accountable to the Jewish nomos, but he places them in a positive relationship to the 
Jewish nomos and claims that they keep its commands; 3) though recognizing the law’s 
universality, he retains its particularity and a sense of Jewish superiority based on it. 
Drawing upon this, four main points will focus our discussion of the Jewish nomos for 
each Diaspora Jewish writing considered: first, how do they refer to the Jewish nomos? 
Second, how do they universalize it? Third, how are Gentiles situated in relation to the 
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Jewish nomos? That is, are they expected to follow the law? Must they become Jews or 
can Gentiles can keep the law as Gentiles? Fourth, how is the particularly of the Jewish 
nomos maintained in light of this? What particular claims are made on the basis of a 
universalized understanding of the Jewish no/moj?        
We will conduct this investigation in conversation with the contours of the Greco-
Roman discussion about nomos presented in the previous chapters. We will attempt to 
understand how Diaspora Jewish writers engaged in the common Greco-Roman discourse. 
What elements and language do they use? How do they use the overall framework of the 
Greco-Roman discourse? My presumption here is that Diaspora Jewish writers did not 
write about the Jewish nomos in a vacuum. The air they breathed was that of the Greco-
Roman world, and this included the widespread nomos discourse and the complex ways 
in which it dovetailed with moral philosophical discourse.     
The Problem of Audience and Purpose 
One constantly recurring problem with regard to Diaspora Jewish literature is the 
dual-headed problem of audience and purpose. By purpose I do not mean purpose as it 
relates to the genre, though this is closely related. I mean purpose in terms of whether the 
literature is intended to be apologetic, missionary, or instructional. It is important to 
address the question of audience and purpose because how we conceive the audience 
affects how we conceive the purpose of the various explanations of the law.
11
 There are 
two ways to go about addressing this issue. One way would be to address it briefly here at 
the beginning of this chapter, and then discuss specific details as we encounter individual 
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authors. The other way would be to address this concern for each writing. The second 
way would result in a good deal of repetition, however, and the first route seems better 
here.    
We cannot with absolute certainty identify the target audience and overall purpose 
of most Diaspora Jewish literature. Nevertheless, some suggestions are more plausible 
than others. There are three main schools of thought. First, the audience is mostly Greek 
and the purpose “missional” or “proselytizing.” In the updated version of Emil Schürer’s 
The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ we find the statement:  
(in the Diaspora) a varied literature came into being, the direct aim of which was 
to convince pagans of the folly of idolatry, to win them over to belief in the one 
true God, and at the same time to convert them to a more serious and moral way 
of life by pointing towards a future reward. This literature did not of course 
always aim at winning pagans over to a full acceptance of the Law and to joining 
the Jewish community. Its purpose was often only conversion to the fundamental 
viewpoints of Judaism.
12
 
 
This view has had some widespread acceptance. But that the literature was purely 
“missional” has received criticism.13 At the least, questions have been raised regarding 
whether the rhetorical purpose and the actual readership match up.
14
 In other words, it is 
very unlikely that the primary readership was actually Gentile. This has caused some to 
offer other suggestions.        
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A second approach argues that the audience is Jewish and the purpose was 
explanation and instruction. Prominently Victor Tcherikover argued in favor of this 
approach stating that “(t)his literature was directed inwards and not outwards and…it 
would be an exaggeration to say that its purpose was solely that of propagating the 
Jewish religion among the Gentiles.”15 He goes on: “Alexandrian literature was created 
not in order to exhibit certain ideas to the outer world, but to give expression to the 
intricate problems which developed within the Jewish community itself and which 
attracted the interest of its members.”16 For Tcherikover, the social and historical 
circumstances of the ancient world are such that the likelihood of this literature being 
produced so that it would have a wide Gentile audience is highly unlikely. Tcherikover 
draws attention to the potential diversity within Jewish communities, Alexandria being 
the focus of his study. The attempt to deal with Judaism and the law in ways that seem to 
speak directly to Gentiles serves to address Jews in these communities who would benefit 
from this approach. Specifically, Tcherikover has in mind the potential problem of 
assimilation among some members of these communities to Gentile life and thought.
17
 
This view has much to commend to it. But it does not adequately consider the possibility 
that the viewpoints in this literature should reach beyond the Jewish communities. In 
other words, might this literature also have a secondary purpose of its message appealing 
to Gentiles?   
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A third approach has been suggested more recently by a number of scholars. This 
view argues for a more complex understanding of “audience.” John Barclay’s article on 
the issue can be considered as one representative. Distinguishing between empirical and 
implied readers, he argues that while we can with certainty only say that other Jews were 
the empirical readers of these writings, we cannot exclude the possibility of them falling 
into Gentile hands.
18
 Barclay also parses the differences between “apologetics,” 
“propaganda,” and “proselytizing” and concludes that Diaspora literature, even though 
rarely, if ever, read directly by non-Jews, could indirectly serve apologetic or 
proselytizing purposes through “oral apologetics.” In other words, this literature likely 
shaped the ways in which Jews communicated the importance of their religion and their 
nomos to other Jews and to Gentiles.
19
  
John Collins also adopts this third way. Writing about the fragments of 
Aristobulus, Collins offers a helpful perspective regarding specifically Jewish readers:  
(the) entire work is a defense of the Jewish Torah against interpretations that 
would make it seem crude and unsophisticated…the apologetic…is addressed on 
two fronts. On the one hand there is the explicit address to the Gentile king and 
the attempt to use acceptable Hellenistic categories. On the other hand, this 
interpretation of Judaism is inevitably a challenge to more conservative Jews and 
a reinforcement to those who thought in Hellenistic categories.
20
 
 
James Carlton Paget also offers helpful thoughts on the matter:  
Why should we in any case have an 'either/or' approach to this literature? And 
even if we believe that most of it is directed to an internal audience, it may be 
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providing Jewish readers with fodder for their conversations with curious or 
sceptical pagans.
21
   
    
The approach I will take is that most of this literature is addressed primarily to 
other Disapora Jews. That some non-Jews may have come across this literature or 
elements of its content cannot be ruled out, however. I would also suggest that we need to 
move past determining the readership according to ethnic identity. We know that there 
were non-Jews who participated to varying degrees in Diaspora Jewish communities, 
whether we call them “God-fearers” or label them otherwise. And despite various 
shortcomings in how some Jewish writers made use of Greek philosophy, we cannot 
overlook the primary fact that we are dealing with shared Greco-Roman cultural and 
philosophical language and thought whereby Jews attempt to explain, legitimate, or 
interpret Judaism and the Jewish nomos. Although the Diaspora Jewish writers and their 
presumed readership may have been primarily ethnically Jewish, these writers 
comfortably express things by means of a shared cultural discourse. If some of the 
literature intends to defend the Jewish nomos, it is likely that such a defense was needed 
either because some Jews were on the brink of dismissing it, or as Paget points out, the 
literature intends to provide arguments, explanations, and perspectives of the Jewish 
nomos for other Jews to adopt and make use of in their contexts. I also suggest that things 
might be simpler. Could not the views expressed just reflect the viewpoints of the Jewish 
authors and their communities, and not created for the purpose of apologetic or defense? 
All of this is important for our study. If, as it seems, these Jewish writings were 
not solely intended to win over Gentiles, but to shape the thinking of other Jews, then the 
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presentations of Judaism—and importantly of the Jewish nomos—may be more than just 
an appeal to the sensibilities of non-Jews, to get them to convert, or to appeal to other 
Jews on the brink of apostasy. We must, it seems to me, also seriously consider that these 
Jewish writers viewed Judaism, the law, and Gentiles in the very ways expressed in the 
literature and encouraged those in their communities to do the same. The articulations are 
not “reactions” to anything; they are reflections of how these Diaspora Jews understood 
their faith and their nomos. One likely consequence of this is that the perspectives on the 
Jewish nomos in Diaspora Jewish literature may do more than serve apologetics or an 
argument. It may reflect more widespread perspectives on the law. 
The Effect of Explanations of Nomos: Universality or Particularity? 
Related to the above discussion, there is an important and ongoing debate 
concerning the use of Greco-Roman categories to interpret the Jewish law. The debate 
may be represented in the work of influential scholars John Collins,
22
 John Barclay,
23
 and 
C. Marvin Pate,
24
 as well as significant scholars of a previous generation: E.R. 
Goodenough and Dieter Georgi.
25
 The central issue I want to draw attention to concerns 
the balance between universalization and particularization. The important question these 
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scholars address is: what is the effect of the participation in wider Greco-Roman 
discourse to explain the Jewish law?   
Goodenough, Georgi, and Collins represent the perspective that generally sees 
Diaspora Jewish literature engaged in a program of universalization by appealing to 
Greco-Roman cultural, ethical, and philosophical concepts and ideas. In spite of 
differences on some details, the overall effect is that the Jewish nomos becomes a 
universal nomos that serves more general Greco-Roman ethics and purposes just as well 
as it serves particular Jewish concerns, or that the Jewish particularities merge into more 
universal concerns.    
John Collins’ statements about the understanding of the law among Diaspora Jews 
may be considered representative of this view. He writes that the law was “treated 
selectively, by highlighting some laws and neglecting others, and it could be buttressed 
with philosophical and religious foundations that were remote from the original Torah.”26 
The Diaspora authors “(emphasize) those aspects of Jewish law which could command 
respect in a Gentile context” and “project Judaism as a universal religion which was in 
accordance with the laws of nature.”27 This includes “a tendency to bypass the distinctive 
laws of Judaism and concentrate on monotheism and matters of social and sexual 
morality.”28 For Collins, Diaspora Jews were trying to present Judaism in a way that 
“invited the respect of…Greeks.”29 Collins speaks of this approach as the “common ethic” 
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of Diaspora Judaism.         
 For Schnabel, Barclay, and Pate, the purpose and effect was not to universalize, 
but reinforce Judaism as distinct and not of a piece with Greco-Roman culture, ethics, 
and philosophy. It is not necessarily that these Jewish writers did not engage with Greco-
Roman culture and discourse. Indeed they did, but their ultimate purpose was not 
universalization. The effect is that the Jewish nomos is not turned into a universal nomos 
serving Greco-Roman ethics, but that the Jewish law stands above and is superior to 
Gentile law and ethics.         
 We may take the relatively recent treatment of C. Marvin Pate as representative. 
Pate attempts to argue that these Jewish writings, in whatever extent they take up Greco-
Roman thought, do so in the service of Jewish particularism.
30
 Pate spends a large 
amount of space investigating Jewish literature’s correlation of law and wisdom in the 
course of arguing that Paul overturned traditional associations of law and wisdom. His 
overall thesis about the law in Jewish literature is that in spite of any use of Greek ethics 
or philosophical thought “the Deuteronomistic tradition significantly impacts those 
Diaspora writings which associate wisdom and law (nomism), the consequences of which 
is that the sense of Jewish self-identity is heightened (particularism).”31 He makes his 
argument about these writings in direct response to Collins:  
The rather typical interpretation of these Diaspora writings has been to view them 
as reducing the Torah to its moral summation – love of God and neighbor – ideals 
compatible with the best of Hellenistic virtue. The point of such a “common ethic,” 
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to use Collins’ term, was to commend Judaism to Hellenism. To accomplish this, 
the more offensive of the Jewish laws of self-identity – circumcision, dietary 
regulations, Sabbath worship – were downplayed. In other words, in these works 
wisdom (universalism) was highlighted at the expense of law (particularism). 
While there is an element of truth to this formulation, the research (conducted by 
Pate) calls for revision of such a construct, for what surfaces in the ensuing 
discussion is, rather, that the (Diaspora) writings, in identifying wisdom and law, 
press any universalistic tendencies into the service of their particularism.
32
 
 
 Pate’s criticism of Collins’ position concerns not the use of Hellenistic categories, 
but how and why Jewish writers interpreted the law the way they did. Pate questions 
whether these Jewish writers were trying to “universalize” Judaism. He also implicitly 
questions what Collins suggests, that these Jewish writers dismissed certain laws and that 
there was a pervasive “common ethic” that was defined by such an interpretation of the 
law. For these Jews, Pate asserts, the entire law remained valuable, and it is not 
universalism, but particularism that is being triumphed.     
I do not intend to set up an either-or paradigm and suggest that either the line of 
interpretation represented by Collins or that represented by Pate are completely one-sided. 
But these schools of thought do demonstrate a clear preference for universalization over 
particularization, or vice versa. They demonstrate a legitimate tension among scholars 
about the nature of the explanations of the Jewish nomos. This tension affects our 
purposes here. The question of the identity of the Jewish nomos in Romans 2 addresses 
its universalization. Paul, it seems, makes his argument on the basis of universalizing 
tendencies, wherein the non-Jew can be both accountable to the Jewish nomos and able to 
keep its commands. If there are no universalizing tendencies among Diaspora Jews, 
however, then Paul’s argument in Romans 2 which builds upon the idea of a universally 
binding Jewish nomos falls flat. On the other hand, Paul also assumes a particularist 
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conception of the Jewish nomos in Romans 2:17–24, which also is a central part of how 
Paul describes the Jewish nomos. In a way the tension among scholars is also reflected in 
Paul’s argument in Romans 2.       
 Let me suggest a few initial thoughts here. Based on what I presented in the 
previous chapters, both universalistic and particularistic tendencies co-exist in Greco-
Roman discourse about nomos. Moreover, Diaspora Jewish writers do not show that they 
consciously reflected on the degree to which they participated in widespread Greco-
Roman discourse about nomos in contrast to their employment of more “Jewish” 
explanations of their nomos. Finally, the nature of the audience and  purpose of these 
writings is such that separating the universalization from the particularization or 
subordinating one to the other is not as easily done as it might seem. The curious mix of 
particular and universal seems to be part of the Diaspora Jewish authors’ mode of 
expression. Jewish writers could draw upon the wider discourse to stress both the 
universalization and particularization of their nomos just as their Greco-Roman 
counterparts did. We need not think that universalization happens at the expense of 
particularization, nor does particularism cancel universalization.      
 Our investigation in this chapter will find significance in not only giving us a 
sense of Diaspora Jewish articulations of the Jewish nomos, but also in furthering 
conversation around the nature of Jewish understandings of the law vis-à-vis the Greco-
Roman environment and discourse about nomos in the ancient Mediterranean.  
Literature to be Considered 
We now move on to the texts. I will select six major Diaspora Jewish writings for 
consideration: Aristobulus, Letter of Aristeas, Sibylline Oracles 3, Wisdom of Solomon, 
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4 Maccabees, and Pseudo-Phocylides. Why these? First, these writings can all be 
securely placed as main representatives of Diaspora Jewish literature. Second, the Jewish 
nomos figures prominently in each of these works, and the authors each attempt to 
universalize the Jewish nomos to some degree. Finally, these writings represent, to the 
best of our knowledge, a chronological and geographical cross-section of Diaspora 
Jewish literature. My goal is not to be exhaustive, but rather to provide a substantial 
context within which we can read Paul’s statements in Romans 2.       
It is immediately clear that I have omitted a few significant Jewish 
writers/writings: Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, Sirach, Philo, and Josephus. First, 
let me address Testaments and Sirach. Without taking too much space here, the main 
reason for omitting these two works concerns the provenance. As John Collins writes, 
treatment of the Testaments as part of Diaspora Jewish literature must proceed with 
caution, and anything said must “be adduced only very tentatively since the provenance 
of the Testaments is notoriously problematic.”33 Even while the original language may 
have been Greek and the “ethics of the Testaments find many parallels in works of the 
Diaspora,”34 I have determined that the better route is to omit them from consideration.35 
This is not to say that Testaments should not be investigated in light of this study, but for 
the purposes of this study. Sirach, as is known, was originally written in Hebrew and 
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translated into Greek.
36
 While consideration of this work would indeed be illuminating, 
we cannot rightly consider it as a Diaspora Jewish work.      
The omissions of Philo and Josephus demand a different explanation. With regard 
to Philo, my reasons are: first, there is no space to give Philo serious consideration here. 
Moreover, Philo’s treatment of the Jewish nomos has been given consideration by a 
number of other scholars.
37
 At the risk of oversimplifying, the main observation is that 
Philo makes full use of Greek philosophical discourse and he is particularly a significant 
example of Jewish appropriation of “law of nature.” Second, and more importantly, I 
want to deliberately discuss Diaspora Jewish explanations of the Jewish no/moj from a 
distinctly non-Philonic perspective. Why? First, we saw in the Introduction to this study 
that many proposals for explaining the universaliztion of the Jewish nomos in Romans 2 
regularly turned to Philo and his use of “law of nature.” For the reasons given in the 
introduction, I wish to fill out the picture. Second, Philo, as I pointed out in the 
introduction, is not necessarily representative of Diaspora Judaism. This is not to say that 
Philo is not of the same cloth as other Diaspora Jewish writers. Indeed, he is! To the point, 
it is actually likely that Philo drew upon other Diaspora Jewish explanations of the Jewish 
nomos just as much as he drew upon Greek philosophy.
38
 My overall objective is not to 
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dismiss Philo from consideration, but to consider more fully non-Philonic Diaspora 
writers to balance out the picture. Philo scholars can then situate Philo within this 
landscape.  
My omission of Josephus is primarily because of his later date. Josephus wrote his 
Contra Apionem, where he presents his fullest discussion of the Jewish nomos, nearly 50 
years after Paul wrote Romans.
39
 Whatever Josephus might contribute to the discussion 
would have little effect on the Diaspora Jewish perspectives before and current to the 
Rome in the mid-50s. Although Josephus does have his own angle on things, it is likely 
that Josephus’ general approach stands in line with the Diaspora literature we will 
consider in this chapter. Although I omit Philo and Josephus from the main consideration, 
they will make a brief appearance toward the end of this chapter, so their contributions 
will not be completely overlooked. They will serve as corroborating evidence on certain 
points. Again, my purpose in this selection of literature is not to be exhaustive. Rather I 
hope to provide a good basis of ways that Diaspora Jewish writers universalized the 
Jewish nomos in conversation with common language and ideas that were widespread 
throughout the Greco-Roman world, in conversation with which we will read Paul’s 
argument in Romans 2.  
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Investigation of Nomos in Diaspora Jewish Writings 
Aristobulus 
 We know of Aristobulus only through five fragments, preserved in the early 
Christian writers Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius.
40
 According to Carl Holladay, 
Aristobulus was a “philosopher-teacher” whose philosophical outlook can be called 
“eclectic,” showing some influence of Stoicism, Pythagorean thought, and Cynicism.41 
He is identified as “teacher of Ptolemy the king (didaska/lw| Ptolemai/ou tou~ 
basile/wj)” in 2 Macc. 1:10. The historicity of his position as the king’s teacher may not 
be true, but as Carl Holladay points out, the reference in 2 Maccabees demonstrates the 
significance of this Jewish philosopher-teacher.
42
 That the king ever read this literature is 
unlikely.
43
    
The work of Aristobulus can be dated to the reign of Ptolemy VI Philometor 
(180–145 B.C.E.).
44
 The character of the work has been called “apologetic.”45 That is, the 
work’s primary tone is one of defense or explanation, and the object of this is the Jewish 
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law.  According to Carl Holladay, for some scholars Aristobulus’ writing “was intended, 
at least in part, to show that Greek philosophers and poets…owed some debt to the 
Bible.”46 But Holladay goes on to offer another way to understand him: the purpose was 
“to show that the Torah, properly (i.e. allegorically) understood, can be intelligible to 
educated Greeks.”47 Since it is unlikely that any educated Greeks read Aristobulus, it 
might be worthwhile to modify Holladay’s statement to say that the purpose is to make 
the Jewish nomos intelligible to an educated Greek perspective. If the main audience was 
likely other Diaspora Jews, the view of the Jewish nomos then may very well be intended 
to shape the outlook of other Jews via this explanation.    
Nomos in Aristobulus 
The word no/moj occurs in the fragments of Aristobulus six times.48 Associated 
words include: “lawgiver” (nomoqe/thj) three times49 and “commands” (nomoqesi/a) five 
times.
50
 In two places the word qesmo&j is also used.51 In all of these occurrences, it is 
clear that the object and referent of these terms is the Jewish nomos.  Aristobulus does 
not seem to single out any specific part of the Jewish nomos, if we are thinking of a 
distinction between the ethical / moral and the ritual laws, and he seems to have the 
Pentateuch as a whole in mind. The terms above suggest a view of the Jewish law that 
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emphasizes its nature as something particular and even written, derived from the hand of 
a human lawgiver. Even though Aristobulus will assert that this lawgiver possesses 
superior philosophical ability and even is divinely inspired (2.2–6), the written and 
particular nature of the Jewish nomos hovers near the center of Aristobulus’ interpretation 
of the law.  
Universalization 
In his interpretation of the Jewish nomos, Aristobulus’ ultimate concern is to 
explain certain elements of the law that seem to be problematic from the standpoint of 
Greek philosophical thought—namely, anthropomorphisms of God and the Sabbath 
command. According to frag. 2, the Greek king asked why the Jewish nomos used “hands, 
arm, visage, feet, and ability to walk…as signifiers for the divine power.”52 In his 
explanation, Aristobulus writes that he wants the king to understand the Jewish law in 
terms of “natural conditions and structures of a higher order” (2:3). One of his main 
concerns, expressed in 2:6, is to move past interpretations or understandings of the 
Jewish Torah which are “devoted to the letter alone” (tw|~ graptw|~ mo/non). Those who 
possess the ability—the wisdom—can understand the “expanded sense” of the Jewish 
law beyond the letter. Aristobulus sets up a contrast between understandings associated 
with “natural conditions and structures of a higher order” and those which are “devoted to 
the letter alone.” The contrast assumes a framework of thought that also supports the 
contrast between particular written nomos and transcendent nomos well-known in the 
Greco-Roman world where particular nomos has significance insofar as it directs to 
universal ethical principles. The language of what is “devoted to the letter alone” in this 
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context seems to be a literalistic reading that limits the significance of the commands of 
the law to Judaism without appropriating the “metaphorical” sense of the commands and 
their significance in relation to virtue. This “expanded sense”—the endpoint to which his 
interpretation is headed—is thoroughly compatible with Greek philosophical thought. As 
we shall see, for Aristobulus the Jewish nomos actually achieves the virtuous goal that 
Greek philosophy and ethics attempt to also achieve. In his explanations Aristobulus 
provides one of the earliest examples of a “metaphorical” interpretation of the Jewish 
law.
53
 He shows that he approaches the Jewish nomos within the framework established 
by the wider web of discourse we discussed in the previous two chapters.     
With this starting point of moving beyond the letter alone, Aristobulus gives the 
Jewish nomos universal significance by relating it to general Greek conceptions of virtue. 
The effect of this is that the law becomes a fount of universal ethical wisdom. The 
commands and statements within the nomos, therefore, are not limited to specifically 
Jewish life, but are able to be used and applied by non-Jews in the pursuit of virtue. His 
quotation from the Greek poet Orpheus points in this direction.
54
 In this poem, 
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Aristobulus cites Orpheus who refers to the “ordinances of the just (dikai/wn qesmou&j), 
divinely set down for all” (4:3). It becomes clear that these ordinances are to be found in 
the Jewish nomos given to Moses in two tablets (4:3). Aristobulus goes on to claim that 
this “two-tablet law” communicates the fullness of God and the proper ways to think of 
God, which are agreed upon by all philosophers and that it “has been drawn up with 
concern for piety (eu)se/bia), justice (dikaiosu/nh), self-control (e0gkra&teia), and other 
qualities that are truly good (kata_ a)lh/qeian)” (4:6).55 We have an example here of the 
Diaspora Jewish writer Aristobulus applying the Jewish nomos directly into the wider 
nomos discourse common among ancient Greek writers.     
 This universal application of the law is true not only in theory, but in the actual 
practice of the commands. In fragment five, he interprets the Sabbath by writing that the 
command of the law refers to the coming of “light” and to wisdom (5:1–2).56 In other 
words, light and wisdom come as a result of keeping this command. Not only that, but it 
seems that the very establishment of the command results in light and wisdom for the 
world. The command is a “sign” of human and divine knowledge. Among Greek 
philosophers, this is also the general definition of wisdom. According to Seneca, “certain 
persons have defined wisdom as the knowledge of things divine and things human. Still 
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others say, ‘wisdom is knowing things divine and things human, and their causes also’.”57 
By making this connection, Aristobulus takes the Jewish command about the Sabbath and 
turns it into a confirmation of commonly recognized Greek philosophical truths and the 
pursuit of Greek wisdom. The universalization of the Sabbath command is also 
demonstrated in a practical way: ancient Greeks actually encouraged its practice (5:5–8)! 
 In two instances (2:3 and 2:4) Aristobulus appears to use Stoic language of 
“nature” when saying that what had been passed on (the Torah) must be understood 
fusikw~j. John Collins translates 2:3 as “according to the laws of nature,” noting that 
fusikw~j is “a technical term for the Stoics.”58 Aristobulus goes on to say in 2:4 that 
Moses’ words concern “natural conditions and structures of a higher order.” Holladay 
suggests that this refers “perhaps” to “those unseen realities that pertain to fu&sij”59 by 
which he seems to mean the ways of understanding reality that are in accord with “nature,” 
but he does not clearly explain. John Barclay suggests that the use of fusika&j should be 
understood in its full Stoic sense.
60
 Again, Barclay assumes a normative understanding of 
fu/sij, which, as we have seen, does not really exist. N. Walter, by contrast, points out 
differences between Aristobulus’ use of the word and that of the Stoics.61 At the most 
basic, scholars seem to think that Aristobulus appeals to the intangible transcendent order 
                                                          
57
 Seneca, Ep. 89.5 (LCL). While many would associate this with only Stoics, Robert Renehan 
shows “there is nothing specifically Stoic about (the definition)” and it had become “a philosophical 
commonplace” by the time of the first century C.E (Robert Renehan, “The Greek Philosophic Background 
of Fourth Maccabees,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 115 [1972] 228). 
 
58
 Collins, “Aristobulus,” 838. Holladay provides a helpful footnote and discussion (Fragments, 
206 n.31).   
 
59
 Holladay, Fragments, 207 n.34. Cf. also Weber, Das Gesetz, 115 n.35. 
 
60
 Barclay, Jews, 154 n.62. Following the suggestion of Collins, “Aristobulus,” 834. 
 
61
 Walter, Thoraausleger, 59-60, 100, 135 n.4., 141–42. 
 
235 
of things referred to as fu/sij. On the basis of this passage alone, it is difficult to say 
much about Aristobulus’ use of fu/sij other than that it relates somehow to “structures of 
a higher order” as Aristobulus states. Given the diversity in associations between nomos 
and physis we saw in chapter two, Aristobulus’ lack of technical Stoic usage need not 
detract from the use of physis as a means to give the Jewish nomos transcendence. It may 
only point out his limited or non-technical understanding and use of the terminology in 
comparison with what we find in more sophisticated Stoic literature. More likely, 
however, Aristobulus represents one point within a spectrum of ways that fu&sij may 
have been used to universalize nomos.       
Aristobulus’ interpretation of the Sabbath command provides another example of 
his appeal to physis. As part of his interpretation of the Sabbath he writes that the entire 
world revolves around seven, and so the Sabbath command is a way of pointing to the 
structures of nature. It is difficult to understand the passage. Holladay translates it:  
Our law code has clearly shown us that the seventh day is an inherent law of 
nature that serves as a symbol of the seven fold principle established all around us 
through which we have knowledge of things both human and divine; and indeed 
all the world comprising all animal and plant life as well revolves around periods 
of seven. (5:4–5). 
 
The difficult phrase in this passage is what Holladay translates as, “Our law code has 
clearly shown us that the seventh day is an inherent law of nature”. The Greek of this 
reads: diasesa&fhke d 0 h9mi~n au)th\n e1nnomon. Most other translators translate the 
statement to say “the legislation has shown plainly that the seventh day is legally binding 
for us.”62 It may be that Holladay supplies a bit too much interpretation in his translation 
of the phrase. With Holladay I take the dative h9mi~n to follow the verb. The noun e1nnomon 
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refers to something that is “ordained by law, lawful.”63 But in the context, the 
connotation of “legally binding” or “lawful” cannot be a reference to the Jewish nomos, 
which would mean that the command is “lawful” with regard to the Jewish nomos. Such a 
statement, it seems, would be redundant. It makes better sense that  the Sabbath 
command is “lawful” with regard to some transcendent sense of nomos. As Holladay also 
argues, the overall context is one in which Aristobulus attempts to situate the Sabbath 
command into the inherent operations of the entire kosmos.
64
 This is also consistent with 
Aristobulus’ expressed purpose in his explanation of the Jewish nomos: it should be 
understood in terms of  “natural conditions and structures of a higher order” (2:3). As part 
of this, the Sabbath command should be understood as “lawful” with regard to some 
transcendent standard, perhaps related to fu/sij, though not clearly expressed as fu/sij.  
Aristobulus’ reworking of Orpheus’ poem is another passage that suggests a 
correlation with “nature.” In 4:3 Aristobulus mentions the “divine logos” that “guides the 
heart.” This is connected with the “just ordinances” which are of the Jewish nomos, 
specifically the Decalogue. While Aristobulus does not explicitly use the phrase nomos 
physeos, the use of a logos in this context suggests something similar to Stoic 
associations of nomos and  physis. In this passage Aristobulus asserts the transcendence 
and universal authority of the Jewish nomos by relating its ordinances with logos. At the 
same time, there is no clear connection with fu/sij.     
 Aristobulus also draws on the idea of a common humanity. In 5:7 he writes that 
through observance of the Sabbath command “we receive knowledge of truth” (gnw~sin 
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a)lhqei/aj lamba&nomen). In the context of speaking of the ancient Greeks’ use of the 
command, it seems that the “we” refers to both Greeks and Jews who receive benefits 
from observance of the Sabbath command. At another point he quotes the poet Aratus 
stating that “we are his offspring” (4:4). This is interesting because here Aristobulus 
approvingly uses the perspective of the Greek poet and in so doing assimilates Jew and 
Gentile into one common humanity. Extending from this, then, is the point that the 
Jewish nomos applies to all humanity as God’s offspring. It should be clear, however, 
that this “family” is made up of those Gentiles who seek virtue and honor God rightly, 
whereas for Aristobulus all Jews already do this. Nevertheless, this is another important 
point that contributes to the universalization of the Jewish nomos in Aristobulus’ writing.
 For Aristobulus, the Jewish nomos is universalized, by promoting universal virtue 
and by illuminating the purposes of “nature,” and of transcendent things. Moreover, it 
works in conjunction with logos and is capable of leading both Jew and Greek toward 
universal virtue.   
Gentiles and the Law 
 While Aristobulus gives the Jewish nomos transcendent and universal 
significance, he does not map out how Gentiles can keep the Jewish nomos. This is not 
part of his purpose. As we saw above, he is interested in explaining certain elements of 
the Jewish nomos; he is not trying to hold Gentiles accountable to it. Yet his arguments 
and his method of universalizing the Jewish nomos suggest a few things.   
The idea of Greeks who follow the Jewish nomos emerges in the suggestion that 
Greek philosophers and poets actually drew upon the Jewish nomos. Ancient 
philosophers, says Aristobulus, are among those who “are amazed at (Moses’) wisdom 
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and inspired spirit” (2:5). It is not just that they admired this Jewish lawgiver. They 
actually took over “significant seeds of inspiration, so that they too are admired” (2:5). 
For example, “Plato followed the tradition of the law…having worked through each of 
the details contained in it” (3:1). Both Plato and Pythagoras “borrowed many things in 
our traditions, (finding) room for them in (their) own doctrinal system(s)” (3:1). The 
examples of borrowing relate to perspectives of God held by these Greek philosophers 
and are the foundation for major philosophical systems that likely included ethics. Here 
Aristobulus is not clear about what things of the law Greeks followed. His point is to say 
that they more generally adopted things of the law in a way that contributed to their 
pursuit of virtue.   
In addition to this, we have just seen that Aristobulus attributes to ancient Greeks 
the keeping of the Sabbath command, making its observance a pathway to the cleansing 
of the soul and reception of “knowledge of the truth” (5:7). Other than the Sabbath 
command, he seems to refer to the Decalogue in 4:3 in a statement from Orpheus who 
says that Moses transmitted divine things “according to the two-fold rule” (kata_ 
di/plaka qesmo/n). While he does not explain this reference, it seems that the Decalogue 
serves an important function in transmitting important knowledge for all people, and it 
may also map out the universal ethic that corresponds to virtue.     
While there is no clear statement about what commands of the Jewish nomos 
Gentiles should keep, it is implicit that by living in accord with common ethics, certain 
(not all) Gentiles may in some way actually be following the Jewish nomos. The 
Decalogue seems to play a defining role, but there is no specification. Nevertheless, one 
can surmise that the things of importance are those things related to higher conceptions of 
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the pursuit of virtue. While following the actual commands of the Jewish nomos remains 
significant, the real value lies in the achievement of virtue and Greek wisdom.  
Particularity 
 One of Aristobulus’ major claims is that the Jewish law brings truth and wisdom 
to the world. For Aristobulus some Greeks have it right—their philosophy, ethics, and 
conceptions of God. But, they have it right because they got it from Moses and the Jewish 
nomos (3.1–3). Aristobulus is clear in his insistence that the Jewish people continue to be 
superior to their Greek contemporaries at all points. As Erich Gruen puts it, Aristobulus is 
very intent on preserving and upholding the Jewish nomos and tradition, even if he does 
so at the cost of making it come off very Greek.
65
      
 Ethnic and social distinctions do not set the framework for the particularity of the 
Jewish nomos. While Aristobulus clearly is concerned with the Jewish nomos the pride 
and superiority based on it are not explicitly founded on ethnicity or God’s covenant with 
the Jews. In fact the word diaqh/kh is not found in Aristobulus’ work. To tease out a 
covenantal understanding would be reading into the work something that is not there.
66
 
The pride and superiority based in the law is ethical and philosophical. Particularly, 
Aristobulus fosters a view of Judaism and its law that prizes itself as the capstone of 
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Greek ethics and philosophy. No doubt the particular commands of the Decalogue 
continue to be significant. But, the purpose is not the promotion of Jewish life and culture 
for its own sake. Rather, the purpose is to give the Jewish nomos and Jewish life meaning 
by situating it on the stage of the universal Greek philosophy and wisdom. As such, the 
Jewish nomos is a sure guide toward this end—but the goal is not to become a Jew, but 
rather to become just and virtuous.  
Conclusion 
 Aristobulus represents an attempt to situate the Jewish nomos as the fount of 
Greek philosophical and ethical thought. He does not specify how the many commands of 
the Jewish nomos apply to Gentile living, but his discussion of the Sabbath seems to be 
paradigmatic. Aristobulus is important because he stands as a very early example of 
Second Temple Jewish approximations of the Jewish nomos in relation to Gentiles and 
Gentile ethics, and is an important predecessor to the interpretations of the law we will 
encounter in Letter of Aristeas. He also may be a predecessor of Philo, even though 
Aristobulus does not allegorize the law himself.
67
 We will see in a general sense that the 
connection with Gentile ethics and philosophy continues to be developed among other 
writers. We will also see, however, that slightly different frameworks and emphases 
inform and shape this connection.         
 The interpretation of the Jewish nomos in Aristobulus’ writing is also significant 
because some of his statements resonate with Paul’s statements in Romans 2. First, 
Aristobulus is concerned with moving past the “letter” of the nomos. Second, he 
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incorporates language of “knowledge of the truth” just as Paul says that the Jew has “the 
form of knowledge and truth in the law” (Rom. 2:20). The parallels are not exact, but 
very suggestive.    
Aristeas to Philocrates (The Letter of Aristeas) 
The so-called “Letter of Aristeas”68 is an account of the translation of the Jewish 
Pentateuch into Greek. It purports to be the written account of Aristeas, a Greek official 
in the court of the Egyptian king Ptolemy II who reigned from 283–247 B.C.E.
69
 This, 
however, is only the fictional situation, and the work dates later than this. A date of 
composition sometime during the second century B.C.E. is most likely, and attempts to 
determine a more specific date have not been completely persuasive.
70
 Moses Hadas 
offers an insightful point about the date when he says, “precise dating of such a work as 
Aristeas is of less consequence than has generally been supposed, because neither the 
author of the book nor its first readers would have regarded it as other than an 
imaginative work of literature.”71 It is difficult to determine the degree of veracity the 
“first readers” would have given to the work. Nevertheless, its message sounds a tone that 
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could likely have resonated with Jewish readers over a wide span of time in the Jewish 
Diaspora.   
The Letter of Aristeas has often been the center of inquiry into the origins of the 
Septuagint, but as John Barclay notes, and as Schürer did before him, the story of the 
translation of the Pentateuch into Greek “is only the narrative framework within which 
the author can assemble a fascinating miscellany of material designed to illustrate the 
value of the Jewish religion.”72 Schürer is more precise: the story of the translation of the 
Jewish Torah is only the framework for “a panegyric on Jewish law, Jewish wisdom, and 
the Jewish name in general, from the mouth of a gentile.”73  
This last statement brings up the question of genre and purpose. As for the genre, 
Moses Hadas tersely called it “a Greek book.”74 But what does this mean? In verse 8 the 
author himself describes what he is doing as a dih&ghsij (diēgēsis) or “narrative.” This 
was a recognized Greek literary form, but it could be quite broadly understood.
75
 
According to the ancient writer Theon, a diēgēsis is “an expository treatise of events 
which happened or may have happened.”76 As an ancient narrative, Let. Aris. may 
contain within it a number of forms or types, and as with other ancient narratives, 
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speeches figure prominently.
77
 It contains important rhetorical elements common to an 
ancient narrative, particularly a prolegomenon in vv.1–8, by which the writer introduces 
the subject of the diēgēsis and its importance. Following the prolegomenon, we may 
divide the narrative into five main sections: 1) an account of the request for the 
translation of the Jewish law (vv.9–82); 2) a description of the temple, Jerusalem, and 
Judea (83–120); 3) Eleazar and his defense of the Jewish nomos (121–71); 4) a short 
transition describing the arrival of the translators (172–81) and a sequence of questions 
and answers over the course of seven royal banquets (182–300); 5) the translation and 
reception of the law and return of the translators (301-20), and a brief conclusion to 
Philocrates (321–22).       
How would the author have reached his Jewish audience with this work? It is 
difficult to determine whether the work would have been understood as actually coming 
from a Greek in the Ptolemaic court, but it is equally difficult to say that this way of 
crafting the narrative would have had no rhetorical effect upon the (likely Jewish) 
audience. The use of the pseudonym “Aristeas” enables the writer to give the impression 
that he is commenting on Judaism from an insider educated Greek perspective.
78
 While 
we cannot say with certainty whether or not this would have been taken seriously, it is 
difficult to overlook the rhetorical effect this may have had on what the author is saying 
about Judaism and its nomos. Our writer is using the genre of diēgēsis to communicate 
the significance of the Jewish nomos by merging Greek and Jewish perspectives of his 
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main characters. The attention given to nomos is framed by the (fabricated) Greek 
perspective of the narrator, Aristeas, and his interest in learning and piety (vv.1–3), as 
well as the interpretation of the Jewish priest Eleazar. Over the course of the narrative, 
one can see the writer make use of these two perspectives to craft his view of nomos.  
Nomos in Letter of Aristeas 
In Let. Aris., the word no/moj occurs fifteen times.79 A related word, nomoqesi/a, 
occurs nine times, at times as a near-synonym of no/moj, and at times to specify 
“commands.” Two other words also refer to nomos: grafh/ (155, 168) and lo/gia (158, 
177). In v.30 the author writes of tou~ no&mou tw~n   0Ioudai/wn bibli/a (“the books of the 
law of the Jews”). The major concentration of these words is focused in the 
prolegomenon (vv.1–8) and rehearsal of the account of the request for the translation of 
the Jewish law (vv.9–50), which contain eight of fifteen occurrences of the word no/moj.80 
Eleazar’s speech and the banquet scenes fill out the description and add some nuance. 
 The overall storyline makes it so that the bulk of the uses of nomos refer to the 
Jewish nomos. While the focus of the narrative is on the translation of the entire 
Pentateuch, the emphasis falls on the specific commands of the law, and less on the 
narrative parts. There is no demarcation within the Jewish nomos or focus on the 
Decalogue. The nomos to which the narrative refers, and which is the main subject of the 
narrative, is the written nomos of the Jewish people.  
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Universalization 
The prolegomena sets the tone for the narrative and provides important elements 
of how the writer, in the guise of the Greek Aristeas, universalizes the Jewish nomos. In 
vv.1–2 he praises Philocrates for his “love of learning”81 and quest for “knowledge.” It is 
as part of this pursuit of learning and knowledge that he narrates the dispatch to the 
Jewish high priest Eleazar, a man of great renown, “for the translation of the divine law” 
which is possessed by the Jewish people written in Hebrew characters (2–3). This account 
of the Jewish law is situated as part of the Greek pursuit of learning, piety, and a shared 
“striving for the good” (th~| pro_j to_ kalo_n o(rmh~|) on the part of both the author and 
reader (v.7).       
The writer’s use of language shared with the larger Greco-Roman discourse is 
significant. In particular, the author associates nomos with paideia and the pursuit of 
universal standards of ethics. The word paidei/a is first used in verse 8, and one finds 
forms of it scattered through the rest of the narrative.
82
 In v.8, the concluding statement to 
the prolegomenon, the Greek Aristeas says to Philocrates:  
for neither the pleasure derived from gold nor any other of the possessions that are 
prized by shallow minds confers the same benefit as the pursuit of paideia and the 
study which we expend in securing it.
83
 
  
This statement, coming as the concluding statement to the prolegomenon, stresses the 
importance of paideia as the ticket to the pursuit of “a pure state of soul,” “seizing upon 
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what is fairest,” and the “pursuit of piety, the greatest good of all” (v.2). The author 
situates the Jewish nomos squarely within this framework; this pursuit of paideia 
involves an understanding of the divine (Jewish) nomos and the Jewish people who “live 
according to the holy law” (v.5).     
This is not generic paideia in the sense of “education” or “culture.” The context 
of an educated Greek speaking on behalf of the Jewish nomos points to Aristeas’ 
engagement with the Greek claims made concerning paideia highlighted in the previous 
chapter. It will be helpful to recall a couple of examples from the previous chapter. 
Paideia was so bound up with Greek civilization and culture that Werner Jaeger wrote 
concerning paideia in Isocrates’ writings: 
In Isocrates, national feeling is that of a culturally superior nation which has 
realized that the efforts it has made to attain a universal standard of perfection in 
all its intellectual activities are its highest claim to victory in competition with 
other races — since these other  races have accepted the Greek forms as the 
absolute expression of civilization.
84
 
 
According to the Tabula of Cebes, Greek paideia stands at the gate of the “dwelling place 
of the happy,”85 also referred to as “life” (bi/oj); those who enter are “saved” (sw&zw)86  
and it is the path to a number of virtues.
87
  
As the narrative of Let. Aris. goes on, it turns out that those steeped in the Jewish 
nomos are superior to the Greeks in their achievement of paideia. The seventy men are 
translators of the Jewish nomos. They are described as men who had “proficiency in the 
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literature of the Jews” (121) and “possessed great natural talent for conferences and 
discussions pertaining to the law” (122). They are also described as men who are 
“superior in paideia” (paidei/a| diafe/rontaj). Within the context of the overall 
narrative, these statements communicate that these are men whose dispositions, shaped 
by the Jewish nomos, thereby display mastery of Greek philosophy and paideia. Their 
impressive philosophical responses at the banquet, then, display not only a good grasp of 
Greek philosophy; they communicate that knowledge of the Jewish law and training in it 
results in such astonishing ability to answer correctly and impressively to nearly any 
matter pertaining to Greek paideia and philosophy (v.321). The Jewish nomos in Let. Aris. 
is a sure pathway toward universal virtue. 
References to wisdom (sofi/a) as a way to universalize the Jewish nomos should 
be placed within this framework. The word sofi/a is used only twice in the banquet 
scenes at the end of the story. In these scenes, the king asks one of the Jewish translators 
concerning “wisdom”: “What is the teaching of wisdom?” (207) and another, “What is 
the fruit of wisdom?” (260). It is important to note that even though written by a Jewish 
writer, the question comes from the Greek king. This wisdom about which the translators 
are questioned is not necessarily the Jewish conception we find in Jewish tradition. It is 
more likely rooted in Greek conceptions of wisdom. While elements of a particularly 
“Jewish” understanding of wisdom might be in play here, it is difficult to rule out that 
Aristeas may be merging Jewish wisdom with a Greek understanding of it. This rounds 
out the reference to paideia earlier in the document, since paideia and Sophia both were 
part of the larger Greek pursuit of universal ethical standards.   
248 
An important element of the universalization is the relationship with God. In 
verse 3 our author uses language of “divine law” (tou~ qei&ou no&mou) from the perspective 
of the Greek, when he attributes to the Jewish people the possession of the “divine 
law.”88 This statement, coming from the Greek Aristeas is significant because it seems to 
me a way of our author putting into the Greek’s mouth a recognition of the divinity of the 
Jewish nomos! Because this reference occurs in the prolegomena, it also sets the tone for 
how the Jewish nomos should be perceived in the rest of the narration. Aristeas does not 
give an account of the translation of just any law; rather, it is the “divine law” which is 
the focus here, and it is set within the context of Greek “knowledge,” “piety,” and paideia. 
Given the context of the discourse about nomos among Greeks at the time, and given that 
Let. Aris. is written under a Greek pseudonym, it seems quite likely that our Jewish writer 
is, in Greek dress, associating the Jewish nomos with other understandings of “divine law” 
present in antiquity—the one transcendent law of God which presides over all other laws 
and peoples and which “educates” in Greek ideals.        
 The understanding of God is important here. Perhaps one of the most significant 
places our writer connects the understanding of God and nomos is in a famous statement 
from Aristeas in vv.15–16. In the course of trying to persuade the king to free Jewish 
slaves in Egypt, Aristeas makes the striking claim that  
the same God who has given them their law guides your (Ptolemy II’s) kingdom 
also, as I have learned in my researches. God the overseer and creator of all things, 
whom they worship, is he whom all men worship, and we too, your majesty, 
though we address him differently, as Zeus and Dis. By these names men of old 
not unsuitably signified that he through whom all creatures receive life and come 
into being is the guide and Lord of all. 
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In this statement we have what some have called one of the most universalizing 
statements written by a Jewish writer.
89
 We should be cautious, however, as to how this is 
understood. There is some debate about the degree of universalization involved. John 
Barclay points out that there is not necessarily “total identification” with Gentile religion. 
From the perspective of the writer, it is a Greek acknowledgment of the Jewish God, and 
not the other way around.
90
 At the same time, there is an attempt to relate Judaism to the 
larger Greek world. Reinhard Weber emphasizes that the writer here appeals to a “strong 
universal monotheism” which was a developing understanding among Greeks. In doing 
this, the author “aims at ‘communication with the Hellenistic environment’ but does not 
make any compromises concerning the heathen polytheism.”91 This seems to be a way for 
the writer to claim that the God of the Jewish people, giver of the Jewish nomos, is the 
universal God of all people and kings.      
Other statements seem to move in this direction of identifying the Jewish God in 
Greek terms, particularly with a Stoic ring.
92
 This view generally explains God in terms 
of a guide of the universe and of all people. Such a conception is expressed by Aristeas 
when speaking to the king:  
When men piously believe that what they do is for the sake of justice and the 
promotion of good deeds, then God, who is Lord of all, guides their actions and 
their designs (18). 
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Also at the beginning of Eleazar’s speech, Eleazar says:  
God is one, and…his power is made manifest in all things, and…every place is 
filled with his sovereignty, and…nothing done by men on earth secretly escapes 
his notice” (132).93  
 
These statements about God are not foreign to statements in the Jewish Scriptures. 
Passages such as Psalm 22:28 (“For dominion belongs to the Lord, and he rules over the 
nations”) suggest that we need not think that the sentiments in Let. Aris. owe only to 
Greek origin. Nevertheless, they also resonate with statements in Cleanthes’ Hymn to 
Zeus: 
Zeus, first cause and ruler of nature, governing all things with your law…this 
whole universe…truly obeys wherever you lead…not a single deed takes place on 
earth without you, God…except what bad people do in their folly.94  
 
To be sure, Aristeas’ statements are not identical to Cleanthes’. The statement in v.18, 
though stated by the Greek Aristeas, resonates especially with Cleanthes’ view that God 
guides the actions of those seeking justice. Eleazar’s statement is slightly different in the 
role God plays in the universe. For Cleanthes, God governs all things so that nothing 
(except the deeds of the wicked) happens without Zeus’ involvement. In Let. Aris. the 
point is not that all things happen at God’s controlling, but that God is aware of all things 
because God is present in all things. It is significant that the statement in verse 18 is put 
in the mouth of the Greek Aristeas. The connection made with Zeus in vv.15–16 and the 
similarities with the conception of God found in Hymn to Zeus together point to at least 
an awareness and interaction with such conceptions of God. It is not that Let. Aris. is 
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turning the Jewish God into a Greek philosophical deity. Such conceptions of God are 
used as a way that speaks to the conversation with the Greek theological and 
philosophical context. This is done in order to present the Jewish nomos as a universal 
and transcendent nomos similar to the koino/j no/moj we read about in Cleanthes’ Hymn 
to Zeus where the one God of the universe, Zeus, rules through both his logos and nomos. 
The “divine law” of the Jewish people is that of the universal God over a common 
humanity.  
Eleazar’s speech in defense of the Jewish law (128–71) builds upon what the 
opening passages of the narrative have already said, but from the perspective of the 
Jewish priest. In this speech Eleazar responds to the Greeks’ questions about specific 
food laws. While the speech is too complex for a detailed discussion here, we can 
highlight some important ways it contributes to the universalization of the Jewish nomos. 
First, the law is rooted in and enables true worship of the one God of the kosmos.
95
 The 
starting point for the laws is the teaching that “God is one” (132). This is also similar to 
descriptions of the pursuit of the philosophical ideal in Greek writers such as Cicero, 
Seneca, and Dio Chrysostom which we encountered in chapter three. As noted above, the 
author of Let. Aris. describes God in Stoic terms, but he also eschews idolatry as a 
violation of this and the root of evil and vice (134–39). In the midst of the 
universalization, our author is clear that certain forms of Gentile life oppose the law.  
Second, the Jewish nomos and its commands serve common ethical virtues. At the 
beginning of the speech Eleazar states that the Jewish law is oriented to the “principles of 
piety (eu0se/bia) and justice (dikaiosu/nh)” (131). At the end of the speech he reiterates 
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the point: “all these norms have been regulated with a view to justice…in order that 
throughout our life and in our actions we may practice justice towards all people, being 
mindful of the sovereignty of God” (168). In the examples given in the speech, the 
commands about mice and the weasel are “for the sake of justice, to promote holy 
contemplation, and the perfection of character” (144). Certain birds are avoided because 
they are “wild and carnivorous” and “oppress the rest and procure their food with 
injustice. It is not that not eating such animals will or will not result in such perfection of 
character; rather, the laws are a sign (shmei~o/n) to remind people “to practice 
righteousness…oppress no one…but guide their lives in accordance with justice” (147; 
also 148). Eleazar also notes that the law was written “with a view to truth and as a sign 
(shmei/wsin) of right reason (o0rqou lo/gou)” (161). In stating this our author draws on a 
distinctively Stoic conception, which as we saw above, is associated with both the 
conception of koino/j no/moj and with Stoic conceptions of law of nature. Finally, the 
laws concerning animals with the parted hoof, specifies that they also chew their cud. 
Laws about these animals are symbols about memory, so that people “remember the great 
and marvelous things the Lord your God did in you” (155). One would expect a list of 
God’s great deeds for the Israelites (the Exodus, conquest of the Promised Land, etc.), as 
one gets in Wisdom of Solomon’s list of the deeds of wisdom.96Instead, one gets a list 
that specifies the human body and (Greek?) culture: “the means for digesting food”; “the 
orderly arrangement of the senses, the working and invisible movement of the intellect, 
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its acuteness in conforming action to any situation and its discovery of arts (texnw~n)” 
(155–56).      
In the banquet scenes (182–300) each Jewish translator answers the king’s 
questions about kingship in Greek philosophical terms, common to philosophical 
kingship theories.
97
 The implication is that these translators, steeped in the Jewish nomos, 
communicate the law’s applicability to even matters of Hellenistic kingship. Our author 
does not say this, but it would not be out of the realm of possibility to suggest that the 
“divine” Jewish nomos serves as the transcendent nomos which the Hellenistic ruler 
should embody.       
The writer of Let. Aris. uses the word fu/sij and the adjective fusiko&j on a 
number of occasions.
98
 The primary usage pertains to the “nature” of people or natural 
endowment of certain things, there are no clear uses that bear directly on how the writer 
universalizes the Jewish nomos. Some of these uses do, however, suggest a negative view 
of human fu/sij, which may suggest some opposition to Stoic understandings. The 
author does use the concept of lo&goj. As we saw above in v.161 Eleazar associates the 
Jewish nomos with o!rqoj lo&goj (“right reason”) noting that the laws given are a “sign” 
of right reason, and that the commands cultivate the use of logos. This is interesting in 
light of the uses of physis in Let. Aris., since many of them have a negative portrayal of 
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physis.
99
 In a sense, then, it may be that the Jewish nomos cultivates “right reason” so that 
a poor physis can be overcome. In Aristeas’ understanding, however, one does not live in 
accord with fu/sij through logos, but rather one lives in accord with God’s universal 
nomos and which brings about “right reason” and achieves virtue.  
Gentiles and the Law 
So how do people achieve virtue and live in accord with God’s nomos? One might 
think that keeping the Jewish commands is the answer. But, Ler. Aris. never holds 
Gentiles accountable to the particular Jewish commands. In the above examples of how 
Let. Aris. universalizes the law, it seems that the author opens a window for the 
possibility, or even likelihood, of Gentiles to obey God as Gentiles. Additionally, the 
genre and the Greek pseudonym suggest the application of the Jewish nomos to Greeks. 
The nomos central to the narrative, while being that of the Jewish people and containing 
many specifically Jewish observances, finds its purpose in the achievement of paideia, 
and the pursuit of “the good” (v.7). It is the law given by the one God who also guides 
Ptolemy’s kingdom and is honored and worshipped by the Greeks (vv.15–16). In 
Eleazar’s speech, the commands are symbols of universal ethical virtues given “to those 
of understanding” (toi~j sunetoi~j), suggesting that one need not be a Jew to follow them 
(v.148).        
While there is a defense of specific Jewish commands, the narrative never clearly 
relays what commands Gentiles should follow. If, as Tcherikover argued, Let. Aris. is 
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written to Jews to open them up to exchange with Gentile culture, then there is no need to 
spell out what Gentiles have to do to keep the law.
100
 According to Gabriele Boccaccini, 
“the Gentile is not asked to be converted or to obey the law” because the document does 
not address Gentiles, but other Jews.
101
 Eleazar could have easily demanded that Greeks 
follow those commands. Nevertheless, there seem to be certain implications or 
consequences of the line of thought given in Eleazar’s speech. On the one hand, the 
Gentile is not required to convert because the Jewish law leads to the same goals as 
Greek ethics and philosophy. Early on, the king, at least in theory, can receive God’s 
blessing and even be counted among those whose life and actions are guided by the one 
God (v.18). He is not asked to keep the commands of the Jewish nomos. From Eleazar’s 
speech, one gets the sense that seeking justice, virtue, and piety are nearly the same thing 
as following the Jewish nomos. On the other hand, Eleazar’s speech does put great 
significance to the commands of the Jewish nomos, even if their purpose is to cultivate 
virtue and justice. But it is clear that these commands are intended for Jews, and Gentiles 
are not required to keep them.      
What is of central importance is the pursuit of virtues, not just the laws 
themselves (cf. 144). To put it another way, to fulfill God’s ethical demand one must 
perform acts of justice and virtue, symbolized in the “divine law” of the Jewish people. 
Eleazar’s explanation of the commands does not necessarily serve to communicate what 
Gentiles should do; it only exists to explain certain commands and praise the Jewish 
nomos as instructing in virtue. According to Gabriele Boccaccini, “the road that permits 
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the Gentiles, or at least some of them, to become “men of God” and not simply “men of 
drink, food, and clothing” is the Greek paideia.”102 The trajectory of the thought is that 
the Jewish nomos, even though it leads to Greek virtue and seems to challenge claims 
about Greek paideia, does not clearly demand that Greeks follow the Jewish commands, 
so long as the Greeks abandon idolatry.  
Particularity  
It would be a mistake to conclude that Let. Aris. sees no real difference between 
the Jewish nomos and Gentile living. One key passage in which this rings true is when 
Eleazar states that the lawgiver, “equipped by God for insight into all things…fenced us 
about with impregnable palisades and with walls of iron, to the end that we should mingle 
in no way with any of the other nations” (139). The Jewish nomos sets Jews as distinct 
from Greeks and barbarians. But it does so in the very same way that Greeks set 
themselves apart also: in terms of the pursuit of virtue and justice. Jewish particularity in 
the law is articulated no differently than Greek claims on the basis of paideia. The Jewish 
nomos is rooted in and comes from the one God of the universe, which all people can and 
sometimes do worship.   
We get a sense of the nature of the superiority on the basis of the Jewish nomos 
right before Eleazar’s speech. Eleazar makes the statement that “the good life (to_ kalw~j 
zh|~n)…consists in the observance of the laws, and this is attained by hearkening much 
better than by reading” (127). “The good life” – a philosophical-ethical commonplace – is 
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found through the Jewish nomos.
103
 In this speech, the Jewish nomos achieves this in a 
distinctly superior way in contrast with other peoples. But, this is not pure opposition to 
all other people. Eleazar gives reasons why Jews are distinct from others, and the thrust 
of this seems to be not to supplant Greek ethics, but to say something about the efficacy 
of the Jewish nomos in achieving Greek ethics and virtue.       
In the banquet scenes it is the translators from Jerusalem—those steeped in the 
Jewish no/moj—who are acclaimed as superior in philosophical learning. Again, this is 
not to supplant Greek philosophy, but is an acknowledgement that training in the Jewish 
nomos results in an astonishing ability to answer correctly and impressively nearly any 
matter pertaining to Greek life and philosophy. As Reinhard Weber puts it, “particularism 
and universalism have entered into a strange mélange.”104     
 The superiority of Judaism, then, is not necessarily an ethnic one, but an ethical 
and religious one. The distinction is not between Jews and Gentiles, and the claim to 
superiority is made within the context of the pursuit of justice and virtue.  It is a 
distinction such that a Gentile need not become a Jew to achieve justice and virtue. The 
universalization of the law into Greek virtues does not lessen the importance of 
obedience to its commands, a point made by more than one scholar.
105
 Written for a 
Jewish audience, the point seems to be rather that the Jewish nomos achieves the same 
goals as paideia. It is not paideia itself that Let. Aris. praises, but rather its purposes and 
                                                          
103
 Contrast this with the pursuit of “life” and the “dwelling place of the happy” in Tabula of 
Cebes 3.1–4.3. 
 
104
 Weber, Das Gesetz, 139. 
 
105
 So Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 34–35; C. Marvin Pate, The Reverse of the Curse, 70. Though 
this does not necessarily translate into a “covenantal background” as Pate argues.    
 
258 
goals. Jews are not set apart because they possess the law. The commands of the law set 
the Jews as distinct outwardly, but intrinsically the commands set Jews apart as superior 
in the universal pursuit of virtue and justice. 
Conclusion 
The effect of Let. Aris. seems to be two-fold. First, like Aristobulus it explains the 
Jewish nomos in terms of Greek ethics and philosophy.  It does this slightly differently by 
placing particular focus on the Greek pursuit of paideia. Second, it suggests a positive 
relation to non-Jews in such a manner as to open up the possibility for some to achieve 
justice and virtue without becoming Jews. The one caveat seems to be worship practices. 
The fault of many Gentiles is the failure to honor the one God in conjunction with their 
pursuit of virtue and justice. This does not mean, however, that they need to become 
“Jewish” if that means becoming circumcised, obeying Sabbath, and other food laws. 
Even though the food laws are specified, this is because of a question about them, not to 
say that Gentiles need to keep them.    
We can put the main thesis of how Letter of Aristeas explains the Jewish nomos in 
the following way: the author crafts the narrative intentionally to elicit agreement from 
his audience, via the fictional addressee Philocrates, that the Jewish law is the superior 
“divine law,” the commands of which and the life prescribed by which are equated with 
paideia and result in “justice” and “virtue.” This leads to the Jewish people being not so 
much distinct from the non-Jews, but rather that the Jewish people are distinct, even 
superior in their realization of virtue and paideia because of their nomos. “Jewishness” is 
not taken out of the picture, but it is reframed so that it is not Jew vs. Gentile, but Jew as 
virtuous vs. non-virtuous and wicked people.  
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The Sibylline Oracles, book 3 
 Like Letter of Aristeas, the Jewish Sibylline Oracles 3 is an example of a Jewish 
writer attempting to speak in the voice of a Gentile. But rather than being an anonymous 
Greek member of the king’s court, the writer of Sib. Or. 3 takes the pseudonym of a more 
famous Greek. The Greek sibyl was well-known in the ancient world, going back at least 
to the fifth century B.C.E.
106
  She was a prophetess of great age and reliable authority 
who communicated messages from God/the gods. Typically these prophecies were of a 
gloomy nature, and dealt with political kingdoms and various disasters.
107
 There seem to 
have been two traditions of Sibylline prophetic literature: official and popular. The 
official collections were in the care of and interpreted by Roman priests thought to be 
Sibylline experts. Other than this, Sibylline collections of a popular nature circulated 
widely throughout the Roman world.
108
 The popularity of the Sibyl seems to have 
blossomed around the time of the emergence of the early Roman kingdom, sometime 
during the second century B.C.E.
109
 It is during this time that we have evidence of “an 
official Sibylline center” in Rome, associated with the temple of Jupiter.110 This seems to 
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have led to the rise of the popularity of the Sibyl, and even to some competition over 
which kingdom or nation the Sibyl favored.
111
 In the hands of our Jewish author, the 
Sibyl favors historic Israel, and the Sibyl is used to speak to universal humanity and to 
express the historical significance of the people of Israel because of their fidelity to God’s 
universal nomos. Yet, the writer does not express this in ways one might expect or take 
this in the direction one would expect.       
The final text of the Jewish Sib. Or. 3 is the result of a complex process. The 
evidence suggests that of the extant version, only fragments i and iii, as well as vv. 93–
829 are of a piece. Verses 1–92 are thought to be a fragment of another Sibylline book.112 
In its present form, all but vv.1–92 can be dated sometime during the mid second century 
to mid first century B.C.E. Greater precision is difficult to establish.
113
 The section in 
vv.1–92, however, seems to have been written during the early Roman empire, and 
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therefore is also useful for our investigation.
114
 Scholars suggest Egypt, Asia Minor, 
Babylon, or even Rome for places of origin. Of these, it is difficult to arrive at a clear 
conclusion, but the most satisfactory options are Egypt or Asia Minor. Rome, however, 
does not seem all that implausible.
115
      
The specific purpose of Book 3 of the Jewish Sibylline Oracles seems to be 
somewhat elusive. John Collins puts it generally: 
Insofar as it presents Judaism in a Hellenized form we may speak of it as 
propaganda or apologetic literature. However, we cannot automatically conclude 
that the work was intended primarily for a gentile audience. It might have been 
written to strengthen the convictions of the Jewish community, which had become 
Hellenized and needed to have its religion expressed in terms of its newly adopted 
culture.
116
  
 
How does this relate to a Jewish Diaspora audience? By writing in the name of the Sibyl 
and adopting this form of literature, our author assumes a universal prophetic voice and 
claims to mediate divine information and warnings from God. As John Barclay writes, 
“adopting the scornful Sibylline mask allows these Jewish oracle-mongers to launch a 
vigorous attack on other nations.”117 As Buitenwerf states, the author uses the genre “to 
extend praise to the Jews and criticism to the non-Jews through the objective, 
unimpeachable testimony of an outsider, a non-Jewish prophetess of the true God.”118
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 There is truth to this view, but at the same time, one must not overlook another, 
important point. The point is this: rhetorically, coming from the Greek Sibyl, the words 
are intended to motivate the entire world to action. The ethical mandate of the document 
applies to all people. The general denunciation of Gentile religion and living does not 
lead to the conclusion that Gentiles must completely convert, nor does it necessarily 
condemn them all. Rather, through the Sibyl the author calls all people to properly 
worship God and straighten up their lives, as the Jewish nation has done. Although there 
clearly is a negative view of Greek life, there is also a level of openness to the possibility 
of Gentiles also doing this. In this the author presents “an extension of Judaism to a 
universal religion in continuity with the human cultures around it.”119 Speaking to a 
primary audience of other Diaspora Jews, this would shape the understanding of Judaism 
and the Jewish nomos as one that is associated not just with Jewish heritage, but with the 
Greek mythological lore and prophetic words of the sibyl.  
Nomos in Sibylline Oracles 3 
The word no/moj occurs ten times in the writing.120 Most all of the uses of the 
word are quite vague, with the common designations being “holy law of the Most High 
God” (vv.580, 719, 768) or “holy law of the immortal God” (vv.276, 600), in v.284 it is 
“laws of the Most High.” Another designation, “universal law” (koino/j no/moj) is used 
once in v.757. The other three occurrences refer simply to no/moj (vv.256, 259, 686). 
Whereas in the previous writings we find nomos clearly specified as the Jewish nomos, 
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such a clear referent is not present in Sibylline Oracles 3. All of this is not to say that the 
author was not referring to the Jewish law. It is to say that this language taps into a more 
universal conceptual field and common Greco-Roman discourse. From terminology alone, 
therefore, one might conclude that no/moj is not defined in specifically Jewish ways.  
 Verse 256 is the one verse that suggests a specifically Jewish understanding of 
nomos. This is also the first occurrence of nomos in the document. Before this verse the 
author had been narrating the rise of certain kingdoms: the Titans and the Greeks. He 
narrates their rise to power and their immorality (110–195). Then he begins to write 
about “the pious men who live around the great temple of Solomon, and who are the 
offspring of righteous men” (213–14). They are “a race of most righteous men” who are 
“always concerned with good counsel and noble works” (220). He describes the journey 
of these people, whom God led out of Egypt, under the leadership of Moses and says: 
“When he, who guided the people whom God led from Egypt, came to Mount Sinai, God 
gave the law from heaven, having written all just things on two tablets” (256). Two 
things are worth noting here: first, the nomos is from God, given to the Jews, though the 
text refuses to call them “Jews” or “Israelites.”121 Second, the writer specifies the Ten 
Commandments, though more in how they were given than in name.
122
 It is within the 
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Ten Commandments that “all just things” for the world are contained. Thus, our writer 
unmistakably does refer to the Jewish nomos. Furthermore the Jewish nomos is one for 
the whole world to live by; it just so happens that God revealed it to the most just people 
on earth, who are the Jews (but remain unnamed as such!). The emphasis falls on the 
nomos being that of a universal God—and this is from the perspective of the Greek Sibyl. 
So, if we take this first occurrence of the word nomos as a cue, we can presume that the 
rest of the uses of the word have in mind this nomos. A notable difference from previous 
writings so far is the absence of reference to specific Jewish commands as the starting 
point or basis of the understanding of nomos. 
Universalization  
One strategy used to give the Jewish nomos universal authority is the way our 
author incorporates his understanding of this nomos into the narration of world history. 
Our author seems to accept the mythological history of the Greek past, and he merges this 
with stories of world history found in the Pantateuch.
123
 By doing this, Sib. Or. 3 places 
an emphasis on one common humanity who share one story (vv. 247, 755–61). This lays 
a basis for our understanding of the prophecies in the book. This also recalls Zeno’s hope 
of which Plutarch wrote, which we encountered in chapter two:  
that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that 
we should have a common life and an order common to us all, even as a herd that 
feeds together and shares the pasturage of a common field.
124
 
    
In chapter 2 above, we saw this as one of the important starting points for other Greek 
writers as well who write of one transcendent nomos for humanity.    
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 An important element that stands behind the perspective of one common 
humanity is the designation of God as “Most High.” On the one hand, this designation 
can be connected with the Old Testament references to God.
125
 At the same time, it 
would be foolish to dismiss the well-known uses of the phrase among Greeks. There is 
evidence of a cult to Zeus the “Most High” (Zeus Hypsistos; u!yistoj), which is to be 
differentiated from “God Most High” (Theos Hypsistos; Qeoj uyistoj).126 Both phrases 
occur in Greco-Roman writings and inscriptions, but there is comparatively less use of 
the more general Theos Hypsistos than of Zeus Hypsistos. The most likely reason for this 
is that the Theos Hypsistos derives from Jewish use, but a Jewish use that may have 
competed with the Greco-Roman phrase and was even taken over by some non-Jews.
127
 
An important element of this is that only the Jewish writer or speaker using this phrase 
would understand that it referred to the Jewish God; others would think it referred to 
“whatever deity he or she considered to be supreme…they would not think of 
Yahweh.”128 It may be likely that a Diaspora Jew hearing or reading the phrase might 
notice little differentiation between the Jewish and Greek meanings. One cannot overlook 
that the use of this phrase in Sib. Or. 3, written for a Jewish audience but under a Gentile 
name, shows a Jewish writer referring to God in a manner that would resonate with non-
Jewish conceptions. 
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The emphases on the common humanity and the designation for God affect the 
way that the writer conceives of the Jewish nomos. In contrast to Let. Aris., the primary 
role of nomos in Sibylline Oracles is that of judgment of all humanity—both non-Jews 
and Jews—because humanity is common and God is one and universal. The judgment is 
because of certain vices and apparent transgressions of God’s expectations expressed in 
the law. We see this in passages such as 580–600 where the author indicts a list of 
peoples for various evils. The indictment is summed up by saying that all humanity 
“transgress(ed) the holy law of the immortal God” and later “they acknowledged neither 
the law nor the judgment of the great God” (686–87). The eschatological expectation is 
that other nations will acknowledge the importance of the law and honoring God and will 
say: “Let us all consider the law of the highest God, for it is the most righteous of all on 
earth” (719–20). Avoidance of judgment for all humanity means following the law of the 
one God.     
This judgment includes the Jewish people, who like the others fell to destruction 
and exile as a result of transgressing the divine law (vv.265–81). The important point for 
our purposes is that this passage suggests that there is no sense in which the nomos is 
different for Jews and non-Jews. If our writer is addressing other Jews, then his 
presentation is such that they are one among others who have transgressed the universal 
law of God.      
This law is described as the “universal nomos” (koino/j no/moj) of God (v.757). 
This statement comes in the description of the culmination of time, when “there will be 
great peace throughout the whole earth” when “the Immortal in the starry heaven will put 
into effect a universal nomos for men throughout the whole earth” (v.755). This time of 
267 
peace resembles the idea of a “Golden Age” written about in Ovid’s Metamorphoses 
1.89ff.
129
 Another possibility is that our author is projecting something like Zeno’s dream 
for humanity into the future and linking it not with Greek rule, but with the divine rule of 
the one God and his nomos. In doing this, and using the term koino/j no/moj our author 
makes a strong connection between the Jewish nomos and ancient conceptions of a 
“universal nomos” that transcended national and ethnic boundaries.    
 There is no use of paideia as in Let. Aris., nor is there language of “wisdom” in 
the universalization of the Jewish nomos. A relation between the Jewish nomos and 
Greco-Roman “law of nature” has been suggested.130 Rieuwerd Buitenwerf has set forth 
one of the more substantial attempts to make this claim. Buitenwerf begins noting that 
because the author of Sib. Or. 3 assumes a universally valid nomos, it cannot be only the 
Jewish law, written on the tablets. Rather, “it must refer to an ethical and religious law 
known to all people.”131 Buitenwerf concludes that the author “sometimes refers to 
Moses’ law, sometimes to natural law.”132 The distinction between the two is one of form, 
not content. According to Buitenwerf “the Jewish law is conceived as a written copy of 
natural law.”133       
Buitenwerf argues this on the basis of two things. First, he argues that “in the 
Graeco-Roman period, it was widely believed that all people had knowledge of unwritten 
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ethical and religious principles which were of divine origin. In Greek authors, this 
universal knowledge of the divine will is often associated with the unwritten, divine law 
of nature.”134 Second, he points out how the Jewish writing Sirach and Philo’s writings 
both connect the Jewish law—indeed identify the Jewish law—with law of nature. 
Sibylline Oracles 3 stands in this trajectory of Jewish writers associating the Jewish law 
with law of nature.
135
        
While Buitenwerf makes some valuable points, we should hesitate to say that the 
writer identifies the Jewish nomos with “law of nature.” First, and most problematic, the 
word fu/sij does not occur in Sib. Or. 3. He does use lo/goj in v.20 to refer to how God 
created the world, but this seems to be more of a connection with Genesis 1 than with 
Stoic doctrine. While Sibylline Oracles does also use koino/j no/moj, it is not connected 
with lo/goj in a way that would suggest that nomos is in accord with logos as a universal 
ethical standard. The problem with Buitenwerf’s analysis is that it equates the Greco-
Roman concept of a transcendent law with “law of nature.” As we saw in chapter two, 
“law of nature” was only one conception of “higher law” among Greco-Roman sources. 
And while some writers do use some of the terminology interchangeably it would be an 
error to think that by transcendent law a Jewish writer automatically had in mind the 
Greek concept “natural law.” Buitenwerf’s use of Sirach and Philo also are problematic 
because he assumes that Sibylline Oracles does the same thing with the Jewish nomos as 
thse other Jewish writers. This is by no means the case. In Sib. Or. we do not have an 
example of a Jewish writer equating the Jewish nomos with “law of nature,” but rather an 
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example of a Jewish writer drawing the concept of koino/j no/moj and making a general 
statement about God’s universal rule.  
Gentiles and the Law 
As part of the genre, the writer sets out to announce God’s judgment upon those 
who do not keep God’s universal law. In doing this, our writer describes not only what 
those who break the law do, but also what keeping it looks like. Those who fall under 
judgment are both Jews and Gentiles. In other words, Sib. Or. 3 makes claims about Jews 
and non-Jews equal accountability to the koino/j no/moj.     
Transgressing or following nomos consists in quite general virtues and vices. 
According to John Collins, “the main message of Sib. Or. 3…would seem to lie in the 
denunciation of idolatry and sexual abuses.”136 While this indeed appears to be an 
emphasis, the list of transgressions is more than this. The Titans are characterized as full 
of fighting and war (110–155); the Greeks are impious, full of oppression, commit same-
sex intercourse, are greedy, and deceitful (156–195). Their kings are criticized for 
arrogance, impiety, adultery, and general wickedness (202–03). In contrast, the race of 
people who “are always concerned with good counsel and noble deeds”(220)—note that 
they are not specified as “Israelites” or “Jews”— are singled out by their “care for justice 
and virtue” (oi4 de\ merimnw~si/n te dikaiosu/nhn t 0 a0reth/n te). They are not greedy or 
oppressive to the lowly, and share their goods fairly (234–247). The key point made is 
that in doing these things, they “fulfill the word of the great God, the hymn of the law” 
(247). Later in an encomium to this “race of pious men” the author praises them as those 
“who devote themselves to the counsels and intention of the Most High” (574). In 
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addition to honoring God in the temple—the opposite of idolatry—they honor their 
parents, respect marriage, and “do not have intercourse with youths in a shameful way” 
(574–600). All of these things are summed up in terms of “transgress(ing) the holy law of 
the immortal God” (600). In 623–34 there is a brief appeal for humanity to repent, which 
is stated in terms of worshipping God, honoring justice, and oppressing none, “for so the 
Immortal bids wretched mortals” (631).  
From all of this we can confirm the importance of sexual sins, but they are part of 
a much larger description of following God’s law. The above lists include a number of 
things one would find in the Jewish Torah: same-sex intercourse, impiety, adultery, 
honoring parents, and not oppressing anyone. Generally these relate to the Decalogue 
with the exception of same-sex intercourse which is found in Leviticus 20:13, and not 
oppressing anyone, a general command scattered throughout the Torah.
137
 The author 
also emphasizes many generally accepted behaviors and virtues/vices that are not 
specifically Jewish. Corresponding with this, there is no mention of Sabbath, 
circumcision, or food laws in Sib. Or. 3, whereas Aristobulus and Letter of Aristeas do 
mention these. There may be concrete reasons for this related to the immediate context, 
but we have insufficient information. It seems that the writer of Sib. Or. 3 has 
significantly shifted the understanding of the Jewish nomos in comparison with 
Aristobulus and Let. Aris. It stands as the written revelation or written manifestation of 
the one divine nomos of the “Most High God.” It is not circumcision and participation in 
Judaism that would place a person among the “just,” but rather the pursuit of behaviors 
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and avoidance of vices specified by the author.
138
          
 Can we agree with George Nickelsburg that “the author does not call for the 
wholesale surrender of the Hellenistic way of life”?139 It seems so. In Sibylline Oracles’ 
condemnation of Gentiles, the alternative to their transgression of God’s law is not 
fulfilling the commands of the law of Moses. It is, rather, living in accord with the 
virtuous behaviors and justice embodied in God’s universal law (koino/j no/moj). This is 
equated with the Decalogue in the first instance of nomos as we have seen. But, he has so 
shifted the significance and meaning of the commands and eliminated any clear reference 
to Israel, with the result that that keeping God’s nomos is a matter of virtue and justice, 
and not of Sabbath and food, circumcision, and other particulars. Putting it this way, the 
universal nomos, which is identified with the law given on Sinai, can be kept by anyone. 
Indeed, it should be lest other nations fall under God’s judgment.  
Particularity  
In spite of the universalism present in Sib. Or. 3, the writer still makes a case for 
Jews as being favored because of their “justice” and proper worship. And while the Jews 
are indicted for transgressing the law, the overall thrust of the document is one of 
indictment of Gentiles.
140
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 At the same time, there is an openness to who is part of God’s people in the 
document. The Jews, who are never called  0Ioudaioi~, are not God’s covenant people, but 
“a race of most just people” (219; ge/noj e0sti\ dikaiota/twn a)nqrw/pwn). There is no 
appeal to Abraham and circumcision; no mention of “covenant.” While there is a clear 
reference to God giving the law to this “race of most just people” it is a universal nomos 
defined without reference to traditional Jewish commands. The (unidentified) Jewish 
people stand out as people to whom God gave the universal nomos for all humanity. They 
stand apart in terms of their successful achievement of living in accord with this koino/j 
no/moj—and keeping specifically Jewish commands is not part of this.141 Later in the 
document the Jewish people are again praised because they, of all people on earth, are 
devoted to the law of “the Most High.” And to them alone God has given “reasonable 
counsel, trust, and the best understanding in their breast” (eu!frona boulh/n kai\ pi/stin 
kai\ a!riston e0ni\ sth/qessi no/hma).142         
One cannot ignore the references to Solomon, Moses, and the giving of the law. It 
is clear that the Israelites of history are those who live according to God’s law, out of all 
humanity. But, what is interesting is that the examples seem to focus on historical Israel, 
and there is an openness that suggests that the author’s call to adherence to God’s nomos 
is open to all, and there is no sense of conversion, other than worship of God. In 265–294 
the writer writes about the exile and hope for restoration. He notes that “the whole earth 
will be filled with you and every sea” and that “everyone will be offended at your 
customs (pa~j de\ prosoxqi/zwn e1stai toi~j soi~j e0qi/moisin)” (271–72). In this there is 
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the idea that the Jewish customs are viewed negatively by non-Jews. But the word here is 
not no/moj but e0qimoj, “custom.” Our author does not say that others will be offended at 
their nomoi. At the same time, our author betrays no shame of these customs. Perhaps the 
use of the word e0qimoj is a reflection of the author’s understanding of these particular 
customs in relation to the koino/j no/moj. The (unidentified) Jewish people are superior in 
their justice and piety because their Jewish customs fulfill or are in agreement with God’s 
koino/j no/moj.             
Conclusion 
 Sibylline Oracles 3 stands out to this point in its noticeable lack of reference to 
sofi/a, paidei/a, or fu/sij. Nevertheless, the nomos to which the author refers is a 
universal nomos that transcends ethnic and political lines. It is the nomos of the Most 
High God that stands at the center of this document as the universal standard for right 
living and God’s standard of judgment. Jew and Gentile stand equally before this 
standard of universal ethical norms. Unlike Aristobulus and Let. Aris., there is no attempt 
to defend or explain particularly Jewish commands; where he does mention what seems 
to be particularly Jewish “customs” he avoids using the word no/moj. The author uses 
ideas and language germane to the Greco-Roman discourse about nomos in a way that 
universalizes the Jewish nomos—but not as the Jewish no/moj. rather the (unidentified) 
Jewish people are simply the only ones who have followed God’s koino/j no/moj, which 
approximates to living in accord with traditional Greek ethical goals or commands from 
the Jewish Torah that are not clearly identified as Jewish, and assimilate easily into 
universal ethical behaviors. The Jewish people, then, are superior in following God’s 
universal nomos, which, contains commands for all humanity.  
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Wisdom of Solomon 
 Wisdom of Solomon is our first example of a Diaspora Jewish writer taking on 
what is traditionally assumed to be the persona of an ancient Jewish figure rather than a 
Greek. The manner in which the author of Wisdom appeals to Solomon is symptomatic of 
how he also treats the law. Nowhere in the text is Solomon identified. But, the statements 
in 7:7–14 resonate strongly with what we read about Solomon in 1 Kings 3:6–15, 8:12–
53, and passages in Proverbs about the value of wisdom.
143
 A reference to building the 
temple in the city of God’s dwelling alludes to Solomon’s building of the temple. That 
the author takes on the persona of Solomon can be safely concluded, but he does so in a 
veiled manner. If the intended audience is a Diaspora Jewish one as most scholars 
suggest, then one would think that this veiled manner of speaking in Solomon’s name 
matters little. Nevertheless, it is not until one gets well into the writing that this becomes 
clear, and the appearance is very much like any sage proclaiming the importance of 
wisdom.      
The consensus is that Wisdom comes from Alexandrian Judaism. There is less 
agreement about when it was written. The broad range extends from 220 B.C.E to 50 
C.E.
144
 A date on the earlier end of this spectrum is very unlikely. David Winston has 
cogently argued for a date during the first half of the first century C.E.
145
 He presses more 
specifically for the time of Caligula (37–41 C.E.) on the basis that the tensions in the 
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book seem to reflect the atmosphere of this period and the riots which broke out.
146
 This 
is plausible, but it is at least interesting, at most problematic, that the author of Wisdom 
does not completely denounce the rulers, if indeed the “rulers” to which the book is 
addressed can be seen as Roman rulers. In fact, the tone of the book seems to hold out 
some hope for “rulers of the earth” to find wisdom and rule justly. Additionally, the real 
polemic in the book is against Egyptians, not Greeks or Romans.
147
 So, while Winston’s 
case is plausible, it does not completely explain these other more positive elements. A 
general date in the first century seems safest.
148
       
The book contains “sophisticated vocabulary and…developed rhetorical features” 
and the author demonstrates knowledge of Middle Platonic philosophy.
149
 It is a work of 
a philosophical nature that encourages the pursuit of wisdom.
150
 The genre of Wisdom is 
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 Here, even though Winston has noted the difficulty in precisely determining the genre of 
Wisdom, I would land on seeing it as “essentially a protreptic with a considerable element of epideitic” (D. 
Winston, CBQ 48 [1986] 527).  
 
276 
an unsettled issue. The two vying proposals are ‘logos protreptikos’ and ‘encomium.’151 
In 1986, David Winston wrote:  
It is thus extremely difficult to determine whether Wisdom is an epideictic 
composition (‘encomium’) with an admixture of protreptic, or essentially 
protreptic with a considerable element of epideitic.
152
 
 
The problem implied in Winston’s statement is that Wisdom of Solomon does not in its 
entirety fit a single genre.
153
 In light of the flexible nature of genre,
154
 perhaps it is 
acceptable that two genres seem present in Wisdom—there need not be an ‘either-or’ 
distinction. But more importantly, as Kolarcik and others point out, both logos 
protreptikos and encomium contain an element of exhortation.
155
     
 There is agreement that 1:1–6:21 are exhortatory, and some propose that this is 
true of the whole book.
156
 If the opening exhortation (1:1–15) can be seen as 
determinative of the entire work, then the overall thrust of the work is to exhort the 
audience to avoid death by pursuing justice and seeking the Lord who thorough wisdom, 
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which enables a pious life and avoidance of death.
157
 If the audience is a Diaspora Jewish 
one, then the question to ask would be why this is written. It is difficult to say, especially 
in light of the centrality of the author’s exhortation to kings and rulers. At the least, we 
can say that it reflects the author’s (and perhaps his community’s) understanding of the 
Jewish nomos in relation to the pursuit of wisdom and the function of nomos for even 
rulers of the earth.
158
 It is also interesting that part of the purpose, at least in the first part 
of the book, concerns the problem of the triumph of the unjust over the just. If this plays a 
significant role in the meaning of the book, as it seems to, then the fact that the author 
does not exhort the Diaspora Jewish audience to keep the Jewish commands of the law, 
but rather to pursue “wisdom” and universal and transcendent virtue, is quite interesting. 
 The unity of the document has been questioned, mostly on the basis of the fact 
that there seem to be multiple styles and rhetorical forms used in the work. But the 
arguments for composite authorship have been countered and there is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that it is a coherent piece of literature.
159
 The work has three main sections.
160
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 One common understanding of the purpose of Wisdom is to strengthen Jews who had a 
tendency to defect or turn toward Greco-Roman life in some unknown ways. The writer is then using 
universal Greek conceptions to win over these potentially apostate Jews by means of an argument about the 
pursuit of wisdom and by couching it within the framework of Israelite history (Weber, Das Gesetz, 181). 
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The first, 1:1–6:11, is a general exhortation to “rulers of the earth.” It is often referred to 
as “the book of eschatology” based on a concern with eschatological judgment of the 
wicked and immortality. The overall tenor of this section, however, seems to be an 
exhortation to pursue “justice/righteousness” as opposed to “wickedness” or “impiety.” 
This section contains the well-known “speech of the impious” (2:1–20) by which our 
author sets out the nature of the impiety which he wants to contrast. The second section, 
6:12–10:21 is often called the “book of wisdom.” There is an overarching focus on 
wisdom herself: the pursuit of wisdom, her nature, and her characteristics. This section 
contains a famous praise of wisdom and her benefits (7:1–9:18). The third section, the 
“book of history,” covers chapters 11–19. It is very possible to read chapter ten as a 
transitional chapter, since wisdom remains the focus, but it also begins to transition into 
the historical overview that continues into chapters 11–19. 
Nomos in Wisdom of Solomon 
Unlike the previous writings we have considered, nomos has received little 
scholarly attention.
161
 The word no/moj is used ten times.162 Although it plays a secondary 
role to wisdom (sofi/a), it does figure as an important element in this author’s 
conception of defining “justice” (dikaiosu/nh) and the sort of life that comes from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statement about the consistency of language and style (Wisdom, 14–15) has been confirmed by others as an 
important indicator of unity (Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 180–81). 
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wisdom. In addition to nomos, our author writes of “commandments” (e0ntolh/) twice: 9:9 
and 16:6 (in the singular), as well as “holy things” (ta_ o#sia) in 6:10.    
 Like Sibylline Oracles 3, there is no clear reference to the Jewish nomos, and a 
few scholars question the certainty with which we can identify nomos as particularly 
Jewish.
163
  Many important references betray no specificity. In the speech of the impious, 
nomos plays a role in the tension between the impious and the just. In 2:11, the impious 
state: “let our strength be a law of justice (no/moj th~j dikaiosu/nhj), for what is weak is 
exposed as useless.” They go on to say that “the just person…reproaches us for sins 
against the law (a(marth/mata no/mou), and accuses us of sins against our paidei&a” 
(2:12). In 2:11 nomos seems to refer to a general manner of living, and the nomos which 
they transgress in 2:12 seems unspecified. Three references to nomos in the central 
section (6:4, twice in 6:18 and in 9:5) likewise allude to an unspecified nomos.
164
 In 6:4 
the author chastises rulers of the earth because “you did not judge rightly, nor did you 
keep the law (ou0de\ e0fula/cate no/mon). In this passage, one could assume the Jewish 
nomos, but to this point in the document nothing has been written to suggest this. Some 
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have suggested that the nomos here is “natural law” or some idea of “natural principles of 
justice.”165 This, however, is not immediately clear.  
In 6:18 the author writes that “love for (wisdom) means keeping her laws; 
attention to the law means certainty of immortality.” The law is connected with wisdom 
(sofi/a), but there still is no specificity here. One could assume particularly Jewish 
wisdom, and thus a particularly Jewish nomos is the referent. There is precedent for this 
in the Jewish Scriptures—especially in Proverbs and even Deuteronomy.166This may be 
an important part of the formative context for this understanding nomos, but how we 
should understand this nomos remains unspecified. In 9:5 the author writes of himself 
that he is “lacking in understanding of judgment and of laws” (e0la/sswn e0n sune/sei 
kri/sewj kai_ no/mwn). Nomos here is connected with judgment, and ultimately related to 
wisdom, but it is not specified. The uses of the unspecified nomos are significant because 
in them nomos plays a central role in loving, seeking, and obtaining wisdom.   
It is not until the final section of the writing that there seems to be some 
specificity to nomos. In chapter 16, the author writes about God’s people and the 
kindness God showed to them (16:2). The author recounts stories in the wilderness, and 
mentions the “law’s command” of which God reminded them (16:6). In chapter 18, the 
author writes about the conflict between the Egyptians and Israelites during the exodus 
and notes that God favored the Israelites, and that they are the ones “through whom the 
imperishable light of the law was to be given to the world” (18:4). He goes not to note 
that the Israelites—whom are not called such, but “the holy children of good people”—
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“with one mind issued the divine law” (to_n th=j qeio/thtoj no/mon e0n o(monoi/a| die/qento).
 In these occurrences, three things stand out. First, the nomos more clearly refers to 
the Jewish law. Second, the people of God are never specified as “Israelites” or “Jews.” 
Like Sib. Or. 3, neither of these designations occur in Wisdom. They are known as 
Israelites or Jews only if the reader recognizes the allusions to the stories, which are told 
in a very vague manner.
167
 The Diaspora Jewish reader would likely recognize the 
allusions, but this does not settle the matter. This writer’s actual portrayal of Judaism, 
even to a Jewish audience, emphasizes not the ethnic or national distinctions; rather he 
portrays to his peers a Judaism that is understood not as “Jew against Gentile” but “just 
against unjust.” Third, even though the nomos in 16:2, 6, and 18:4 refer to the law given 
on Sinai, the author describes it in a way that reorients the significance of such a 
connection by placing within an overall framework of the pursuit of wisdom and Greek 
virtue.
168
            
Is this nomos which the author associates with the Jews in a veiled manner the 
same as the nomos he writes about in the earlier parts of the document? John Collins 
answers this question in the affirmative because our author presupposes a link that has 
already been made in Ben Sira.
169
 This may be the case, but we cannot be certain that our 
author drew on Sirach, nor can we assume that the author of Wisdom made the same 
connection as the author of Sirach. It may be more likely that a connection between 
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nomos and Sophia has to do with more general Jewish wisdom traditions as found in 
Proverbs. At the same time, however, as we saw in chapter three above, connections 
between nomos and the pursuit of Sophia were also being made by Greek writers. Given 
this complexity it is best to consider the internal logic of Wisdom of Solomon.    
The way the three sections of Wisdom and the centrality of sofi/a both work to 
help us understand the references to nomos. In the opening section, the impious are 
chastised for not keeping the nomos. This is part of the exhortation to seek wisdom, and 
the impious are examples of those who don’t. In the hymn to wisdom in chapters 6 
through 9, keeping wisdom’s laws is a key element of seeking and loving her. 
Additionally, wisdom is associated with God. Seeking wisdom is the only way the kings 
can follow God and rule justly (6:1–25). God is “the guide even of wisdom” (7:15) and 
wisdom “is a breath of the power of God” and “an image of his goodness” (7:25–26). In 
these sections, much of the language resonates with Greek pursuits of virtue. In the final 
section, we find “the major illustration of the workings of wisdom”—wisdom as 
described in the first two sections of the book.
170
 In this last section, the author returns to 
a contrast between the impious and the just. Here the contrast is not between individuals, 
but between groups, and the “just ones” are the Israelites to whom God gave the law. It 
follows that the nomos associated with the Jewish people at the end of the book is the 
same thing as the nomos associated with seeking wisdom and justice. May conclude that 
our author presumes the Jewish nomos throughout the entire work, and perhaps even an 
association between wisdom and nomos that one finds in Proverbs. But this is done in a 
way that integrates significantly with Greek conceptions of the pursuit of virtue and 
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Sophia. Thus, the identity of the nomos in Wisdom does not come across as being 
“Jewish” but rather more universal. 
Universalization 
 According to Eckhard Schnabel, “the law (in Wisdom) is conceived as a universal 
entity.”171 For some scholars, the author of Wisdom associates the law with “law of 
nature.”172 This claim is made on the basis of the way that the author explains the law and 
its commands in terms of universal principles of justice and morality. It is also argued on 
the basis of an association with wisdom, which is related to God and the created order.
173
  
 There are only two references to fu/sij in Wisdom to consider in relation to this: 
7:20 and 13:1. In 7:20, God is referred to as giver of wisdom, creator of all things—from 
knowledge to the “workings of the elements” (e0ne/rgeian  stoixei/wn) to “the natures of 
living things” (fu/seij zw|&wn). The general tenor reflected in 7:15–22 of a piece with 
“the Greek philosophical vocabulary.”174 The use of “nature,” however, is not connected 
with God’s nomos. One might suggest that the author elsewhere makes a connection with 
physis and nomos via sofi/a, but such a connection would be weak, since our author 
never suggests that nomos is in accord with physis. The use of physis in 13:1 confirms 
                                                          
171
 E. Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 132. Also Weber, Das Gesetz, 192. 
  
172
 Collins, Between Athens, 199–200; Weber, Das Gesetz, 188–90. 
 
173
 Collins, Between Athens, 199–200; Weber, Das Gesetz, 188–89: there is “no conflict” between 
the law of nature and the particular law. According to Weber the author of Wisdom makes the “natural 
law” concrete in the commands and laws of the Torah in passages such as 9:5 and the use of e0ntolh/ (189). 
The author sees the Jewish nomos as “the most authentic expression” of natural principles of justice. The 
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this. The author writes that all humans with ignorance of God are “foolish by nature” 
(ma/taioi…fu/sei).175 In other words, there is a link here between physis and ignorance of 
God—quite the opposite of some Greek connections according to which following physis 
is following God and God’s nomos.176 Moreover, when we consider Wisdom in its 
entirety, there seems to be a connection between wisdom and nomos that excludes physis. 
It seems that our author is not associating nomos with physis as a way to universalize the 
Jewish nomos.           
 It is clear that the author of Wisdom associates law with wisdom.
177
 According to 
Winston, the author “very likely believed…that the teachings of the Torah were tokens of 
Divine Wisdom, and that they were in harmony with the laws of the universe and as such 
implant all the virtues in man.”178 The language our author uses to describe wisdom, 
however, is a complex mixture of Stoic and Middle Platonic thought, Egyptian Isis 
theology, and Jewish wisdom speculation, and it is impossible to sort out which of these 
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guides our author’s conception.179 It would be foolish to say definitively that one of these 
serves our author’s purposes to the exclusion of another; likely more than one or all of 
them are in play, perhaps unconsciously so to our author. Wisdom serves as “the perfect 
bridge between the exclusive nationalist tradition of Israel and the universalist 
philosophical tradition which appealed so strongly to the Jewish youth of Roman 
Alexandria.”180 It is likely that the difficulty in determining the understanding of wisdom 
in the book is because wisdom speculation itself—among Greeks and Jews—was such a 
complex, but very common topic.      
Wisdom plays the central role in the book; it is that which our author commends 
as the sure guide and one who bestows “justice,” a life pleasing to God, and ultimately 
immortality. The total effect of our author’s depiction of wisdom is to describe wisdom 
as a universal entity which is closely related to God (7:25–26) and to the created world 
(6:22; 8:1; 9:1–2). Moreover, wisdom is the source of all justice and ethical living (7:21–
23; 8:5–7). Sophia must be sought and imparted to humans (1:4; 3:11; 6:1–20). Seeking 
Sophia brings “reason” (lo/goj; lo/gismoj) and those without wisdom have poor reason 
(1:16–2:24; 3:10–12). For our author, sofi/a is a universally available entity, and seeking 
it leads to the prize of virtue and correct reason, which bears striking similarities to Greek 
philosophical discourse.      
According to our author, Sophia has commands or “laws” which can be either 
followed or transgressed: “love of (wisdom) is keeping of her laws, and keeping of her 
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laws is assurance of immortality (6:18). This nomos which is later identified with the 
Jewish nomos, is a universal standard because it comes from wisdom and instructs in the 
ways of universal sofi/a. The description of sophia in Wisdom bears similarities to 
paideia in the Tabula of Cebes. Both writings refer to paideia and wisdom in similar 
ways: 1) they are the gateway to life or salvation
181
; 2) people must come to them
182
; 3) 
they purify people of vice and give the gift of virtue.
183
 While a literary relationship 
between the two is unlikely, it does seem that both are participating in a common 
discourse.
184
 The incorporation of nomos into this framework by the author of Wisdom 
points to the author’s use of the available web of discourse to universalize the Jewish 
nomos in an appealing way.
185
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Our author also incorporates paideia into his universalization of the law. There is 
one more important passage where the author relates nomos directly to paideia. An 
important passage that communicates this connection is in 6:17–19. 
The beginning of wisdom is the most sincere desire for instruction (paidei/a),                                                         
and concern for instruction (paidei/a) is love of her,                                                                                     
and love of her is the keeping of her laws,                                                                                    
and giving heed to her laws is assurance of immortality,                                                             
and immortality brings one near to God. 
 
In light of the previous chapter, it is immediately clear that the association of wisdom, 
paideia, and nomos are very similar to such associations made by Greek writers.
186
 The 
passage occurs in the section where our author describes wisdom, exhorting the kings and 
rulers of the earth to seek wisdom. In their folly, they have not “kept (God’s) law, nor 
walked according to the will of God” (6:4). The author holds out hope that they will 
“learn wisdom and not fall away” (6:9). In vv.17–19 the author makes use of the literary 
form sorites to make a number of important claims about wisdom. The result of the 
sorites is that the author links a “desire” and “concern” for paideia, which is what leads 
to wisdom, to “keeping her nomoi.” The pursuit and attainment of paideia and thus also 
of Sophia come through the Jewish nomos. This is not unlike Proverbs. Proverbs, 
however, frequently writes of “commands” and “decrees” which seem to refer to specific 
commands of the Jewish Torah. In Wisdom, by contrast, the author does not draw 
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attention to any specific commands of the Jewish Torah in his understanding of nomos.
187
 
As in Let. Aris., it is likely that the reference to paideia reflects an allusion to the Greek 
cultural hallmark, and that our author is co-opting this to make a claim about the 
universal validity of the Jewish nomos.
188
   
The above points place the author’s conception of nomos and its significance 
squarely within the widespread Greek discourse I outlined in chapter three above, 
wherein Greek writers prized Greek paideia as a means of attaining “wisdom” and 
philosophia and, ultimately, a life in accord with transcendent ethical principles good for 
all humanity. Building upon this connection with paideia, our author makes an 
unambiguous claim in 8:7 that wisdom “teaches” (e0kdida/skei) the four cardinal virtues: 
“temperance” (swfrosu/nh), “prudence” (fro/nhsij), “justice” (dikaiosu/nh), and 
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“courage” (a0ndrei/a). Given the association between Sophia and nomos above, the laws 
of wisdom, then, instruct in these universal virtues.      
It is worth noting that there is no defense of the Jewish nomos in the document. 
Nor are there any metaphorical, symbolic, or allegorical interpretations of any commands. 
When our author writes of the Jewish nomos, he seems to refer to some universal entity 
that is in accord with and comes from God and divine sofi/a, which brings true paideia.  
We can agree with John Collins who writes that “it is likely that Wisdom…saw the Law 
of Moses as the embodiment of a universal law.”189 
Gentiles and the Law 
If the Jewish nomos is made into a universal nomos, the commands of which 
embody God’s universal Sophia to humanity, what commands should people keep? In his 
book The Reverse of the Curse, C. Marvin Pate states about Wisdom of Solomon: 
Wisdom’s nomism is rooted in Deuteronomy: Blessings of the covenant belong to 
those who wisely obey Torah while its curses await those who foolishly live in 
unrighteousness, Gentile and apostate Jew alike.
190
 
 
Pate’s concern is to show how Jewish writings draw on Deuteronomy and a covenantal 
framework in their interpretation of the law. Pate correctly isolates Wisdom’s concern 
with the accountability of both Jew and Gentile to the Jewish nomos. Pate may be correct 
about Wisdom’s use of Deuteronomy. But in Wisdom keeping the commands of the 
universalized nomos does not have to do with the blessings of the covenant with Israel, 
but rather with pursuing sofi/a and the commands of this nomos are universal virtuous 
behaviors. We have seen that the nomos which is generally unspecified throughout 
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Wisdom is the Jewish law. But for our author it is a universal nomos. If Deuteronomy lies 
behind this author’s “nomism,” it is a significantly reworked understanding that seems to 
minimize many of the law’s actual commands.      
In Wisdom of Solomon we find that the author focuses on general ethical 
behaviors when describing ways in which people follow or do not follow the commands 
of God’s sofi/a. The nomos is not strongly associated with particularly Jewish life and 
customs
191, and there is no real sense of “becoming Jewish” or transferring into the 
people of Israel. Our author works with a central framework in which “justice” 
(dikaiosu/nh) is contrasted with “injustice” (a0diki/a). Part of the universal appeal is 
through commands or behaviors that lack any ethnic or national specificity, but rather can 
be observed by all people. John Collins writes that our author’s ethics “basically conform 
to the “common ethic” of Hellenistic Judaism, which focused on idolatry and sex-related 
offences.”192 As with Sib. Or. 3 we should not think that this is the limit of the ethic. 
Even if readers (then and now) recognize the allusions to the Jewish people in the later 
part of the book, the emphasis falls on distinguishing the just and the unjust, not Jew and 
Gentile as ethnic or national groups.
193
         
There are two main ways that Wisdom gives a sense of commands to follow. All 
of the commands of the nomos emerge from the starting points of God as the one God of 
the universe, and God’s sophia as universal and available to all. Within this frame, our 
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author itemizes those things that are in accord with the nomos of wisdom. Among them 
the writer of Wisdom includes: murder, theft, corruption, treachery (14:22–28). Along 
this line of thought, our author makes an important claim in 8:7: “if a person loves 
righteousness, her labors are virtues; she teaches temperance and prudence, righteousness 
and manliness.” The Jewish nomos which is associated with sophia universally applies to 
the entire kosmos by leading to virtue. There is no mention of particular Jewish 
commands, though our author does have the impious say that “his (the righteous person’s) 
life is unlike others, and his paths are backwards” (2:15). Given the (veiled) association 
of Jews with the righteous, it is likely that this is a statement that communicates the 
significance of the particular Jewish ways of life. Moreover, these ways are part of the 
way that the righteous person is presented. But, they are not defining of nomos. In the 
speech of the impious, their transgression of the law is put in terms of excessive pursuit 
of wealth and “revelry” (2:7–9), oppression of the “righteous poor” and the widow (2:10), 
and violence (2:17–20). Also mentioned as opposed to wisdom and her nomoi are things 
like: pride, riches, boasting (5:8), envy (7:23), inhospitality to strangers (19:13). All of 
these may be found in the Jewish nomos, and are applicable to all humans. Also 
characteristic of wisdom (and thus her nomoi) are: loving good, being beneficient, and 
showing kindness (7:22–23). In his exhortation to rulers of the earth, he warns them that 
they have not “kept the law” (6:4). Reider’s suggestion that it refers to “the law in the 
Jewish sense, the Torah with its precepts and statutes and commandments” is not quite 
correct.
194
 From the statements made in Wisdom on the whole, the things of the law that 
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the rulers have not kept are the general ethical behaviors mentioned above.
195
  
 Our author also itemizes what is in accord with God’s nomos by means of his 
account of Israel in chapters 10–19. In these chapters the ways of “justice” are associated 
with certain heroes known from the Old Testament, as well as key events in the history of 
the people Israel. It is important that the individuals and the people Israel are not 
specifically identified.
196
 This history, in part at least, serves to describe historically how 
wisdom has worked in the world, and how certain people have or have not lived 
according to wisdom. The author writes of Abraham in 10:5, but he is not named, only 
described as a “just man” (to_n di/kaion). While Abraham lived before the giving of the 
law, presumably his “just” identity is related to living in accord with wisdom’s nomos, 
which consists in universally recognized behaviors. There is no clear statement that 
Abraham kept the nomos, no reference to the command of circumcision, or to some other 
specific act of following the law.
197
 If “Abraham” is an example of a “just man” then it is 
done without reference to anything specific to the Jewish nomos.    
 According to 12:19 God “taught” his people that to be “just” one must be a “lover 
of humanity” (dei~ to_n di/kaion ei]nai fila/nqrwpon). John Collins points out that the 
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word filanqrwpi/a “was a Stoic concept, grounded in the affinity between the divine 
and the human established by the Logos.
198
 It has to do with the unity of humanity as one 
common people under one god, who should be ruled by one “common nomos,” a 
commonplace idea in antiquity as we have seen in a previous chapter. Likewise in a later 
passage, “lawless people” are described as such because of their worship of other deities 
and their inhospitality (17:1–3; cf. also 19:13–16 where the sin of Sodom is “hatred of 
strangers” [misoceni/a]). The quality of philanthropia may be singled out because of the 
accusation that Jews were misanthropes, as, for example we find in Hecataeus.
199
 There 
may be some deflection of criticism here, then. Nevertheless, we still have the author of 
Wisdom attributing to the Jewish nomos a command that aligns with Greek moral 
philosophy, even if he is summarizing the commands about hospitality.
200
   
 Throughout Wis. 10–19, a recurring theme is idolatry. The “impious” live lives of 
vice and wickedness because of their worship of other gods.
201
 Specifically, it is worship 
of gods other than the God identified with the deliverance of Israel (13:1–14:21). But this 
God is in actuality the God of all people, not just of the Jewish people. Anyone can 
repent and turn to this God (12:23–24) and such turning is not explicitly associated with 
anything related to the Jewish nomos. The turning to God and proper worship is linked 
with recognition of God’s ways and a recognition of the God which supports and enables 
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all life (12:1; 13:1ff.; 15:10–11; 16:16). This element, however, is put in terms of 
achieving virtue and justice, not becoming Jewish. A myriad of vices that emerges from 
idolatry are listed in 14:24–28: murder, adultery, theft, deceit, corruption, faithlessness, 
perjury, just to name a few.        
Theoretically, then, the non-Jew need only avoid idolatry and pursue the general 
manner of life that wisdom desires. The focus on idolatry and proper acknowledgment of 
God may suggest some sort of transfer into Judaism at the social level. That is, if we 
assume that not committing idolatry means abandoning one’s religious practices and the 
social dynamics that come along with them. But it is not clear from Wisdom that this 
means converting to Judaism, experiencing circumcision, obeying Sabbath, food laws, 
and so on. These things are not dismissed, either. What stands out in, when it comes to 
explaining what the nomos demands, is living in accord with general ethical behavior.    
Particularity 
 It seems that there is little room for Jewish particularity in Wisdom. Indeed, if 
there is any sense of an emphasis on particularity it is veiled by the veneer of Greek 
philosophical ethics. This veneer does not, however, completely obscure any Jewish 
particularity. The one element of particularity is that the nomos that prescribes the 
commands of wisdom is the Jewish nomos. Much of Wis. 10–19 focuses on Jewish 
history. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people are never specified, for the author 
and knowledgable readers, the Israelites are the most just people on earth.    
 Joseph Reider speaks of chapters 10–19 as presenting “an arrogant and 
undisguised particularism.”202 There certainly is a sort of attitude of disdain for non-Jews 
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here. One finds typical polemic against idolatry, and in agreement with Winston and 
Collins, it seems that the polemic against Egyptians and Canaanites “served the author as 
symbols for the hated Alexandrians and Romans of his own day.”203 C. Marvin Pate 
draws attention to the fact that 12:22 points to the privilege of God’s people when he 
writes that their enemies are “scourged ten thousandfold.”204 Throughout 18:1–19:5 there 
is a clear sense of God’s people vs. the enemies who commit idolatry and commit vice.205 
 But, the particularism here is complex. While readers will recognize the clear Jew 
vs. Gentile distinction, the author himself does not put it this way. That our author does 
not specify the identity of God’s “righteous” is significant. At the same time, it is true 
that “custom and tradition led (the author) to associate righteousness with the observance 
of the Jewish law, however modified.”206 The key point here, is the modification. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, in the widespread Greco-Roman discourse particularistic 
tensions did not go away. The larger discourse enabled writers to uphold certain modes of 
existence as universal and good for all humanity. Those who did not pursue paideia were 
“barbarians.” There often was a clear line between those who lived in accord with 
transcendent nomos, virtue, wisdom, or paideia. The Jewish writer of Wisdom plays on 
this same field. There is no temple in which to worship God. The Jewish nomos and the 
Jewish people are where God’s universal sofi/a is found and the people are given the 
law for the good of the whole world. As such, they and not the Greeks or Romans are 
able to enlighten the world, but in the ways of justice and virtue, not in the ways of 
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Judaism. True, the overall goal coming from this Jewish author is “thoroughly Jewish.” 
But the message is “thoroughly Jewish” in a modified form. We can agree with A. 
DiLella that there is something “progressive” in Wisdom.207 Our author is rephrasing and 
reexamining Judaism and the nomos in light of the larger and widespread discourse 
wherein claims in favor of Greek paideia and the pursuit of Sophia dominate the 
landscape. While it is true that the virtues are “embodied in the Torah,”208 this claim is 
articulated in a way that sounds more universally Greek than Jewish. The polemic in the 
last part of the book does not serve to emphasize Judaism as God’s people, but rather to 
illustrate “justice” and “piety” and the work of wisdom.209 If our author is writing to other 
Diaspora Jews, then he is certainly reflecting upon Judaism and the Jewish nomos in a 
way that situates it within a universalistic framework.  
Conclusion 
 Wisdom of Solomon is indeed an enigmatic and complex document. Nevertheless, 
we must summarize our discussion. The author writes a document that exalts the pursuit 
of “righteousness” which is realized in the pursuit of “wisdom.” The tone of the book 
walks the line between polemical and didactic. That which the writer calls his readers to 
pursue is universal—available to all people. Our author writes of nomos within this 
context, and this nomos prescribes that which is of the domain of universal wisdom. 
Particularly, this is Greek virtue and related behaviors. In contrast to Aristobulus and Let. 
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Aris., there is no defense of particular Jewish commands. Like Sib. Or. 3, there is no 
specification of   0Ioudaioi~ or “Israelites.” The nomos, nevertheless, is the Jewish nomos 
and it is universalized by means of placing it within the framework of Greek ethical and 
philosophical discourse and the pursuit of virtue. There is no clear use of any conceptions 
of transcendent nomos, though from the associations with wisdom and the pursuit of 
virtue, as well as the connection between God and the nomos, the Jewish nomos is 
conceptualized as transcendent. Our author nevertheless holds that Israelites are God’s 
people and those through whom this universal nomos is made known to the world (18:4). 
There is a sense of “antagonism” as Barclay argues.210 However, it is a very specific 
antagonism—to idolatry and Greek worship of man-made deities. The Jewish nomos 
stands as that which embodies virtue and ethics available to all and to which all people 
are accountable; the Jewish people are not Jews over against Gentiles, but examples of a 
“just” people who live according to the universal ethical standard of sofi/a. 
Pseudo-Phocylides 
 The writing known as Pseudo-Phocylides, unlike the other writings, can hardly be 
distinguished as coming from the hand of a Diaspora Jewish writer.
211
 Nevertheless, it is 
recognized by nearly all scholars as coming from a Diaspora Jewish writer or community, 
mostly on the basis of its use of the Septuagint and certain “characteristic Jewish 
themes.”212 Moreover, the document employs what has been recognized as a 
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compendium or summary of Jewish moral instruction based in the Torah that is familiar 
to and used by Philo (Hypothetica 7.1–9) and Josephus (Contra Apionem 2.190–219).213 
We will discuss this in more detail below, but for now it is evidence of the Jewish nature 
of the instruction in Pseudo-Phocylides.      
The work, like Let. Aris. and Sib. Or., assumes the persona of a Greek.
214
 The use 
of the name Phocylides and the genre of the literature is that of a “gnomology”—a form 
the intent of which is to instill ethical instruction, and could be quite adaptable for use by 
any community or particular ideology.
215
 According to van der Horst, “(i)f it was 
someone’s concern to propagate wise and useful advices for daily life, the name 
Phocylides was a pre-eminently appropriate pseudonym.”216 In this case, our author 
presents the work as Greek ethical instruction, but with a tinge of Jewish moral teaching 
based in the Jewish nomos. The audience could be equally Jewish or Greek. If, as we 
have already pointed out, these writings primarily were for Diaspora Jews, then it speaks 
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volumes as to how Diaspora Jews—at least those associated with this document—
envisaged ethical living and its relation to the Jewish nomos.   
It is not certain when or where our author wrote this piece. Most scholars suggest 
that Alexandria is the place of origin, mostly on the basis of one passage that refers to the 
dissection of bodies (verse 102).
217
 But this is a thin basis, especially given how little we 
know about the various locales of the ancient Mediterranean world. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that if it is from Alexandria, the ethical instruction bears quite a different stamp 
than other Alexandrian Jewish writers.
218
 As for date, the generality of the message does 
not permit a clear answer. The positive tenor toward Greek ethics and life suggests a time 
when Jew-Greek relationships might have been positive, and thus many suggest a time 
before Caligula (37–41 C.E.).219 This presumes, however, an Alexandrian origin, which 
is not certain. A date sometime during the 1
st
 century B.C.E–1st century C.E. is about as 
precise as most scholars find comfortable.
220
    
The purpose of Pseudo-Phocylides can only be stated generally because of the 
flexible nature of the work and the lack of historical circumstances. Generally this sort of 
work was educational in nature.
221
 Whether the audience was Greek or Jewish, or both, is 
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difficult to say. In a general sense, however, the work is intended to instruct in universal 
ethical living. More specifically, the intent seems to be to present instruction rooted 
primarily, but not exclusively, in the Jewish nomos, and to do it in a way that shapes the 
lives of Jews and Gentiles equally.
222
 
Nomos in Pseudo-Phocylides 
 One glaring issue with regard to Pseudo-Phocylides is that the word no/moj never 
is used. Neither is “command” (e0ntolh/) or “lawgiver” (nomoqe/thj). Nevertheless, we 
should not conclude from this that the document has nothing to contribute to our 
discussion. Many recognize that the writer summarizes the Decalogue in the beginning of 
the work in vv.3–8.223 He writes:  
Neither commit adultery nor rouse male passion      
Neither contrive deceptions nor defile your hands with blood     
Do not be unjustly rich but live from honorable means    
Be satisfied with what you have and refrain from what belongs to others  
Do not lie, but always say things that are true    
Honor God first, and thereafter your parents 
 
This summary is significant because it functions as a prothesis or propositio for the entire 
work, which “enunciates but does not explicate certain principles and requirements that 
set the stage for the exhortation that follows, implying its moral stance and material 
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presuppositions while anticipating many of its essential ethical themes.”224 With the 
exception of honor God, these statements are based in the second tablet of the Decalogue, 
focusing on “ethical and social obligations.”225 It is noteworthy that he does not simply 
recite the commands from the Decalogue, but adds balancing statements, connected with 
“nor,” “and,” or “but.” Additionally, the author selectively and creatively summarizes the 
Decalogue, leaving out the commands concerning idolatry, taking God’s name in vain, 
and the Sabbath command; he also rearranges the order: 
Table 1. Comparison of the Decalogue and Ps.-Phoc. 3–8   
The Decalogue  Pseudo-Phocylides 3–8 
No other Gods  Verse 8 
No Idols (verse 8) 
Do not take God’s name in vain (verse 8) 
Honor the Sabbath  
Honor parents Verse 8 
Do not murder Verse 4 
Do not commit adultery Verse 3 
Do no steal Verse 5? 
Do not bear false witness Verse 7 
Do not covet Vv.5-6 
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In spite of the alterations, this summary is intended to represent “the entire Decalogue, 
which, in turn, stands for the Jewish law.
226
 It may be that the command to “honor God” 
summarizes the first four commands from the Decalogue. On the whole, even if the word 
no/moj is not used, what we find in the work are commands and instruction intended to 
instruct an audience in ethical living, and it finds its basis in the Decalogue. A number of 
the instructions also parallel laws from the Pentateuch and Proverbs.
227
   
Universalization  
 According to the opening of the work, the instructions contained are “resolutions 
of God through holy judgments” (v.1). Elsewhere the writer states that God will judge 
those who do not follow the instruction (vv.11, 17, 111). The instruction, in other words, 
is not that of a particular people or heritage, but rather that of the one “immortal God” 
(qeo_j a!mbrotoj; v.17). They are transcendent and universal ethical instructions for 
anyone, regardless of political, social, or ethnic identity. Furthermore, the instructions are 
from a Greek, not Jew, and while from the “immortal God” they are not explicitly tied to 
Moses, the Jewish nomos, or Jewish history. This also can be seen in the way the writer 
seamlessly mixes those instructions with parallels to commands in the Jewish Old 
Testament with instruction and commands well known from Gentile ethics.
228
   
 The instructions are for the most part intended to facilitate growth in virtue and 
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 See Wilson, The Senences, 14–16. Wilson notes connections with Homer, Hesiod, and the 
Greek poet Phocylides of Miletus. Specifically, Wilson points out the likelihood that the latter Phocylides 
may have served as a model for Ps.-Phoc. at the level of not only specific instructions, but also at the 
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(Wilson, The Sentences, 16–17).  
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justice. The structure of the poem itself seems to be built around the cardinal virtues: 
justice / dikaiosu/nh (vv.9-54), moderation / swfrosu/nh (vv.55-96), courage / a)ndrei/a 
(vv.97-121), and wisdom / sofi/a (vv.122-31).229 Moreover, P. van der Horst, drawing on 
the work of J.P. Audet, has made a significant connection between Pseudo-Phocylides 
and words of Plutarch in his On the Education of Children 7D-E, a passage which we 
encountered in the previous chapter.
230
 I quote the passage here for convenience. Plutarch 
writes that through philosophia which is the “head and font of all paideia” one attains: 
knowledge of what is honorable and  what is shameful, what is just and unjust, 
what, in brief, is to be chosen and to be avoided, how a man must bear himself in 
relation to the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, 
with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; 
that one ought to reverence the gods, to honor one’s parents, to respect one’s 
elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one’s 
friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be 
overbearing with slaves; and most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success 
or over-distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute with pleasures, nor impulsive 
and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the 
advantages which accrue from philosophy.
231
  
 
Plutarch’s statement aptly sums up the general sense of the instruction in Pseudo-
Phocylides, which is placed within the sphere of the universal Greek concern for true 
paideia and the benefits of philosophia. If we connect this with the vague association 
with the Jewish Decalogue, the writer is turning commands found in Jewish tradition and 
seamlessly turning them into a cornerstone upon which true paideia and philosophia, as 
well as a universal ethic and a detailed explication of the cardinal virtues is built.    
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 Some have suggested that Pseudo-Phocylides uses “law of nature” as part of his 
instruction. Collins suggests a connection with “law of nature” on the basis of statements 
such as “give nature her due (do/j ti fu/sei kau0to/j), beget in turn as you were begotten” 
(v.176).
232
 There are three other uses of fu/sij in Ps.-Phoc.: vv.125, 187, and 190.233 
With the exception of v.125, the other references pertain to instructions focused on sex 
and reproduction. While fu/sij does not figure prominently, it does form the basis for 
these particular commands about sexuality. According to Wilson, it was a typical move in 
the ancient world to mold one’s understanding of sexual ethics on the basis of fu/sij.234 
On this basis, Ps.-Phoc. does show use of “nature” as a guide for some, but  not all, 
ethical decisions. The instructions are indeed divine, and in some cases “nature” also 
corresponds with the instruction, but the “laws” are not those of fu/sij, and their 
transcendence is not rooted in fu/sij; rather, they are universal and transcendent 
instructions of the immortal God.  
Gentiles and the Law 
 What parts of the Jewish nomos apply to Gentiles? This is a difficult question to 
answer. On the one hand, the second half of the Decalogue serves as an important basis 
for our author’s instruction. In addition, there are a number of instructions that have 
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parallels or even are drawn directly from the Old Testament.
235
 The Old Testament 
parallels concern mostly social, economic, and general moralistic instruction.
236
   
 On the other hand, one may say that all of the commands and instructions in the 
entire work apply to all people. There is no sense in which our author makes any 
distinction between the parts of the Decalogue he summarizes in vv. 3–8 and the rest of 
the instructions in the poem, nor is there a focus on application to Jews. The summary of 
the Decalogue serves to introduce the various instructions, but the instructions in the rest 
of the document are no less significant. Additionally, the way in which instructions 
drawn from the Old Testament are assimilated with Greek ethical instruction suggests 
that following Gentile ethical wisdom is one and the same with following the Decalogue 
and various parts of the Jewish nomos, and vice versa. There is no instruction in Pseudo-
Phocylides’ interpretation of the Jewish nomos that does not apply to non-Jews, and no 
instruction which non-Jews cannot keep just as well as Jews. P.W. van der Horst puts it 
this way: “(Ps.-Phoc.) preaches a kind of universally valid ethics that could be assented to 
by any right-minded (person) in antiquity.”237 Given that one central foundation of this 
ethical instruction seems to be the Decalogue, then it seems to be a clear conclusion that 
Pseudo-Phocylides views the Decalogue as defining the Jewish nomos, which illuminates 
divine instruction, and that it is available for Gentiles to follow as Gentiles.  
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Particularity 
 It is difficult to find any explicit way in which the instruction in Pseudo-
Phocylides serves Jewish claims to ethical superiority. On the surface, the author is 
promoting not a Jewish way of life, or even the Jewish nomos, but rather general ethical 
wisdom. Now, if we dig beneath the surface we might find that the use of the Decalogue 
seems to suggest some sense in which universal ethical instruction ultimately has its roots 
in the Decalogue given by God to the Israelites. In addition, in v.54 the author writes: 
“God alone is wise, mighty, and also rich in blessings” (ei[j qeo/j e0sti sofo/j dunato/j q 0 
a#ma kai\ polu/olboj). He writes this as a way to caution against pride in one’s own 
wisdom, might, or wealth (v.53). Most scholars recognize a possible allusion to the 
Shema in Deuteronomy 6:4: “The Lord our God is one Lord” (ku/rioj o( qeo_j h9mw~n 
ku/rioj ei[j e0stin).238         
 Without dismissing the above points, it is difficult to lean on either of them too 
much. First, our author does not exploit these possible ways of focusing on Judaism or 
the Jewish nomos, not even in a veiled way that we see in Sibylline Oracles or in Wisdom 
of Solomon. Second, with regard to the possible allusion to Deuteronomy 6:4, it is not 
that the allusion is not there. Rather, our author does not say enough or expand upon it in 
order to differentiate from other similar claims made by Greeks.
239
 In other words, he 
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Pythagoras wrote, “No one is wise but God alone” (mhde/na ga_r ei]nai sofo_n [a!nqrwpon] a)ll ) h2 qeo/n) 
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Sentences, 151). This is corroborated in what we have seen in Aristobulus, Let. Aris., and Sib. Or. 3, though 
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could have said in the introduction something like: “These resolutions of the one God 
through holy judgments, given on two tablets, passed on by Phocylides the wisest of men.” 
But he does not. In fact, by associating this instruction with the ancient Phocylides, and 
not Moses, our author effectively strips the instruction of any real Jewish claim! On the 
other hand, however, it may still be said that this Phocylides received his instruction from 
the same God who gave the Decalogue, and on that basis also claim that this great ethical 
instruction really has its roots in the Jewish Decalogue. While this sense of a Jewish 
claim might lie beneath the surface, it remains that our author does not ever make this 
point. 
Conclusion 
 Pseudo-Phocylides stands at the far end of the spectrum of universalization of all 
our writings in that universalization stands as the main emphasis, rather than 
particularization. What is presented are not the commands of the Jewish nomos, but 
divine instructions mediated through a known Greek figure, and what is promoted is 
general Greco-Roman ethical wisdom. The Jewish Decalogue stands as the summary of 
the wisdom instruction, but in such a way that it is not differentiated from universal 
Greco-Roman moral instruction. Both Jews and Gentiles can equally follow this 
instruction, and both will be rewarded equally. 
4 Maccabees 
 4 Maccabees is a moving account of fidelity to the Jewish nomos. In this account, 
the author attempts to demonstrate the unwavering devotion of the priest Eleazar, the 
seven brothers, and their mother, to the Jewish nomos. As David deSilva writes, “(t)he 
                                                                                                                                                                             
as noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is unlikely that this literature should be classified primarily as 
“missionary” literature.  
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author has immersed himself in the elements of Greco-Roman philosophical ethics and 
rhetorical composition with a view to promoting commitment to the Jewish way of 
life.”240 “Jewish way of life” for the writer of 4 Maccabees is defined in the Jewish 
nomos. To put it succinctly, the book is a defense of the philosophical and ethical 
superiority of the Jewish nomos.
241
         
The story itself is based on the story recorded in 2 Maccabees 6–7, which took 
place sometime around 168 B.C.E, suggesting that a date earlier than the first century 
B.C.E. is not unlikely.
242
 There are arguments in favor of a date late in the first century 
C.E., but they are not conclusive.
243
 The most likely range is sometime in the middle of 
the first century, between 19–72 C.E.244       
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 The book presents Judaism as not just philosophical, but as philosophy itself; all 
others are not really philosophies at all.
245
 One might say that the power of the Jewish 
nomos is in defining philosophia.
246
 Although the author is Jewish, it is worth noting that 
he makes an attempt to make Judaism appear rather objectively philosophical. It would 
not be outside of reason to think that an ancient reader could read nearly all of the first 
chapter (through verse 32) and not have any idea that the rest of the story would be a 
defense of the Jewish nomos. Even the statement that “wisdom” is “education in the law” 
in 1:15 does not bear a distinctly Jewish stamp apart from the story of the martyrs.
247
 To 
put it another way, the presentation in the first chapter could have been written by nearly 
any Greek or Roman with a general philosophical-ethical understanding. This will change 
significantly as the story goes on, but the way the author presents the issue of Jewish 
obedience to the commands of the Torah has its starting point with the Greek pursuit of 
virtue, not obedience to the covenant.       
 To whom is this message sent? Given the nature of the story told, it is most likely 
written to other Diaspora Jews to encourage fidelity to the law.
248
 Interestingly, our 
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author feels the need to present keeping the commands of the law in terms of fulfilling 
Greek ethical and philosophical aspirations. It is difficult to escape both the particularism 
in this work of literature and the way that the Jewish nomos does not completely eschew 
these Greek ideals. David deSilva states it well:  
The author of 4 Maccabees addresses Jews for whom neither solution would have 
been acceptable. Rather, these were Jews who had a high level of appreciation for 
the conversation and culture of the Greco-Roman world, who were drawn to what 
their Gentile neighbors prized, and who sought to carve out a place in the 
conversation while still maintaining their distinctive voice and identity. If their 
Gentile neighbors continued to withhold acknowledgment of that voice, at least 
they would need internal assurance that their position was viable both from within 
a Jewish point of view and from an unprejudiced Greco-Roman point of view, if 
such could be found.
249
 
 
 The Jewish nomos stands at the crossroads of maintaining a particularly Jewish 
mode of living and seeing the world and ethical living through the lens of Greco-Roman 
philosophical-ethical discourse. It is an attempt to assert the rational and philosophical 
veracity of keeping the commands of the Jewish nomos in the face of very real and 
tempting reasons to not keep the commands, particularly laws concerning food.
250
 
Nomos in 4 Maccabees 
 It goes without saying that the specifically Jewish nomos is the primary focus of 4 
Maccabees. The word no/moj occurs 38 times.251 Twice the author uses nomoqesi/a (5:35; 
17:16). One of the distinctive elements of the use of nomos in 4 Maccabees is the focus 
on “commands.” The author references various commands of the law a number of 
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times
252
, and the word e0ntolh/ (“command”) occurs five times.253 In fact one of the 
themes of the entire story is a battle between the “command” of the king and the 
“commands” of the law.254 The central issue at stake pertains to the command concerning 
the eating of pork (5:1–38). While this may reflect a particular problem at issue for the 
author or his readership, this particular command is probably meant to be an example for 
more general law-keeping and is the vehicle to contrast a Jewish and Gentile ways of 
living.
255
 Redditt offers a further conclusion that the focus is on the Pentateuch, and thus 
not simply the Decalogue.
256
 
Although the focus is on “commands” of the law, we should not think that we are 
dealing with “legalism” or strict command-keeping for its own sake. The specific 
commands of nomos in 4 Maccabees instruct in divine and human matters (1:17) as well 
as embody a way of life (2:8) that is at once Jewish and more broadly philosophical and 
“reasonable” (1:1–15).   
Universalization 
 While the nomos in 4 Maccabees clearly refers to the Jewish law, and while it is 
set in opposition to the “commands” of the king (notice that the king’s “commands” are 
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not nomos!),
257
 our author still interprets the Jewish nomos through the lens of Greek 
philosophy. That our author turns Judaism and its nomos into philosophy does not 
necessarily mean that it has become a universally authoritative standard. The emphasis 
clearly lies on asserting Jewish superiority. But by situating the Jewish nomos as 
educating in true philosophy, there is some measure of universalization not unlike the 
ways in which Greeks turned Greek manners of life into that which achieved universally 
prized ethical ideals. Indeed, what we have in 4 Maccabees is quite similar to the ways in 
which Greeks asserted the universal significance of their particular manners of life by 
means of the pursuit of philosophia and through the concept of paideia. 4 Maccabees 
represents a Jewish author asserting the primacy of one particular mode of existence, 
rooted in the Jewish nomos.         
 There are a few key ways in which our author turns the particular commands of 
the Jewish nomos into transcendent and universally applicable commands for all 
humanity. First of all, our writer presents his case in a universal manner. What he says is 
intended to align with widespread Greek “philosophical” pursuits and pertains to widely 
known “virtues” as well as the Stoic demonstration that “reason controls the passions” 
(1:1-9). Furthermore, he presents instruction in the law as leading to “wisdom”: 
Now reason, indeed, is a mind with right reason pursuing the life of wisdom. 
Wisdom is knowledge of divine and human matters and the causes of these. This, 
then, is paideia of the law, through which we learn divine matters honorably and 
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human matters advantageously. The types of wisdom are prudence and justice and 
courage and moderation (1:15–18). 
 
As we saw above, this definition was also used of the Sabbath in Aristobulus. As many 
have pointed out, this is taken directly from Greek philosophical discourse.
258
 Moreover, 
as we have seen in previous chapters, this language was fused with the widespread nomos 
discourse as writers would attempt to provide a means by which one could live in 
accordance with transcendent and universal ethical principles.
259
     
 In addition to this passage, in 2:23 our author writes, “to the mind he (God) gave 
the law, conducting oneself according to which, one will rule a kingdom that is at once 
moderate and just and good and courageous.” While many acknowledge that the author 
draws on a typical Greek philosophical commonplace of the mind ruling over the rest of 
the body,
260
 there may also be another reference here: it may be part of the way that 4 
Maccabees attacks certain understandings of the Hellenistic ruler with Antiochus as the 
foil—as an example of someone who does not conduct himself in accord with the law, 
and thereby does not rule virtuously, but unjustly. As the story goes on we see that the 
Greek ruler Antiochus is no true ruler, but rather a “tyrant” (5:1, 27; 6:1). This is very 
similar to what we see in material about Hellenistic kingship. If a ruler does not rule 
according to divine nomos, then that ruler is in fact a tyrant and not a good ruler. We read 
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in the writing attributed to the Pythagorean Archytas, referenced above, titled 
“Concerning Law and Justice” (peri_ no/mou kai_ dikaiosu/nhj) that “when the law is 
transgressed, the king is a tyrant.”261 As we saw in chapter two, it is the duty of the king 
to rule in accord with, indeed to embody, transcendent nomos among the people.
262
 By 
rejecting the Jewish nomos—which is a “divine nomos” according to 5:16 and 6:21—
Antiochus is rejecting the transcendent nomos of the universe. This also is reminiscent of 
the struggle reflected in Sophosles’ Antigone between the decree of the king and the 
“unwritten laws” of the gods. The difference in 4 Maccabees being that the nomos is not 
an “unwritten nomos,” but a divinely ordained nomos of God.  
These connections suggest that our author enters into a widespread discourse 
whereby ancient writers attempted to define true nomos that was transcendent of human 
law. David deSilva rightly points out that “such obedience to the divine and eternal laws 
in flagrant disregard for unjust decrees by temporal tyrants was lauded in classical Greek 
culture.”263 It also works to say that disobedience of the Hellenistic king to the divine 
nomos reflects not a true king, but a tyrant who does not rule in accord with transcendent 
nomos.      
As we have seen, our author also links the commands of the law with the pursuit 
of virtue. The heroes of the story, Eleazar and the seven brothers, all died “on behalf of 
virtue” (u(pe\r a)reth~j) in 1:8. In 1:18, the forms of wisdom, attained through instruction 
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in the law, are the cardinal virtues:  “prudence” (fro/nhsij), “justice” (dikaiosu/nh), 
“courage” (a0ndrei/a), and “moderation” (swfrosu/nh). Throughout the rest of the story 
our author consistently either refers to one or more of these virtues in relation to the 
law,
264
 or to “virtue” (a)reth/) or “the virtues” in general rather than repeat them all.265 
Our author places particular emphasis on “piety.”266 Traditionally, scholars have 
understood the emphasis on “piety” and its connection with nomos as a way that our 
author asserts Jewish particularity.
267
 Although this is not to be debated, one wonders, 
given the Greek philosophical knowledge of our author, if “piety” relates not only to 
one’s worship or belief in God, but also to one’s ethical conduct in life. As we saw in 
chapter three, “piety” was a regular virtue mentioned in Greco-Roman writers’ 
associations with nomos and the pursuit of virtue. As a slightly different example, 
Epictetus writes about “piety” that “whoever takes care to strive as is necessary and to 
cease as is necessary, in this (he) also cares for piety.”268 This, according to Epictetus, is 
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 fro/nhsij: 1:2, 18, 19.  
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 Epictetus, Enchiridion, 31.4: o#stij e0pimelei=tai tou= o)rge/gesqai w(j dei= kai\ e0kkli/nein, e0n 
tw|~ au0tw|~ kai\ eu0sebi/aj e0pimelei=tai.  
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distinct from offering sacrifices and such “according to the customs of our fathers” (kata_ 
ta_ pa&tria) which is for all Greeks to do. To be “pious” is beyond these mere 
requirements of devotion to God.    
Given this overall context, our author’s association of “piety” with nomos should 
not be limited to a Jewish religious claim. It may be that “pious reason”—reason that is 
faithful to God’s divine nomos is also reason that stands in line with the proper 
expectations of those who live in harmony with the divine ordering of the world and with 
virtue. In other words, in remaining faithful to the commands of the Jewish nomos, our 
author exhorts readers to real eu0se/beia in the world. The commands of the law exist as 
commands of the one God, and thus are a universal order, and to follow them is also to 
follow this divine order to the world; it is eu0sebh/j.269     
Our author also connects the Jewish nomos with “law of nature.” The word fu/sij 
occurs in 4 Maccabees eight times.
270
 Three of these occur in the exchange between the 
king Antiochus and Eleazar the priest in chapter five. Antiochus attempts to persuade the 
priest “in order that you might save yourself by eating the pork” (5:6; o3pwj 
a0pogeusa/menoj tw~n u9ei/wn sw|&zoio). In his attempt at persuading the priest the king 
appeals to nature in 5:8 when he questions following the law’s command “when nature 
has graciously provided a most excellent thing” (that is, pork). He goes on to say that it is 
“unjust (a!dikon) to turn away from the gifts of nature (ta_j th~j fu/sewj xa&ritaj)” 
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(5:9). By “nature” Antiochus seems to mean a universal, cosmic principal by which 
human action should be determined. In other words, by eating pork Antiochus promotes 
“life in accordance with nature” and Eleazar and the Jewish people violate nature and 
promote what is “unjust” (a!dikon). Our author, thus, directly places the Jewish nomos 
within the Greco-Roman nomos discourse, specifically setting the Jewish nomos in 
opposition to physis. The implied danger is that the Jewish nomos actually enslaves its 
people to human tradition.
271
   
The author of 4 Maccabees takes this as an opportunity to respond blow for blow, 
asserting that Antiochus’ “nature” is actually “unlawful” when he says, “the tyrant, 
having urged him on in this manner to the eating of the unlawful meat” (5:14). For our 
author, what is claimed to be in accord with nature is actually contrary to nomos—the 
Jewish nomos. In Eleazar’s response he stresses that the nomos he and other Jews follow 
is indeed “divine.” The author goes on to state through the words of Eleazar in 5:25 that 
the creator of the universe gave the law, and he did so “according to nature”: 
Therefore we do not eat unclean food, for believing that God established the law, 
we know that the one who created the kosmos has sympathized with us giving law 
according to nature. 
 
The phrase is notoriously difficult to translate. The phrase in Greek reads:  
oi!damen o3ti kata_ fu/sin h(mi~n  sumpaqei~ nomoqetw~n o( tou~ ko/smou kti/sthj 
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The difficulty is whether the dative h(mi~n should go with the verb sumpaqei (“the 
creator of the kosmos has sympathized with us”)272 or with kata_ fu/sin (“the creator of 
the world, in giving us the law, has conformed it to our nature”).273 Both deSilva and 
Redditt before him offer good arguments in favor of the former translation.
274
 We should 
also add that the verb sumpaqe/w has no object in the sentence if it is not h(mi~n. 
Furthermore, there is the question of how to understand kata_ fu/sin. As is known, the 
phrase is a philosophical commonplace, particularly in Stoicism.
275
 The question is 
whether it is the giving of the law that is “according to nature” or whether it is God’s act 
of sympathy that is “according to nature.”276 deSilva understands it in terms of the latter, 
arguing that “according to nature” refers to “the parent’s love and provision for the 
child’s education and upbringing” which is “in accordance with nature.”277 But this 
would make little sense of the overall point of the passage, since the contrast that has 
been set up is one between “nature” as understood in terms of the cosmic order of things 
and the Jewish nomos. It makes better sense to understand that it is the establishment of 
the law that is kata_ fu/sin, an act done out of sympathy “for us.” So, rather than the 
Jewish nomos being contrary to physis, our author stresses through Eleazar’s speech that 
it is in fact given according to nature. The consequence of this is that the Jewish nomos 
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comes from the creator of the universe and correspondingly defines what is kata_ fu/sin. 
The implication is that the actual command of the Jewish nomos defines what is 
“according to nature.”     
In Eleazar’s response, the tables are turned. Rather than the Jewish nomos being 
the particular nomos in contrast with physis, it is the king’s decrees that are in violation of 
divine nomos. As we have seen in chapter 2, other ancient writers also associated nomos 
with physis, and there was room to argue that one particular nomos best reflected 
transcendent ethical norms. In part our author is only taking up the age-old contrast 
between divine law and the decress of a king, exemplified in Sophocles’ Antigone.278 In 
making this point, it is claimed that the Jewish nomos actually is the divine nomos, a 
transcendent and universal nomos, established by the creator of all things. Even the 
decrees of the king, who was supposed to embody transcendent nomos to his kingdom, 
are inferior and can be critiqued from the standpoint of this (Jewish) divine nomos. The 
other references to physis in the story (13:27; 15:13, 25; 16:3) all fit within this. In so far 
as the Jewish nomos defines physis, the brotherly love and motherly parental love that led 
the mother to exhort her children to adhere to the commands of the law are all actions of 
physis. They are so, precisely because they serve to further obedience to the Jewish 
nomos, which is kata_ fu/sin.       
Primarily, then, the Jewish nomos is universalized by associating it with the 
pursuit of philosophia and virtue. It is also a transcendent nomos through a connection 
with Hellenistic kingship theory and a relationship with physis. Our author’s entry point, 
at least according to the structure and rhetoric of the work, is from universal to 
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particular.
279
 This is just the opposite of Aristobulus and Let. Aris., who begin with the 
commands of the Jewish nomos and move out toward universalization. In 4 Maccabees 
our author’s stated point is to articulate a Greek philosophical thesis and then give 
demonstrate its achievement through the commands of the Jewish nomos.      
Gentiles and the Law           
 The narrative and purpose of 4 Maccabees does not, it seems, directly address 
Gentiles and their place in relation to the Jewish nomos. In fact, the thrust of the storyline 
is to encourage Jewish fidelity to the Jewish nomos. But as we have seen, this nomos is 
nothing other than the universal nomos set forth by God, creator of all things. The virtues, 
“piety,” reason, and even “nature” all find their meaning in this nomos. Moreover, in 1:2 
the author writes that his argument “is indispensible to all for the purpose of knowledge” 
(a)nagkai~oj ei0j e0pisth/mhn panti_). Moreover, the way that 4 Maccabees attacks 
philosophical Hellenistic kingship theories suggest application to those outside Judaism. 
A good king should, unlike Antiochus, follow the commands of the Jewish nomos.  
 For the author of 4 Maccabees, there is little room for achieving any of the above 
ideals apart from following the specific commands of the Jewish nomos. In contrast with 
previous writings, 4 Maccabees stands out by its absence of any attempt to read the 
Jewish commands in any symbolic or allegorical manner. Even though the end result is 
not unlike previous writers—that the commands of the Jewish nomos lead to ethical 
virtue—there is no appeal to certain general behaviors one should either follow or vices 
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to avoid. There is no sense that following God’s nomos is really a matter of avoiding 
adultery, murder, and the like. It is a matter of adamant obedience to the specific 
commands of the Jewish nomos. In previous explanations of the law in Aristobulus and 
Let. Aris., the commands symbolically lead one to the same things as Greco-Roman 
ethics. 4 Maccabees lacks such amicability. There is no symbolic meaning to the law. 
The point is that virtue comes only through Jewish obedience to the Jewish nomos, and 
not through any assimilation to Greek manners of life, which are really not kata_ fu/sin. 
Implicit in the way that the author universalizes the law, then, is a sense in which non-
Jews must also follow the Jewish nomos literally, with no exception, if they wish to 
achieve ethical virtue.  
Particularity 
 There is no doubt that the central point in 4 Maccabees concerns fidelity to the 
specific commands of the Jewish nomos. It is clear that the Jewish nomos is the channel 
by which Jews achieve universal Greek philosophical tenets of wisdom and virtue, and 
that it is a universal and transcendent divine nomos that defines physis. Yet, because of 
the directionality of the author’s argument, the particular ways of the Jewish nomos are 
the sole means to these ends. In fact, there is a sense of opposition between obedience to 
the Jewish nomos as the means toward these Greek philosophical goals and Greek life as 
the alternative. The author sets the specifically Jewish “ancestral law” (16:16) in 
opposition to Greek life (8:8); God is the “ancestral God” of the Jewish people (12:6), 
while being the creator of the world; “the children of the Hebrews alone are invincible in 
behalf of virtue” (9:18).         
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The particularity expressed in 4 Maccabees is certainly different from the writers 
encountered thus far. It is undisguised, and unabashedly singular in the way that it 
focuses on the observance of the commands of the Jewish nomos, and specifically only 
these. Obedience to the Jewish nomos as the divine nomos in accord with “nature” as well 
as participation in Jewish tradition and history stand as the only means of Greek paideia 
and true philosophia. John Barclay writes, “There is no indication that Gentiles may lay 
claim to any such status or entertain any such hopes.”280 This, I think, could be clarified 
to say that no Gentiles can lay claim to such status, nor to fulfill such hopes as 
Gentiles.
281
 If there is any hope for Gentiles, they must become Jews and follow the 
Jewish law as it is written.     
Conclusion 
 4 Maccabees represents a different way of explaining the Jewish nomos. While 
our author indeed interprets the law within the framework of more universal Greek moral 
philosophy, he does so only for the purpose of emphasizing the significance of 
faithfulness to the letter of the law. We find no metaphorical interpretations; nor do we 
find any sense of stating “the things of the law” in terms of widely recognized ethics. The 
specific commands of the Jewish nomos alone lead to virtue and are in accord with physis. 
In contrast with Ps.-Phoc., 4 Maccabees represents the complete opposite end of the 
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spectrum. Nevertheless, both writers maintain that the Jewish nomos somehow leads to 
the attainment of Greek virtue! 
Conclusions 
 On the basis of this chapter, what do these Diaspora Jewish writers tell us about 
how Diaspora Jews understood nomos? To answer this, let us return to the framework of 
the three main questions I raised at the beginning of this study: 1) how do Diaspora 
Jewish writers universalize the Jewish nomos?; 2) what parts of the Jewish nomos are 
Gentiles expected to keep, or what do writers assume they can keep as Gentiles?; 3) how 
do writers express the particular significance of the Jewish nomos in light of its 
universalization?  
With regard to universalizing the Jewish nomos, there is both commonality and 
diversity. It is clear that all of the writers draw upon the widespread Greek philosophical 
and ethical web of discourse. By saying this, I want to emphasize that all of the Jewish 
writers do more than just make use of certain terms or concepts. When we read them in 
conversation with the Greco-Roman nomos discourse—the connections made with ideas 
of kingship, the pursuit of virtue, philosophia, and claims made by Greeks about paideia, 
and by Romans about Roman law and ways of life—it is clear that Diaspora writers were 
participating in this widely disseminated discourse at a deeper level than just co-opting 
terms and concepts. One of the overall purposes of this larger discourse was to identify an 
ethical-political standard that transcended particular social, political, and ethnic norms 
and provided some universal standard for a common humanity. The Jewish writers 
understand the significance of the Jewish nomos within this, even if each of them enters 
into this discourse for different reasons and with different purposes. This common 
324 
discourse served as a way to defend or explain certain elements of the Jewish nomos 
(Aristobulus, Let. Aris., 4 Macc.). The Greco-Roman discourse was also it seems just part 
of the way that the Jewish nomos was understood. This is the case for all of the writers to 
a degree, though Sib. Or. 3, Wis., Ps.-Phoc. seem to approach the interpretation of the 
law from a different angle. This group of writers were not purposefully explaining or 
defending the Jewish nomos, but rather situating the Jewish nomos within the Greco-
Roman discourse as a way to situate it as God’s universal standard for all people. The 
genre and the rhetoric of these writings suggests that it is not problems with the Jewish 
nomos specifically and singularly that drives these interpretations; it is also the more 
widespread problem with nomos and establishing a common political-ethical basis in the 
Greco-Roman world. The Greco-Roman discourse provided the language and 
conceptions that helped them interpret the Jewish nomos. Their Jewish frame of reference 
is not diminished but it applied in new ways to the widespread nomos and ethical 
philosophical discourse. This is no different from other ancient writers’ attempts to 
elevate their own particular ways of life as in accord with transcendent nomos or the 
pursuit of virtue.      
Some of the writers make more deliberate use of specific concepts of transcendent 
nomos: “universal nomos” (koino/j no/moj) is used in Sib. Or. 3; associations of nomos 
with physis are used by Aristobulus, 4 Maccabees, and Ps.-Phoc. to a lesser degree. The 
associations of nomos with physis all fall within the broader spectrum of such 
associations in the Greco-Roman world and they are all used for slightly different 
purposes. One thing we should note is that these associations of nomos and physis are by 
no means the only framework for universalizing the Jewish nomos, nor is it necessarily 
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the main one. In addition to associating nomos with physis, these writers also appeal to 
Hellenistic kingship theory, arguments about the significance of Greek paideia, and more 
general moral philosophical concerns that are not directly linked with “law of nature.” In 
short, there were a number of options available to universalize and give a sense of 
transcendence to the Jewish nomos. The various writers all used them widely and to 
varying degrees as necessary.        
How do the writers define the “things of the law” or describe what is expected of 
Gentiles? There is again diversity here. There are two basic groups: those who focus on 
specific commands of the law (Aristobulus, Let. Aris., 4 Macc.) and those who explain 
the commands of the law in terms of widely recognized virtuous or non-virtuous 
behaviors (Sib. Or. 3, Wis., Ps.-Phoc.). It should be noticed that this grouping is 
consistent in relation to the purposes of the writers. In other words, the concern to defend 
or explain the Jewish nomos is directly related to the sorts of commands used to describe 
the universally applicable Jewish nomos. In writings where there is no clear apologetic 
intent, “the things of the (Jewish) nomos” are less distinctly Jewish and more general; 
anyone can do what the law commands, without becoming Jewish. Moreover, the more 
apologetic works do not clearly spell out what specific commands apply to Gentiles. But 
at the same time, they still universalize the Jewish nomos, setting it within the framework 
of more general Greek pursuits.     
Concerning the listing of general ethical behaviors, there is a significant 
phenomenon that we noted when discussing Pseudo-Phocylides. This writing shares with 
Philo’s Hypothetica and Josephus’ Contra Apionem a compendium of ethical instruction 
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or a “Gesetzepitome.” This has been helpfully itemized by a number of scholars.282 
Essentially this summary takes a number of commands, presumably found in the 
Pentateuch, and consolidates them into a “summary” of the commands of the Jewish 
nomos. Gregory Sterling’s article “Universalizing the Particular” helpfully lists the 
general commands and the likely Biblical source. Table 2 below shows the main 
commands and their Biblical backgrounds.  
Table 2. Summary of the Law in Pseudo-Phocylides, Philo, and Josephus
283
 
Law Biblical Text Pseudo-
Phocylides 
Philo 
Hypothetica 7 
Josephus  
Against Apion 
2 
Sexual Offences     
Sex in Marriage 
for procreation 
only 
    
Homosexuality Lev. 20:13 3, 190–92, 
213–14 
1 199, 215 
Adultery Lev. 20:20; 
Deut. 22:22 
3, 177–83 1 199, 201, 215 
Rape Deut. 22:22-29 198 1 200, 201, 215 
Violations of 
Person and 
Property 
    
Abuse of slave Ex. 21:20–27 225-26 2 215 
Theft Ex. 20:15;  
Deut. 5:19 
6, 18 2, 6 216 
Impiety against 
God, parent, or 
benefactor 
Lev. 24:15–16 80 2 217 
Haustafel     
Wife and husband Gen. 3:16 (?)  3 201 
Parents to govern 
children/honor of 
parents 
Deut. 21:18–21 207–09 3 206 
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Honor of elders Lev. 19:32 220–22  206 
Care for Others     
Do not deny 
water 
  6 211 
Give food to the 
poor 
Lev. 25:35 22–30, 109 6 211 
Do not deny 
burial 
 99 7 211 
Do not disturb 
graves 
 100–01 7 211 
Human 
Reproduction 
    
Do not sterilze 
men 
 187 7  
Abortion Ex. 21:21–22 
(LXX) 
184 7 202 
Infanticide  185  202 
Sex with pregnant 
wife 
 186  202 
Mistreatment of 
animals 
  7 213 
Economic 
Honesty 
    
Unjust scales Lev. 19:36 15 8 216 
False standards  Lev. 19:35 14 8 216 
Do not share 
secrets 
  8 207 
Treatment of 
Animals 
    
Do not empty a 
nest 
Deut. 22:6 84–85 9 213 
Do not reject 
pleas of an animal 
Deut. 22:1–2  9 213 
 
 There are several observations to make. First, a number of commands draw from 
a selection of Old Testament laws. But, the laws are for the most part nothing that one 
would probably not find in other constitutions. Second, there is a degree of variation to 
these summaries, depending on what the “core” of this list of commands is. Philo clearly 
has a shorter summary, while Josephus’ is a bit longer, and Pseudo-Phocylides greatly 
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expands on it to the point that it is hardly discernable. Third, for all three writers there is 
material included from non-Jewish sources, with Pseudo-Phocylides expanding on the 
summary most extensively with instruction derived from generally accepted ethical 
behaviors commended in the Greco-Roman world.
284
     
 Was this compendium intended for Jews or Gentiles? For each individual writer 
who uses this list, there is a different application. For Philo and Josephus it was used in 
the service of “Jewish apologetics.”285 In Philo’s Hypothetica his objective was primarily 
to defend the Jewish people and their laws.
286
 In Josephus’ Against Apion, he is writing in 
response to the rhetorical question, “What, then, are the precepts and prohibitions of our 
law?” (2.190). We must keep in mind that on the whole, Philo and Josephus present the 
Jewish nomos in a way that it is also the one true nomos, the best legislation for 
humanity.
287
 According to Josephus, “just as God permeates the universe, so the law has 
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which the whole universal world is regulated.” On Philo’s universalization of the Jewish nomos, the 
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found its way among all humankind.”288 So, while Josephus presents an apologia for the 
Jewish law, he presents also the precepts of a universal law ordained by a divinely 
inspired legislator (Moses), and following this nomos would benefit all humanity.
289
 For 
Pseudo-Phocylides this summary of the law fits in throughout his general ethical 
instruction. There is no apologia or sense of explaining what the Jewish nomos consists 
of. Rather, it becomes part of universal instruction of God’s “resolutions” that have no 
explicit audience. Moreover, the writer of Pseudo-Phocylides puts this instruction as not 
from any Jewish source, but from a well-known Greek source. The instruction applies to 
and is for all people. As such, the nomos that Gentiles—indeed all people—are to keep 
consists of a general corpus of ethical instruction, based in the second half of the 
Decalogue but certainly inclusive of much non-Jewish ethical instruction.   
 To what do we attribute this common ethical instruction? Some have suggested 
literary dependence, at least when describing the connections between Philo, Josephus, 
and Pseudo-Phocylides.
290
 But, it is probably better to think in terms of a common 
tradition that may have been written, but certainly should not be thought of in this way 
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only. Gregory Sterling suggests dependence on “(a) common tradition(s) of ethical 
instruction” which may have been written, but more likely was oral.291 If it was written, it 
seems probable that it took different forms in different communities. This common 
instruction, according to Sterling’s analysis included “clusters” in topical instruction: 
sexual offenses, violations of others, household code, mistreatment of others, care for 
others, burial customs, human reproduction, economic honesty, and treatment of 
animals.
292
 But Sterling also notes that we should not think this exhausts the ethical 
instruction.   
Based on our investigation, we may add Sibylline Oracles 3 and Wisdom of 
Solomon to the list of Diaspora Jewish writers who seem to share a common outlook on 
the Jewish nomos, as well as even sharing some of the “commands” that issue from the 
universalized Jewish nomos. Both Wisdom and Sibylline Oracles write of the commands 
of the divine nomos in terms of quite general commands that pertain to general social and 
relational ethical mores. They both also supply substantive lists of behaviors commanded 
by the law and vices to avoid. These writers may contribute to a fuller picture of Diaspora 
Jewish ethical instruction, loosely based in the Jewish law, and certainly universal in its 
application.
293
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 Is this understanding of the commands of the Jewish nomos to be understood in terms of 
“Noachide” or “Noachian” laws? Probably not. The main reason is that this tradition does not seem to have 
really developed until the early Rabbinic period (cf. Collins, Between Athens, 170–71). In Jubilees, which 
dates to the 2
nd
 century B.C.E., there is reference to commands Noah gave directly to his sons: “observe 
righteousness, and to cover the shame of their flesh, and to bless their Creator, and honour father and 
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interpretations of the Jewish nomos in Diaspora writings precursors to Noachide laws? It may be, but we 
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Other writers we have considered—Aristobulus, Let. Aris., and 4 Macc. diverge 
from this picture slightly, though, it is difficult to say whether these writers would or 
would not have agreed with these summaries of the law. They reflect a tension we find 
even in Philo and Josephus, for whom Sabbath and circumcision remain significant, but 
do not for some reason find their way into these summaries of the law. Nevertheless, for 
both Aristobulus and Let. Aris., the specific commands are a means toward a Greek 
philosophical and ethical goal. For 4 Maccabees, this is not the case. It may be that the 
overall purpose of 4 Maccabees makes things more complex. Out of all of the writings 
considered, 4 Maccabees is the only one that clearly and directly addresses the problem 
of Jewish fidelity to the law. He does not really have the relationship of Gentiles to the 
law in mind, even if the arguments he makes allow for some suggestions to be made 
along this line of inquiry.        
All of the writers we have considered emphasize the importance of recognizing 
and worshipping the one universal God. This is typically stated in terms of the rejection 
of idol worship. While it cannot be denied that this one God is the God known in the 
Jewish Scriptures and tradition, the writers rarely capitalize on this. Rather, the literature 
demands that to be virtuous and just, one must cease worshipping idols and myths and 
honor the one God, but this is not strongly associated with Jewish religious practices. 
Some Gentiles, it seems, can do this as Gentiles (Aristobulus, Let. Aris., Wis., Sib. Or. 3, 
Ps.-Phoc.). And much of this literature expresses this in ways that resonated with Gentile 
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writers who expressed similar sentiments and even critiques of idolatry.
294
 John Barclay 
notes that, while conceptually this may be ambiguous in relation to Gentile statements, in 
practice Jews would never have worshipped any deity outside of the synagogue.
295
 The 
particularity of the Jewish claim, then, cannot be avoided. But it is a particularity within 
the framework of a significantly universalized message.    
Is there a phrase or word to describe the ways these Jewish writers explained or 
defined how Gentiles related to the universalized Jewish nomos? Terence Donaldson 
writes of “ethical monotheism” in his study Judaism and the Gentiles.296 According to 
Donaldson, this was one “pattern of universalism…in which Jews consider it possible for 
Gentiles to acquire accurate and adequate knowledge of the one true God, or to relate to 
this God in appropriate ways, without any knowledge of Judaism or association with the 
Jewish community.”297 The last phrase in Donaldson’s description could, in light of our 
work here, be modified. It is not that these Diaspora Jewish writings dismiss any 
knowledge of Judaism or the Jewish community as important. Rather, the general 
trajectory of the literature is such that by living in accord with the virtues or in pursuing 
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philosophia or wisdom, non-Jews are in actuality living in accord with the nomos known 
within Judaism. This is so, according to the rhetoric of the Diaspora writings, because 
knowledge of Judaism and is also knowledge of the virtue in accord with the universal 
nomos, the commands of which are of a general ethical nature. Whether in actuality Jews 
in Diaspora communities were as nearly dismissive of circumcision and other defining 
Jewish laws is an important question. Nevertheless, intended or not, the consequences of 
the perspectives revealed in this literature suggest this sort of understanding. As 
Donaldson puts it, “if (the Jewish writers) were aware of the tension (between claiming 
the superiority of the Jewish nomos and also the value of Greek philosophy and 
ethics)…our authors were prepared to live with it. In any case, it should not be allowed to 
overshadow the clear evidence for the belief that Greek philosophy and the Jewish law 
represented independent paths to the same destination, even if one were inferior to or less 
effective than the other.”298    
Is there a “reduction” of the law in these texts?299 I would not say that there is. 
But there is something distinctive going on. There certainly is a dominant focus on proper 
recognition and worship of God and universal ethical behavior. But this does not seem to 
be simple “reduction.” Perhaps a better way to see it might be “redirecting.” That is, these 
writers are “redirecting” the overall purpose of the Jewish nomos in conversation with the 
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common Greco-Roman political-ethical-philosophical discourse.
300
 As with other ancient 
writers, if any particular nomos, if any particular community’s ways of existing in the 
world, were to have meaning and significance, there must be a “redirecting” of the 
overall understanding of the ways of life and modes of existence so that they made sense. 
 According to John Collins, this “common ethic” in Diaspora Judaism “must be 
attributed to the influence of the synagogue preaching.”301 While things are probably 
more complex than a direct dependence on synagogue preaching, information from what 
we know about the synagogue from literature may help fill things out. Many scholars 
have observed that the Diaspora synagogue was a “public event” wherein Jews fostered 
the interest of Gentiles and educated them in the Jewish nomos.
302
 According to Philo in 
Moses 2.216 the synagogues are “schools (didaskalei~a) of prudence and courage and 
temperance and justice and also of piety, holiness and every virtue by which duties to 
God and humanity are discerned and rightly performed.” In a well-known passage from 
Special Laws 2.62–63 he writes: 
on the seventh day there are spread before the people in every city innumerable 
lessons of prudence, and temperance, and courage, and justice, and all other 
virtues; during the giving of which the common people sit down, keeping silence 
and pricking up their ears, with all possible attention, from their thirst for 
wholesome instruction; but some of those who are very learned explain to them 
what is of great importance and use, lessons by which the whole of their lives may 
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be improved.
 
And there are, as we may say, two most especially important heads 
of all the innumerable particular lessons and doctrines; the regulating of one's 
conduct towards God by the rules of piety and holiness, and of one's conduct 
towards men by the rules of humanity and justice; each of which is subdivided 
into a great number of subordinate ideas, all praiseworthy.
303
  
   
Now, this all can be seen as part of Diaspora Jewish missionary activity.
304
 But we should 
not think that the synagogue services were just for impressing Gentiles! John Collins 
notes that the Gentile attraction was of secondary significance, that education and 
formation of Diaspora Jews was the primary purpose.
305
    
 To my mind it is important that, like the synagogues, we do not overlook that 
much of this literature was primarily directed to other Diaspora Jews. There is, of course, 
the secondary possibility that non-Jewish readers benefited from it or the claims made in 
the literature. As such, I do not think that we must be limited to thinking that most of this 
literature had a “missionary” purpose. Neither should we limit the purposes to “allay the 
anxieties and  confirm the identity of Jewish readers who, existing in a bi-cultural 
environment and being pulled in different directions by loyalty to Jewish tradition on the 
one hand and the blandishments of the surrounding culture on the other, were in need of 
just such reassurance.”306 Given the widespread cultural discourse described in the 
previous two chapters, it is just as likely that the Jewish writings we have considered in 
this chapter were just writing about their traditions and nomos in the best ways they knew. 
They were not necessarily going out of the way to appeal to Greco-Roman discourse in 
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order to make things more appealing. If the ways in which Philo describes the synagogue 
service, and if the material in the Diaspora literature we have considered in this chapter 
also represents the general approach in the synagogues, then we should conclude that the 
interpretations of the Jewish nomos we have discussed in this chapter shaped Diaspora 
Judaism in a significant way.     
With regard to particularity, it should be clear that the ethic in many of these 
writings was connected to the Jewish Scriptures themselves. The Decalogue seems to 
have a significant place, but there are also connections between more universal behaviors 
and various commands in the Torah. On the whole, the writings considered in this chapter 
suggest that Diaspora Jews believed that the Jewish people benefited because of their 
possession of the law. But “the impetus for this pattern of thought seems to have arisen 
primarily from forces at work in the Hellenistic environment of the Jewish Diaspora.”307 
Primarily this means that the Jewish claim on the basis of the law is put in terms of the 
Jews’ superiority in the attainment of moral virtue. The focus is not necessarily on Israel 
as God’s “chosen” people, but rather on God’s people as more virtuous people in relation 
to universal and transcendent ethical-political standards. This is a virtuous community in 
which, it seems, anyone can participate. In some ways following a distinctly Jewish way 
of life as described in the Jewish nomos results in this attainment of virtue. Jews possess 
or follow a nomos that is defined in terms of virtues to which all people theoretically have 
access. In spite of the universal nature of this nomos, however, it is nearly ubiquitous in 
these writings that there is one people who possess this nomos concretely or have had it 
specifically given to them. Ideally, one should be circumcised and enter into the Jewish 
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community—a point which easily could have been exploited by our writers, but is not. 
Likewise, our writers could have drawn greater attention to ethnic Judaism or made 
stronger arguments for the nationalistic distinctions. But they do not, and this is telling 
with regard to how they understood their particularism.        
 We can clarify by comparison with a growing scholarly construction of Second 
Temple Judaism. In recent scholarship, especially concerning Judaism and the law in 
relation to Paul, there has been much made of “covenantal nomism.”308 In this view, the 
law was given as part of the covenant with Israel and outlines those stipulations for those 
in the covenant. There are two main tenets of this view of the law: first, are that the law is 
for Jews, the obedience to which is necessary for “staying in” the covenant community; 
second, those who have built upon “covenantal nomism” have stressed that the law—
particularly obedience to specific Jewish commands of circumcision, Sabbath, and food 
laws—is a marker of ethnic or social distinctiveness between Jews and Gentiles.309 
Gentiles, because they do not participate in these particularly Jewish commands, remain 
the outside “other” and not part of God’s covenant people.  
Our discussion in this chapter suggests that this is not the dominant view of the 
law in these Diaspora Jewish writings. This study suggests that the understanding of the 
law as defining the covenant community, and of certain “works of the law” as marking 
entrance into the covenant community, is not quite what we find in the Diaspora Jewish 
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literature.
310
 As we have seen, the emphasis in the Diaspora literature is on being “just” 
(dikai/oj) or “unjust” (a!dikoj) or virtuous rather than wicked. This is held out to all 
humanity, moreover, and not language used to divide Jew from Gentile. One important 
consequence of these Diaspora arguments is that Jews are often greater than Gentiles in 
being “just.” This may be because they are “chosen” as God’s people, but it is not a point 
that receives emphasis. In other words, this may be taken to mean that by being “just” 
one is also part of the covenant community. But in the literature it is not put this way. 
Obedience to the law is not described as a “response” to God’s covenant in the Diaspora 
Jewish literature. If one wants to insist that it is, then according to the Diaspora writings 
we have considered, obedience to God’s nomos is a response required not of Jews only, 
but of all humanity, which renders the covenantal framework less significant in these 
interpretations of the law.  
Moreover, in the Diaspora literature we considered, the focus is not on the 
specific Jewish commands as distinguishing marks. Where some writers focus on certain 
Jewish commands, it is unavoidable that the commands distinguish Jew from Gentile. But 
the emphasis is on obedience to universal ethical norms—to which the specific 
commands educate. There is no emphasis that the commands themselves signify divine 
favor. It is the attainment of virtue through observance of the commands that sets the Jew 
apart. Observance of the Jewish nomos does therefore carry with it a “definitional 
aspect”311 which entails a socio-political element. This is expressed, however, as part of 
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the larger framework of Greco-Roman discourse about nomos. In this discourse nomos 
defined one community from another—it was part of the essence of the word. But the 
discourse proceeded to also define nomos in a way that united rather than divided 
humanity. The Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law we have discussed interpret the 
Jewish nomos within this matrix—it is a law of the Jewish people which nevertheless 
unites humanity in the way that it appeals to all humanity and directs toward universal 
ethical behaviors. It is defining of Judaism by setting out in concrete form God’s 
universal ethical demand and thus enabling the Jewish people to achieve virtue and 
“justice” in a way superior to others. As part of the explanations of the law, the defining 
is in terms of being “just” and virtuous, and not as strongly Jew over against Gentile. 
An often used example to illustrate the social distinction based in the law withing 
covenantal nomism is Let. Aris. 139-42: 
139
The lawgiver, being wise, equipped by God for knowledge of all things, taking 
a comprehensive view of each thing, fenced us around with unbroken palisades 
and with iron walls in order that we might not mix with other nations in any way, 
remaining holy according to body and soul…142Therefore, so that we do not 
receive distortion, being sullied by anything or conversing with worthless things, 
he fenced us around from all directions in purity and through relating to laws of 
food, drink, touch, hearing, and appearance.”  
 
James Dunn uses this passage on a number of occasions as a prime example of the “social 
function” of the law312 and to illustrate the understanding of the law as a point of 
distinction between Israel and the nations as a people “chosen by (the one) God to be his 
people.”313 This social distinction was one of the key “corollaries” that issued from 
                                                          
312
 Dunn, “The New Perspective: Whence, What and Whither?” 8–9. 
 
313
 Dunn, “The New Perspective on Paul: Paul and the Law,” 146–47. 
 
340 
covenantal nomism.
314
 This was related to a sense of privilege of being the one nation 
favored by God and given the law.
315
 Gentiles were sinners because they did not have the 
law. What is missed, however, and what this study provides, is a larger framework within 
which to understand the perspective exemplified in Letter of Aristeas. The law in Let. 
Aris., as we saw, is both the Jewish no/moj and a law which instructs in virtues and 
behaviors universally known. In Let. Aris. not all Gentiles are sinners; those who are 
“unjust” are not so because they do not have the law, but because they do not live 
according to virtue. They are consumed by things of lesser significance. The law 
facilitates in this pursuit, but it is not strongly intimated that possession alone secures this.  
We have in this chapter seen that, in spite of differences among writings, these six 
Diaspora Jewish writings display a basic common perspective on the Jewish nomos. We 
may summarize this by highlighting the basic elements: (1) the law is rooted in its origin 
as coming from the one God of all humanity. As such (2) it is described in a way that its 
commands pertain to a way of life that leads to virtue and ethical dikaiosu/nh. Some 
writers argued that the particular commands of the law lead or guide people to virtue. For 
other writers the law does not prescribe anything particularly Jewish but rather common 
ethical behaviors. It is just that the common ethical behaviors prescribed by God are in 
concrete form in the Jewish nomos. In spite of the diversity, the overarching claim is that 
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the Jewish nomos leads to the cultivation and attainment of ethical goals that trace 
throughout Greco-Roman nomos discourse. Because of this (3) the Jewish nomos is a 
universal nomos to which all humanity is equally accountable and keeping its commands 
is not the privilege of only the Jew. There is a general sense in which Gentiles can keep 
(some of) the commands of this universal nomos. At some level, then, Gentiles do follow 
God’s universal nomos—understood in terms of universal ethics or virtue, to which the 
Jewish nomos points or which is identified with the Jewish nomos. These writings place 
Jews and Gentiles as equals in the pursuit (not necessarily attainment!) of virtue, paideia, 
and living in accordance with a transcendent and universal nomos. Nevertheless, (4) the 
Jewish people, because they possess this universal nomos in written form achieve Greek 
ethical ideals better than any other political community. There is a political and social 
distinction between Jew and Gentile, but this distinction is situated within the framework 
of the pursuit of being a “just” or an “unjust” people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ROMANS 2 AND DIASPORA JEWISH DISCOURSE ABOUT NOMOS 
Introduction 
In the introduction to this study, I argued that a complex conception of no/moj 
undergirds Paul’s argument in Romans 2, a conception which leads to some of the more 
difficult statements about nomos in all of Paul’s letters. I also pointed out that Romans 2 
plays an important role for understanding the sort of Jewish perspectives on the law with 
which Paul was in conversation. How one paints the picture of this Jewish view of the 
law will directly affect how one understands what Paul says about nomos.  Consequently, 
the Jewish conception of the law one supplies in order to explain Paul’s references to 
nomos will affect how one understands Paul’s point in Romans 2. 
 Drawing on the fact that Paul was in conversation with a community rooted in 
Diaspora Judaism, I have in the previous chapters constructed a complex understanding 
of no/moj in the ancient world to better understand the ways in which Diaspora Jews 
interpreted the Jewish nomos. We attempted to establish main lines of a common 
discourse in the ancient world where writers attempted to articulate a conception of 
nomos that was transcendent and universally applied to one common humanity, 
instructing in common virtuous behaviors and dissuading from vice. In chapter four I 
showed that Diaspora Jewish writers’ primary means of interpreting the Jewish no/moj 
was through interaction with this widespread web of discourse. In these explanations we 
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saw that Diaspora Jews shared this cultural discourse and like other Greek and Roman 
writers universalized their nomos, while also maintaining its particularity. The 
interpretations of the law reflected in the Diaspora Jewish literature universalized the 
Jewish nomos in two senses. Some writers argued that the law came from the one God of 
all humanity and they aligned it with conceptions of transcendent nomos. Others claimed 
that its commands apply to all people. We saw that many of the writers actually extended 
an exhortation to all humanity associating the Jewish nomos with forms of transcendent 
nomos and the pursuit of virtue and wisdom through paideia or philosophia. Within this 
discourse the Jewish writers also consistently claimed that of all people on earth they 
lived most virtuously because they had God’s nomos in written form. This was not just a 
claim for Jewish ethnic superiority, but it was primarily a claim to ethical virtue, 
challenging and usurping claims reflected in Greek and Roman writers.  
In this chapter, I want to argue that Paul conducts his argument in Romans 2 in 
conversation with important elements of these Diaspora Jewish explanations of the 
Jewish no/moj. By using the diatribe form of argument Paul presents basic elements of 
this understanding of nomos which, as we saw in the previous chapter is widespread and 
has several common claims in spite of differences. It is likely that the main lines common 
to interpretations of the Jewish nomos would have been familiar to his audience. There 
are several reasons for this. First, as we saw in the previous chapter, there exist 
summaries of the Jewish nomos that focus not on particularly Jewish commands, but 
rather on ethical behaviors and expectations that easily apply to anyone—Jew or Gentile. 
These summaries are found widely in the Jewish literature in conjunction with 
interpretations of the Jewish nomos conducted within a shared web of discourse in the 
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Greco-Roman world, from Pseudo-Phocylides, to Josephus, to Philo, to Wisdom of 
Solomon, and Sibylline Oracles 3. Such wide attestation suggests that these 
interpretations were common. Second, the descriptions of the Jewish synagogue found in 
Josephus and Philo, even though there may be some rhetorical exaggeration involved, 
still probably reflect how Diaspora synagogue communities may have understood 
themselves. That Philo’s context is Alexandria and Josephus’ is Rome also suggests that 
this understanding was to some degree common. We may also add Aristobulus’ 
interpretation of the Sabbath to this. According to Aristobulus the obedience of the 
Sabbath command results in bringing light and wisdom to the world. If the referent here 
is related to Sabbath synagogue gatherings, then we have another early Alexandrian 
Jewish witness to this general perspective. Finally, as noted in the previous chapter, it is 
best to consider that the Diaspora literature that reflects these common interpretations of 
the Jewish nomos both reflects and shapes Diaspora Jewish communities.  
Through the diatribe Paul relies upon some of the common points of these 
interpretations of the law in order to emphasize that keeping the particular Jewish 
commands should not cause division and judgment within the community. On the basis 
of the universalized understanding of the Jewish nomos and its relation to the pursuit of 
virtue, Paul wants to argue that Jew and Gentile stand equally as falling short in that 
pursuit. Most importantly, situating Paul in conversation with this Diaspora Jewish 
framework will explain the main problems with nomos we addressed at the beginning of 
this study. But it will not be enough to just assert that he does this. We must still establish 
that Paul is indeed in conversation with this framework, before we clarify how he uses 
this in his argument.   
345 
Nomos and Problems of Interpretation in Romans 2 
 To begin, we should refresh ourselves with important points about nomos in 
Romans 2 that we highlighted in chapter one. First, the law figures in Romans 2 only 
explicitly from 2:12-29.
1
 Second, Paul conceives of the Jewish nomos as a universal 
standard for both Jew and Gentile. God’s judgment, as well as that which is required of 
Jews and Gentiles, is impartial (2:6, 11), both Gentiles and Jews can do what this law 
says (2:12–16; 2:21–29). Third, there is no sense in which “the things of the law”—that is 
the commands of the law that lead to being dikaio/j—are any different for Jews than for 
Gentiles. Finally, Paul retains a sense of a Jewish boast in the law (2:17–21). Even 
though this nomos has a universal scope and does not seem to apply differently to Jews 
than to Gentiles, Jews somehow have a claim based on it.     
These very points about the law have caused such debate that when one turns to 
interpret Romans 2 one enters into a virtual interpretive battlefield. Numerous scholars 
have tried to sort out how Second Temple Judaism relates to Paul’s statements, and 
whether or not what Paul says in Romans 2 is actually “Pauline.” In his recent book 
Introducing Romans: Critical Issues in Paul’s Most Famous Letter, Richard Longenecker  
has summarized the main “problems of interpretation” which scholars have noted in these 
very passages.
2
 The problems include: 1) that Paul builds on the “assumption that 
                                                             
1
 As noted in the introduction, Paul uses no/moj nineteen times from Rom. 2:12-29: 2:12 (2x), 13 
(2x), 14 (2x), 15, 17, 18, 20, 23 (2x), 25 (2x), 26, 27 (2x). This frequency in such a brief section is second 
only to Romans 7 out of the entire Pauline corpus. In Romans 7, the word occurs 23 times in twenty-five 
verses: Romans 7:1 (2x), 2 (2x), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (3x), 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23 (3x), 25 (2x). 
 
2
 R. Longenecker, Introducing Romans: Critical Issues in Paul’s Most Famous Letter (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) 356. The summary of points that follows comes from pp. 356–57. 
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righteousness is associated with the practice of the Mosaic law,”3 2) that Paul assumes 
the possibility of Gentiles being “just” through doing the commands of the law as 
Gentiles,
4
 and 3) that much of the language and phraseology in these very passages is not 
“typically Pauline.”5      
Some scholars claim there is no clear explanation for these difficult statements, 
that the entire chapter (as well as 1:18–32) is an interpolation of Diaspora Jewish 
material.
6
 E.P. Sanders argues only slightly differently—that the entire chapter is a 
Diaspora synagogue sermon (or at least contains material from this context) and thus is 
                                                             
3
 Longenecker, Introducing Romans, 356–57. 
  
4
 Other important interpreters who nave itemized the problems include: E.P. Sanders, Paul, the 
Law, and the Jewish People, 123–35; K. Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace—to The Doers: An Analysis of 
the Place of Romans 2 in the Theology of Paul,” NTS 32 (1986) 72–93. See also Klyne Snodgrass’ article, 
“Spheres of Influence: A Possible Solution to the Problem of Paul and the Law,”JSNT 32 (1988) 93–113; 
Kari Kuula, The Law, 88–89. 
 
5
 So E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 125–26, 128–29. Sanders states that the 
following statements are not Pauline: that those who do the law “will be righteoused” (2:13); the statement 
about repentance in 2:4; the “hearing and doing theme” in 2:13; that Gentiles who keep the law and will 
judge the Jew (2:27). One may add the statement in 2:6 that God will judge each person according to his 
works and the emphasis on the importance of good works for righteousness in 2:7–10. See also William O. 
Walker, Jr., “Romans 1:18–2:29: A Non-Pauline Interpolation?” NTS 45 (1999) 533, 539. Walker itemizes 
a total of seven hapax, nine words that occur in the New Testament but not in other Pauline writings, and a 
few other words that either are only in “pseudo-Pauline” writings or only in 1:18–32. Of course, this can be 
a subjective judgment As pointed out by Victor Furnish: “Highly subjective judgments about content and 
tone are intermixed with often questionable generalizations about the apostle’s style and vocabulary. What 
emerges is a Paul created in the interpreter’s own image” (“Pauline Studies,” in The New Testament and Its 
Modern Interpreters, ed. E.J. Epp and G. MacRae [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989] 325). At the same 
time, however, the uniqueness of the phrases and words used must be explained. 
 
6
 J.C. O’Neill made this argument in his commentary in 1975 (Paul’s Letter to the Romans 
[Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975] 40–56). While others have made this suggestion, O’Neill was followed 
substantively by William O. Walker, Jr., “Romans 1:18–2:29: A Non-Pauline Interpolation?” 533–52. 
Such arguments, however, are difficult to prove, lack any real external evidence, and have not convinced 
very many scholars (Dunn, Romans 1–8, 77; Fitzmyer, Romans, 270). Most commentators do not even 
consider the possibility.  
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not really “Paul’s” even though he includes it in his argument.7 If this is the case, 
however, the provenance of the understanding of the law that leads to these statements 
must still be explained. Others claim that Paul is inconsistent and his argument 
problematic.
8
 A few others have argued that those who keep the law are Gentile 
Christians,
9
 or that Paul is speaking hypothetically in some places.
10
 Paul never indicates 
that he is speaking hypothetically, nor is there evidence that Paul is speaking specifically 
or singularly of Gentile believers when he refers to Gentiles in the argument.  
The above observations and explanations concerning the law in Romans 2 exist 
within a particular reading of Romans 1:18–3:20. According to this reading Paul is 
executing a propositional presentation of the gospel of justification by faith for all 
humanity.
11
 In the words of Kari Kuula, “since people must be saved from something, 
Paul must first reveal the condemned status of humanity.”12 Thus, the point of Romans 2 
is to lead into 3:21–26 and the argument for the equal justification of Jew and Gentile on 
                                                             
7
 Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 123–35.  
 
8
 Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 25–27, 97–109.  
 
9
 So Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 152, 155–63; N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” 132–39, 143–
50; S. Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Rom. 2:14–15 Revisited,” JSNT 85 (2002) 
27–49.  
  
10
 E. Käsemann, Romans, 73–76 (Paul speaks hypothetically in vv.27–29); F. Thielman, Paul and 
the Law, 171–74 (suggests that much of Paul’s argument about Gentiles is hypothetical). 
  
11
 Those who read Romans 1:18-3:20 in this way include: Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 103–04; 
Käsemann, Romans, 33–36; Fitzmyer, Romans, 269–70; Hultgren, Romans, 85–86, 111–12; Moo, 
Romans, 90--94; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 104–06. Tobin’s interpretation is a bit different from others since 
Paul is presenting his understanding of the gospel in a particular way in order to address concerns those in 
Rome might have had about the scandalous nature of his message as given in Galatians. Nevertheless, 
Paul’s concern is still to present the message of the gospel in propositional form.  
 
12
 Kari Kuula, The Law, the Covenant, and God’s Plan, vol. 2: Paul’s Treatment of the Law and 
Israel in Romans (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003) 85. 
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the basis of faith. According to this general reading Paul begins by presenting the gospel 
message that all humanity is under God’s wrath (1:18–32). As a first step, Paul sets up an 
account of Gentile immorality in 1:18–32 that would be familiar to his audience as a 
typical Jewish polemic against Gentile idolatry and immorality. Then in 2:1–29 Paul 
turns to establish on the basis of God’s impartiality that Jews are equally culpable and 
under God’s judgment, so that he can conclude that “no one is righteous” and all are 
under sin in 3:19–20. In order to make this argument Paul draws upon traditionally 
Jewish claims, but he also makes some claims that are not traditionally Jewish—
specifically concerning the righteousness of Gentiles and their obedience to the law. 
According to Kari Kuula Paul is “forced” to establish somehow that Gentiles can keep 
the law in a way that equalizes Jew and Gentile before God.
13
 This, according to Kuula, 
“endangers” Paul’s conclusion in 3:9 and 19.14  
Recently, a number of scholars have attempted to show that Paul’s argument 
addresses a specific sort of Judaism, referred to as “nationalistic” or “ethnocentric”—a 
description of Second Temple Judaism that has its roots in E.P. Sanders’ construction of 
“covenantal nomism.”15 According to this interpretation of Romans 2 Paul’s is concerned 
to strip away any Jewish reliance upon ethnic boasting in God’s favor with Judaism. This 
favor is attested by the giving of the law, and this covenant signified by possession of the 
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 Kuula, The Law, 97. 
 
14
 Ibid., 97. 
 
15
 See E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion 
(London: SCM Press, 1977); James Dunn, “The New Perspective on Paul,” in The New Perspective on 
Paul, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008) 99–120. This was originally given as the Manson Memorial 
Lecture at the University of Manchester in 1982 and first published in BJRL 65 (1983) 95–122; see also 
“The New Perspective on Paul: Paul and the Law,” in Romans 1–8, lxiv–lxxii. 
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law exempts Jews from judgment. For most in this camp Paul critiques this “typically 
Jewish attitude” from the very beginning in 2:1, even though what Paul says is general 
enough to condemn any who “judge.”16 According to this interpretation Paul in Romans 2 
makes an argument that emphasizes God’s universal judgment in order to “(deflate) 
Jewish presumption (that Israel’s being the people of the law indicates God’s 
predisposition in Israel’s favor).”17 Dunn goes on:  
Paul’s point is that the law must be allowed its function as a universal standard set 
by God, and not be reduced to the level of an identity marker which distinguishes 
Jew from Gentile or be characterized too superficially by a rite like circumcision 
which separates the Jewish “us” from the Gentile “them.18 
  
As this interpretation goes, Paul in 2:12–16 argues for an obedience “unrestricted 
by ethnic boundaries” by claiming that Gentiles can keep the law just as Jews can, and 
thus argues that reliance on covenant or “overconfidence in election” really amount to 
nothing.
19
 Kuula states that in 2:12–16 Paul is arguing with a view according to which 
Jews “have the divine law and they are in a position to do it and thus to receive the 
blessings associated with the law. Therefore, in order to maintain the idea of equality and 
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 Dunn, Romans 1–8, 89–90. 
 
17
 Ibid., 77. Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance: Aspects of Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994) 52–53; Byrne, Romans, 88–90. 
 
18
 Dunn, Romans 1–8., 77. 
 
19
 Ibid., 95. N.T. Wright offers an interesting variation on this. For Wright Paul is critiquing a 
Jewish perspective that amounts to “National Righteousness” which is “the attempt to use the law as the 
covenant badge which would keep membership within that covenant limited to Jews and Jews only” (“The 
Law in Romans 2,” 139). But Wright’s own exegesis does not necessitate this. In 2:12–16, Paul’s point, 
according to Wright, is that Gentile Christians now fulfill the law in a way that Israel failed to do (140–42). 
For Wright Paul is not universalizing the law, but claiming that Gentile Christians fulfill the eschatological 
expectations of law fulfillment and return from exile. Wright’s exegesis falters on misunderstanding how 
the Jewish law was understood by Diaspora Jews and has no explanation of how Gentile Christians can be 
said to keep the law.  
 
350 
divine impartiality, Paul had to introduce the claim that the blessing of having and doing 
the law is not confined to the Jews only.”20 In 2:17–29, the point is that the Jew has 
misunderstood the real import of the law and has a “misplaced” national pride in the 
law.
21
       
In spite of the title “new perspective,” this reading of Romans 2 is not all that 
“new.” It seems that it is in some ways only labeling more clearly what others have 
already said. A number of non-“New Perspective” or pre-“New Perspective” interpreters 
interpret Romans 2 in a similar manner without the “nationalistic” or “ethnic” language. 
C.E.B. Cranfield, for example, who sees the Jew as boasting in works and “claiming to 
have put God in one’s debt,” also recognizes a sense of “privilege” based in possession 
and knowledge of the law.
22
 Käsemann also states that Paul argues that “(t)he gifts 
granted to the Jew in salvation history do not protect him against universal judgment. 
This is directed first against any reliance on the reception and possession of the Torah as 
the true mark of the difference between Jew and Gentile.”23 The common feature of this 
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 Kuula, The Law, 93. Italics original.  
 
21
 Dunn, Romans 1–8, 117–18. A. Andrew Das similarly argues concerning Romans 2 that Paul’s 
objective is to:   
(deny) that Jewish ethnic privilege and identity (as attested by circumcision and possession of 
God’s law) mitigate God’s strict judgment of all people according to their works. God will judge 
the Jew no differently from the Gentile and without granting any special leniency or mercy. Paul 
therefore compromises the gracious framework of covenantal nomism in favor of a universal 
judgment according to one’s deeds (Paul, the Law, and the Covenant, 191). 
See also George Carras, “Romans 2:1–29: A Dialogue on Jewish Ideals,” 188–89; Douglas Moo, 
Romans, 125–27, 157–59. 
 
22
 Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 138–39; 164–66. Cranfield also puts Paul in the place of arguing for 
universal judgment in order to equalize Jew and Gentile before God.  
 
23
 Käsemann, Romans, 61–62; see also p.71. Others who make similar statements include 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 296, 306–07; Moo, Romans, 125–27; Byrne, Romans, 88–89, 96–99; Hultgren, 
Romans, 112, 117–18, 131–32. Even some “revisionist” readings provide essentially the same reading: 
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interpretation is that it claims Paul is arguing for God’s universal judgment according to 
works and that Gentiles also keep the law so that he can undermine reliance upon God’s 
favor shown through possession of the law and the covenant.  
A few scholars have observed that Paul’s explanation of the law is not unfamiliar 
in Judaism, noting that Paul’s reference to Gentiles who do “the things of the law” is not 
unheard of among Diaspora Jews.
24
 For example, Brendan Byrne writes that Paul refers 
to something like Philo’s association of the Jewish law with law of nature in order to 
“(overthrow) any exaggerated claims made for the law as sole moral guide and criterion 
of judgment.”25 This statement presumes, however, that the equal judgment according to 
the law was a point not known to or held by Paul’s audience, that Paul is asserting this 
claim against the Jew by presenting a universalistic understanding to counter a 
particularistic or “nationalistic” understanding of the law. Thomas Tobin, who does not 
ascribe to the “nationalistic” interpretation, still states that Paul is trying to argue that 
“both Jews and Gentiles are judged by the same criterion of the observance of the law.”26  
One of the main claims made by all of the Jewish writers we discussed in the last 
chapter is that the Jewish nomos was also a universal nomos because it pointed to or 
contained instruction to which all humanity was accountable. This was a common claim 
of Diaspora Jewish explanations of the law in all of the Diaspora literature we 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Paul is arguing for the universality of the Jewish nomos in the face of a particularistic or nationalistic 
Jewish understanding that excludes Gentiles from the possibility of being “just” on the basis that they do 
not have the law and so are unrighteous and under God’s judgment (Watson , Paul, Judaism, and the 
Gentiles, 200–16). 
  
24
 Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 114–15; see also Byrne, 92–93; Moo, Romans, 149–51.  
  
25
 Byrne, Romans, 89.  
 
26
 Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 115.  
352 
encountered. Given the nature of the audience and purpose of this literature, which was 
the formation of Diaspora Jewish communities, it is inescapable that this universalized 
conception of the Jewish nomos was known by those in Rome. If this is the case then the 
outcome and purpose of Paul’s argument should be seen differently. If Paul is not arguing 
for the universality of the law as a criterion for both Jew and Gentile, and against a 
particularistic or nationalistic understanding of the law as being only given to Israel, then 
what is his argument in Romans 2? More importantly, how do common elements of the 
interpretation of the law we saw in Diaspora literature affect Paul’s argument? Before 
addressing this central question, a few important preliminary issues must be addressed.  
Foundations for Interpreting Romans 2 
In his recent monograph, Richard Longenecker draws attention to two 
foundational points for interpreting Romans 1:18-3:20. First, there is an unusual degree 
of traditionally Jewish material. This is not just with regard to words and phrases used, 
but even in the “structures and arguments” of the section.27 The questions related to this 
are: what is the nature of the Jewish material? How does it function in Paul’s argument? 
Second, Paul uses diatribe to communicate his points. For Longenecker, this raises the 
question about whether or not certain elements in Romans 2 should be thought to 
represent Paul’s teaching.28 This also relates to understanding how the Jewish material 
functions in the argument. I add a third element: Paul’s argument in Romans 2 is closely 
related to 1:18–32. This is generally noticed by most scholars, but the underlying 
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 Longenecker, Introducing Romans, 362–63. 
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 Longenecker, Introducing Romans, 360. 
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perspective is not really worked out in a substantive way.
29
 Concerning the Jewish 
material, it is our contention in this study that  most of the problems with regard to 
Romans 2 proceed from the fact that interpreters do not incorporate more fully the 
Diaspora Jewish context. In what follows I address directly the first point—the Jewish 
material in Romans 2—and then how this applies in relation to the second—Paul’s use of 
diatribe. In the course of this we will draw attention to important aspects of the third 
point.  
Paul’s Use of Diaspora Jewish Elements in Romans 1:18–2:29 
Romans 1:18–32 
 A number of the scholars confirm that a Diaspora Jewish context factors into 
Romans 1:18–3:20. In 1995 Calvin Roetzel commented that “to make significant 
progress in the consideration of Paul’s view of the law,” one main area of research is to 
attend more to Diaspora Judaism. He goes on stating “it is a commonplace that Diaspora 
Jewish communities operated with a highly complex multifaceted, subtle understanding 
of the law” and cites Romans 1:18–32 as a text that “requires some such provenance.”30 
In Romans 1:18–32 this takes the form of a stock Jewish critique of Gentile idolatry and 
its immoral consequences. Most all scholars draw attention to parallels found in some 
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 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 121–37, has given the most sustained argument for the unity of 
1:18–2:11. Her argument is that the theme of “divine impartiality” (Rom. 2:11) is the thematic focus of the 
argument here. Her anaylsis, however, does not provide a more specific context concerning the nature of 
the Jewish material Paul employs in this argument. Others who emphasize the continuity in perspective 
between Rom. 1:18–32 and 2:1–11 include: Dunn, Romans 1–8, 78–79; Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter, 38–39; 
Das, Paul, the Law, and the Covenant, 171–79; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 110. 
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 Roetzel, “Paul and the Law: Whence and Wither?”, 270. 
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portion of Wisdom of Solomon 11–15.31 The general pattern is as follows: in Romans 
1:18–32, Paul’s main points are that (1) humanity is under God’s judgment (1:18) 
because (2) they have not rightly recognized and honored God, even though God is 
known to them in creation (1:19–21). (3) Rather than honor God, they worship other gods 
and idols (1:22–23, 25, 28) and therefore (4) their ethical conduct is “unjust” and contrary 
to God’s expectations for life (1:24, 26–27, 29–32). In Wis. 11–15, the author criticizes 
idolatry and a failure to recognize God, which contributes to Gentile immorality. Wisdom 
of Solomon 13:1 states, “for all people who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature 
and unable to know the one who exists from the good things that are seen, nor did they 
come to know the artisan from paying attention to the works.” Rather, they worshipped 
created things (13:3–5). As a result, they are unjust and their ethical conduct is full of 
vice (14:22–-26). It is worth noting that we encountered this last passage in the previous 
chapter. The vice list in Wisdom is part of the way that the author of Wisdom identifies 
the sorts of behaviors that are either commanded or prohibited by nomos, which in the 
argument in Wisdom is a universal nomos, available to all humanity.   
Some have suggested that Paul is relying specifically on Wisdom of Solomon. 
Francis Watson has recently argued in favor of Paul’s specific interaction with Wis. 13–
14,
32
 pointing out that both Paul and the author of Wisdom make similar points in the 
                                                             
31
 Fitzmyer, Romans, 271–72; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 53; Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles, 
195–96; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 108–10; Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter, 34–35; Byrne, Romans, 64–64; 
Moo, Romans, 97. But, see Stowers, Rereading, 85–125; Byrne, Romans, 71–72; Hultgren, Romans, 91 
who also suggests connections with Greco-Roman polemic against injustice and vice and failure to 
recognize God.  
 
32
 Francis Watson, Paul and the hermeneutics of Faith (London: T & T Clark, 2004) 404–410. 
Watson does note that the direct “engagement” (not dependence!) between Paul and Wisdom specifically is 
not necessary, but it is likely and helpful to see how Paul diverges from Wisdom at important points (405).  
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same order.
33
 Watson claims that certain connections show Paul’s particular references to 
Wisdom of Solomon in the use of certain phrases and words: the Greeks are “worthless” 
(Wis. 13:1; Rom. 1:21); reference to “seeing, perceiving, knowing, and recognizing” God, 
as well as the general polemic against idolatry.
34
 But, Watson’s case is not as strong as it 
seems, and even Watson suggests that Paul is in some ways “independent” of Wisdom of 
Solomon.
35
  
A number of scholars have pointed out that the perspective or “argument” found 
in Wisdom and in Rom. 1:18–32 is present in other Diaspora Jewish literature such as Let. 
Aris. 132-39, Sib. Or. 3:8–45, 545–61, and Josephus’ Against Apion 2.190–208.36 In 
particular Sib. Or. 3:545–61, presents the condemnation in a way similar to Wisdom with 
a similar order and with similar wording, but in its own unique way. The author writes 
that Greeks will be judged for their error in sacrificing to idols (548). Doing this is put in 
terms of “error in thinking” (pla/non e0n fresi_), forgetting God, and forsaking God’s face 
(548–50). This places the Greeks as “pioneers of evils to mankind” (553) and is related to 
being “taught to think worthless things (ta_ ma/taia)” (555), all of this will result in the 
“wrath of God (qeou= xo/loj)” (556). In Aristobulus and Pseudo-Phocylides, even though 
a clear condemnation of idolatry is not present, right ethical living includes proper 
recognition of God (Aristob. 2:1–5, 10–11; 4:2–6; Ps.-Phoc. 8, 29, 54, 106–11). The 
focus on proper recognition of God as the universal God of all people in Aristobulus 4:2–
                                                             
33
 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 405. 
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 Ibid., 406. 
 
35
 Ibid., 407. 
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 See also Dunn, Romans 1–8, 56–59; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 109, who also gives references to 
Philo’s use of similar arguments.  
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6, Let. Aris. 16, 131, and Ps.-Phoc. 8, 54 is part of their attempt to associate the Jewish 
nomos with Greek philosophical ideals.
37
    
All of these writers make this general argument not just to denounce Gentile 
culture or religiosity. As it is found in Wisdom, Let. Aris., Sibylline Oracles 3, and to a 
degree in Pseudo-Phocylides, it is part of the attempt to universalize the Jewish nomos by 
referring to it as a transcendent nomos or by claiming that its commands lead to the 
attainment of virtue for all humanity, while also critiquing Gentile immorality on the 
basis of the Greco-Roman web of discourse and ethical arguments central to it. This 
means that Paul’s use of the Diaspora Jewish stock critique of Gentile immorality is not 
just a one-sided dialogue with Wisdom. There is every possibility that Paul is entering 
into dialogue with widespread Diaspora Jewish attempts to claim, within the framework 
of Greco-Roman ethical and philosophical discourse, that the Jews worship the one God 
and follow the one nomos over all humanity. As Dunn remarks:  
Paul thus is clearly and deliberately following Hellenistic Judaism in using this 
kind of language as an apologetic bridge to non-Jewish religious philosophy—a 
fact which must decisively influence our understanding of the meaning he 
intended his readers to derive from it.
38
 
    
In addition to the similarities with the general Diaspora Jewish arguments, Paul 
weaves into 1:18–32 particular statements and language common to (but not necessarily 
exclusive to) this Diaspora Jewish universalizations of the law in conversation with 
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 It is worth noting that this proper recognition of God does not have anything to do with proper 
Jewish worship practices or even with the Temple in Jerusalem in these writings. Sibylline Oracles is 
exceptional in that the writer associates the ethical living of the Jewish people (though not mentioned as 
such) with worship of God in the temple (3:537–78) and writes of a scenario where all people will worship 
God at the Temple and live in accordance with God’s koino/j no/moj (702–23).  
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 See also Dunn, Romans 1–8, 58. While, as we have seen above, I would disagree with Dunn’s 
emphasis on “apologetic” and that it is not just “religious” philosophy at issue here, but ethical arguments, 
his point is nevertheless correct. 
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Greco-Roman discourse. According to some the use of ta_ a)o&rata of God in Rom. 1:20 
is found only in Wis.18:9 and in Philo
39
, and that otherwise it is common to Greek 
philosophical discourse.
40
 It occurs, however, also in Sib. Or. 3:11–12: “There is one 
sovereign God, ineffable, whose dwelling is in heaven; self-sprung, unseen (a)o/ratoj) 
yet seeing all himself alone.” The use of this word in reference to God, as Käsemann has 
noted is likely part of the typical Diaspora Jewish attempts to both mitigate the problem 
of anthropomorphic statements about God, as well as identify and universalize God in 
Greco-Roman categories as we saw in Aristobulus above.
41
 The reference to h3 a)i+/dioj 
au)tou~ du/namij kai_ qeio/thj (“his eternal power and divinity”) in verse 20 also resonates 
with Jewish interaction with Greco-Roman discourse.
42
 In verse 22 Paul writes of those 
who dishonor God, “claiming to be wise, they became fools.” As we saw in chapter three, 
seeking wisdom and being “wise” (so/foj) were important elements of Greek ethical 
discourse, as part of the pursuit of virtue through wisdom and philosophia.
43
 Significantly, 
Paul’s statement resonates with the way Jewish writers challenged these claims by 
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 Opif. 1:31; Leg. 3:206; Cher. 1:101; Mig. 1:181; Mos. 1:158; Dec. 1:59; Philo’s use of the word 
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132–33, 195; Wis. 1:6; 12:13, 18; Sib. Or. 3:11, 19, 194, 717, 760. 
 
43
 See chapter three above. Also Dunn, Romans, 60. 
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arguing that true wisdom and philosophia come through paideia in the Jewish nomos and 
not Greek philosophy or paideia.
44
 The accusations of a)diki/a and a)se/beia in v.18,45 as 
well as the reference to “desires” (ta_ e0piqumi/a) in v.24 and “passion” (pa/qoj) in v.26 
find their home comfortably in the Diaspora literature which participates in Greco-
Roman ethical discourse.
46
 Finally, the association of the vice list with the “decree of 
God” (to_ dikai/wma tou~ qeou~) in 1:29–32 also is part of the wider discourse we have 
pieced together in chapters two through four where writers (both Greco-Roman and 
Jewish) connect the decree or the command of transcendent nomos or the Jewish nomos 
with the pursuit of virtue and vice.   
The above connections can be made to some degree with other Jewish literature 
as well. It is not as if only in Diaspora Jewish literature we find arguments against 
idolatry, “injustice,” “impiety,” or where we find the use of vice lists. But all of the above, 
taken together, bear significant similarities to the interpretations of the law and ethical 
arguments made in Diaspora Jewish literature as we have seen in the previous chapter. 
The key point here is that in Rom. 1:18–32 Paul is not repeating just any criticism of 
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 Cf. especially the statement in Aristobulus (5:4), 4 Maccabees (1:15–16) that associates typical 
definitions of “wisdom” with the Jewish nomos.   
 
45
 Sib. Or. 3:36, 184, 362, 496, 498, 568; Ps.-Phoc., 5, 10, 21, 135; Let. Aris., 210, 212, 277, 292.  
In Letter of Aristeas the Jewish nomos specifically serves to curb a0diki/a (Let. Aris. 146, 152, 162, 166 
[where a)sebei/a is also mentioned]). In 4 Macc. 5:9 following the Jewish law is “unjust” from the 
perspective of the Greek king, a claim that is turned around by the author of 4 Maccabees. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, “impiety” is a central element in 4 Maccabees. In Wisdom part of the central exhortation 
in 1:5 is to have a “holy and disciplined spirit (a#gion pneu~ma paidei/aj)” that will “expose approaching 
injustice” (e0legxqh/setai e0pelqou/shj a)diki/aj). Cf. also Wis. 1:8; 3:19; 4:16; 11:15; 12:23; 14:28; 
16:24.For more see the discussion in chapter four above. 
 
46
 Wilckens, Römer, 109–10. According to Let. Aris. 211, the essence of kingship is “to rule one-
self wisely and not be led astray by…unseemly desires”; in 4 Macc. it is obedience to the Jewish nomos 
that leads to the ridding of e0piqumi/a (1:3, 34; 2:4, 6; 5:23). 
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Gentile idolatry and immorality, but presenting in his own words
47
 a common perspective 
employed by Diaspora Jewish writers as part of their claims about the universal authority 
of the Jewish nomos within the framework of widespread Greco-Roman discourse about 
nomos and ethical living.  
Romans 2:17–20 
What Paul says in 2:17–20, when considered along with 1:18–32, adds to our case 
that Paul is in conversation with these particular Diaspora Jewish perspectives. Whereas 
in 1:18–32 Paul utilizes Diaspora Jewish arguments against immorality, in 2:17–20 he 
itemizes the various “boasts” based in the Jewish nomos. There is no reason to think that 
the boasts are unrelated to the perspective expressed in 1:18–32. Paul writes in 2:17–20:  
But if you call yourself “Jew” and if you rely upon nomos and you boast in God 
and know the will (of God) and you examine the things of superior worth, having 
been instructed from the nomos, having convinced yourself that you are a guide of 
the blind, a light for those in darkness, an educator of the thoughtless, a teacher of 
children, having the form of knowledge and truth in the nomos…  
 
While there are parallels with a wide spectrum of Jewish literature in these verses
48
, 
many scholars agree that the general tenor reflects Diaspora Judaism. James Dunn, 
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 Contra those who suggest that Paul in 1:18–32 is using “speech-in-character” to present an 
opposing teacher’s “missionary sermon” or “gospel” (Stowers, Rereading, 117, 142, includes 2:1–16 in 
this “speech-in-character”; Campbell, The Deliverance of God, 528–47, limits the rhetorical device to 
1:18–32). The most damaging point is that there is no clear evidence that 1:18–32 represents another 
‘voice.’ Campbell and Stowers emphasize Quintilian’s reference that the speaker or writer need not indicate 
when the new voice comes in (Stowers, Rereading, 17–19; Campbell, Deliverance, 531–34). But one need 
not posit this for 1:18–32. Stowers does not seem to assert this as sharply as Campbell, when he writes that 
in 1:18–32 “the ancient reader overhears Paul critique impious gentile culture and depict its dilemma of 
slavery to passion and desire” (Rereading, 142). This seems to be a likely way to understand 1:18–32, but 
calling it “speech-in-character” does not seem necessary.  
 
48
 For example, see the statement by Douglas Moo: “every item on the list in vv.17–20 can be 
paralleled in Jewish literature of the time” (Romans, 159). But note that Moo goes on to specify Diaspora 
Judaism as the most likely background for these claims (Romans, 162). 
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referring to vv.19–20, writes that Paul’s target “is more likely to be the Diaspora than the 
Palestinian Jew, since the former naturally had an apologetic and even missionary 
concern which was mostly lacking in the latter.”49 Likewise Moo: “Paul’s description of 
this role (of the Jew as educator) uses language drawn particularly from Jewish 
propaganda directed to the Hellenistic world.”50 The phrases “educator of the thoughtless” 
(paideuth_n a)fro/nwn) and “teacher of children” (dida/skalon nhpi/wn) would be very 
much at home in Plutarch’s On the Education of Children which, as we saw in chapter 
three, proclaims the value of paideia and the pursuit of philosophia as the path to virtue, 
claims which Jewish writers regularly applied to the Jewish nomos.
51
 Particularly 
interesting is how Paul’s language reminds one of how Philo and Josephus described the 
Diaspora synagogue. According to Philo in Moses 2.216 the synagogues are “schools 
(didaskalei~a) of prudence and courage and temperance and justice and also of piety, 
holiness and every virtue by which duties to God and humanity are discerned and rightly 
performed.”52 This is not to overlook the general Biblical framework for the phrases 
“guide to the blind” (o)dhgo_n tuflw~n) and “light in darkness” (fw~j tw~n e0n sko/tei).53 
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 Dunn, Romans 1–8, 112. See also Käsemann, Romans, 68–71; Campbell, Deliverance, 564. 
 
50
 Moo, Romans, 162, with the caveat that the Jewish literature and purposes should not be seen 
through the lens of “propaganda” alone. It should be remembered that this literature had other Jews as its 
primary audience, and reflected general self-understandings and accepted interpretations of the Jewish 
nomos that were not just for the purpose of winning Gentiles or rationalizing the law.  
 
51
 See chapter four above. Cf. especially the discussions on Letter of Aristeas, Wisdom of Solo-
mon, 4 Maccabees, and Pseudo-Phocylides. 
 
52
 See chapter four above. Cf. also Dunn, Romans 1–8, 111; K. Haacker, Der Brief des Paulus an 
die Römer (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1999) 68.  
 
53
 Isa. 42:6–7; 49:6; 51:4. 
   
361 
These, rightly, reflect more general Jewish self-understandings and wisdom traditions.
54
 
The specificity of the other expressions, however, provides the particular manner in 
which general Jewish self-understanding is being applied. It is associated with Diaspora 
Jewish attempts to universalize the Jewish nomos and unite Jewish life with universal 
ethical goals, and criticize Gentile immorality on the same basis. And so we find in Wis. 
18:4 the claim that the “light of the law” comes through God’s (unidentified!) people who 
life “just” lives, and in Sib. Or. 3:195 a reference to the people who would be a “guide of 
life” (bi/ou kaqodhgoi_) for all humanity. In addition, Paul’s statement that in the law is 
the “form of truth” in 2:20 bears resemblance to Aristobulus’ statement that the Sabbath 
law represents “knowledge of the truth” (5:7) or Let. Aris. 161 where the commands of 
the law are given with a concern for “truth” (pro_j d 0 a)lh/qeian).55     
Romans 2:21–23 
Finally, the accusations in 2:21–23 directed against the Jewish perspective in 
vv.17–20 contribute to our picture. Paul asks the interlocutor: 
                                                             
54
 See Dunn, Romans 1–8, 112; Moo, Romans, 162; Hultgren, Romans, 127. Peter Stuhlmacher, 
Paul’s Letter, 42–43; Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 232–34. Schnabel especially emphasizes the connection 
with Jewish wisdom traditions. As we saw in the previous chapter, wisdom traditions are indeed used in the 
Diaspora Jewish literature, but there are two elements that are not present in Schnabel’s analysis. First, the 
wisdom traditions are used in the service of interpreting the Jewish nomos within the framework of Greco-
Roman ethical nomos discourse. Second, and confirming this point, many of the Jewish writers use 
distinctly Greek philosophical understandings of sofi/a.  
 
55
 Cf. also 4 Macc. 5:18 where the accusation is made that the Jewish nomos is not kata_ 
a)lh/qeian, and 6:18 where that charge is reversed; Aristobulus 4:6: “The entire construction of our law is 
arranged with a view toward piety, justice, self-control, and all other good things which are in keeping with 
the truth (kata_ a)lh/qeian).” This claim in relation to the Jewish nomos is found in other Jewish literature: 
1 Enoch 3:8. But see 1 En. 104:12–13 which suggests that the books of Enoch are in accord with truth, and 
there is less emphasis on the law. Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs does also contain a number of 
associations of the law with truth, and these writings may also draw from a similar pool of thought as the 
Diaspora literature. Otherwise, strong associations between the law and “knowledge of truth” or of the law 
being in accordance with truth are conspicuously absent from most all non-Diaspora Jewish literature.  
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Therefore, the one teaching another, are you not teaching yourself? The one 
proclaiming ‘do not steal’—do you steal? The one saying ‘do not commit 
adultery’—do you commit adultery? The one detesting idols—do you rob 
temples?
56
 
  
Two things suggest that Paul has in mind the sort of Diaspora perspectives and arguments 
we discussed in chapter four above. First, the commands that Paul lists parallel the 
common elements of the Jewish nomos singled out by Diaspora Jewish writers in their 
various attempts to universalize the Jewish nomos. Paul is not concerned, it seems, with 
breaking specifically Jewish commands such as Sabbath or food laws. One could easily 
explain this by noting that Paul is issuing a prophetic critique not unlike Amos, Micah, or 
Hosea.
57
 Paul may indeed be doing something similar, but there is more to it, I suggest, 
given the ways we have seen that Diaspora Jews emphasized such commands in their 
interpretations of the Jewish nomos. We are reminded of the summary of the Decalogue 
in Pseudo-Phocylides, which as we saw was reflected in most of the literature. As Edgar 
Krentz has also shown, the list of transgressions is common to Greco-Roman discourse 
wherein ancient writers would criticize other people for violations of universal ethical 
standards.
58
 For Krentz, Paul uses this list to condemn the Jew in the same way that he 
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 The questions here may also be accusatory statements: “you steal!...you commit adultery!...you 
rob temples!”  
 
57
 Most of the Old Testament prophets condemn Israel and Judah most often for “social” sins or 
idolatry. Amos condemns Israel for greed and injustice against the poor (2:6–11; 5:11), general injustice 
(5:4-24), and extravagance (6:1–7). Micah criticizes also the abuse of power and greed and injustice (2:1–
11; 3:1-3) and to seek mercy and justice (6:8). Hosea criticizes idolatry and forgetting God (1–2), as well as 
“swearing, lying, murder, stealing, and adultery (4:1–2). This is described as “forget(ting) the law of your 
God” (4:6) and a violation of the covenant.   
 
58
 E. Krentz, “The Name of God in Disrepute: Romans 2:17-29 [22–23],” CurTM 17 (1990) 429–
39. 
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condemned the Gentile in 1:18–32.59 The accusation of “temple-robbery” is particularly 
significant here. As Krentz has shown, it is a common part of vice lists in Greco-Roman 
ethics. Moreover, Paul draws on a Jewish exegetical tradition that takes Exodus 22:27 as 
commanding respect for the Gentiles’ gods.60 Later in the article, Krentz makes a brief 
connection with Jewish “apologetic” literature that stressed that the Jewish God was 
identified as a universal god as also the god of all peoples.
61
 This is part of the 
widespread ethical discourse in the ancient world in which Diaspora Jews actively 
participated.    
It may be correct to take the command of “temple-robbing” literally and as part of 
a tradition associated with Exodus 22:27. But, I suggest there is more going on here. First 
of all, there is no use of any form of either i9erosule/w, i0ero/suloj, or i0erosuli/a in the 
Old Testament. There is one reference in Acts 19:37, where the town clerk in Ephesus 
tries to convince the crowd that Paul and his companions are “neither temple robbers 
(i9erosu/louj) nor blasphemers of our goddess (Artemis).” The only occurrences of these 
words in non-Philonic Jewish literature are in 2 Macc. 4:39, 42; 9:2; 13:6, and Sib. Or. 
2:14 and 13:12. In 2 Maccabees the reference is primarily to the sacrilegious actions 
toward the temple in Jerusalem by Antiochus. In Sib. Or. 2:14 the word refers to “temple 
robbing” as part of the woes of the end times. The reference in 13:12 is late.62    
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 Ibid., 437–38. 
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 Ibid., 436–37. 
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 Ibid., 438–39. 
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 The 13
th
 book of the Sibylline Oracles is dated to the third century C.E. (J. Collins, “Sibylline 
Oracles,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 1:453). 
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Philo uses either of the words i9erosule/w or i0erosuli/a on a number of occasions 
almost always as part of a list of common vices which are contrary to virtuous living and 
to God’s nomos.63 Particularly illuminating for our context is the reference in On the 
Confusion of Tongues (Conf.) 1:163 where theft, adultery, murder, and “sacrilege” or 
“temple-robbing” (i9erosulei~n) are listed as vices of a person without “prudence” 
(fro/nhsij) and are symptoms of the disease of “injustice” (a)diki/a). If we recall, the 
main problem God has with humanity is “injustice” (Rom. 1:18 [2x], 29; 2:8). In De 
Decalogo 1:133 i)erosuli/a is an example of a violation of the Decalogue’s command 
against murder: in murdering one robs God of the true offering and true worship which is 
the offering of the human person living according to virtue (cf. Romans 12:1!). Finally, in 
Spec. 2:13, Philo lists “theft, “sacrilege” (i9erosuli/a), adultery, and rape” as exemplary 
of  those who perform acts of wickedness (kako/j), and such commands are common to 
the “national laws” of many people who pursue justice (dikaoisu/nh). The uses in Philo 
are particularly significant in showing how i0erosuli/a is part of a common list of 
exemplary vices which are contrary to God’s dikaiosu/nh and to God’s nomos. In doing 
this, Philo is drawing on common lists in Greek ethical discourse and applying it to 
interpret the Jewish nomos and Jewish ways of life—not unlike the Diaspora writers 
considered in chapter four above. Moreover, Philo’s primary (not only) audience were 
Diaspora Jews as well. Assuming that Philo, even though somewhat distinct among 
Jewish writers in his frequent use of the word, stands within the line of tradition we have 
described in the previous chapter, we have Paul in Romans 2:21–22 referring specifically 
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 Philo, Leg. 3:241; Jos. 1:84; Spec. 3:83; 4:87.  
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to a typical set of violations of God’s universal nomos that were likely familiar to a 
Diaspora Jewish audience.    
A Thematic Connection between Rom. 1:18–32 and 2:1–11 
Given Paul’s use of Diaspora Jewish perspectives in 1:18–32 and particularly in 
2:17–24, and that both seem to derive from the same overall Diaspora Jewish frameworks 
that situated ethical living in relation to nomos understood in terms of the wider Greco-
Roman discourses, it stands to reason that such perspectives also stand behind what Paul 
writes in 2:1–16 and 25–29. One could assume this because, as we noted above in the 
introduction, Paul’s argument demands that the conception of nomos to which he refers 
be consistent. But there is more to support this. A number of scholars have argued that 
1:16–2:11 form a unit. Jouette Bassler and A. Andrew Das have observed a chiastic 
structure in the material: 
A  0Ioudai/w| te prw~ton kai\  3Ellhni (1:16) 
  B  a)pokalu/ptetai ga_r o)rgh= qeou~ (1:18) 
   C  ei0j to_ ei[nai au0tou_j a)napologh/touj (1:20) 
   C / dio_ a)napolo&ghtoj ei]  (2:1) 
  B /  e0n h(me/ra| o)rgh~j kai_ a0pokalu/yewj dikaiokrisi/aj qeou~ (2:5) 
A /  0Ioudai/w| te prw~ton kai_  #Ellhni (2:9-10)   
 
Whether the chiasm is intended or not, it does demonstrate a unity in the section of 1:16–
2:11. Das has also pointed to a confluence of particular terms in the material that further 
reinforce the general unity with regard to the perspective in this section.
64
 Joseph 
Fitzmyer has pointed out how this structuring minimizes the shift from third person to 
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 Das points out the parallel panti_ tw~| pisteu/onti in 1:16 and panti_ tw~| e0rgazome/nw| in 2:10; 
e0pi\ pa~san in 1:18 and 2:9; “wrath” (o)rgh/), “truth” (a)lh/qeia), and “injustice” (a)diki/a) in 1:18 and 2:5 
and 8, but in reverse order (Paul, the Law, and the Covenant, 172–73). 
 
366 
second person at 2:1.
65
 While Fitzmyer is correct, should not detract from the connections 
between 1:18–32 and 2:1–11. In order to not minimize the important change in 2:1, we 
may see the unity of 1:18–2:11 in its repetition of thematic words and ideas. In other 
words in 2:1–11 Paul repeats key ideas that we find in 1:18–32. 
Conclusion 
The significance of all of these connections—the Diaspora Jewish framework for 
1:18–32, the use of Diaspora Jewish claims in 2:17–20, the accusations in vv.21–23, and 
the connections between 1:18–32 and 2:1–11—lies in their collective weight. As noted 
above, Paul’s use of Diaspora Jewish material is not a new suggestion.66 In light of the 
above, however, I suggest that more precision can be established. Paul’s argument does 
not just contain material from Diaspora Judaism, used by Paul here and there. Rather, 
Paul conducts his argument in Romans 1:18–2:29 on the basis of and in conversation 
with specifically Diaspora Jewish perspectives which are part of widespread Diaspora 
Jewish explanations of the Jewish nomos. Not only that, but as we have seen, these 
perspectives exist within, and are articulated within a widespread Greco-Roman 
discourse that focuses on establishing one universal and transcendent ethical-political 
standard for humanity. 
The Use of the Diatribe and the Structure of Romans 2  
The Use of Diatribe  
Identifying the Jewish context of Romans 2 is only part of the task of understand-
ing how Paul uses a Diaspora Jewish understanding of no/moj. How does Paul conduct 
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 Fitzmyer, Romans, 298; also Dunn, Romans 1–8, 78–79. 
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 Cf. E.P. Sanders: “It is not novel to find in Romans 2 material from Diaspora Judaism” (Paul, 
the Law, and the Jewish People, 127). See also Käsemann, Romans, 70–71. 
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the argument? Commentators since Bultmann have increasingly recognized in Romans 
Paul’s use of the ancient literary form of diatribe.67 One main characteristic of diatribe is 
the use of the rhetorical device called the (imaginary) interlocutor. Until Stanley 
Stowers’s book on the diatribe in Romans, this element of the interlocutor had not re-
ceived any serious focus.
68
 Since Stowers’ study, the interlocutor has been more thor-
oughly studied in relation to Romans and has found its place in a number of interpreta-
tions.
69
 The study of the interlocutor has enabled us to investigate with more detail and 
precision what Paul is trying to communicate and how is goes about this.
70
 For many 
Romans 2 is one key example of Paul’s use of the interlocutor.71 The interlocutor is a fic-
tive dialogue partner who functions rhetorically in ancient literature to further an argu-
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 Ruldolf Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die Kynischstoische Diatribe 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910); Stanley Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Ro-
mans (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981); Changwon Song, Reading Romans as a Diatribe (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2004); Thomas Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 84–98. 
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 Stowers, Diatribe, 81–85. 
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 The most important contribution is the work of Runar Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor in Ro-
mans 2: Function and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International, 2003). Other treatments on a smaller scale include: Stowers, “Paul’s Dialogue with a Fellow 
Jew in Romans 3:1–9,” CBQ 46 (1984) 707–722; Rereading Romans, 126–175; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 
118–23; Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007) 25–26; 193–267; 
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A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) 111–12. 
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 For example, A. Andrew Das applies study of the interlocutor to his analysis of Romans 2 (Solv-
ing the Romans Debate [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007] 87–89. More recently Douglas Campbell uses 
the study of the interlocutor as a central part of his very suggestive interpretation of Romans 1:18–3:20 
(The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2009) 528–600. 
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 Many scholars think that Paul is in dialogue with a certain “interlocutor” in Romans 2, even 
though the identity of the interlocutor is in question (e.g. Dunn, “Issue,” 166; Romans 1–8, 78; Stowers, 
Rereading, 126–58; Runar Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and  Identity in the 
Context of Ancient Epistolography, [Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003]; Robert Jewett, Romans, 193, 
196).  
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ment by representing a certain perspective. A writer’s use of this rhetorical device may be 
recognized through a number of ways: dialogical style, direct address to the second per-
son singular “you,” or an address to a more general “person” using the vocative 
(a1nqrwpe).72 In Romans 2:1, Paul addresses an anonymous individual: w} a!nqrwpe (“O, 
man”); in 2:17 he addresses in the second person an individual who calls himself a Jew 
(Ei0 de\ su_  0Ioudai=oj e0ponoma/zh| [“if you call yourself a Jew”]), and he uses the second 
person singular “you” a total of twenty-seven times throughout the entire chapter.73 Many 
find Paul using the rhetorical convention only in 2:1–5 and 2:17–29.74 For some it makes 
sense that Paul is carrying on a discussion with the same interlocutor throughout all of 
Romans 2,
75
 but this is not necessary, and it could be that Paul presents a dialogue with 
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 Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 93. An example of address to the second person singular is in Epictetus’ 
Discourses 1.13.3–4: “Slave, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus as his progenitor and 
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25; 1.2.33–37; 1.4.5–12; 1.18.8–10; 1.21; 1.22.17–21. 
 
73
 2:1 (4x); 2:3 (3x); 2:4 (2x); 2:5; 2:17, 18, 19 (2x); 2:21 (4x); 2:22 (4x); 2:23, 24; 2:25 (2x); 2:27. 
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 E.g., Fitzmyer, Romans, 305f.; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 93–107; Witherington argues that Paul is 
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(Paul’s Interlocutor, 153). 
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 See Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor, 151–64; Francis Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gen-
tiles, 197–202. 
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two interlocutors—one in 2:1–11 (or 1–16) and another in 2:17–29.76 More specifically, 
Paul uses the device of the interlocutor.  
Commonly the writer will use the interlocutor to represent a particular voice or 
perspective in order to challenge this perspective as it has been presented.
77
 In these vari-
ous instances the writer addresses not an actual dialogue partner, but rather the interlocu-
tor is a device used to represent a particular position of viewpoint.
78
 The use of the inter-
locutor often allows the writer to address, censure, or instruct the audience in an indirect 
manner.
79
 Usually this is done by highlighting certain elements of the position or behav-
ior that needs correction in the eyes of the writer.
80
 As Thomas Tobin points out, one of 
the common ways in which the interlocutor functioned in (Epictetus’) dialogues is “to 
point out some failing or misunderstanding on the part of these interlocutors or address-
ees.”81 According to Stowers, use of the interlocutor “exposes contradiction, error, and 
ignorance” and that the “basic function…is indictment.”82 The interlocutor may represent 
a common opinion or perspective known to the audience.
83
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Related to the use of the interlocutor is the rhetorical device called “speech-in-
character” (proswpopoii/a). This is where the writer “produces speech that represents 
not himself…but another person or type of character.”84 In doing this, the goal is not to 
present the exact words of the character, but rather it is a “presentation of moral choice 
embodied in words and arguments.”85 Quintilian assumes that one should distinguish be-
tween the writer’s or speaker’s voice and that of the interlocutor whose voice is repre-
sented in the speech-in-character. But as Quintilian also points out, the craft of using this 
device could involve a level of seamlessness. He writes that the words of the other “may 
be inserted without the introduction of any speaker at all….This involves a mixture of 
figures, since added to proswpopii/a is ellipse, which here consists in omitting any in-
dication of the one speaking” (9.2.37).86 In many instances, the speech-in-character is 
nothing more than the writer presenting words or a perspective that is not his own, with 
little indication.
87
 Stowers cites even the problem with Homer who often stated views 
which were not his own, but in the ignorance of later readers these statements were de-
termined to be non-Homeric.
88
 Indeed they were not! But, Homer still wrote them. A 
speech-in-character may take on many forms: monologue, soliloquy, or dialogue. It could 
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also be between the writer and the interlocutor or between the interlocutor and someone 
else. In one passage Quintilian states that proswpopoii/a  
is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory. By this means 
we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with 
themselves…Or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations 
between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, put words of advice, 
reproach, complaint, praise, or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons….It is 
also convenient at times to pretend that we have before our eyes the images of 
things, persona, or utterances.
89
  
 
Generally, as part of a diatribe, the purpose of the “speech-in-character” is 
didactic or exhortatory. It serves the purpose of demonstrative rhetoric, which serves to 
persuade or “enhance” a certain ethos, perspective, or action.90 In Romans 2:1–16, I 
suggest that Paul is doing something like this by summarizing or presenting main 
elements common to Diaspora Jewish ethical arguments associated with interpretations of 
the law in order to provide a basis upon which to make a point to his audience on the 
basis of this same perspective.
91
 
Others have similarly suggested that Paul is conducting an “intra-Jewish 
debate.”92 According to George Carras, in Romans 2 Paul conducts a dialogue with 
another Jewish perspective, but in a way that draws on Jewish premises to point out 
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problems with the other Jewish perspective.
93
 Thomas Tobin similarly writes that Paul 
argues “that the conduct of Jews must be judged on the same basis as the conduct of 
Gentiles.” Paul “demonstrates this…through the use of quotations from the Jewish 
scriptures as well as through the use of other traditional Jewish viewpoints” but “moving 
beyond” these viewpoints as well.94 Between Carras and Tobin there are important 
similarities and differences First, both Carras and Tobin see Paul using a variety of 
Jewish commonplaces, even though Paul uses them in different ways. Second, in Tobin’s 
analysis Paul is not debating a Jew throughout Romans 2, whereas for Carras he is. This 
difference is significant, since it means that Paul may be using Jewish material differently. 
This raises an important question about what Paul is doing in Romans 2: with whom is 
Paul’s argument in dialogue in 2:1–11 (or 1–16)? 
Tobin draws attention to the fact that few scholars recognize that in 2:1–11 and 
17–29 Paul conducts a dialogue with two different interlocutors.95 This is primarily 
because many scholars claim that Paul is addressing a Jew throughout all of chapter 2. 
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Since this is an issue of importance in understanding Paul’s argument in Romans 2, we 
will address it here.
96
 
There are three main arguments brought forth by those who claim that Paul 
directs the argument in 2:1–11 (some say v.16) at a Jew.97 
1. The points of contact between 2:1–16 and Wisdom 11–15 “strongly suggest that Paul 
was thinking of just such Jewish assumptions.”98 James Dunn and others have argued 
also that the relationship between Romans 2:1–11 and Jewish texts like Wisdom of 
Solomon suggest that Paul is questioning a Jew who held such a view. Particularly the 
statement in 2:4, which questions the abuse of God’s mercy, suggests that Paul had in 
mind a Jew relying upon “special privileges of Israel.”99 
2. The references to Jews and Greeks suggests that Paul is working within a traditional 
Jewish division of humanity, and any assumption Gentile morality as we find in 2:1–16 
                                                             
96
 In N.T. Wright’s essay “The Law in Romans 2,” he avoids discussing this issue because “it does 
not so directly connect with the question  of the law” (132).  I must respectfully disagree with this choice. 
The identity of the person in 2:1–16 so much influences how scholars interpret Paul’s argument in Romans 
2 that it necessarily influences how one conceives of the issue with the law in the argument as well. 
 
97
 The most extensive list may be found in C.E.B. Cranfield’s commentary (Romans 1–8, 138). He 
lists seven points, not all of which are equally persuasive, and which have been addressed by Runar 
Thorsteinsson (Paul’s Interlocutor, 177–88).   
 
98
 C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 138. This is similar to Douglas Campbell who has argued that 
the person in 2:1ff. is a Jewish figure on the basis of connections with 1:18-32. The material in 1:18–32 
bears a strongly Jewish imprint, and the person in 2:1ff. is “the mirror image of the discourse in 1:18–
32…He has spoken the discourse of 1:18–32…and the argument’s bite after 2:1 consists of this figure’s 
entrapment in his own aggressive program” (The Deliverance of God, 343). 
 
99
 James Dunn, Romans 1–8, 79–80, 90; Simon Gathercole, Where is Boasting?, 198. Gathercole 
writes that “the designation “the one who judges” is appropriate to a Jew, not because the Jewish people 
were more judgmental than others but because they took pride in being able to judge, in the sense of 
discern.” To read “judge” in these terms takes some liberties that do not seem warranted in the text, and 
even if it were, as we have seen, taking pride in being able to discern who is and who is not ethically “just” 
seems to have been the prerogative of many groups in the ancient world. See also the comments in 
Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor, 183-84. 
  
374 
would be unlikely.
100
 Related to this, the “judge” seems to support the condemnation in 
1:18–32, something which could only be said of a Jew.101 
3. Francis Watson argues that the close links between 2:1–6 and vv.17–24 suggest that 
the two sections are addressed to the same person.
102
 Likewise, Douglas Campbell has 
argued that the charges against the individual in 2:21–23 are “essentially…the same” as 
in 2:1–3.103 
These above points need not necessarily mean that Paul is specifically addressing 
a Jew in 2:1ff. Working backward, first of all, when compared with vv.17–24, there is a 
noticeable difference in the specificity of the address. In vv.17–24 Paul specifies the Jew, 
and itemizes unmistakable Jewish claims. In vv.1–11, references are much more veiled—
enough that modern scholars must make convincing arguments to convince the modern 
reader that Paul had a Jewish addressee in mind. The claims of hypocrisy that Paul points 
out in 2:1–11 do not necessitate a Jewish “hypocrite.”104 The charges in 2:21–23 may be 
similar in rhetorical force, but Paul’s argument describes them in distinctly different 
ways, one explicitly Jewish (vv.21–23) and one not (vv.1–3). As we shall see below, Paul 
uses the diatribe to make a general argument and then apply it to the Jew in 2:17–29. The 
approach of reading a later passage onto an earlier one—in this case reading 2:21–23 
onto vv.1–11 should be used with caution. It embodies what Runar Thorsteinsson calls “a 
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backward reading of the text” which begins from a later point and draws inferences about 
an earlier point. While perhaps helpful at times, it can misread the rhetorical intention of 
the text and “is to be avoided as far as possible.”105    
Second, a distinction between Jews and Gentiles in 2:12 does not imply that 
Paul’s target is a Jew—as if non-Jews or especially Paul’s audience in Rome who were 
not ethnic Jews would have been unaware of such a distinction. The distinction between 
Jews and Gentiles may reflect the perspective from which the critique comes, and not 
reflect the one who is being criticized.   
More significantly, it is not necessary on the basis of a Jew-Gentile division to 
posit that only a Jew would have agreed with the condemnation of immorality in 1:18–32. 
It is correct that the one who judges in 2:1–5 is critical of those who act unjustly in 1:18–
32. But it is not “unlikely” for Paul to assume Gentile morality or that support of the 
condemnation in 1:18–32 could only come from a Jew. James Dunn, for example, 
mentions Stoics and the “sophisticated Greek” who could have agreed with the 
condemnation in 1:18–32 and thus have been the rhetorical target in 2:1–11.106 Indeed, as 
we have seen in chapters two and three, there is evidence that there were also Gentiles 
who condemned certain forms of immorality. According to Christoph Jedan, both Seneca 
and Cicero reflect a common “natural law teaching.”107 The pattern is as follows. It 
begins with (1) proper recognition of God’s existence, often on the basis of God’s work 
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in creation. This is then related to (2) a discussion of what is due to human beings on the 
basis of a shared human-ness as endowed by God with the capacity to reason. Upon this 
there is (3) a discussion of virtues and virtuous behavior that should follow from (1) and 
(2).
108
  
Dio Chrysostom’s twelfth discourse, titled “The Olympic Discourse, or On Man’s 
First Conception of God,” is particularly illuminating. The perspective presented in this 
discourse calls attention to the importance of proper recognition of the gods, that there is 
to Greeks and Barbarians alike a conception of God “arising from the course of nature 
without the aid of human teacher” (12.27). He goes on to ask how people (a generic 
“they”) could have  
remained ignorant and conceived no inkling of him who had sowed and planted 
and was not preserving and nourishing them, when on every side they were filled 
with the divine nature through both sight and hearing, and in fact through every 
sense (12.29).  
 
Dio also states that God is knowable through the seasons and the capacity to reason 
(12.32). He chastises certain men who claim to be “wiser than all wisdom” (sofw/teroi 
th~j a(pa/shj sofi/aj), but who have in their philosophical reasonings shown themselves 
to be ignorant, as if pouring lead into their ears or “hung before their eyes a curtain of 
deep darkness” (12.36). These people have set up an image of  
one single female divinity, depraved and monstrous, representing a kind of 
wantonness or self-indulgent ease and unrestrained lewdness, to which they gave 
the name pleasure—an effeminate God in very truth—her they prefer in honor 
and worship with softly tinkling cymbal-like instruments…and all this universe 
above us they assert is without purpose or intelligence or master…and no creator 
having made it in the first place. (12.36–37)  
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Dio goes on later to point out that the barbarians who find difficulty conceiving of god 
“name mountains gods, and unhewn trees, too, and unshapen stones, thing which are by 
no means whatever more appropriate in shape than is the human form” (12.61). Part of 
Dio’s argument also attributes to the “philosophers” a certain non-virtuous manner of 
living (wantonness, self-indulgent ease, lewdness, pleasure) that is related to their 
incorrect conceptions of god.  
My overall point here is to give examples of Gentiles who would agree in a 
general way with condemnation of immorality as we find in 1:18–32, and thus be in the 
place of the “judge” in 2:1–11. In a sense, and within the web of discourse we have 
discussed in previous chapters, this sort of condemnation of immorality was a way to 
distance one manner of living from another. This not to say that all Gentiles would agree 
with Romans 1:18–32. The condemnation of idolatry certainly would conflict with most 
Gentile religious practices. But as the statement from Dio Chrysostom suggests, and other 
scholars have also noted Gentile criticism of idol worship and worship of animals is not 
unheard of.
109
 This condemnation is not just a “Jew-against-Gentile” judgment; it must be 
placed within the context of Jewish engagement with perspectives such as we find among 
Greco-Roman moralistic writers such as Cicero, Seneca, and Dio Chrysostom. It is a 
Jewish condemnation that both relies upon the Greco-Roman web of discourse and 
challenges it as part of a shared cultural discourse.    
This brings us to the the first point made above—that Paul in 2:1–challenges 
assumptions particular to the Jewish condemnation of immorality in 1:18–32. For those 
who argue that Paul is addressing a Jew in 2:1–16, this means that Paul is throwing the 
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Jew’s assumptions of moral superiority back in the face of the Jew. The statement 
pointed to most often is the call to repent and to not test God’s patience in 2:4.110 A 
number of scholars see Paul directly challenging the statement in Wisdom 15:1–2: “But 
you, our God, are kind and true and patient, and ruling all things in mercy. For even if we 
sin we are yours, knowing your power.” The connection with Wisdom cannot be easily 
dismissed.
111
 But Wisdom must be interpreted as participating in the common Diaspora 
Jewish attempts to interpret the law where the warnings given and the exhortations to 
follow God’s nomos do not isolate Gentiles, but rather address all humanity.112 If, as we 
noted in the previous chapter, the primary purpose was to instruct and shape Diaspora 
Jews, then the exhortations and warnings would serve to call other Jews to obedience 
through an appeal to the universality of the law on Greco-Roman ethical terms. In 
Wisdom this is rhetorically accomplished by presenting a challenge to all humanity to 
turn to the one God and live in accordance with this one God’s nomos. Just as the 
exhortations in Wisdom are rhetorically include Gentiles, Paul’s mention of testing God’s 
patience and the call to repent need not be directed at a Jew, though it certainly would 
include a Jew as part of all humanity who are accountable to God’s law.  
An example of exhortation to Gentiles can be found in Sib. Or. 3:545–829 which 
is a large section containing four admonitions to Greeks (and the entire Gentile world) to 
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turn to God.
113
 In this section the author exhorts Greeks to “reverence” God (550). He 
addresses “you, cunning mortal (brote_ poikilo/mhti)” and exhorts, “do not tarry, do not 
delay!” (624) in order that this person might “convert, abandon your wrong lifestyle, and 
appease God…so that he may have mercy” and to “observe righteousness and oppress 
nobody, for these are the things the immortal commands for miserable mortals (624–29). 
Likewise, Wisdom actually presents a general call to Gentiles to turn to God and from 
“injustice” (1:5), to follow God’s nomos and not experience condemnation. In Wisdom 
12:1–22, the author expresses God’s mercy toward “unjust” people who indulge in 
behaviors against God, in hopes that they might repent, giving them “time and 
opportunity to give up their wickedness” (12:20). In light of these examples, Paul’s 
statement in 2:4, “Or do you despise the wealth of his goodness and forbearance and 
patience, being ignorant that the kindness of God leads you to repentance?” could just as 
easily be directed at a Gentile as a Jew.     
In light of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the person targeted in 2:1 is 
a generic person—part of the “all humanity” against which God’s judgment falls (1:18). 
The address is directed at neither Jew nor Gentile, but may apply to either.
114
 According 
to Tobin, in 2:1–11 Paul uses an “apostrophe” to question the general person who 
judges.
115
 Given the similarities with the Diaspora perspective in 1:18–32 and the way 
that Paul addresses a general person and calls him toward pursuing good deeds in 
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accordance with God’s decree, I suggest that the apostrophe also comes from the point of 
view of the Diaspora Jewish perspective. This is within the realm of possibility for the 
diatribe, as a writer or speaker could address someone through apostrophe from the 
vantage point of a particular perspective that may or may not be the writer’s.   
The Structure of Romans 2 
How one structures the argument is important to understanding the argument. 
Romans 2:1–29 has been divided into at least three movements: vv.1–11, 12–16, and 17–
29 (vv.17–24 and 25–29).116 For some scholars, these movements are no more than 
simple ways to identify the general movements in the argument. For other scholars, 
however, the breaks correspond to changes in Paul’s argument.117 For even some who see 
the different parts as representing general movements, there is some lack of agreement as 
to where vv.12–16 should be placed. Do they go with vv.1–11 or with vv.17–29?118  
The cues in the Greek text provide no clear warrant for a major break between 
vv.11 and 12 or between vv.24 and 25. Byrne argues that vv.12-16 fit better with Paul’s 
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polemic against the Jew in vv.17-29.
119
 But the statement in v.12 is not a move to a new 
thought where Paul turns to address more particularly “Jewish” concerns about the 
law.
120
 Rather, verse 12 issues from the statement in 2:11 that “there is no partiality with 
God.” The use of the ga_r in 2:12 suggests that the statements in 2:12 and following will 
provide an explanation of the point implied in 2:11, and the statements in 2:14–16 do the 
same for the statement in 2:13. In other words, 2:1–16 is one continuous movement 
within 2:1–29.121     
Likewise, in verse 25, Paul does not really turn to circumcision as a separate topic 
from the law, which he addressed in 2:17–24. Most understand that Paul is focusing more 
specifically on the Jewish claim on the basis of circumcision.
122
 While the language of 
circumcision is new to the argument, Paul continues to refer to nomos four times in 
vv.25–29. Moreover, the language of circumcision depends upon the claims about the 
law made in vv.17–24, which also depends on what was said in 2:1–16.123 So, vv.25–29 
are a new move in the argument, but not a new or distinct section in which Paul addresses 
circumcision, as distinct from the topic of the law. 
The only recognizable break in chapter 2 occurs at 2:17 with the change in 
addressee.
124
 This is not to say that there are not distinct movements within the argument; 
                                                             
119
 Byrne, Romans, 88. 
 
120
 As asserted by Carras, “Romans 2:1–29,” 196; Byrne, Romans, 88; Dunn, Romans, 104.  
 
121
 Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 153; Moo, Romans, 144–45; Hultgren, Romans, 116–17.  
 
122
 Moo, Romans, 166–67; Dunn (Romans 1–8, 119) sees Paul moving more specifically from 
doing good, to the law, to finally circumcision as the central Jewish claim that Paul is undermining;   
 
123
 Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 115–18; Kuula, The Law, 100. 
124
 Some have argued that there is no change in addressee in 2:17 (Gathercole, Where is 
Boasting?, 199; Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 139, 163–64), but the actual naming of an interlocutor and the 
contrastive use of de_ together suggest that the argument takes on a new focus. 
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indeed, there are. But, it seems that much nuanced and detailed analyses have divided up 
Paul’s argument more than necessary, so that there is debate over whom Paul addresses 
and what his point is. From the cues in the text, there are two main movements in 2:1–29 
in which Paul addresses two people or representatives of two groups, one in 2:1–16 and 
the other in 2:17–29.
125
    
If we relate this to the identity of the interlocutor in 2:1–11 and Paul’s use of 
diatribe, then it seems that Paul is using diatribe to address a general interlocutor from a 
Diaspora perspective in 2:1–16 and the “Jew” in 2:17–29. I suggest here that what Paul is 
doing is moving from universal to particular. That is, in 2:1–16 Paul makes a more 
general argument from principle, drawing on Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, 
the purpose of which is to accuse the general judge from the perspective of the Diaspora 
Jewish perspective. The identity of the “judge” in 2:1–16 remains anonymous—it may be 
anyone who participates in the pursuit of virtue. Implicitly, then, the general 
condemnation in 1:18–32 falls not only upon the Gentile, but also the Jew—a point which 
Paul will make more clearly in 2:17–29.
126
 The ambiguity of the “judge” is intentional. 
Tobin puts it well: “The condemnation in 2:1–11 gives Paul…the rhetorical foundation 
he needs to speak explicitly in 2:17–29 about Jewish conduct in the same way that he has 
been speaking about the conduct of this anonymous addressee.”127 Paul summarizes the 
Diaspora perspective in 2:1–16 and applies the principles of the Diaspora Jewish 
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perspective to the Jew in 2:17–29. In making his argument in this way Paul commands 
agreement with anyone in his audience who condemns idolatry and immorality, but he 
also sets a foundation upon which to highlight Jew and Gentile equality on the same basis. 
A breakdown of the argument I am suggesting is this: 
2:1–16: God’s equal judgment on the basis of the law  
  2:1–11: The importance of doing good 
   2:12–16: The singular standard of the law and its consequences 
2:17–29: Questioning the Jew(ish Perspective) 
  2:17–24: If doing the law matters, then the “Jew” is also guilty 
  2:25–29: Implications concerning status before God—circumcision and 
   uncircumcision 
 
The Argument in Romans 2:1–29 
 It now remains to apply the Diaspora Jewish framework to the argument of 
Romans 2. There are numerous issues to address, and the secondary literature is vast. 
Accordingly, I cannot address every point of discussion. I will, rather, offer an 
interpretation with a focus on clarifying Paul’s references to nomos and how Paul is 
advancing the general argument.         
2:1–16 
In this first part of Romans 2, Paul uses the diatribe to present from the Diaspora 
Jewish perspective a critical questioning of anyone who judges the immorality described 
in 1:18–32. Paul does not turn against the Jew, but continues to use the Diaspora Jewish 
perspective set up in 1:18–32. There are three movements in the argument: 2:1–8, 9–11, 
and 12–16. 
 In the first movement, 2:1–8, Paul uses the diatribe to question a general person 
who judges others, but practices “the same things.” The argument warns the “judge” to 
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beware of claims to ethical superiority over those who do any of the things in 1:18–32.
128
 
Paul presents the apostrophe not as an indictment, but a warning that highlights God’s 
judgment and the need for pursuing good and avoiding “injustice.”129 While the statement 
in 2:1 does have a tone of indictment against the one who judges, the rhetorical point of 
the whole section is to call attention to God’s judgment of all people according to their 
actions. The one who judges is not condemned, but questioned (2:1–3), warned (2:4–5), 
and implicitly exhorted to seek good (2:6–8). Commonly commentators argue that Paul is 
indicting the Jew. Brendan Byrne, for example, argues that in 2:1–3 Paul springs a “trap” 
to “erode Jewish confidence of being preserved from God’s eschatological wrath.” Paul, 
says Byrne, “argues (in vv.4–11) that the claim to a more favorable treatment on the basis 
of Israel’s special position is illusory (vv.4–5) since eschatological judgment will be 
strictly according to a person’s works (vv.6–10).130 As we have seen, however, this 
section is directed at a general humanity. Paul is not explicitly focusing on the Jew—or 
the Gentile for that matter. The apparent criticism of Jewish privilege associated with 
verse 4 is in keeping with what we saw in Sibylline Oracles 3 and the other writings 
mentioned above which issue a warning and exhortation to all humanity to follow God’s 
law.
131
  
                                                             
128
 These “same things” are not explicitly identified. It seems best to connect it immediately with 
the vice list in 1:29–31 (Dunn, Romans 1–8, 80).  
 
129
 Contra the language of Bell, who states that Paul is “attacking the self-righteous person” (No 
One Seeks, 139–40. There is no sense here of Paul “attacking” anyone. Paul’s language, rather, is to call 
attention to the importance of doing good and not living contrary to God. 
 
130
 Byrne, Romans, 80. 
 
131
 This reading eliminates the problem of how Paul could justifiably say that the Jew does “the 
same things” as those condemned in 1:18–32 (see Byrne, Romans, 81). If the section focuses on a general 
person—neither Jew nor Greek, but either—in a manner like Diaspora Jewish literature, then the warning 
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Rhetorically, the apostrophe summarizes the foundational theme of God’s 
judgment upon acts of wickedness and vice upon which the interpretations of the law in 
the Diaspora literature stand. Paul does not yet mention God’s no/moj as the standard 
according to which God will judge, but this will become clear in 2:12–13. At this point 
Paul, by summarizing the ethos of Diaspora Jewish exhortation to all humanity to turn to 
obedience to God within the Greco-Roman ethical framework of seeking to do “good” 
and avoid “injustice,” presents the importance of doing good and avoiding wickedness in 
a manner that would have been recognized and agreed upon by those in Rome.  
The section in 2:9–11 begins abruptly on the heels of verse 8. In these verses Paul 
draws out what is implicit in the Diaspora perspective: judgment and life are held out 
equally to Jew and Greek. This follows especially from the point in vv.1–8 which remind 
“all who judge” that all humanity will be judged according to their works of good or 
“injustice.” A number of commentators claim that in specifying “Jew and Greek” Paul is 
singling out “Jewish presumption of priority of privilege.”132 It is not clear, however, that 
Paul is drawing attention to the strangeness of placing Jew next to Greek in this phrase. 
In fact, within the Diaspora Jewish framework the equality of Jew and Gentile in terms of 
their standing before a common ethical standard was a basic foundation.
133
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
would not be as challenging or difficult to swallow for a Jewish-minded audience. One need not see the 
judgmental Jew “as exemplary for humanity as a whole” either (Käsemann, Romans, 54). The section in 
2:1–16 is in fact directed at humanity as a whole. 
  
132
 Dunn, Romans 1–8, 88; Fitzmyer, Romans, 303; Carras, “Romans 2:1–29,” 193–95.  
  
133
 This is not to question the ways in which Diaspora Jews claimed to be superior to Gentiles. 
But, it was a superiority that presumed equality with regard to the pursuit of and judgment according to the 
same ethical standard. This is precisely what Paul is describing in Rom. 2:9–10. 
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Paul unites the statements in vv.9–10 to the common Jewish view that the one 
God will judge all humanity impartially (2–11).
134
 According to Bassler, this foundational 
Jewish understanding of God was flexible and applied to different contexts and 
arguments, especially to circumstances where Israel’s relationship with the nations was at 
issue.
135
 God’s impartiality, as we have seen, is a foundational part of Diaspora Jewish 
attempts to universalize the Jewish nomos. In the Diaspora literature, divine impartiality 
did not only serve to distinguish Israel from the nations. It also provided an important 
basis upon which Jews could claim superiority over Gentiles in the pursuit of the 
common ethical goal.  
According to Tobin, “Paul turns the principle of God’s impartiality in a somewhat 
different direction.”136 By this it seems that Tobin means that Paul uses impartiality to 
emphasize judgment of the Jew and the possibility of Gentile obedience where the Jew 
would not. I suggest that this direction would still be within the Diaspora Jewish 
perspective. For example, Sib. Or. 3:256 states that God’s transcendent nomos was given 
in the form of two tablets on Mount Sinai, but it also recognizes the potential for disaster 
for Jews and all people who do not live in accord with the koino/j no/moj (3:259, 271–
                                                             
134
 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 43: “It is clear that divine impartiality was regarded (in the Second 
Temple period) as an axiomatic attribute of God.” It is questionable as to whether divine impartiality is the 
central theme of the argument as Bassler contends (see also Bell, No One Seeks, 143–44; ). It is, no doubt, 
an important piece of the argument, but divine impartiality, at least in the Diaspora literature, seems to flow 
out of the oneness of God as God over all humanity, which also seems to be the presumption behind 1:18–
2:16.  
 
135
 Ibid., 43–44. 
 
136
 Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 112. 
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76
137
). The general instruction in Pseudo-Phocylides makes no distinction between Jew 
and non-Jew on the basis of possessing the law. It calls for all humanity to obey God’s 
instruction. In Wis. 12:19–22 the writer calls all—Jew and Greek alike—to turn to 
wisdom and follow God’s commands. Even though there is favor shown to the “righteous” 
they are evaluated equally by God. In light of these, Paul is not necessarily pushing for a 
“universalization” of God’s judgment that would include Jews who thought they were 
exempt.
138
 No Diaspora Jewish literature seems to assume that other Jews are equally 
held to the requirement of obedience to the law. It is also important to recognize that Paul 
does not condemn the Jew here. Rather, from within the voice of the Diaspora Jewish 
perspective, Paul draws attention to an implication of what was commonplace among 
Diaspora Jews, and also what is also in continuity with a theme that Paul has been 
emphasizing all along in the letter.
139
 Jew and Gentile stand equally in the pursuit of 
“justice” and “good”; the possibility of “injustice” and “wickedness” is held out to them 
equally.
140
    
                                                             
137
 This passage refers to the Assyrian exile, but as part of the purpose of Sibylline Oracles it 
serves as a warning to Jewish readers of the same fate—that is, of breaking God’s universal nomos in a way 
no different from Gentiles. 
 
138
 Dunn, Romans 1–8, ; Karras, “Romans 2:1–29,” presents a particularly difficult interpretation 
that contends that the Jewish perspective against which Paul argues holds both to divine impartiality and 
Jewish privilege (195–96). He must conclude that this Judaism is “a religion whose practice was out of 
accord with its deepest convictions” (196). 
 
139
 Rom. 1:5, 7, 16, 18. 
 
140
 This interpretation eliminates the problem noted by some that Paul is affirming that God will 
reward people—Jew and Greek—on the basis of good works (Moo, Romans, 139–42). If Paul is 
summarizing main tenets of the Diaspora Jewish perspective, then Paul is not arguing for justification by 
works at all (though he could be). But Paul is not making an argument for this; rather using the diatribe, the 
rhetorical point is to set up a perspective and use it to argue a point on the basis of the established 
perspective.  
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In 2:12–13 Paul continues to present elements of the Diaspora Jewish perspective. 
The use of ga_r signifies that it follows out of the point made in vv.9–11.141 Beginning 
here Paul draws critical attention to the law, using the word nomos nine times between 
vv.12 and 15. The uses of the word are quite overwhelming when one reads this passage 
aloud, especially with the inclusion of two uses of a)no/mwj in verse 12 (in addition to the 
two uses of no/moj in that verse as well).  
Paul’s point in vv.12–13 is to apply the claim of God’s impartial judgment of all 
humanity to the law. This would be a natural move, as the common sentiment in Diaspora 
Judaism was that the universal ethical standard for all humanity was found in the law. 
Paul first states that “all who have sinned ‘lawlessly’ (a0no/mwj) will also perish 
‘lawlessly’ and all who have sinned ‘in the law’ (e0n no/mw|) will be judged ‘through the 
law’ (dia_ no/mou). This reflects, as many have noted, a traditional Jewish understanding 
of humanity vis-à-vis the law. But there is some debate about how it should be 
understood. There are two main options. First, “lawlessly” refers to Gentiles who are 
“lawless” because they are not Jews and thus do not possess God’s law. The point is that 
Paul is making a distinction between Jews and Gentiles, with Jews as a distinct people 
who are set apart from Gentiles on the basis of the law.
142
 The understanding of the law is 
that of a “boundary marker” that sets Israelites apart as God’s chosen people.143 It 
presumes a Jewish perspective according to which Gentiles are inherently under God’s 
judgment and Jews are not because of the covenant. Paul is then challenging this with 
                                                             
141
 So Käsemann, Romans, 61; Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 153; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 114.  
 
142
 Moo, Romans, 145–46.  
 
143
 Dunn, Romans 1–8, 95.  
 
389 
v.13 where he stresses that it is not the “hearers of the law” (i.e. Jews) who are justified, 
but “doers” of the law. Paul will then substantiate this with the claim that Gentiles can 
keep the law in vv.14–16.  
The second way is to understand a0no/mwj more generally, referring to “lawless” 
sinning—that is, it refers to those who sin in a “lawless” manner.144 Stowers makes the 
strongest argument for this reading of the word. For Stowers, the problem is that Paul had 
been setting out the principle of equality and impartiality with regard to judgment, and it 
makes no sense for Paul to regress by distinguishing between Jew and Gentile in 2:12 on 
the basis of nomos.
145
 Stowers notes that among ancient writers the word regularly refers 
to acting “lawlessly”—that is, contrary to law.146 He also mentions in passing that it is 
not outside of the realm of possibility in the Jewish Scriptures to consider Israelites 
“lawless”—that is not living in accord with God’s law.147  
The two readings of a0no/mwj need not be mutually exclusive. The “traditional” 
reading assumes a framework with a distinction between Jews and Gentiles on the basis 
of being apart from the law or “within (the sphere of) the law.” If we consider the 
evidence of the Diaspora Jewish literature, there is more complexity to the Jewish 
perspective than that Gentiles are just “outside of the Jewish law.” On the one hand, 
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 E.g. Stowers, Rereading, 134–38. 
 
145
 Stowers, Rereading, 138. 
  
146
 Ibid., 135–36. 
 
147
 Ibid., 137. The one Pauline use of a)no/moj in 1 Cor. 9:21 seems, on the surface, to suggest that 
Paul has a pattern (in all of two uses!) of using the word to refer to non-Jews—those not of the law (for 
many scholars this is evidence that Paul’s use in Rom. 2:12 is like this). However, a closer inspection of 1 
Cor. 9:21 in its context suggests otherwise. In the immediately preceding example, Paul writes, “to those 
under the law, I became as one under the law…” Unless Paul had completely renounced his Judaism 
(which there is no reason to think so), then the reading in this verse should not be taken to mean that Paul 
became a Jew, whereas before he was not. 
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Diaspora writers place all humanity within the sphere of the law because the Jewish 
nomos—God’s law—was universal and applied to all people in some way. On the other 
hand, Jews possessed this nomos in a unique way, having it in written form. But this 
possession of the law did not mean that non-Jews were a)no/mwj—apart from the law—in 
terms of having God’s universal ethical standard available to them. Rather, they were 
a0no/mwj in terms of not possessing the written form of this universal and transcendent 
nomos.  
Two important writings—Sibylline Oracles 3 and Wisdom (the only two of our six 
Diaspora writings that use the words a)no/mwj or a)no/mia)  provide helpful uses of the 
word. In Sib. Or. 3:496 the author writes of the Phoenicians who are “unclean” and 
“lawless” (a!nomoj) and under God’s judgment. But it is not because they are not Jews 
and thus without the law (a)no/mwj), but because they have not kept the universal nomos 
of God known to them. Also in 3:763: “unlawful” relates to those who do not serve the 
living God, to which the writer exhorts all people, even if the Jewish people do this and 
Greeks do not. Their “lawless” behavior does not focus on them not being people of the 
law. The word relates to actions—a manner of life that is not in keeping with the 
universal nomos of God, not necessarily with covenant status or identity. In Wisdom, the 
word also refers to a manner of living, and not exclusively as a way to identify the Jews 
over against Gentiles.
148
 While the underlying themes of Sibylline Oracles and Wisdom 
permit an identification of the “lawless” with Gentiles, there are two points that merit 
attention. First, the veiled manner in which Jews are described in this literature; they are 
not Israelites or Jews, but “just ones” (Sib. Or 3:219; Wis.10:20; 12:19). Second, the 
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 Wis. 5:7, 23; 15:17; 17:2.  
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nomos according to which “lawlessness” is measured is a universal one, the commands of 
which are available to all humanity to either follow or transgress.  
Given the connections we have already observed between Wisdom and Sibylline 
Oracles 3 and Paul in Romans 1:18–32 and elements of 2:1–16, these passages should 
warrant consideration in our understanding of a)no/mwj in 2:12. Sinning a0no/mwj need 
not refer to a Jew/Gentile distinction where Jews are favored because of the law, and 
Gentiles are naturally under judgment because they are a0no/mwj. Rather the distinction is 
more complex, specifying a distinction between those who possess God’s universal 
nomos in written form and those who do not. The phrase e0n no/mw| would then be taken to 
mean “in the sphere of the law” as a reference to Jews who possess God’s universal 
nomos in concrete form.
149
 Those who sin a0no/mwj still are under God’s nomos—the 
same nomos that applies to those e0n no/mw. This is implied in verse 13 where Paul draws 
attention to the importance of keeping nomos and not just “hearing” it: “for it is not the 
ones hearing the law who are just, but the ones doing the law will be made just” (2:13).  
Verses 12 and 13, taken together, reflect the Diaspora Jewish claim that Gentiles 
who do not possess the Jewish nomos in concrete form are nevertheless accountable to 
the law, just as Jews are—both are accountable to one universal standard, even though 
the two groups of people relate to it differently.
150
 Paul may be countering a Jewish view 
                                                             
149
 Similarly, Fitzmyer, Romans, 308; Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 153–54. Contra Dunn and others 
who understand “in the law” as “within the terms and boundary formulated by the law” (Romans 1–8, 96). 
Also  
 
150
 Thus, the problem noted by Das is no longer a problem. Das asks, “how can God’s judgment be 
impartial if there is a division in humanity based on the possession or nonpossession of God’s law?” (Paul, 
the Law, and the Covenant, 179). Das’ question falters on not seeing how Diaspora Jewish arguments held 
Gentiles accountable to the Jewish law by associating it with transcendent nomos and universal ethical 
pursuits. The written Jewish nomos commanded in concrete form what were universally recognized divine 
392 
that associated privilege with being able to “hear” the law only, but it is to be understood 
within the framework of an exhortation to all humanity.
151
 He is, as he has been, 
describing common elements of Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law: justice and 
virtue are linked with following the commands or decree of God’s universal nomos. The 
difference between those who sin a)no/mwj and those who sin e0n no/mw| does not mean 
that Gentiles have a different standard than Jews. It only refers to the relationship 
between those who do not possess and those who do possess God’s universal nomos in 
written, concrete form.  
Building on the point made in vv.12–13 Paul states the possibility that Gentiles 
can do what the law says. This is the logical consequence of what was presented in 2:1–
13, which focuses on God’s impartial judgment in accordance with the law.152 In verses 
14–15 Paul writes:  
14
 For whenever Gentiles, those not having the law by nature do the things of the 
law, these not having law among themselves are law, 
15
 such ones demonstrating 
the work of the law written in their hearts… 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ethical expectations. God’s judgment is impartial on the basis of the universal ethic which was best 
exemplified in the Jewish nomos.  
  
151
 According to Dunn (Romans 1–8, 97) Paul’s statement focuses on the Jewish emphasis on 
“hearing the law” which was associated with “righteousness.” The passages Dunn cites for this are not a 
reliable basis upon which to make his case, however. It is true that Jews “have” the law, and so have the 
privilege of “hearing” the law. But possessing the law does not amount to “righteousness,” as a Diaspora 
Jew would recognize, for it is God’s universal law which is in concrete form. The Diaspora perspective, not 
Paul, has already wrested any reliance upon only “hearing” the law by interpreting the law within the 
framework of Greek ethical pursuits of living in accord with certain virtuous behaviors and emphasizing 
obedience to its commands.  
 
152
 Contra N.T. Wright who sees the Gentile keeping of the law as an “exception” to the situation 
that Gentiles are “without the law” (“The Law in Romans 2,” 146). But, as we have seen, Paul is not 
arguing in 2:12–13 that Gentiles do not have the law and thus cannot keep the law. Rather, Paul is 
expressing the understanding that those who do not possess God’s universal nomos in concrete form are 
still accountable to keeping the law. 
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This is one of the central passages about which scholars cannot seem to find a convincing 
interpretation. 
First, who are the Gentiles here? The two main interpretations are Gentile 
Christians
153
 or non-believing Gentiles.
154
 While it is certainly tempting to say that Paul 
is referring to Gentile believers, nothing in the text suggests that he is specifying Gentile 
believers.
155
 First, when Paul writes of Gentile Christians in relation to the Jewish nomos, 
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 Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 155–57; N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” 131–50; Simon 
Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves,” 27–49; Jewett, Romans, 212–13. 
  
154
 This is the view of most scholars: Fitzmyer, Romans, 310; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 98; Moo, 
Romans, 149–51; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 113–15; Kuula, The Law, 93–94. 
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 The most interesting statements are: the reference to the law written on the heart in 2:15, the 
connection between Gentile obedience and judgment “according to my gospel” in 2:16, and the references 
to Gentiles condemning Jews in 2:26–29. The reference to the law written on the heart, however, does not 
necessarily refer to Jeremiah 31. Moo notes that the connection with Jeremiah 31, though close, is not close 
enough to think that Paul is using the passage in any meaningful way (Romans, 151–52; also Stuhlmacher, 
Paul’s Letter, 43; Fitzmyer, Romans, 311). With regard to 2:16, the phrase “according to my gospel” likely 
refers to the mention of the day of judgment when God “judges the secrets of humanity” and not to the 
obedience of Gentiles. Paul is just relating his gospel message to this Diaspora Jewish framework, not 
affirming the obedience of Gentiles that will result in acquittal, but affirming the judgment of God in 
accord with one’s deeds (Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace,” 72–93; Dunn, Romans 1–8, 102–03; Byrne, 
Romans, 90). The statement about Gentiles condemning Jews on the basis of works is probably, as part of 
Paul’s argument, a way of stating a consequence of the Diaspora Jewish framework which Paul is 
summarizing in 2:1–16.  
Richard Bell itemizes five problems with associating the Gentiles with Gentile Christians: (1) the 
reference to Gentiles as a)no/mwj and as ones “not having the law” cannot refer to Gentile Christians who 
are not a!nomoj but e1nnomoj xristou~ (1 Cor. 9:21); (2) Paul’s contrast in Romans 2 is Jews and Gentiles 
as ethnic groups, not Jews and Gentile Christians; (3) that Gentiles keep the law “by nature” is not Pauline; 
(4) Paul is not concerned with Christians in Rom. 1:18–3:20; (5) the reference to Jeremiah 31:33 (LXX 
38:33) in 2:15 is never used in the sense of no/moj a!grafoj (No One Seeks, 152-53). Even though I agree 
with Bell’s conclusion in general, I do not think all of Bell’s points are convincing. The reference to “not 
having law” could refer to Gentile Christians who, in their nature as Gentiles, do not possess the Jewish 
nomos among them in written form. The reference to those who sin a)no/mwj in 2:12 need not refer to the 
Gentiles in 2:14–15. In 2:12–13 Paul is stating a principle about the equal judgment according to doing the 
law; in 2:14–15 Paul is illustrating how Gentiles can do what the law says. The statement in 1 Cor. 9:21 
refers to Paul specifically in an argumentative statement that cannot be taken ipso facto to refer to all 
believers just because Paul says it of himself here. That Paul’s contrast in Romans 2 concerns ethnic groups 
does not mean that Gentile Christians cannot be in view. It may have been their Gentile ethnicity that was a 
problem in Rome. The idea of keeping the law “by nature” presumes that fu/sei should be taken to modify 
the verb poiw~sin rather than e1xonta, which, as we shall see, may not be correct. While Paul may not be 
concerned with Christians in his immediate argument in 1:18–3:20, they cannot be far removed from his 
purposes. The reference to Gentiles having the law “written on their hearts” need not be a reference to Jer. 
31.  
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he uses language of “fulfill” (plhro/w)156 and not “do” (poie/w)157 or “keep” (fula/ssw; 
Rom. 2:26).
158
 Second, according to the logic of present in Diaspora interpretations of the 
law, the obedience of Gentiles who do not possess the law in concrete form is a 
possibility. Paul is not saying that all Gentiles do this perfectly.
159
 Paul is, it seems, only 
drawing attention to one element common to some of the Diaspora interpretations of the 
law: the universal ethic demanded by God’s nomos can be met by Gentiles. Third, the 
nature of Paul’s argument suggests that he is not intent on specifying the identity of these 
Gentiles. Paul presents a generic statement that issues from the Diaspora Jewish 
perspective about God’s impartial judgment according to nomos. In accord with the use 
of Diatribe, Paul need not isolate a particular group. The point is to draw attention to how 
two groups in humanity—Jew and Gentile—both live ethically in relation to one 
standard.
160
 This does not mean that Gentile Christians cannot be in view here. As 
Bassler writes,  
Paul is speaking here of ideal types in order to treat through them two groups of 
humanity and their relationship to God’s justice. However, the situation is 
complicated by the fact that Paul knows the final stage of his argument…So 
although Paul must, for the sake of his argument, speak here in general terms of 
the ideal Greek or Gentile as such, it is probably no accident that the contours that 
Paul gives to this figure also fit the Christians.
161
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 Rom. 8:4; 13:8, 10; Gal. 5:14.  
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 Cf. Rom. 10:5; Gal. 3:10–12; 5:3 which seem to suggest a negative view on “doing” the law. 
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 Cf. Gal. 6:13. 
 
159
 The use of o#tan (“whenever”) at the beginning of 2:14 can be taken to mean that Gentiles only 
seldom keep the law (Dunn, Romans 1–8, 98; Moo, Romans, 149).  
 
160
 See also Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 144–45; Das, Paul, the Law, and the Covenant, 180–81. 
  
161
 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 145. Gathercole, rightly I think, points out cautiously that it is 
“perfectly possible in principle that Paul should contrast believing Gentiles with unbelieving Israel in Rom. 
2” (“A Law unto Themselves,” 32). But, in actuality Paul is not specifically doing this. As we shall see, 
395 
Second, what is the no/moj? According to a number of scholars, Paul refers to the 
Stoic idea of living according to nomos “naturally” or “by nature” in 2:14. According to 
these scholars, the dative fu/sei in the phrase ta_ mh_ no/mon e1xonta fu/sei ta_ tou~ no/mou 
poiw~sin relates to the verb poiw~sin. Paul is saying that Gentiles do the law “by nature.”  
There are several reasons why Paul is writing of those who do not have the law 
“by nature” rather than of Gentiles doing “the things of the law” fu/sei. First, the 
placement of the dative fu/sei can just as easily go with ta_ mh_ no/mon e1xonta as with ta_ 
tou~ no/mou poiw~sin.162 I am inclined to take fu/sei with the first phrase because 
positioning it before the article of the phrase ta_ tou~ no/mou poiw~sin seems to exclude it 
from joining with the phrase and removes it further from the verb which it would 
modify.
163
  Second, the common statement made by writers who use “law of nature” is 
that people should live according to nature (kata_ fu/sin) or “following nature.” They do 
not typically use the dative fu/sei (“by nature”). Philo provides an important example of a 
Diaspora Jewish writer who, of all Jewish writers, wrote most of “law of nature” and 
ascribed to Gentiles the possibility of keeping God’s universal nomos within this 
framework. In his On the Migration of Abraham 1.128 he writes that the goal of those 
who study philosophia is “to live following nature” (to_ a0kolou/qwj th|~ fu/sei zh~n). Here 
the dative is used, but this is because it follows after a0kolou/qwj, so the idea of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
what Paul is doing here is setting a foundation to address the issue between Jewish believers and Gentile 
believers in Rom.14–15. 
 
162
 See C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans 1–8, 156–57, who notes that the placement of fu/sij itself is not 
decisive.  
 
163
 Cf. also Gathercole, who points out that the argument that the adverbial dative must be within 
the clause it qualifies is not as sound as it seems. There are sufficient examples where the dative follows the 
verb, which suggests that the decision cannot be made purely on word order (“A Law unto Themselves,” 
35–36). See also N.T. Wright, “The Law in Romans 2,” 145. 
396 
“following” nature is expressed. Later in the same work, Philo writes of some who “are 
by nature inclined to receive instruction” (fu/sei paideutiko_n o!nta). These people may 
be in their natures inclined toward paideia, but they do not live in accordance with God’s 
nomos “by nature” alone.  
Finally, and most particularly, in the Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law 
which associate the Jewish nomos with fu/sij, the possibility for non-Jews to follow 
God’s nomos “naturally” or “by nature” is slight. For these writers, Gentile “nature” does 
not lead to obedience. Wisdom 13:1 is interesting in this regard. As we saw above, the 
point of the statement is that “all humans” are ignorant of God and “foolish by nature” 
(ma/taioi fu/sei). In addition, the discussion in 4 Maccabees suggests that Gentiles 
cannot by following “nature” arrive at obedience to nomos. Rather, the Jewish nomos 
defines what is in accord with physis (4 Macc. 5:6–25). Human nature needs the Jewish 
nomos to bring the human mind into accord with virtue (4 Macc. 1:1–18). This is not to 
say that some of the writers do not associate the Jewish nomos with physis. As we have 
seen, they do.
164
 But there is a crucial distinction between the Jewish nomos being in 
accordance with physis and the ability to follow God’s universal nomos “by nature.”165   
I return to Philo, who uses the dative fu/sei a total of 321 times throughout his 
writings. In nearly every use it is used to refer to the inherent constitution of something. 
For example in Leg. 1:52 “vain opinions are impure by nature” (oi1hsij de_ a0ka/qarton 
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fu/sei).166  In Opif. 1:134 he makes the statement that the corporeal human is “by nature” 
(fu/sei) mortal, and that only the man made “in the image of God” who is only 
perceptible by the mind, is “by nature” imperishable. Philo also writes in Mig. 1.94 about 
laws which are “by nature” (fu/sei) and thus should be kept, but he does not suggest that 
this is done “by nature.”167  In Somn. 1.167 he says that virtue can exist “by nature” 
(fu/sei), but Philo applies this to the patriarchs, and likely would not apply this to a non-
Jew. Indeed, those who can “by nature” (fu/sei) follow God’s law are extraordinary and 
rare people in Philo’s thought.168 Interestingly, in De Decalogo 59 he specifies that 
people who are ignorant of God are “by nature uninstructed” (a)dida/ktw| th~| fu/sei). This 
seems to be a reference to the manner of existence of those who are not instructed in the 
Jewish nomos and are thus without true knowledge of God. This also suggests that it 
would  be unlikely that a Diaspora Jew like Philo would really reckon to the non-Jew the 
ability to follow God’s nomos “by nature.” Paul holds a similar view of Gentiles 
elsewhere in his writings and tends to use fu/sij to signify “identity” or state of existence 
rather than behavior or the manner of doing something.
169
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It seems reasonable to conclude that Paul, who is drawing on elements common to 
Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, would not attribute to Gentiles the ability to 
keep God’s universal nomos “by nature” (fu/sei) even while this law, as we saw in some 
instances, could be understood as kata_ fu/sin. Gentile obedience to God’s nomos, 
however, is not dependent on “law of nature” conceptions in many of the Diaspora 
writings we considered. Paul’s point here is to draw attention to what is implicit in 
common Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, which claimed that the Jewish 
nomos was the one divine and transcendent nomos, given by God, according to which 
God would judge all humanity, but which prescribed a universal ethic attainable by all. 
So in spite of not having the law “by nature”—that is, the divine nomos in written form—
Gentiles still can do things that demonstrate the ethical living to which the law points 
apart from fu/sij.  
The no/moj in this passage, then, is the Jewish law. As we saw in the introduction, 
however, there is no consensus about how this is so. Moo argues that nomos refers to “the 
demand of God generally.”170 The Gentiles who do not possess the law of Moses, 
“nevertheless have access to knowledge of God’s will for them.”171 From what we have 
seen in the previous chapter, such a distinction between the Jewish nomos and some other 
universal standard is not as easily made in Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law. 
The Jewish nomos, as we have seen, is often understood as one and the same with 
transcendent nomos and it prescribes not only specifically Jewish commands, but a 
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universal ethic. If, as we have been arguing, Paul’s argument centers within this 
framework then the no/moj to which Paul refers should also be understood as the 
“reoriented” Jewish nomos; a law that is revealed specifically to Jews, the commands of 
which are universal. In these explanations, Jewish writers did not rely solely upon “law of 
nature,”172 nor did they rely only upon Jewish wisdom speculation apart from any Greek 
influence.
173
 Both of these are to be included within this framework, but Jewish writers 
were not constrained to just one of these conceptions.
174
 Rather, they worked within the 
widespread nomos discourse and Greek ethical arguments and used a number of ways 
possible to stress the transcendence and universality of the Jewish nomos.
175
 They used 
their own traditions and understandings and shaped them in new contexts to make claims 
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in new ways. Like other people, Jews were attempting to align their particular nomos 
with universal and transcendent nomos and thus argue that the Jewish nomos embodied 
the universal ethical norms for human life. When Paul writes of the possibility of 
Gentiles keeping “the things of the law,” the understanding of no/moj is that of the Jewish 
nomos “reoriented.” Paul is thus not “oscillating” between a universal and a 
particularistic understanding of law in an attempt to justify Gentile keeping of the law.
176
 
Rather, Paul is relying upon what seem to be common conceptions of the Jewish nomos 
as a universal law for all humanity—that by which God will judge humanity and as 
something which both Jew and Gentile can and should keep.  
Third, how does Paul’s argument conceive of the “things of the law” and the 
“work of the law” in 2:14–15 and “the decrees” (ta_ dikaiw/mata) of the law in 2:26? 
Many suggest that Paul “reduces” the law to moral norms.177 According to Kuula, the 
“ambiguous expression” is a reduction of the law and is used to refer to “the things that 
belong to the sphere of the law” and Paul is suggesting only “part” of the law.178 For the 
most part, scholars struggle to make sense of this phrase as I noted in the introduction. A 
number of commentators say it cannot refer to the whole of the law.
179
 In a way, however, 
the law in its fullness must be in mind, otherwise Paul’s argument would not work, 
especially in light of the parallel statements in 2:26–28 that the Gentile’s obedience will 
result in judgment over the Jew. Paul’s point would not hold if Paul only had in mind the 
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sketchy, inconsistent obedience of Gentiles.
180
 According to Das, if Gentiles did all that 
the law requires, “they would no longer be Gentiles.”181 These problems with defining 
what things of the law Gentiles keep and how they do it can be eliminated when we 
consider the Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law. 
As we saw in chapter four, Diaspora Jewish literature regularly “reorients” the 
understanding of the commands of the law in terms of universal or commonly held 
virtuous behaviors and avoidance of vices. The “things of the law” were often understood 
in terms of the Decalogue and other widely encouraged and universally recognized 
behaviors.
182
 Paul can claim without explanation that non-Jews can do what the law says 
and remain uncircumcised because this is the way that Jews had conceived of nomos in 
their arguments. It is important to note that neither Paul nor Diaspora Jews dismiss the 
particular Jewish commands. Sabbath, circumcision, food laws and the like were all still 
important for Jews. This is where the larger discourse is important. The Jews participated 
in a discourse where particular laws of particular communities were not dismissed, but 
rather interpreted and given significance on a universal stage of a common humanity. The 
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ultimate goal of certain laws was the cultivation of virtuous behaviors and justice 
common to all people—it was these, not the particular commands of particular nomos, 
that aligned with transcendent nomos. There is no sense that these Jewish writers were 
referring to anything less than the whole law in their reorientations of the law. Nor did 
they argue explicitly for dismissal of their own traditions and particular laws. 
Circumcision, Sabbath observance, and food laws all held value as a way that Jews 
achieved universal ethical goals, but they always led to ethical behaviors beyond the 
commands themselves.
183
 What is specified for Gentiles are not the particularly Jewish 
commands but the ethical living which the Jewish nomos best embodied. It is important 
to here to keep in mind that the “things of the law” specified by Diaspora Jews were 
commonly related to the Decalogue, but were not limited to it.  
I suggest, therefore, that “the things of the law” in this context are the universal 
and transcendent principles to which all of the particular commands point. They include 
commands found in the Decalogue and other places in the Jewish Scriptures where more 
general commands might be mentioned. Drawing on Diaspora perspectives, Paul is not 
implying that Gentiles know to keep the Sabbath, food laws, or circumcision, or that they 
are required to do so. This does not mean that the phrase does not refer to the law in its 
totality. Understood in terms of the universal ethical behaviors and principles that the 
Jewish nomos fully embodies, “the things of the law” refer to all those things toward 
which the law instructs. 
What Paul is saying here stands in relief when we place Paul’s statements within 
the rhetorical purpose of Rom. 2:1–16. Paul is not advocating that the Jewish nomos can 
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be treated without regard to circumcision, Sabbath, etc. Nor is he admitting that the Jew 
is no better because of the law. Paul has been drawing on elements common to Diaspora 
Jewish interpretations of the law that interpreted the Jewish nomos in relation to a 
widespread Greco-Roman web of discourse, interpretations which affected the social 
issue of Jew-Gentile relationships. By drawing attention to Gentile obedience, Paul does 
not try to condemn Jewish particularity; rather Paul draws attention to the equality of Jew 
and Gentile within the framework established by common Diaspora Jewish 
interpretations of the law. It is important to keep in mind that Paul is not arguing for the 
universality and universal application of the law, but presenting the Diaspora Jewish 
perspective which assumes this point. The universality of the Jewish nomos is an 
unaviodable consequence that issues from Diaspora Jewish claims about the universality 
of the law and of God’s impartial judgment according to the law. Paul is not trying here 
to undermine any Jewish presumption, nor is he challenging Jewish obedience to the law 
or Jews’ position as God’s people because God gave them the law. Paul’s point is to 
emphasize that on the basis of common Diaspora interpretations of the Jewish nomos, 
which support universal principals commonly identified with transcendent nomos, good 
and sincere Gentiles who do not possess the Jewish nomos can live in accord with the 
general ethical behaviors.     
Let us sum up what Paul has done in 2:1–16. In this first movement of the 
argument in chapter 2, Paul presents an apostrophe to a person who judges immorality. In 
this apostrophe, he draws upon common Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, and 
summarizes a typical Jewish exhortation to ethical living in accordance with the law. He 
focuses on the common conception that the Jewish nomos is in reality God’s universal 
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nomos to which all humanity is accountable. In summarizing this perspective, Paul is not 
simply regurgitating material. Rather, he is deliberately drawing attention to important 
elements common to Diaspora Jewish perspectives. Paul is not setting out an attack on 
Jewish privilege. He is relying upon common Diaspora Jewish warnings against 
participating in immorality that associate the Jewish nomos with transcendent nomos and 
universal ethical principles. In doing this, Paul rhetorically confirms this universal 
conception of the law as well as the common ethical purposes to which it points, but he 
does so in such a way that highlights the equality of all humanity with regard to the 
universal standard of God’s nomos. More importantly, in doing this Paul lays an 
important foundation for what will come in 2:17–29.   
2:17–29 
It is not until 2:17 that Paul actually addresses the “Jew”—“but if you call 
yourself (a) Jew” (Ei0 de\ su_ e0ponoma/zh|).184 This begins the second apostrophe in the 
argument. From the tenor of the argument, and from what we have already suggested 
above, Paul addresses a Jew who holds a self-identity and role rooted in Diaspora Jewish 
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405 
conceptions of the role of Judaism and the Jewish nomos vis-à-vis the widespread Greco-
Roman discourse. In this section, Paul will critique the Jew’s self-understanding on the 
very basis of the ethical perspective presented in 2:1–16. This is done in parallel fashion 
to the first one in 2:1–16 but as a particularizing of the more general apostrophe in 2:1–
16.
185
     
In the first stage of this section (vv.17–21a), Paul itemizes certain claims that 
many summarize as the “boast” of the Jew. The Jew sees himself in the position of a 
teacher and ethically superior because of the law. As have seen already, Paul is drawing 
on convictions reflected in Diaspora Jewish literature related to the claim that Jews 
possess in concrete form God’s universal nomos, and by following this nomos they are 
superior in ethical living and in paideia to Gentiles, who strive for the same things. This 
Jewish perspective presents Judaism and living in accord with the law as paideia for the 
world—in contrast to the Greeks.186 Paul’s point is to summarize basic claims of the 
Diaspora Jew, and to do so in a way that emphasizes their reliance upon having the law 
and their own claims to doing the law and fulfilling ethical goals better than all others.   
In recent Pauline scholarship it has become common to claim that the boast and 
superiority related to the Jewish nomos is that of a special status based on possession of 
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the law, Jewish election, and ethnic or national privileges.
187
 James Dunn writes that in 
Romans 2:17–24 Paul “presupposes a Jewish sense of privilege in Israel’s election and 
particularly in the law.”188 The boast is one that emphasizes the possession of the law as a 
mark of God’s favor and exemption from God’s judgment. More than one scholar has 
claimed that the Jewish boast or superiority behind Romans 2:17–24 is one which 
assumes a view that “ethnic Israel is inalienably the people of the one true god, and that 
her possession of the law, quite irrespective of her keeping it, demonstrates this fact.”189  
In light of what we discussed in the previous chapter on Diaspora Jewish 
literature, however, we must conclude that the Jewish “boast” and claim of superiority is 
more complex than this. To some degree it is quite the opposite of the final statement 
quoted above. The boast in the Diaspora literature was a boast of living in accordance 
with universal standards of justice and virtue. It was not a boast that was “irrespective” of 
keeping the law; rather it was a boast in keeping the law, and it had value because it was 
not just a boast in adherence to the particular commands of the Jewish nomos, but in 
achieving virtue and justice as expressed in a shared cultural political-ethical discourse. 
This should not be confused, however, with understanding the commands of the law as “a 
ladder of good works to climb to a moral self-righteousness.”190 They had God’s 
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universal nomos in concrete form, the commands of which “educate” and “instruct” all 
people in virtue and justice. It is possessing the concrete form of God’s transcendent and 
universal nomos that sets the Jew apart, but not possession without virtuous obedience. It 
was because they possessed God’s law and obeyed it they exhibited exemplary obedience 
and a manner of life that is in accord with and leads to virtue. 4 Maccabees is significant 
in this regard. There is  an emphasis on keeping “the ancestral law” (4 Macc. 4:23; 5:33; 
8:7; 9:1; 16:16), but the core of the book is on obedience to this law an example of 
achieving Greek philosophical and ethical ideals, and above all, seeking the prize of 
virtue (1:1–15; 7:22; 9:8; 9:31; 10:10; 11:2; 12:14). The value of the law stands or falls 
on the Jew’s obedience to the law. In Letter of Aristeas this is also the case when Eleazar 
insists that obedience to the commands makes the Jewish people the most just and 
virtuous (144–50). While the often cited passage in vv.141–43 refers to the Jewish people 
being separated from all others, the emphasis is not on “ethnic” or “social” 
distinctiveness—even though these play a role—but ethical distinctiveness by keeping 
the commands and being a people of virtue rather than vice.
191
   
This is not the Jew who “relies on (the law) in the sense of thinking to fulfill it in 
such a way as to put God in his debt or imagining complacently that the mere fact of 
possessing it gives him security against God’s judgment.”192 Nor is this “nationalistic 
distinctiveness.” While the particular commands are part of the Jewish identity, the Jew is 
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set apart in terms of being di/kaioj and virtuous, knowing the commands of the one God 
and this God’s universal nomos available to all people.  
Paul holds these claims in suspension. He writes,  
17
 But if you are called “Jew” and if you rest upon the law and you boast in God 18 
and you know the will (of God) and you discern things of worth, having been 
instructed from the law, 
19
 being certain to be yourself a guide of the blind, a light 
of those in darkness, 
20
 an educator of the imprudent, a teacher of the immature, 
having the form of knowledge and truth in the law—  
 
Paul does not continue the thought, nor does he deny these claims. But he holds them 
contingent upon the next questions. In this second part (vv.21b–24), Paul questions this 
boast on the very basis of the Jew’s own claims:  
21
therefore the one teaching the other, do you not teach yourself? The one 
proclaiming do not steal, do you steal? 
22
 The one saying do not commit adultery, 
do you commit adultery? The one detesting idols, do you rob temples? 
23
 You 
who boast in the law, through the transgression of the law you dishonor God, 
24
 
for the name of God is blasphemed on account of you among the Gentiles, just as 
it is written.   
 
It is noteworthy that what Paul lists bears striking resemblance to the summaries of the 
law and vice lists encountered in much of the Diaspora literature as well as many 
common vices contrary transcendent nomos and universal ethical standards known in the 
Greco-Roman world. Paul is turning the tables back upon the Jew on the same foundation 
as the one he presented in 2:1–16, which was rooted in interpretations of the Jewish 
nomos within the larger Greco-Roman discourse. If Paul is drawing on common elements 
of Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, as he seems to be, then we should not see 
his emphasis as trying to argue that the Jew does or does not commit these specific acts, 
though he may be doing so. Rather, the function of these verses is to question the Jew’s 
obedience to God’s universal law on the same basis that the Jew holds the Gentile 
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accountable. Given the way Paul sets up the common Diaspora Jewish claims about 
ethical justice (dikaiosu/nh) and living in accord with the transcendent and universal 
standard of God’s no/moj in 2:1–16, he now turns to apply this to the “Jew” by 
questioning the Jew according the very same criteria. Paul is not calling into question a 
boast in the mere possession of the law; rather, he utilizes the very terms upon which 
Jews condemned Gentiles and applies their argument to say that Jews’ claims to virtue 
and to being “just” also falls short. Not only that, but their disobedience to God’s 
universal nomos, in light of their claims, calls God himself into question (v.24).   
In the final section, vv.25–29, Paul draws out the consequences of his point.
193
 
Here we differ from scholars, such as Bell, who assert that Paul turns away to a new issue, 
that of circumcision.
194
 Paul turns to consequences of his argument through an appeal to 
circumcision. It is interesting that circumcision has not been part of the discussion to this 
point. This suggests that the incorporation of circumcision into the argument here may be 
more a part of Paul’s agenda than part of any argument against inclusion of Gentiles. 
That is, Paul turns to circumcision to illustrate the further consequence that, according to 
the types of arguments commonly reflected in Diaspora Jewish literature, any distinction 
between Jew and Gentile on the basis of obedience to particular commands nomos alone 
should not be determinative of one’s status before God.     
What understanding of circumcision Paul has in mind here is debated. On the one 
hand, some suggest that Paul questions circumcision as an ethnic identity marker that sets 
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Jews apart from Gentiles.
195
 According to this view, circumcision was bound up with 
covenant identity, as “a test of covenant loyalty and a mark of Jewish national 
distinctiveness.”196 It was a fundamental piece of Jewish identity and a “boundary line 
between Jew and Gentile.”197 
While the significance of circumcision cannot be denied, the evaluation of it 
seems more complex than this. Circumcision indeed set Jews apart—there is evidence for 
this from not only Jewish writers, but also Greek and Roman writers. Louis Feldman 
discusses a wide variety of ways that Greek and Roman writers reacted to circumcision, 
not all of which emphasize “nationalistic” ties, but more often they point out peculiarities 
with the practice.
198
 An interesting, but later, example from Suetonius also illustrates the 
significance of circumcision for identifying Jews in his The Lives of the Twelve Caesars. 
He discusses taxes levied by Domitian, saying: 
Besides other taxes, that on the Jews was levied with the utmost rigor, and those 
were prosecuted who without publicly acknowledging that faith yet lived as Jews, 
as well as those who concealed their origin and did not pay the tribute levied upon 
their people. I recall being present in my youth when the person of a man ninety 
years old was examined before the procurator and a very crowded court, to see 
whether he was circumcised.
199
 
   
It is clear that the practice of circumcision is linked with the Jewish people as a 
distinct community. This example also suggests that the individual was not clearly 
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identifiable as a Jew on other grounds. We must press further to understand how this 
distinctiveness associated with circumcision was understood. One must not assimilate all 
Jewish literature into one Jewish perspective that maintains ethnic or nationalistic 
distinctiveness.
200
 We should be especially apprehensive about this because the Diaspora 
writings scarcely make mention of circumcision. This is one of the more shocking 
realizations I have made in this study. Neither peritomh/ nor a)krobusti/a occur in any of 
the Diaspora Jewish writings we have considered, other than one reference in 4 Macc. 
4:25 to circumcision of Jewish sons being related to the suffering of some at the hands of 
Greek authorities. But, this reference does not single out circumcision as any different 
from other observance of the Jewish law. 
201
 Only Philo and Josephus make any 
significant references to circumcision. For Philo, circumcision was particular to the 
Jewish people, but it was not understood in an explicitly “nationalistic” or “ethnic” 
manner.
202
 Rather it was a symbol or an outward display of “the cutting out of pleasure 
and of all passion.”203 In this understanding, circumcision does not stand out any more 
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than other particularly Jewish commands. For Josephus, there is more of a sense of a 
connection with the Jewish people, of being something particular that identifies one as a 
Jew.
204
 
With the exception of Josephus, who wrote after the destruction of the temple and 
in circumstances quite different from the other Diaspora literature we’ve considered,205 
the general tendency in Diaspora Jewish literature is to understand circumcision not just 
as an ethnic identity marker or a badge of superiority. To be sure, it was a distinctive 
practice, a way of distinguishing Jew from Gentile. Yet, something must also be said 
about Diaspora Jewish writers other than Philo and Josephus not mentioning the 
command in their interpretations of the Jewish nomos and in their claims about ethical 
living.
206
 The best explanation seems to be that it was not a focal point of their 
interpretations of the law and of ethical living. Where we do encounter it in Philo and 
Josephus, as we have seen, its significance was understood in line with the general 
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arguments about the Jewish nomos we have described in chapter four above. That is, in 
the interpretations of the Jewish nomos reflected in Diaspora Jewish literature, the 
distinctiveness between Jew and Gentile was often not put in ethnic terms, but in ethical 
terms: the “just” and the “unjust.” Within this framework, circumcision represented a 
central tenet of the universalistic-yet-particularistic nature of the claims being made by 
Diaspora Jews. It should not be questioned whether Jews thought actual circumcision was 
necessary—at least for them. Their symbolic interpretation did not diminish the 
importance of keeping the command. Indeed, it may have served to heighten keeping the 
command (as in the case of 4 Maccabees). At the same time the nature of the Jewish 
arguments also saw the command as a particular way or realizing a more universal ethic. 
As with other particular Jewish commands, it was commonly understood as symbolic—of 
eliminating passions and vice and thus ultimately subordinate to the purposes of the 
ethical arguments made by Diaspora Jews.
207
 This is not to make a false distinction. But 
it is not simply possession of the law or the command of circumcision or simply ethnic 
distinctiveness that is the focus. This is part of the equation, but it should be understood 
within a larger cultural discourse about ethical living and transcendent vs. particular 
nomos within which many Diaspora Jews understood the commands of the Jewish 
nomos.
208
  
Against this context, Paul is not attacking an “ethnic” understanding of 
circumcision. Rather, he is drawing out the consequences of the Jewish perspective. If 
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circumcision served to make Jews distinct from Gentiles on the basis of ethical living 
(not covenant!) then Paul turns the argument. If, on the basis of the Diaspora claims, 
Gentiles and Jews have the same ethical goals, and Gentiles can do “the things of the law,” 
then those Gentiles should also be considered “circumcised” in a metaphorical sense—
insofar as Jews have considered the real meaning of circumcision as excising passion and 
vice. That is, if Gentiles keep God’s law, as they can according to the argument, then 
their obedience must also demonstrate their own cutting away of the desires of the flesh.  
At the end of this section of Romans 2, Paul has pointed out on the basis of 
common Diaspora Jewish arguments and perspectives that the “Jew” also breaks the law 
and is “unjust” before God. Paul is not arguing that the “Jew” is a flagrant transgressor of 
God’s nomos. Rather, Paul is using a common Diaspora understanding of the Jewish 
nomos—that the commands point to universal ethical virtue—to raise the question not of 
the Jew’s obedience to the Jewish commands, but to raise the question of the Jew’s 
achievement of the same ethical virtue to which the Gentile is held.  
Conclusion 
Our goal in this chapter has been to show how Diaspora Jewish interpretations of 
the law help us understand Paul’s argument in Romans 2. Particularly, we have sought to 
explain the conception of nomos in the argument and at the same time offer a reading that 
better integrates the Jewish perspective with which Paul was in conversation.  
As we have argued, Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law provide a coherent 
framework that explains the universality of nomos and how Paul can say that Gentiles can 
keep “the things of the law” as Gentiles. It also provides us with a new way to understand 
the Jewish “boast” that is more consistent with the overall Jewish perspective with which 
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Paul seems to be in conversation. Like their Greek and Roman counterparts, Diaspora 
Jewish literature shows how Jews asserted the authority and universality of Jewish ways 
of living expressed in the law. They did this in a variety of ways—by associating the law 
with transcendent conceptions of nomos, and by asserting that the law achieves what 
Greek paideia, wisdom, or philosophy aimed to achieve—cultivating the attainment of 
virtuous behaviors common to all humanity. The overall discourse was both ethical and 
political in that Greeks, Romans, and Jews adapted it to argue that the true realization of 
transcendent ethical norms was found in Greek, Roman, or Jewish manners of living.    
We saw that when Paul writes of the law as a universal standard for ethical living 
for Jew and Gentile in 2:13–15 and 26–28, he does not appeal to “law of nature” 
specifically. He did not need to since the universality of the law was assumed, being 
articulated in a number of ways. Paul does not reduce the law to “moral” norms, either 
when he attributes to Gentiles the ability to keep the law as Gentiles in 2:14–15 and 26–
27. The “reorientation” of the commands of the law provide the foundation for Paul to 
evaluate the fulfilling or breaking of nomos equally. The expectations of the universal 
nomos are no different for Jew or Gentile because the commands of the law were 
articulated in terms of commands of the Decalogue and other universally recognized 
virtues and vices.   
Not only does this context explain the conception of nomos in Romans 2, but it 
also gives us a new look on Paul’s argument in Romans 2. It is most likely that the 
arguments and interpretations of the Jewish nomos reflected in the Diaspora Jewish 
literature we considered were in some way known to Paul’s audience in Rome. That is, 
ethical living within the believing community was likely evaluated in terms of the 
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efficacy of the Jewish nomos to bring about ethical virtue and a life in accord with 
universal ethical behaviors. In Romans 2 Paul utilizes common elements of these 
interpretations of the law that were made within a shared web of discourse common 
among Greco-Roman writers. The point of the nomos discourse was to express for a 
common humanity a universal way of life that was in alignment with transcendent norms 
of justice and virtue. The point of Paul’s argument is to use this framework to 
demonstrate that Jew and Gentile are in fact equal with regard to ethical living, that when 
it comes to living in accord with universal nomos, neither Jew nor Gentile can claim the 
upper hand. The Jewish interpretations with which Paul was in conversation contained a 
certain claim: the Jewish people achieved universal virtue better than others, because the 
law was the clearest embodiment of transcendent nomos. The claim that obedience to the 
Jewish commands of the law was a superior way to achieve the universal ethic was of 
central importance. Paul’s argument tries to show by means of the example of Jewish 
transgression of common norms that this is not so. Paul then draws attention to the 
distinctive significance of circumcision as a symbol of Jewish ethical superiority. 
According to the logic of these interpretations, following the particular commands of the 
Jewish nomos are secondary to the pursuit and embodiment of virtue and justice.  
The point Paul lands on at the end of chapter 2 emphasizes the equality of Jew 
and Gentile on the basis of this web of discourse. Paul is not claiming that circumcision 
or particular Jewish commands of the law are insignificant. Nor is Paul arguing with a 
narrowly “nationalistic” Jewish perspective. The particularity Paul addresses is one of 
ethical superiority. It is works righteousness rooted in ethnic privilege, or ethnic privilege 
that finds its significance in ethical superiority based in obedience. Paul does not deny 
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that the law embodies God’s universal ethic. But Paul has called into question any stark 
distinction between Jew and Gentile made on the basis of living up to particular 
commands of the Jewish nomos. Jews may possess God’s nomos, but it points to and 
embodies universal and not particular commands. Paul’s concern is to stress that on the 
basis of keeping the universal commands of the law, there is no distinction between Jew 
and Gentile. 
Does Paul accept justification according to deeds? Yes, but justification that is  
not according to specifically Jewish commands of the law. Rather, it is obedience to 
commands of God’s universal nomos that results in being “just” (dikai/oj). The Jewish 
nomos points to this, but, as Paul points out, obedience to specific commands of the law 
do not necessarily lead to this. The Jew who claims ethical superiority on the basis of 
obedience to the particularly Jewish commands may still violate the universal behaviors 
to which the Jewish nomos points.  
How does this relate to the larger argument of 1:18–3:20? While we cannot take 
too much space here, I suggest that the entire section is not, on the whole, anything new 
or controversial to Paul’s audience. Rather, Paul is “reminding” his readers of the basic 
elements of the gospel message in which they stood and drawing attention to particular 
ethical points that he felt needed attention. His argument shows how he carefully draws 
attention to important ethical consequences. First, he does this within the framework they 
knew by presenting a basic summary of a common Diaspora Jewish ethical perspective in 
1:18–32 and 2:1–16. Second, on the basis of this ethical perspective Paul reminds his 
readers, specifically in 2:17–29, that with regard to ethical living, neither Jew nor Gentile 
has any advantage. The point is not to argue for how Jews and Gentiles are saved, but on 
418 
the basis of a common understanding, to draw attention to the important ethical point that 
being “just” is not by “works of the law” (3:20), whether understood in terms of the 
particularly Jewish commands or  universal and transcendent ethical principles and 
behaviors to which the commands point.
209
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Summary and Review 
This study began by asking questions about the conception of no/moj in Romans 2. 
We observed in the introduction that while Paul refers to the Jewish nomos, he writes of 
it in a way that has invited some confusion and debate. We also pointed out that three 
main components undergird the complex conception of no/moj upon which Paul’s 
argument relies, and these three components spark most of the confusion and debate. The 
three components are: (1) nomos is universal, (2) its commands can be kept by Gentiles, 
apart from possessing the Jewish nomos in concrete form, and (3) it is a basis upon which 
the Jew can boast over the Gentile, in spite of the law’s universality. We saw in the 
introduction that scholars have offered a number of attempts to explain the conception of 
the Jewish nomos in Romans 2. Not only have scholars differed in offering different 
Jewish explanations of the law, but they have also given different explanations of “the 
things of the law” that relate to the Jewish law but are kept by Gentiles. The resulting 
picture is that there is no clearly articulated answer to the question of nomos in Romans 2 
that adequately explains all three components. The task I set out was to identify a 
framework that explains this conception of the Jewish nomos.  
 Our journey has been one of describing how ancient writers wrote about nomos 
within political-ethical contexts. In chapter two we spent time connecting dots between 
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various writers’ statements about nomos and the larger social and cultural settings within 
which these writers participated. As we did this we outlined a basic grammar for 
nomos—a set of key structural elements that would shape any understanding of nomos in 
the Greco-Roman world. This consisted first in recognizing that nomos referred to that 
which was normative for political and ethical life. It was mainly understood as politically 
and culturally limited because it defined living for only the community for which it was 
normative. Nomos therefore not only defined ethical living, but also distinguished 
political and social communities from one another. Political and social changes in the 
ancient world led to the development of a new ‘inflection’ of nomos. This new ‘inflection’ 
allowed nomos to continue to be normative when the community for which it was 
normative was understood in terms of a common, universal humanity, not limited by 
social and political boundaries. This new ‘inflection’ developed in the face of 
cosmological, political, and philosophical changes, wherein it became necessary for 
nomos to refer to something transcendent and universal. There was a growing sense that 
there should not be many differing nomoi but one universal nomos, transcendent of 
contexts and authoritative to determine ethical living for one political community—that 
of all humanity. In this new understanding of nomos, three things stood out: (1) that it 
relates to God, (2) that it applies universally to all humanity with no distinction; (3) its 
“commands” were vaguely understood in terms of general ethical behaviors, rather than 
certain norms limited to a particular community.   
 This concern was also for many writers theological. In various ways the ultimate 
goal in the pursuit of virtue was alignment with divinely ordained expectations. This 
could be claimed by speaking of god or Zeus. It could also be claimed by referring to 
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fu/sij or even no/moj itself as being inherently divine, so that living in accord with one of 
these was in reality aligning with the divine order of the kosmos. For some writers 
aligning with the divine as the real goal, and living in accord with particular nomos was 
secondary or even a worthless pursuit. In light of divinely ordained standards, particular 
nomoi often were seen as short-sighted. Even though the pursuit of divine and 
transcendent standards rendered particular nomos as a secondary norm, it did not result in 
rendering particular nomos completely useless.  
As we saw in chapter three, Greek and Roman writers often drew upon 
conceptions of virtue and  vice to explain life in accord with transcendent nomos. In other 
words, the goal of living in accord with the various conceptions of transcendent nomos 
was the attainment of virtue and certain ethical behaviors that writers determined were 
exemplary of this pursuit, as well as the avoidance of certain vices. Particular nomos was 
evaluated on this basis as well. On the one hand it could help guide some people toward 
transcendent nomos. On the other hand, some writers would criticize certain nomoi based 
on their own perception of its ability to educate and direct a society toward justice and 
virtue. Many of these claims and arguments were not necessarily objective. Rather, the 
nomos discourse and the elements of the grammar of nomos we highlighted provided an 
avenue for Greek and Roman writers to either exalt or ridicule particular nomoi and 
customs in light of conceptions of transcendent nomos and universally recognized ethical 
pursuits. We also saw that the widespread nomos discourse and its associations with the 
pursuit of virtue dovetailed with many writers’ descriptions of the pursuit of philosophia 
and Sophia. For a number of Greek writers this appears in the way they exalted paideia 
as that which brought virtue to humanity. Roman writers who praised the greatness of 
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Roman laws and the triumph of Roman rule in bringing law and order to the world 
likewise used this framework and even usurped some of the claims made by Greek 
writers. These writers drew upon a broad foundation of expressions of universal and 
transcendent ethical norms. The nomos discourse, in an ironic twist, enabled writers to 
claim cultural and even ethnic superiority of what was particular on the basis of the same 
discourse that originally challenged particular nomos.  
 In this widespread discourse, nomos was not used as a way to define an ethical 
standard. The entire discourse also concerned political matters. That is, it was concerned 
with the ethical flourishing of communities and the establishment of one common ethic 
for all humanity. The attempt to define a transcendent ethical norm which shaped how 
writers thought about the not only ethical but also social formation, but also facilitated 
claims of the superiority of either Greek or Roman ways of life was an attempt at what 
we referred to as “social engineering.” That is, the Greek and Roman writers were not 
only interested in making grand claims about their ways of life; they were attempting to 
argue for the benefit of their ways of life for all humanity.  
 In chapter four, we saw that many Diaspora Jewish writers were in many ways no 
different than their Greek and Roman counterparts. Diaspora Jewish literature, through a 
wide variety of genres, demonstrates interaction with the widespread Greco-Roman 
discourse, using it to make claims about the Jewish nomos and Jewish ways of living. We 
saw this both in the various terms used as well as the overall frameworks used and 
arguments made by these writers. They asserted the authority of the Jewish nomos for all 
humanity. In form these claims were no different than those of Greek and Roman writers. 
What could have been seen as a particular “Jewish” nomos that prescribed particularly 
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“Jewish” ways of living became in their interpretations something that prescribed 
universal ethical commands. When these Jewish writers would describe the commands or 
transgressions of nomos, they rarely focused on what was particularly Jewish, but instead 
itemized general behaviors common to Greek ethical discourse, or that easily could be 
assimilated into this discourse such as the second table of the Decalogue. These writers 
were not solely concerned to defend the law or proselytize Gentiles in this endeavor. 
Their primary audience consisted of other Diaspora Jews, which means that these 
interpretations and explanations of the Jewish nomos were intended to have explanatory 
power for other Jews. It shaped Jewish identity just as much as it defended or explained 
the Jewish nomos. The line between living in accord with universally recognized ethical 
or virtuous behaviors and living according to the Jewish nomos was quite thin.  
Jewish particularity, however, was not eradicated. In this “reorientation” of the 
law, particular Jewish commands were neither dismissed completely, nor were they the 
focus of attention. Particular Jewish commands, when they received focus, were 
“reoriented” to align with conceptions of transcendent nomos and common Greek and 
Roman virtues and ethical behaviors. Even the one writing that created the strongest 
dichotomy between Jew and Gentile—4 Maccabees—finds the dietary commands’ 
significance in its capability to lead to the conquering of passion and the acquisition of 
virtue. The outcome is that the Jewish nomos was used, like Greek paideia, as a way of 
“social engineering.” That is, by interpreting the Jewish nomos in this way, these Jewish 
writers claimed that obedience to the Jewish law was the best way to virtue and ethical 
dikaoisu/nh for all humanity. They claimed distinction from Gentiles primarily in terms 
of ethical practice and obedience to conceptions of universal nomos, which they as a 
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people achieve more fully because their nomos educates and embodies universal 
behaviors and ethical virtues.  
While it is tempting to speak of one coherent “Diaspora Jewish” conception of 
nomos, it would be a mistake to do so. As we saw at the end of chapter four there is 
considerable diversity in the ways Diaspora Jewish writers would interpret the Jewish 
nomos. Nevertheless, there are broad commonalities which suggests that many Diaspora 
Jewish writers were each, as it were, coloring in the same picture but with different colors, 
drawing attention to different elements. The main points in common creates a general set 
of common claims as these writers interpreted the Jewish nomos in interaction with the 
Greco-Roman discourse. The main points of this are that (1) the law is rooted in its origin 
as coming from the one God of all humanity. As such (2) it is described in a way that the 
particular commands find their meaning in the way they foster a way of life that leads to 
virtue and ethical dikaiosu/nh. Some writers argued that the particular commands of the 
law lead or guide people to virtue. For other writers the law does not prescribe anything 
particularly Jewish but rather common ethical behaviors. It is just that the common 
ethical behaviors prescribed by God are in concrete form in the Jewish nomos. In spite of 
the diversity, the overarching claim is that the Jewish nomos leads to the cultivation and 
attainment of ethical goals that trace throughout Greco-Roman nomos discourse. Because 
of this (3) the Jewish nomos is a universal nomos to which all humanity is equally 
accountable and keeping its commands is not the privilege of only the Jew. There is a 
general sense in which Gentiles can keep (some of) the commands of this universal 
nomos. At some level, then, Gentiles do follow the Jewish nomos. These writings place 
Jews and Gentiles as equals in the pursuit of virtue, paideia, and living in accordance 
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with a transcendent and universal nomos. Nevertheless, (4) the Jewish people, because 
they possess this universal nomos in written form achieve Greek ethical ideals better than 
any other political community. There is a political and social distinction between Jew and 
Gentile, but this distinction is situated within the framework of the pursuit of being a 
“just” or an “unjust” people.  
As I argued in the final chapter, this general Diaspora Jewish framework of the 
law provides the foundational framework of understanding upon which Paul’s conducts 
his argument in Romans 1:18–2:29. I explained how the Diaspora Jewish conception of 
nomos satisfactorily makes sense of all three elements of the conception of nomos in 
Romans 2—its universality, the claim that Gentiles keep the law, and the nature of the 
particular claim. Based on this framework nomos in Romans 2 refers to the Jewish nomos 
understood in terms of the universalizing interpretations common in Diaspora Jewish 
literature. It is a nomos to which all humanity is accountable and by which all humanity 
will be judged. Paul’s statement that Gentiles “do the things of the law” is not a strange 
or outlandish claim, but rather is part of these Diaspora Jewish interpretations. By 
universalizing the Jewish nomos and “reorienting” its commands as in accord with virtue 
or describing the commands as being equal with universal ethical behaviors, the 
likelihood of Gentile obedience is expected. Nevertheless, this Gentile “doing” of “the 
things of the law” happens by those who are “by nature” outside of the direct influence of 
the most virtuous nomos. Positing Gentile obedience is not a threat to the Jewish 
perspective, since according to the Jewish literature itself, such obedience was inferior. 
Paul summarizes these main points in 2:1–16, stressing that being “just” or “unjust” is 
determined by obedience to God’s nomos and that it applies to all humanity. We saw that 
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Paul is not attempting to argue for the universality of the law, but rather is using 
important elements of common Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law that already 
interpret the law as universal. 
In 2:17–29 Paul then addresses the particular Jewish boast in the law in light of 
the foundation established in 2:1–16 and universality of the law. The language Paul uses 
is drawn directly from common Diaspora Jewish claims that usurped the claims of 
Greeks and Romans to the same effect. The claim was that right ethical living and being 
“just” was found in Jewish ways of life. Not only that, it was also argued that the Jewish 
people, because they possessed God’s universal no/moj in written form, lived in 
accordance with universal ethical behaviors better than others. The Jewish boast, as we 
saw, was in the Jew’s position as an ethical educator of the world. Paul argues, however, 
on the basis of common Diaspora Jewish arguments, that the Jew is no more ethical than 
Gentiles since, in spite of their particular manners of living, they still do not fully live in 
accord with universal ethical standards. As I argued, Paul’s questions in 2:21–24 do not 
upend Jewish “nationalism” or “ethnic superiority.” Such an argument, in light of the 
Jewish prophetic literature, would not work. Paul’s overall point is that neither Jew nor 
Gentile can claim to be “just” (dikai/oj) when one considers how both groups violate the 
universal commands of God’s nomos. Jews may be circumcised and possess God’s 
universal nomos in written form, but this does not mean that they have actually “cut out” 
passions and vice from their lives. On the basis of the wider web of discourse neither Jew 
nor Gentile can claim ethical superiority. Gentiles may be able to do “the things of the 
law” but they still live “unjustly”; Jews may live with the privilege of possessing the 
written form of God’s law, but they still violate God’s ethical demand to which all people 
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are accountable. Paul’s purpose is to say that obedience to particularly Jewish commands 
should not be a point of differentiation between Jew and Gentile since they do not lead to 
ethical virtue.  
Contributions of the Study 
I would like to now suggest contributions of this study with regard to the 
following areas: (1) situating Paul in conversation with his contexts; (2) the law in 
Second Temple Judaism; (3) the law and ethical living in Paul’s letters.  
Paul and either Judaism or Hellenism? 
This study hopefully provides an example of a “thicker” understanding of 
interpretations of the law in Paul’s milieu by situating Paul in conversation with Diaspora 
Jewish interpretations of the law and their interaction with Greco-Roman conceptions of 
nomos. We have argued that it is precisely the engagement with the Greco-Roman web of 
discourse that allows us to more fully understand the Diaspora Jewish interpretations of 
the law we considered in chapter four. Failure to consider the ways in which these 
Diaspora Jewish writers explained or modified elements of Jewish life and the Jewish 
nomos in interaction with the wider culture would be like interpreting modern Christian 
claims about the gospel or about faith without seeing how these claims resonate with 
modern culture in significant ways. It would result in a poorer understanding of the 
nature of Christian claims today.  
This aligns with the approach advocated in a collection by scholars aiming to 
interpret Paul beyond the “Judaism/Hellenism” divide.1 The essays draw attention to two 
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 Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2001). 
  
428 
emphases. First, that interpreting Paul should look not just to establish Paul’s 
“background.” Instead they advocate interpreting Paul within “contexts” in which he 
lived. Second, these scholars argue that any dichotomy between Judaism and Hellenism 
should be given up.
2
 Such a stark dichotomy is not entirely accurate.
3
 As Wayne Meeks 
points out, this opposition or dichotomy that assumes that the meeting of the two is a 
“battleground” likely results from two things.4 First, ancient history itself. The tension 
reflected between Judaism and Hellenism is found mainly in 1 & 2 Maccabees. Meeks 
rightly draws attention to the difficulty of attributing too much stability to this. This 
literature served as propaganda for a support of the Jewish writers and their causes. The 
complexity of the actual interactions between Judaism and Hellenism suggests that ideas 
of such a stark opposition should not be considered normative. The second point from 
which the tension emerges, and the one to which Meeks ascribes more weight, is “the 
history of modern scholarship.” For Meeks, scholarship, in part relying upon what we 
find in Maccabees, in part trying to distance Judaism and Early Christianity from its 
“pagan” opposition, has assumed a tension between Hellenism and Judeo-Christian 
history. 
 Meeks’ first point about the nature of ancient evidence may be without the 
nuance given to the matter by Barclay in his book Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora.
5
 
At the same time, however, and even with his reservations, Barclay’s book shows that the 
                                                             
2
 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide,” in Paul Beyond the 
Judaism / Hellenism Divide, 1–3. 
 
3
 Ibid., 3.  
 
4
 For what follows see Meeks, “Judaism, Hellenism, and the Birth of Christianity,” 17–18. 
 
5
 Cf. Barclay’s helpful grid to analyze assimilation, acculturation, and accommodation (Jews, 82–
102). 
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Judaism / Hellenism opposition is problematic. Jews may have opposed certain elements 
of Greco-Roman religion and culture, but at the same time they shared much in common 
from language, to the use of literary forms of expression, to philosophical and ethical 
commonplaces that were part of the fabric of the ancient world. Even if Greeks, Romans, 
and Jews (and Paul) all brought different traditions to the table—which they did—they 
did so as they simultaneously participated in and constructed a shared context. Thus, as 
we have seen, particular traditions were adapted to and shaped by the common cultural 
discourses to which they were applied. Not only that, but these various writers also 
shaped those cultural discourses. In other words, there is no singular or unique 
perspective on nomos that can be called Jewish, Greek, or Roman in an isolated way. 
That the importance of interpreting Paul in conversation with more complex webs 
of discourse has not entirely been taken hold of can be seen in two ways. First, a number 
of studies that attempt to understand references to the Jewish nomos in Paul tend to focus 
on interpreting Jewish views of the law almost as if they were conducted in opposition to 
or isolation from substantive engagement with any surrounding Greco-Roman discourse. 
This is not to say that scholarship is not aware of parallels to or even some conversation 
with what we find in Greco-Roman writers, but that the level of engagement with the 
broader context is piecemeal and not substantive. For example, Frank Thielman, in his 
wide ranging study Paul and the Law, registers no interaction with this larger framework. 
The collection of important essays from the third Durham-Tübingen Research 
Symposium in 1994, entitled Paul and the Mosaic Law likewise gives very little attention 
to situating Jewish understandings of the law within its Greco-Roman context. Dunn’s 
The Theology of Paul the Apostle draws attention to certain Greco-Roman parallels here 
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and there, but does not deal with Jewish engagement with Greco-Roman perspectives at a 
more substantial level of a shared discourse.
6
 As we have shown in this study, such 
analysis of Jewish engagement with the shared cultural discourses provides the 
possibility for much insight.  
Second, we see that the contrast continues in a recent monograph by Niko 
Huttunen on Paul and the law with a specific focus on Paul’s Greek counterpart 
Epictetus.
7
 Huttunen focuses on a comparison of Paul and a Greek philosopher primarily 
because study of Paul’s view of the law with consideration to “gentile texts” is “with few 
exceptions—ignored.”8 For Huttunen, this is problematic because “Paul’s sayings on 
law—like any other thing he said—were uttered under the influence of the Greco-Roman 
context.”9 This is no doubt true and Huttunen’s approach to compare Paul with Greco-
Roman writers is needed and useful. At the same time Huttunen’s words betray the 
ongoing latent divide between Judaism and Hellenism. Yes, Paul the Diaspora Jew 
should be interpreted in comparison or conversation with Greek and Roman writers. Yes, 
he should be interpreted in comparison or conversation with Jewish writers. But to do 
either of these in isolation yields, in my estimation, results that only continue to enforce 
the use of Judaism or Hellenism as “pawns in a power game” in spite of our best 
                                                             
6
 Of recent scholars who discuss Paul and the law, only three draw any significant attention to 
understanding Paul and Judaism within their broader context of complex interaction with Greco-Roman 
perspectives. S. Stowers, Rereading; T. Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric; U. Schnelle, Apostle Paul, 506–21). 
Schnelle specifically draws attention to the failure of scholarship to engage substantially with this more 
complex web of discourse (Apostle Paul, 506, 509–10). 
  
7
 Niko Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison (London: T & T Clark International, 
2009). 
 
8
  Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus, 2. 
 
9
 Ibid., 2. 
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intentions.
10
 Moreover, it misses a significant part of the discourse—the active interaction 
between Jewish and Greco-Roman perspectives. 
The present study has attempted to show the significance of seeking to understand 
Paul “in conversation with” his complex contexts—as a participant in a shared cultural 
discourse. In the words of Wayne Meeks, “we came to see the Diaspora of the Jews (and 
also Paul!) as no longer peculiar—however many distinctive features it might have—but 
part of a much broader phenomenon.”11 As we have seen, many of the Diaspora writers 
do not just react to the Greco-Roman discourses; they participate in the widespread 
conversation in ways that suggest something more is happening than reacting to the “evil” 
Greco-Roman culture. As Engberg-Pedersen points out, and as we have seen, Greek, 
Roman, and Diaspora Jewish understandings of nomos all had their distinct elements, but 
they are also all part of the “Hellenistic” discourse.12  
It is “within (this) contemporary cross-cultural web” that we have found the 
meaning of Paul’s references to nomos in Romans 2.13 That is, by placing the Diaspora 
Jewish writers in conversation with Greco-Roman discussions about nomos, we have 
been able to see how the understanding of the Jewish nomos took on certain forms as a 
result of engagement with discussions in the Greco-Roman world. One notable benefit is 
that it is as a result of reading the Jewish literature in conversation with the Greco-Roman 
discourses that we can see the complexity of the Jewish view of the law, that it cannot be 
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 Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide,” 3. 
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reduced to either “legalism” or “nationalistic” righteousness. This also enables us to see 
Paul not disagreeing with the Jewish nomos alone, or with Judaism as an either “legalistic” 
or ethnically particularistic religion. For Paul, the entire moral discourse built upon 
seeking to elevate one community’s manner of existence over another as “more virtuous” 
or ethically superior is bankrupt. Finally, as I shall suggest below, reading Paul in 
conversation with this broader context also enables us to evaluate in new light the 
difficulties with Paul’s statements about the law and how Paul relates to the law in his 
ethical and theological thought.  
The Law in Second Temple Judaism 
When it comes to understanding the law in second temple Judaism, the terms 
“covenantal nomism” and “New Perspective on Paul” have enjoyed a great deal of 
popularity. These are not synonymous, but they often are lumped together as they hold in 
common a general view of the law in Second Temple Judaism. The “New Perspective” is, 
according to James Dunn who coined the phrase, the natural descendent of E.P. Sanders’ 
“covenantal nomism.”14 Both Dunn’s articulation of Judaism according to the “New 
Perspective” and Sanders’ description of Second Temple (Palestinian) Judaism, however, 
are specific expressions of a wider phenomenon rooted in a general understanding of 
Second Temple Judaism (at least of primarily Palestinian provenance) as not being 
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 James Dunn, “The New Perspective on Paul,” in The New Perspective on Paul, 99–120. Dunn 
expresses that he agrees with Sanders’ re-evaluation of Judaism, but not with his interpretation of Paul 
(104–05). See also “The New Perspective on Paul: Paul and the Law,” in The New Perspective on Paul, 
142: “Unfortunately Sanders did not follow through this insight (of covenantal nomism) far enough or with 
sufficient consistency.” From this basis he attempts to argue for a “new perspective” on Paul and Paul’s 
relationship with the Judaism of his day.  
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“legalistic” or having a merit-salvation.15 In this re-evaluation of Judaism, the law has 
become understood not as a legalistic code, associated with “legalism” or “works-
righteousness,” where obedience to its commands results in their salvation. Rather it is 
presented as a code of living for a people already “saved by grace.”16  
E.P. Sanders famously described the Jewish “pattern of religion” in which the law 
is a significant component as “covenantal nomism.”17 Sanders wrote that “covenantal 
nomism is the view that one’s place in God’s plan is established on the basis of the 
covenant and that the covenant requires as the proper response of man his obedience to 
its commandments, while providing means of atonement for transgression.”18 Later 
Sanders summarizes in some detail the main elements of covenantal nomism: 
(1) God has chosen Israel and (2) given the law. The law implies both (3) God’s 
promise to maintain the election and (4) the requirement to obey. (5) God rewards 
obedience and punishes transgression. (6) The law provides for means of 
atonement, and atonement results in (7) maintenance or re-establishment of the 
covenantal relationship. (8) All those who are maintained in the covenant by 
obedience, atonement and God’s mercy belong to the group which will be saved. 
An important interpretation of the first and last points is that election and 
ultimately salvation are considered to be by God’s mercy rather than human 
achievement.
19
 
 
The crucial element to this understanding of the law was that the law should be 
understood within the framework of a gracious act of God in establishing a covenant with 
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 Sanders discusses a number of scholars on Judaism who preceded him in an attempt to give a 
“more fair” interpretation of Judaism (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 33–59). N.T. Wright, “The Paul of 
History and the Apostle of Faith,” Tyndale Bulletin 29 (1978), 70; James Dunn, “The New Perspective on 
Paul: Paul and the Law,” 141–42; 145–46.   
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 Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 419, 420, 427. 
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 Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 419–428. 
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Israel. The function of the law and obedience to the law in this framework should be 
understood in terms of participation in the covenant community—“staying in” the 
covenant.
20
 Independently of Sanders N.T. Wright stated slightly differently that the law 
should be understood “not as a legalist’s ladder but as a charter of national privilege, so 
that, for the Jew, possession of the law is three parts of salvation.”21 This has been 
developed by Dunn who has emphasized based on this general perspective that the law 
represented an ethnic or social distinctiveness between Israel and the Gentiles.
22
 Gentiles 
were outside of God’s people because they were not a people of the covenant and did not 
have the law.  
In the past few decades, this understanding of the Jewish law has influenced many 
studies on Judaism, Paul, and the law.
23
 At present it is safe to say that the “New 
Perspective on Paul” and the general view of the law upon which it stands is no longer 
new in Pauline scholarship.
24
 In fact, for many scholars we are now moving into a “post-
New Perspective” era.25 But there is reason to think that we are not yet there, as a number 
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 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 419–28; Dunn, “The New Perspective on Paul,” 145–
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 N.T. Wright, “The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith,” 65–66. 
 
22
 Dunn, “The New Perspective,” 146–49.  
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 This is especially true of the premise that Judaism is not “legalistic” and that the Jewish law is 
for “staying in” the covenant. Cf. also Simon Gathercole, “Early Judaism and Covenantal Nomism: A 
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 See e.g. Don Garlington, In Defense of the New Perspective on Paul: Essays and Reviews 
(Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2005), 1. 
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 A. Andrew Das, Paul, the Law, and the Covenant (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2001) 268–73; B. 
Byrne, “Interpreting Romans Theologically in a Post-‘New Perspective’ Perspective,” HTR 94 (2001) 227–
41; idem., “Interpreting Romans: The New Perspective and Beyond,” Int 58 (2004) 241–52; Francis 
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Eerdmans, 2007); Michael Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God: Studies on Paul, Justification, and the 
New Perspective (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2007) 179–83. 
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of scholars continue to address this general perspective directly either arguing for or 
against it.
26
 Some of these recognize some strengths of “covenantal nomism,” but still 
assert that Sanders and others have only replaced one lop-sided perspective of Second 
Temple Judaism with another.
27
 To re-balance things, some scholars have argued that 
Jews emphasized “doing” the commands and keeping the law for “righteousness.”28 
Additionally it has been argued that the Jewish law cannot be reduced to a social or 
ethnic boundary marker and that obedience to the law is not limited to “staying in.”29 
Perhaps the most significant example is the two-volume assessment and challenge to 
covenantal nomism, Justification and Variegated Nomism.
30
 In the first volume, subtitled 
The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism, a number of scholars surveyed Second 
Temple Jewish literature and questioned the degree to which the pattern of religion in all 
Second Temple Judaism is indeed “covenantal nomism” as well as whether obedience to 
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 Most recently, A. Andrew Das, “Paul and Works of Obedience in Second Temple Judaism: 
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the law has more to it than just “staying in the covenant.”31 In general those who have  
most strongly challenged covenantal nomism wish to maintain a view of the Jewish law 
similar to what Herman Ridderbos expresses in his Paul: An Outline of His Theology:  
The law is the unique means to acquire for oneself merit, reward, righteousness 
before God, and the instrument given by God to subjugate the evil impulse and to 
lead the good to victory. It can rightly be said, therefore, that for the Jews the law 
was the pre-eminent means of salvation, indeed the real “substance of life.32 
  
Not all of those who have found problems with Sanders’ new perspective about Judaism 
and the law would agree with the entire statement. Nevertheless, Ridderbos’ statement 
exemplifies the significance of obedience to the law as a means of righteousness, an 
emphasis that has been de-emphasized by “covenantal nomism.”33 Others have registered 
similar statements. Thomas Schreiner writes that “Jewish nationalism and exclusivism 
cannot be neatly separated from Jewish obedience to the law…It was not sufficient to be 
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 It should be noted, however, that not all of the scholars in this volume disagreed with Sanders 
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ethical virtue (“Philo of Alexandria,” 357–79).  
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an ethnic Israelite; one also had to obey Torah.”34 According to Simon Gathercole, while 
there is diversity in how it is expressed, “obedience is a vital basis for receiving eternal 
life” in Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphal texts.35 
Recently (2008) James Dunn has given a thorough response to criticisms, 
recognizing some of the strengths of the critics’ arguments, but also pressing for the  
ongoing validity of covenantal nomism.
36
 He attempted to clarify that there is more to the 
Torah than its function as a social boundary-defining marker between Jews as God’s 
people and non-Jews as “sinners” by nature (Gal. 2:15).37 But for Dunn, this does not 
undermine “covenantal nomism”; it lies within the essence of “covenantal nomism” 
which emphasizes the “interrelationship” between covenant and law.38 It is just that in 
some of the Jewish literature the “nomism” aspect can be quite strong.39  
Dunn seems to be saying what a few others have said in their responses to 
“covenantal nomism.” That is, many of those critical of it have, in spite of the rhetoric 
involved, have actually noted the equal importance of obedience and election or 
covenant.
40
 Stephen Westerholm even pointed out that setting up stark alternatives 
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 So e.g. Gathercole, Where is Boasting?, 263–65; Das, Paul, the Law, and the Covenant, 43–44, 
69. Chris Van Landingham in particular has pointed out in a very nuanced manner challenge the “ethno-
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between “nationalistic righteousness” or “ethnic boundaries” and a Judaism rooted in 
“works righteousness” is to pose a false dichotomy.41 It is clear that the tendency to over-
emphasize either side of the debate should be faulted for trying to categorize the 
understanding of the law in Second Temple Judaism too rigidly. The above debate 
suggests that Jews interpreted the law in terms of both national or ethnic distinctiveness 
and ethical obedience.
42
 The “covenantal nomism” group rightly emphasizes an ethnic or 
social (or both!) component to the understanding of the law. The law was not associated 
only with doing works, and a view that reduces the Jewish understanding of the law to 
“legalism” or “works-righteousness” alone is certainly incomplete or even misguided. 
Several of Paul’s statements concerning the law do demand that it played a role in 
distinguishing Jew from Gentile
43
 and Paul never outrightly speaks of “legalism.” On the 
other hand, one significant problem with “covenantal nomism” and the “New Perspective” 
is that, in the words of John Gager, the “emphasis on Jewish ethnic pride reverts to the 
outmoded, unhistorical dichotomy between Jewish particularism and Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
centric” understanding of Judaism and the latent idea that Second Temple Jewish theology considered Jews 
exempt from judgment because of possession of the law or covenant status. He writes that “ample evidence 
suggests that God is merciful, forgiving, and loving (to the benefit of Israel throughout its history and its 
citizens throughout their lives), but this mercy does not mean that God overlooks a person’s character at the 
Last Judgment…Likewise, Jews did not perceive in God’s covenant with Israel a guarantee of eternal life 
for descendants of Abraham…Many eventually interpreted the covenant promise of physical life as a 
promise of eternal life with the only stipulation being obedience. Many authors did not believe that the 
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universalism.”44 That is, it turns the Jews with which Paul was in conversation into an 
exclusivist social-ethnic community who condemned all who were not them. Paul is 
forced to try and make his Jewish counterparts see that God’s salvation is for Jew and 
Gentile, and to get them to see past their own ethnic superiority.
45
 The problem with this 
is that we have seen in Diaspora Jewish literature that the law was universalized and not 
seen as just a particular ethnic boundary marker. On the other side there is something to 
be said about drawing attention to the issue of obedience as Paul’s statements and 
criticisms betray an association between the law and works in the Jewish view of the law. 
This is not works that simply reinforce social or ethnic distinctions, but works that are 
linked directly with being “just” in God’s sight.46 The whole of Romans 2 is a significant 
passage in that both the emphasis on works and on Israel’s distinctiveness play important 
roles. 
There are two main problems with the above debate about the law in Judaism. 
These problems find their way into much of the work establishing the “New Perspective” 
view and arguing against it. First, much of the debate has been based on a construction of 
Judaism that was limited to Palestinian Jewish and rabbinic literature.
47
 This is not to say 
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440 
that non-Palestinian Jewish literature has not been involved. But it is brought into the 
discussion and placed under the lens of “covenantal nomism” rather than on its own 
terms. Scholars have used Diaspora Jewish literature to either find or refute certain 
elements of “covenantal nomism.” A focus on Diaspora Judaism on its own terms and in 
conversation with Greco-Roman arguments has received little attention.
48
 This is 
surprising because even while claiming that “covenantal nomism” is found in Diaspora 
Judaism, Sanders adds an important caveat that “one finds important emphases in 
Hellenistic Jewish theology which are not extant in any Palestinian literature.”49 By not 
assuming that “all Judaism is (equally) Hellenistic Judaism” we have in this study opened 
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up the possibility of focusing more on specific arguments within Diaspora Judaism. The 
fulcrum of our understanding is the larger context in which the Jewish perspectives on the 
law and on Jewish life have emerged. The Greco-Roman context does not entirely 
remove particularity or the “covenant” in relation to the law. The ancient discourse was, 
as we saw, one of “social engineering” around the widespread pursuit of ethical virtue. 
But this context does suggest another element at play in the understanding of the law. 
This leads to the second main problem. Because of this lens under which Diaspora 
literature has been placed, most of the scholarship focuses on the law as something given 
within the boundaries of Israel’s covenant. The law, it is assumed, is something that 
applies to only Israel. Because of this the whole debate about “works” in relation to 
righteousness proceeds on the basis that those who are judged as righteous or unrighteous 
according to the law are Jews to whom the law was given. The arguments thus focus on 
how the law either emphasizes the necessity of obedience for Jews to be vindicated, or 
whether Jews, because they possess the law and covenant, are saved regardless of the 
level of obedience. Either way, the emphasis lies on understanding the law and obedience 
to the law within the closed circle of Judaism over against Gentiles.
50
   
The singular change of seeing that the Jewish nomos was interpreted as a 
universal and transcendent nomos that embodies universal ethical standards for all 
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humanity significantly reorients how we understand this issue. It shifts the framework for 
understanding the law and its commands, as we noted above in chapter four, from the 
giving of the covenant to Israel to a framework that incorporates and is driven by the 
establishment of God’s universal nomos to which all humanity is accountable. This is a 
point noted mostly by suggestion in several of the essays in the first volume of 
Justification and Variegated Nomism.
51
 Our study has attempted to articulate this 
difference in framework with more detail and clarity. Because of the Greco-Roman web 
of discourse within which many Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law take place, 
keeping the commands of the law does not result only in “staying in” the covenant. 
According to these interpretations obedience to the law’s commands does not maintain 
Jewish status as God’s covenant people, but leads to being a dikai/oj people. Keeping the 
commands of the universalized Jewish nomos makes an individual and a community “just” 
and virtuous. What we have seen in the interpretations and arguments reflected in the 
Diaspora Jewish writings we considered is not “covenantal nomism”; rather, it is 
something like “cultural-ethical nomism.” 
Seeing things within this wider framework has shown us that the understanding of 
the law with which Paul was in conversation in Romans cannot be reduced to a “legalistic” 
or “works righteousness” understanding; neither was it simply “nationalistic” or one of 
“ethnic superiority.” It was an ethnic superiority rooted in ethical obedience. This appears 
much like “covenantal nomism” with one very significant difference: the significance of 
obedience to the law pertains not just to Jews and their obligation as being in God’s 
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covenant. Rather obedience is understood on the basis of participation in the Greco-
Roman ethical discourse. It is observance of the commands of the one law which the one 
God gave to all humanity. Obedience and “righteousness” on the basis of obedience is 
held out to Gentiles as well. In other words, the law is not limited to God’s covenant. The 
power of the Jewish boast in the law is observance of universally known ethical norms 
through the commands of the particular Jewish no/moj.  
At the same time, the Diaspora Jewish literature we have discussed does not 
devalue ethnic significance related to the law. We agree that there was a distinctive 
ethnic-social element. In these Diaspora Jewish interpretations, this ethnic-social element 
stood upon obedience as well as possession of the law. The law which Jews possessed 
and obeyed was given for the purpose of ethical virtue; it found its significance on the 
stage of universal ethical discourse. Obedience is not for the purpose of “staying in” the 
covenant and thereby be a people distinct from others. Obedience to the law leads to the 
same ethical virtue toward which Greeks and Romans strove. Obedience leads to virtue 
which makes Israel “just.” Distinctiveness is found in the achievement of virtue on the 
basis of the law, not in “election” and thus being God’s special people just because of 
possession of the law. Jews may achieve virtue because of God’s covenant or giving of 
the law, but such a claim is hard to find in most of the Diaspora interpretations of the law. 
As we saw, there are references to the Decalogue and to Moses giving the law, but little 
emphasis placed on a covenant by which Israel is “safe” from God’s judgment.   
As we noted in the introduction, not all understandings of the Jewish nomos are 
the same. There is much said in Second Temple Judaism about the law, and differences in 
the frameworks in which we find interpretations of the Jewish law influences the claims 
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they made. We do not want to make the same general mistake of substituting one “all-
Jewish” view of the law with another. In other words, substituting an old “legalistic” or 
“works-righteousness” view of the law with a newer, more improved “covenantal 
nomism” does not answer all of the problems and questions. Hermann Lichtenberger 
importantly writes that  
(i)t would be fatal if Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism, which has been a 
standard work for some time, suffered the same fate as Billerbeck’s Kommentar 
zum NT aus Talmud und Midrasch, which by its monumental fullness…released a 
whole generation of scholars from any independent study of the sources. Even 
after Sanders the question of the Jewish law is still at issue.
52
 
  
In investigating in detail the understanding of nomos in Romans 2, we have 
entered into the vast and complex world of Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law. 
What we have seen in this study is a particular understanding of the Jewish nomos upon 
which Paul constructs his argument to his particular audience in Rome. This Judaism 
with which Paul is in conversation certainly does not stand for Second Temple Judaism. 
It is contextual. That is, we have described a particular set of arguments and 
interpretations about the Jewish nomos that are part of a certain web of discourse in the 
Greco-Roman world. Paul’s argument in Romans 2 is likewise contextual as it depends 
upon this web of discourse. Thus, my study is not meant to replace “covenantal nomism,” 
as if I were arguing for a whole Jewish pattern of religion. We have, however, drawn 
attention to an important understanding of the law in Diaspora Judaism that is different 
from “covenantal nomism” and it is one in conversation with which Paul developed one 
of his more significant arguments about the law. 
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Paul and the Law 
The effect of our study on both of the above areas means that there is room for 
reconsideration of certain elements of the larger issue of Paul and the law. In the 
following pages, I will take what I have argued concerning Paul’s engagement with the 
Diaspora Jewish framework of understanding the law and apply it, by way of suggestion, 
more widely to what Paul says outside of Romans. I will briefly comment on the 
following issues: (1) Paul’s “problem” with the law; (2) Paul’s apparent “oscillation” 
between nomos as the particular Jewish law and nomos as a universal standard; (3) the 
ongoing significance of the law for Paul’s ethical instruction. 
Paul’s “Problem” with the Law  
If the conception of the Jewish law with which Paul was in conversation in the 
letter to the Romans is what we have described in this study, then the “problem” Paul has 
with the law should receive some reconsideration. Within the generally accepted 
interpretation of the “New Perspective,” the problem Paul had with the law is that it is 
used to exclude Gentiles from participating in the people of God. Gentiles, because they 
do not possess the law and are thus outside of the covenant people, must take upon 
themselves the “works of the law.” 
Based on our work, we saw that in Romans 2 the problem Paul had was not that 
Gentiles were not being allowed to be “in” the covenant community, but that being “just” 
(dikai/oj) cannot happen apart from obedience to the law. The issue at stake in the 
Roman community composed of both Jew and Gentile related to the common issue of the 
day: how is an individual and a community “just” (dikaio/j)? The argument in Romans 2, 
on the interpretation I offer, seems to significant links with the problem reflected in 
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Romans 14 where community members were evaluating—judging—on the basis of living 
in accord with the law (Rom. 14:1–23). That is, Paul’s argument in Romans 2 may be 
intended to provide a foundation to address those who lived in accord with the law’s 
particular commands (food laws, Sabbath, etc.) and may have considered themselves 
more ethically “just” than those who did not. His point is to undermine this sort of 
perspective by arguing from its own basic premises.  
The issue was not one of being in or out of the covenant, but of ethical 
dikaiosu/nh. Paul’s problem, seen in this context, is with the use of one particular manner 
of living as a way toward “justice” (dikaiosu/nh) and its ethnic/social consequences. 
Such claims cannot be made because according to Paul’s evaluation humans as a matter 
of fact sin regardless of what nomos they claim to follow. No one attains “justice” 
(dikaiusu/nh). In Paul’s thought the Jewish nomos—and any nomos for that matter—only 
leads to the knowledge of sin and is incapable in itself of bringing about the dikaiosu/nh 
to which it points (3:20; 7:1–14). Within this framework Paul’s argument in Romans 2 
emphasizes that there is no place for distinction or judgment on the basis of “works of the 
law.” From Paul’s perspective, the arguments in the community were only creating 
division on the basis of particular manifestations of transcendent nomos where there 
should be unity on the basis of the ethical goals to which they point (13:8–10). In this 
pursuit of dikaiosu/nh all humanity falls short of God’s law (Rom. 3:23; 7:1–25), and 
therefore arguments and judgments based in claims to virtue and “justice” on the basis of 
keeping nomos are futile. In this light, Paul’s “problem” with the law is not a mark of 
difference from or opposition to Judaism—at least the one with which he was in 
conversation. Paul’s evaluation of the law actually is one within the possibilities and 
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arguments put forth by Diaspora Jews. He upheld the value of the law as understood 
within the Diaspora Jewish framework, but also recognized the futility of the entire 
endeavor.  
Paul’s “Oscillation” between a Particular and Universal Nomos  
As we noted in this study, the apparent oscillation between particular and 
universal nomos in Romans 2 is explained when we see that Paul is relying upon 
Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the Jewish nomos. But this problem is not limited to 
Romans 2. Several scholars mention Romans 7:1–12, 22, 25, and 8:7 as places where 
Paul uses nomos in a way that may refer to either the Jewish nomos or some universal 
nomos.
53
 Heikki Räisänen has most forcefully argued on the basis of a number of places 
in Paul’s letters that Paul “oscillates” without explanation between the Mosaic law and a 
law applicable for Gentiles.
54
 Räisänen draws most attention to Gal. 3:13–14, 23–25, and 
4:1–11.
55
 In these places Paul places the Gentile audience under the law: “Christ 
redeemed us from the curse of the law” (3:13); “we were imprisoned…under the 
law…the law was our paidagogos” (3:23–24); “God sent his son…in order to redeem 
those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children, and because 
you are children…” (4:4–6). In these statements the problem is not that Paul is using 
nomos to refer to some universal concept of law whereas in other passages he uses nomos 
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to refer to the Mosaic law. As Räisänen observes, “the context suggests that he is talking 
about the Sinaitic Torah” but Paul’s use of “we” and “us” in these passages demands that 
‘curse of the law’ must…have a wider reference.”56 Räisänen goes on: “while Paul is 
seemingly talking of the Mosaic law of Sinai, and even bases part of his argument on 
dating it in the time of Moses, the law nevertheless tacitly assumes much wider 
dimensions. Paul is simultaneously thinking of something that concerns all men, not just 
the Jews. The situation of Jew and Gentile (before the law) melt together.”57  
For Räisänen and others, the point that leads to the problem of Jewish Torah vs. a 
universal nomos is a view that by default nomos “denotes the Mosaic law of Sinai” which 
“by definition concerns the Jews, but not the Gentiles.”58 In Westerholm’s Perspectives 
Old and New, thesis #3 about the law in Paul is that “The law of Moses contains 
ordinances binding only on Jews.”59 This view of the law presumes that the Mosaic law is 
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clearly distinct from conceptions of universal or transcendent nomos. If, however, a view 
of the law as we have seen in Diaspora Jewish literature plays a role in Galatians as it 
does in Romans, then the problem is not Paul’s statements about the law but the view of 
the law assumed by scholars. According to these Diaspora interpretations, nomos refers to 
the Mosaic law, but in such a way that its scope is not limited to Israel.
60
 It is a nomos 
understood by reference to the Jewish nomos and particularly the Decalogue. But by 
redefinition or “reorientation” in conversation with Greco-Roman nomos discourse it 
concerns not only Jews but also Gentiles.
61
 It is according to this redefinition that the 
nomos refers to not just Israel’s covenant obligations, or concerns only Jews, but is in fact 
a universal nomos under which all humanity exists.  
A reconsideration of the above passages in both Romans and Galatians in light of 
this context would, I suspect, yield very interesting results.
62
 It would be worthwhile in 
light of this to reconsider the nature of the problem in Galatia—was it an issue of 
salvation and “being in God’s covenant people” or was it an issue of determining the 
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nature of ethical living in the community? That is, was the problem how Gentiles should 
be saved or a problem of how Gentiles “in Christ” should live (according to the law or 
not according to the law?)? It would also be worthwhile to reconsider Paul’s view of the 
law and the details of his arguments in light of the Diaspora Jewish perspectives. 
The Law and Ethical Living in Paul’s Thought  
The view of the law in Diaspora Judaism, as a view of the law that derives from 
conversation with Greco-Roman arguments about no/moj and ethical living, has 
implications on how we might understand Paul’s ethical instruction. Scholars have 
troubled over the ongoing significance of the Jewish nomos for Paul’s Christian 
communities. At points Paul argues against “works of the law” (3:27–28; Gal. 3:2–12) 
but at other times he insists that believers “fulfill the law” (Rom. 8:4; 13:8–10) and that 
keeping the commands of the law is of importance, even if actual circumcision is not 
(Rom. 7:1–14; 13:8–9; 1 Cor. 7:19; Gal. 5:14). For some scholars when Paul speaks of 
believers fulfilling the law apart from circumcision or other specific Jewish laws he 
misunderstands the law by not treating it as a whole. Either that or he is picking and 
choosing—adapting the importance of the law to his needs. The example in 1 Cor. 7:19 
illuminates the problem particularly clearly. Here Paul states that “circumcision is 
nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but keeping the commandments of God (is what 
matters).” Here Paul relativizes circumcision but in the same statement claims that 
“keeping the commandments of God” counts for something. Likewise in the above 
passages in Romans and Galatians Paul emphasizes commands from the law of a more 
universal application and summarizes them in terms of “love.” 
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Recently, both Markus Bockmuehl and James Thompson have argued that 
Diaspora Judaism provides an important foundation upon which Paul builds the ethical 
living to which he calls his communities.
63
 Bockmuehl argues upon a wide Jewish basis 
that Paul applies an understanding according to which Gentiles are to obey the laws 
applicable to them, while Christian Jews should still live according to the Torah.
64
 
According to Bockmuehl Paul draws on the Noachide laws for Gentiles, which held a 
long tradition of development in Second Temple Judaism
65
 and provide “the rationale and 
content of early Christian ethics, as well as its criteria of selection in the use of Old 
Testament laws.
66
 Even though he writes that “Jewish concepts of a universal law for 
Gentiles proved to be indispensable for the development of Christian ethics” he limits the 
usefulness to Noachide laws.
67
  
James Thompson argues differently, that Paul “gives moral instructions that are 
derived from the Torah and correspond largely to the summaries of the law that Jews in 
the Diaspora had developed” and that Paul “follows common interpretations of the 
law.”68 Thompson shows, from a limited selection of texts, that Diaspora Jews used a 
variety of ways to interpret the Jewish law and make it applicable to all humanity.
69
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Thompson argues that Paul shares in common with his Diaspora counterparts a view that 
“all humanity is subject to the law’s demands” but also that he appeals only to “a limited 
range” of instruction from the Torah.70 Thompson is not clear on the matter, but he does 
not claim that there are different commands applicable to Gentiles than to Jews. One 
caveat is that Paul is “less dependent” on Greco-Roman conceptions than his Diaspora 
Jewish counterparts. This is evident from Paul’s lack of use of the cardinal virtues and 
lack of a clear use of concepts such as “law of nature” in his actual ethical instruction.71 
Furthermore, the centrality of “love” as the fulfillment of the law is distinct in Paul, even 
though some Diaspora Jewish writers do refer to Leviticus 19:18.
72
  
These scholars confirm our argument about the significance of Diaspora Jewish 
interpretations of the law for Paul’s argument in Romans 2.73 While the general Diaspora 
Jewish context has been confirmed as significant in our study, we also have been able to 
gain more specificity. With Thompson and contra Bockmuehl, this study argues that 
Paul’s context of ethical instruction is not the concept of Noachide law. What is 
problematic in Bockmuehl’s treatment, however, is that he seems of overlook that many 
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Diaspora Jewish writers do not distinguish between those laws that apply to Gentiles and 
those that apply to Jews. The nomos of which Disapora Jewish writers write is one nomos, 
the commands of which apply to Jew and Gentile. Furthermore, the Diaspora Jewish 
writers we have considered do not appeal to Noah or commands given before the Mosaic 
law was given. Rather, they appeal to universally recognized ethics for all people with 
which the particular commands align. Moreover, our study agrees with Thompson that 
Paul’s ethical instructions do not derive from certain commands made applicable to 
Gentiles, but rather from what we have called “reorientations” of the Jewish nomos 
whereby the commands are hardly specifically Jewish, but are still said to derive from the 
Torah.  
One of the contributions of our study to is to point out the larger landscape upon 
which the Diaspora Jewish (and Pauline) ethical arguments have been made. By doing 
this, we can see the larger landscape upon which Diaspora Jews interpreted the law and 
possibly why Paul can omit the ethical importance of certain particular Jewish laws. Paul 
clearly devalues the particular commands of circumcision, Sabbath, and dietary laws. I do 
not, however, think we can say that Paul claims that they are unnecessary and to be 
thrown out for Jews. I suggest that the larger discourse about nomos which we have 
discussed is helpful in providing a way to understand what Paul is doing.  
In Paul’s Diaspora context laws such as circumcision, Sabbath, and food laws 
receive meaning in relation to the ethical goal to which they point—whether as symbolic 
or otherwise. I suggest that Paul understands the ethical purpose or telos in terms of the 
manner of living that derives from Paul’s understanding of the Christ event. Of utmost 
significance, then, for Paul’s “reorientation” is the example of Christ and not “nature,” 
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paideia, or Greek virtue itself. This is where he differs from his Diaspora Jewish 
counterparts. In Galatians 3:24 Paul calls the (Jewish) law a paidagwgo_j…ei0j 
Xristo/n. He also refers to “the law of Christ” (Gal. 6:2). In Romans 10:4 Paul famously 
writes that “Christ is the telos of the law.” All of these statements relate Christ to the law, 
and not entirely in a negative fashion; rather it is relating the law to Christ in a 
subordinate fashion; the Jewish nomos still finds great significance in relation to Christ. 
In light of our study, it would be very fruitful to explore how these statements relate to 
the widespread nomos discourse we have outlined and the Diaspora Jewish participation 
in that discourse. Initially, I suggest that Romans 10:4 is not a statement about the 
cessation of the law, but a statement about Christ as that to which the law guides or 
points.
74
 The law’s commands, in other words, all point to the example of God’s 
dikaiosu/nh in Christ, the example of suffering or self-giving love for one’s neighbor 
(Rom. 13:8–10; 14:15; Gal. 6:2; Phil. 2:1–15). This also would make sense of Galatians 
3:24–25. The law, as a paidagogos, instructs and guides those under it toward a goal, 
which is met in the person of Christ.
75
 Could the “law of Christ” in Gal. 6:2, formally, be 
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 Cf. the similar argument made by Tobin, “Romans 10:4: Christ the Goal of the Law,” SPhA 3 
(1991) 272–80; Paul’s Rhetoric, 308–13.  
 
75
 I find much to agree with in David Lull’s article ““The Law was Our Pedagogue”: A Study in 
Galatians 3:19–25,” JBL 105 (1986) 481–98. Lull is correct to stress that the law does not lead to Christ 
who “instructs” in ethical living. I find it interesting, however, to consider that Paul refers to Christ as 
embodying the ethical life to which the law as a pedagogue assisted the child in achieving (497). As Lull 
draws attention to, the pedagogue’s purpose was to participate in the child’s education in virtue, regardless 
of how various people in the ancient world evaluated the pedagogue’s effectiveness in this task (“The 
Law,”489–95). Interestingly (but not accidentally) much of the literature to which Lull draws attention 
participates in many aspects of the same nomos-ethical discourse we discussed in chapters two and three 
above. In light of this, it would be certainly worthwhile to investigate the intersection of the Greco-Roman 
paidagwgo/j with Diaspora interpretations of the Jewish nomos. In an article that interprets the 
pedagogue slightly differently, Michael Smith views the pedagogue too much under the influence of the 
“New Perspective” and thus emphasizes the way Paul’s reference to the law as a “pedagogue” is to 
emphasize the law’s purpose of “(guarding) Israel from being contaminated by the Gentile religions around 
her…by being a wall to keep her locked in and the Gentile sinful practices locked out” (“The Role of the 
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understood as something like transcendent nomos to which the commands of the Jewish 
nomos point or of which they are symbols?
76
 
This may be likely if indeed Paul makes these statements within an already 
familiar framework within which the Jewish nomos, as well as all other nomoi and 
manners of living, were already being related to some universal and transcendent ethical 
standard. For Paul, this is the example and person of Jesus Christ. As such, believers—
both Jew and Gentile—can be said to “fulfill the law” by obeying the central command: 
“love one another.” This does not nullify the law, but upholds it as Paul writes in Romans 
3:31. One may still be circumcised, follow Sabbath, or even dietary laws if that is one’s 
preference. But one must understand that doing so does not make one ethically superior 
or distinct, for it is not the laws themselves that matter. Let me attempt to sum this up by 
adapting and stringing together Paul’s statements: “circumcision is nothing (in itself) and 
uncircumcision is nothing (in itself), but what matters is “keeping the commands of 
God,”77 the chief of which is “summed up in this: you shall love your neighbor as 
yourself,”78 which is the “law of Christ.”79  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pedagogue in Galatians,” Bib Sac 163 [2006] 213). There is, as with our comments on “covenantal 
nomism” and the “New Perspective,” an element of truth to this, but Smith’s conclusion and understanding 
of Paul’s statement would benefit from Lull’s focus on the educational and moral role of the pedagogue. 
Smith, interestingly does not engage with Lull in any significant way, other than a citation where Lull 
draws attention to an ancient writer who makes a statement that supports Smith’s emphasis (“The Role, 
211).   
 
76
 Michael Winger presses in this direction in his article “The Law of Christ,” NTS 46 (2000) 537–
46. He interprets nomos in Gal. 6:2 through the lens of more general conceptions of “law,” suggesting that 
the “law of Christ” is “the true law” (545). Winger’s argument focuses more on general linguistic 
understandings of nomos, whereas I am coming at things from the angle of perceptions of nomos held by 
Greek, Roman, and Jewish writers. Moreover, I am not sure that Paul’s phrase in Gal. 6:2 means that the 
Jewish law is “plainly an inferior one” as Winger suggests (545). 
 
77
 Adapted from 1 Corinthians 7:19. 
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 Rom. 13:9. 
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Paul does not oppose the Jewish law or break with Judaism. Rather, Paul works 
within a web of discourse that includes Paul’s Diaspora Jewish context and applies the 
Jewish arguments and interpretations of the law rooted in this web of discourse to focus 
not on Greek virtue or “law of nature” but upon the Jewish Messiah. This is not to revert 
to an older paradigm according to which Diaspora Judaism paved the way for 
Christianity. Rather, my claim is that Diaspora Jewish interpretations of the law, in 
participation with a complex web of discourse in the first century Mediterranean world, 
provided for Paul much of the language and framework through which to communicate 
the significance of Jesus Christ for ethical living “in Christ” to his audience in Rome and 
quite probably, I suggest, his other letters as well. 
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 Gal. 6:2.  
  
457 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Dictionaries, Encyclopedias, Lexicons, and Grammars 
 
Becker, Lawrence C. and Charlotte B. Becker, eds. Encyclopedia of Ethics. 3 vols. New 
York: Routledge, 2001. 
Clarke, Paul B. and A. Linzey, eds. Dictionary of Ethics, Theology, and Society. New 
York: Routledge, 1996. 
Freedman, David N., ed. The Anchor Bible Dictionary. 6 vols. New York: Doubleday, 
1992. 
Kittel, Gerhard and G. Friedrich, eds. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. 
Translated by G. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964—1976. 
Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 
9th ed. with supplements added. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996. 
Zerwick, Maximilian. A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament. Unabridged 
5th Rev. Translated by Mary Grosvenor. Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 
1996. 
Primary Sources 
 
Aland, Kurt and Barbara, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. 
Metzger, eds. Novum Testamentum Graece. Nestle-Aland 27. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 1993. 
Andocides. On the Mysteries. Translated by Kenneth Maidment. Vol. 1 of Minor Attic 
Orators in Two Volumes. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.   
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1944. 
_____. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1926. 
_____. Rhetoric. Translated by J.H. Freese. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1926. 
458 
 
_____. Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices. Translated by H. 
Rackham. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. 
Buitenwerf, R. Book III of the Sibylline Oracles and its Social Setting: with an 
Introduction, Translation, and Commentary. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Charlesworth, James H., ed. The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. 2 vols. Anchor Bible 
Reference Library. New York: Doubleday, 1983–1985. 
Cicero. On the Republic, On the Laws. Translated by Clinton Walker Keyes. LCL. 
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1928. 
_____. De Provinciis. Translated by R. Gardner. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1958. 
_____. Pro Flacco. Translated by C. Macdonald. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976. 
_____. On the Nature of the Gods. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1933. 
deSilva, D. 4 Maccabees: Introduction and Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex 
Sinaiticus. Leiden: Brill, 2006. 
Demosthenes. On the Crown. Translated by C.A. Vince. Orations Volume 2 (18-19). 
LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926. 
_____. Against Aristocrates. Translated by J.H. Vince. Orations Volume 3 (21-26). LCL. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. 
Diels H. and W. Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin, 1951-52. 
Dio Chrysostom. Discourses 1-11. Translated by J.W. Cohoon. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1932. 
_____. Discourses 12-30. Translated by J.W. Cohoon. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1939. 
_____. Discourses 61-80. Translated by H. Lamar Crosby. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951. 
Diodorus Siculus. Library of History. Translated by C. H. OldFather et al. 12 vols. Loeb 
Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1933–1967.  
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Translated by R.D. Hicks. 2 vols. 
LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925. 
459 
 
Dionysius of Halicarnassius. Roman Antiquities. Translated by Earnest Cary. 7 vols. 
LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937–1950.  
Epictetus. Discourses. Translated by W.A. Oldfather. 2 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1925, 1928. 
Fitzgerald, John and L. Michael White, translators and eds. The Tabula of Cebes. SBLTT 
7. Chico: Scholars Press, 1983. 
Hadas, Moses. Aristeas to Philocrates (Letter of Aristeas). New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1951.  
Herodotus. The Persian Wars. Translated by A.D. Godley. 4 vols. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1920-1925.  
Holladay, C. Fragments of Hellenistic Jewish Authors, volume III: Aristobulus. Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1995. 
Isocrates. Translated by George Norlin and Larue Van Hook. 3 vols. Loeb Classical 
Library. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1928–1945. 
Josephus. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray et al. 13 vols. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1926–1965.  
Kirk, G.S., ed. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1962. 
Kraus, Wolfgang, and Martin Karrer, eds. Septuaginta deutsch. Das griechische Alte 
Testament in deutscher Übersetzung. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2009. 
Mahlerbe, Abraham. The Cynic Epistles. 
Ovid. Metamorphoses. Translated by F.J. Miller. 2 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1916. 
Philo. Translated by F. H. Colson et al. 12 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University, 
1929–1962. 
Plato. Translated by Harold North Fowler et al. 12 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1914–1990. 
Plutarch. Lives. Translated by Bernadette Perrin. 11 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1914–1926. 
_____. Moralia. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt et al. Vols. 5, 8. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1936, 1969. 
460 
 
Polybuis. The Histories. Translated by W.R. Paton. 6 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1922. 
Pseudo-Aristotle. De Mundo. 
Quintilian. Translated by D.A. Russell. 5 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002. 
Rahlfs, Alfred, and Robert Hanhart, eds. Septuaginta. Rev. ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft, 2006. 
Seneca. Epistles. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. 3 vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1917–1925. 
Seneca. Moral Essays. Translated by John W. Basore. 3vols. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1928–1935. 
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translated by R. G. Bury. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1933. 
_____. Against Logicians. Translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1935. 
_____. Against Ethicists. Translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1936. 
Sophocles, Antigone. Translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1994. 
Strabo. Geography. Translated by Horace Leonard Jones. 8 vols. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1917-1932. 
Suetonius. Lives of the Caesars. Translated by J.C. Rolfe. 2 vols. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1914. 
Tacitus. Translated by Clifford H. Moore and John Jackson. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1931. 
Taylor, The Hymns of Orpheus. London, 1792. 
Thom, J. Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus: Text, Translation, and Commentary. STAC 33. 
Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 2005. 
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by C.F. Smith. 4 vols. LCL. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919-1923. 
461 
 
Virgil. Ecologues. Georgics. Aeneid: Books 1-6. Translated by H. Fairclough. LCL. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. 
_____. Aeneid: Books 7-12. Translated by H. Fairclough. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1918. 
Wilson, W. The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides. CEJL. New York: de Gruyter, 2005.  
Xenophon. Memorabilia. Translated by E.C. Marchant and O.J. Todd. LCL. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1923. 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Paul and the Law 
 
Adeyemi, F. The New Covenant Torah in Jeremiah and the Law of Christ in Paul. New 
York: Peter Lang, 2006.  
Das, A. Andrew. “Paul and the Law: Pressure Points in the Debate.” Pages 99-116 in 
Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the Apostle. Edited by M. Given. Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2010. 
_______. “Paul and Works of Obedience in Second Temple Judaism: Romans 4:4-5 as a 
“New Perspective” Case Study.” CBQ 71 (2009): 795-812. 
________. Paul, the Law, and the Covenant. Peabody: Hendrickson, 2001. 
deLacey, “The Sabbath/Sunday Question and the Law in the Pauline Corpus.” Pages 160-
95 in From Sabbath to the Lord’s Day: A Biblical, Historical, and Theological 
Investigation. Edited by D.A. Carson. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982. 
Downing, F. Gerald. Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches. London & New York: 
Routledge, 1998. 
Dunn, J.D.G. The New Perspective on Paul. Revised edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2008. 
Dunn, J.D.G., ed. Paul and the Mosaic Law. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. 
Feuillet, A. “Loi de Dieu, loi du Christ et loi de l’Espirit d’aprés las epîtres pauliniennes: 
Les rapports de ces trios lois avec la Loi Mosaique.” NovT 22 (1980): 29-65. 
Hübner, H. Law in Paul’s Thought. Translated by James Greig. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1984. 
462 
 
Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison. London: T&T Clark, 2009. 
Kuula, Kari. The Law, the Covenant, and God’s Plan, volume 2: Paul’s Treatment of the 
Law and Israel in Romans. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003. 
Lull, D. ““The Law was Our Pedagogue”: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25,” JBL 105 
(1986) 481-98 
Martens, J. The Superfluity of the Law in Philo and Paul: A Study in the History of 
Religions. Ph.D. diss., McMaster University, 1991. 
Moo, Douglas. “‘Law,’ ‘Works of the Law,’ and Legalism in Paul.” WTJ 45 (1983): 73-
100. 
Pate, C. Marvin. The Reverse of the Curse: Paul, Wisdom, and the Law. Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 2000. 
Räisänen, Heikki. Paul and the Law. 2d ed. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum 
Neuen Testament 29. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987. 
_______. “Paul’s Word-Play on no/moj: A Linguistic Study.” Translated by David E. 
Orton. Pages 67-94 in Jesus, Paul, and Torah: Collected Essays. Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1992. Translation of: “Sprachliches zum Spiel des Paulus 
mit no/moj.” Pages 131-54 in Glaube und Gerechtigkeit: In Memoriam Rafael 
Gyllenberg. Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1983. 
 
Roetzel, Calvin. “Paul and the Law: Whence and Whither?” Currents in Research 3 
(1995): 249-75. 
 
Rosner, Brian. “Paul and the Law: What he Does not Say.” JSNT 32 (2010): 405-419. 
 
Sanders, E.P. Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1983. 
 
Schnabel, E. Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: A Tradition Historical Enquiry 
into the Relation of Law, Wisdom, and Ethics. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985. 
 
Schreiner, T. The Law and Its Fulfillment: A Pauline Theology of Law. Grand Rapids: 
Baker Books, 1993. 
 
Seifrid, Mark. “Natural Revelation and the Law in Romans.” Tyndale Bulletin 49 (1998): 
120-25. 
 
Snodgrass, K. “Spheres of Influence: A Possible Solution to the Problem of Paul and the 
Law.”JSNT 32 (1988): 93-113 
 
463 
 
Sonntag, H. NOMOS SWTHR: Zur politischen Theologie des Gesetzes bei Paulus und im 
antiken Kontext. Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 2000.  
 
Sprinkle, Preston. Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism 
and in Paul. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. 
 
Thielman, F. Paul and the Law: A Contextual Approach. Downers Grove: IVP, 1994. 
 
Tobin, T. “Romans 10:4: Christ the Goal of the Law.” SPhA 3 (1991): 272-80. 
 
Westerholm, Stephen. Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The “Lutheran” Paul and His 
Critics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004. 
 
Winger, M. By What Law? The Meaning of No&moj in the Letters of Paul. Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1992. 
 
______. “The Law of Christ.” NTS 46 (2000): 537-46. 
 
Romans Commentaries. 
 
Achtemeier, P. Romans. Interpretation Bible Commentary. Atlanta: John Knox, 1985. 
Barrett, C. K. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Harper’s New Testament 
Commentaries. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. 
______. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 2d ed. Black’s New Testament 
Commentaries. London: A & C Black, 1991. 
 
Byrne, Brendan. Romans. Sacra Pagina 6. Collegeville: Liturgical, 1996. 
 
Cranfield, C. E. B. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 
International Critical Commentary. London: T & T Clark, 1975. 
 
Dunn, James D.G. Romans 1-8. Word Biblical Commentary 38A. Nashville: Nelson 
Reference & Electronic, 1988. 
______. Romans 9-16, Word Biblical Commentary 38B. Dallas: Word, 1988. 
Fitzmyer, Joseph A. Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. 
Anchor Bible 33. New York: Doubleday, 1993. 
Haacker, K. Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 
1999. 
464 
 
Hultgren, A. Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2011. 
Jewett, Robert. Romans. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007. 
Käsemann, Ernst. Commentary on Romans. Translated by Geoffrey Bromiley. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980. 
Keck, Leander E. Romans. Abingdon New Testament Commentaries. Nashville: 
Abingdon, 2005. 
Leenhardt, L’épître de Saint Paul aux Romains. CNT 6. Neuchâtel: Delachoix & Niestlé, 
1957. 
Michel, Otto. Der Brief an die Römer. 14th ed. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über 
das Neue Testament (Meyer-Kommentar). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1966. 
Moo, Douglas J. The Epistle to the Romans. New International Commentary on the New 
Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. 
O’Neill, J.C. Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Baltimore: Penguin, 1975. 
Sanday, William, and Arthur C. Headlam. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans. International Critical Commentary. New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1895. 
———. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 5th ed. 
International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1902. 
Schlatter, Adolf. Romans: The Righteousness of God. Translated by Siegfried 
Schatzmann. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995. 
Schlier, Heinrich. Der Römerbrief. Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen 
Testament 6. Freiburg: Herder, 1977. 
Schmithals, Walter. Der Römerbrief: Ein Kommentar. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1988. 
Schreiner, Thomas R. Romans. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. 
Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998. 
Stowers, Stanley K. A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1994. 
 
Stuhlmacher, Peter. Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary. Translated by Scott J. 
Hafemann. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994. 
465 
 
 
Talbert, C. Romans. Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary. Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 
2002.  
 
Tobin, Thomas H. Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts: The Argument of Romans. Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 2004. 
 
Wilckens, Ulrich. Der Brief an die Römer. Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum 
Neuen Testament 6.1. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener-Verlag, 1978. 
Wright, N.T. “The Letter to the Romans: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections.” 
Pages 395–770 in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 10. Edited by Leander E. Keck. 
Nashville: Abingdon, 2002. 
 
Works on Romans 2 
 
Bornkamm, G. “Gesetz und Natur (Röm 2:14-16).” Pages 93-118 in Studien zu Antike 
und Urchristentum. BevT 28. München: Kaiser Verlag, 1959.  
 
Campbell, Douglas. “A Rhetorical Suggestion Concerning Romans 2.” Pages 140–67 in 
Society of Biblical Literature 1995 Seminar Papers. Edited by Eugene H. Lovering 
Jr. Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 34. Atlanta: Scholars, 1995. 
 
Carras, G. “Romans 2:1-29: A Dialogue on Jewish Ideals.” Biblica 73 (1992): 183-207. 
 
Ito, Akio. “Romans 2: A Deuteronomistic Reading.” Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament 59 (1995): 21–37. 
 
Krentz, E. “The Name of God in Disrepute: Romans 2:17-29 [22-23].” Currents in 
Theology and Mission 17 (1990): 429-39. 
 
Lamp, J. “Paul, the Law, Jews, and Gentiles: A Contextual and Exegetical Reading of 
Romans 2:12-16.” JETS 41 (1999): 37-51. 
 
Maertens, P. “Une étude de Romains 2:12-16.” NTS 46 (2000): 504-19 . 
 
Martens, J. “Romans 2:14-16: A Stoic Reading.” NTS 40 (1994): 55-67. 
 
Snodgrass, K. “Justification by Grace—to the Doers: The Place of Romans 2 in the 
Theology of Paul.” NTS 32 (1986): 72-93. 
 
Thorsteinsson, Runar M. Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in the 
Context of Ancient Epistolography. Coniectanea biblica: New Testament Series 40. 
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003. 
 
466 
 
Walker, William O. Jr., “Romans 1:18-2:29: A Non-Pauline Interpolation?” NTS 45 
(1999): 533-52. 
 
Wright, N. T. “The Law in Romans 2.” Pages 131–50 in Paul and the Mosaic Law. 
Edited by James D. G. Dunn. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. 
 
General Bibliography 
 
Adams, James L. “The Law of Nature in Greco-Roman Thought.” JR 25 (1945): 97-118. 
Adkins, A.W.H. “Aretê, Technê, Democracy and Sophists: Protagoras 316b-328d.” JHS 
93 (1973): 3-12.  
Anderson, G. The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire. New 
York: Routledge, 1993. 
Annas, J. “Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness.” Pages 35-56 in Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical 
Essays. Edited by Nancy Sherman. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 
Asmis, E. “Cicero on Natural Law and the Laws of the State.” Classical Antiquity 27 
(2008): 1-33. 
Atkins, E.M. “Cicero.” Pages 477-516 in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Political Thought. Edited by C.J. Rowe and M. Schofield. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
Attridge, Harold W. “Josephus and His Works.” Pages 185–232 in Jewish Writings of the 
Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings. 
Edited by Michael E. Stone. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984. 
Audet, “La sagesse de Ménandre l’Égyptien,” Rev. Bib. 59 (1952): 55-81.  
Aune, D. The New Testament in Its Literary Environment. Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1987. 
Barclay, John M.G. Against Apion: Translation and Commentary. Vol. 10 of Flavius 
Josephus: Translation and Commentary. Edited by Steve Mason. Leiden: Brill, 
2007. 
______. “Apologetics in the Jewish Diaspora.” Pages 129-48 in Jews in the Hellenistic 
and Roman Cities. Edited by J. Bartlett. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
———. Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 
117 CE). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. 
467 
 
______. Obeying the Truth: Paul’s Ethics in Galatians. Vancouver: Regent College, 
1988. 
———. “The Politics of Contempt: Judaeans and Egyptians in Josephus’s Against 
Apion.” Pages 109–27 in Negotiating Diaspora: Jewish Strategies in the Roman 
Empire. Edited by John M. G. Barclay. Library of Second Temple Studies 45. 
London: T & T Clark, 2004. 
Bassler, Jouette M. “Divine Impartiality in Paul’s Letter to the Romans.” Novum 
Testamentum 26 (1984): 43–58. 
———. Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom. Society of Biblical 
Literature Dissertation Series 59. Chico: Scholars, 1982. 
Bauckham, R. “Apocalypses.” Pages 135-88 in Justification and Variegated Nomism: 
The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism. Edited by D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, 
and M. Seifrid. Vol. 1 of Justification and Variegated Nomism. Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2001. 
Beauchamp, P. “Epouser la Sagesse—ou n’espouser qu’elle? Un enigma du Livre de la 
Sagesse.” Pages 347-69 in La Sagesse de l’Ancien Testament. Edited by M. Gilbert. 
Leuven: Gembloux, 1979. 
Beale, G. “The Overstated “New” Perspective?” BBR 19 (2009): 85-94. 
Beavis, M. A. L. “Anti-Egyptian Polemic in the Letter of Aristeas 130–165 (The High 
Priest’s Discourse).” Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, 
and Roman Periods 18 (1987): 145–51. 
Belkin, H. “The Alexandrian Source for Contra Apionem II.” JQR 27 (1936-37): 23-31. 
Bell, Richard H. No One Seeks for God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 
1.18–3.20. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 106. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998. 
Bellotti, Raymond A. Roman Philosophy and the Good Life. Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2009. 
Berthelot, Katell. “The Use of Greek and Roman Stereotypes of the Egyptians by 
Hellenistic Jewish Apologists, with special reference to Josephus’ Against Apion.” 
Pages 185–221 in Internationales Josephus-Kolloquium, Aarhus 1999. Edited by 
Jürgen U. Kalms. Münsteraner Judaistische Studien 6. Münster: LIT, 2000. 
Betz, Galatians. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979. 
Bickerman, E. “Zur Datierung des Pseudo-Aristeas.” ZNW 29 (1930) 280-98. 
468 
 
______. “The Date of Fourth Maccabees.” Pages 275-81in Studies in Jewish and 
Christian History. Leiden: Brill, 1976. 
Bird, M. The Saving Righteousness of God: Studies on Paul, Justification, and the New 
Perspective. Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2007. 
Blumenfeld, B. The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy, and Kingship in a Hellenistic 
Framework. JSNT Supplement 210. London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001. 
Boccaccini, G. Middle Judaism: Jewish Thought 300 B.C.E. to 200 C.E. Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991. 
Bockmuehl, M. “1QS and Salvation at Qumran.” Pages 381-414 in Justification and 
Variegated Nomism: The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism. Edited by D.A. 
Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and M. Seifrid. Vol. 1 of Justification and Variegated 
Nomism. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001. 
______. Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakah and the Beginning of Christian 
Public Ethics. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000. 
Borgen, P. Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time. Leiden/New York: Brill, 1997. 
______. “Philo of Alexandria.” Pages 233-282 in Jewish Writings of the Second Temple 
Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus. 
Edited by M.E. Stone. Volume 2 of CRINT Section 2: The Literature of the Jewish 
People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Telmud. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1984. 
Borgen, P. Early Christianity and Hellenistic Judaism. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996. 
Borgen, P. and S. Giversen, eds. The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism. Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1997. 
Bornkamm, Günther. Early Christian Experience. Translated by Paul L. Hammer. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1969. 
Bousset, Wilhelm. Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter. 2d ed. 
Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 1906. 
Brändle, R. and E. Stegemann. “The Formation of the First “Christian Congregations” in 
Rome in the Context of the Jewish Congregations.” Pages 117-27 in Judaism and 
Christianity in First-Century Rome. Edited by K. Donfried and P. Richardson. 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998. 
469 
 
Broadie, Sarah. “The Sophists and Socrates.” Pages 73-97 in The Cambridge Companion 
to Greek and Roman Philosophy. Edited by David Sedley. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
Bruce, F.F. The Epistle to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982. 
Bryant, J. Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece: A Sociology of Greek 
Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans and Stoics. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996. 
Bultmann, R. Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die Kynischstoische Diatribe. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910. 
Burridge, R. What are the Gospels? 2d ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004. 
Bussmann, Claus. Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt auf dem Hintergrund der 
spätjüdisch-hellenistischen Missionsliteratur. 2d ed. Frankfurt: Herbert Lang, 1975. 
Byrne, B. “Interpreting Romans: The New Perspective and Beyond.” Int 58 (2004): 241-
52.  
______. “Interpreting Romans Theologically in a Post-‘New Perspective’ Perspective.” 
HTR 94 (2001): 227-41. 
Caird, George B. “Review of Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns 
of Religion.” Journal of Theological Studies 29 (1978): 538–40. 
Campbell, Douglas A. The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009. 
Carey, C. “Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 116 
(1996): 33-46. 
Carson, D.A., P.T. O’Brien, and M. Seifrid, eds. Justification and Variegated Nomism, 
vol. 1: The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism ed. D.A. Carson, P. T. O’Brien, 
and M. Seifrid. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001.  
______. Justification and Variegated Nomism, vol. 2: The Paradoxes of Paul. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004. 
Caizzi, F. D. “Protagoras and Antiphon: Sophistic debates on justice.”311-331in The 
Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy. Edited by A.A. Long. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
470 
 
Chesnut, G. “The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic, and Late 
Stoic Political Philosophy.” ANRW 16.2: 1310-1332. Part 2, Principat, 16.2. Edited 
by Wolfgang Haase. New York: de Gruyter, 1978. 
Collins, J. Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora. 
2d. edition. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000. 
______. Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age. Louisville: Westminster, 1997 
Cotter,W.  “ Cosmology and the Jesus Miracles.” Pages 118-31 in Whose Historical 
Jesus. Edited by W.E. Arnal and M. Desjardins. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1997. 
Crawford, Barry S. “Review of Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith.” Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 68 (2006): 559–60. 
Crook, J.A. Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C.-A.D. 212. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1967. 
Das, A. Andrew. Solving the Romans Debate. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007. 
Davies, W.D. Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology. 
Fourth edition. Mifflintown: Sigler Press, 1998. 
Delatte, A. Étudies sur la literature pythagoricienne. Paris: Champion, 1915. 
Di Lella, A. “Conservative and Progressive Theology: Sirach and Wisdom.” CBQ 28 
(1966): 139-54. 
______. The Wisdom of Ben Sira. AB 39. Garden City: Doubleday, 1987. 
Dewey, A. Spirit and Letter in Paul. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996. 
Dill, S. Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. 
Dodson, Joseph R. The ‘Powers’ of Personification: Rhetorical Purpose in the Book of 
Wisdom and the Letter to the Romans. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die 
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 2/161. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. 
Donaldson, T. Judaism and the Gentiles: Jewish Patterns of Universalism (to 135 C.E.). 
Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007. 
Donfried, Karl P., ed. The Romans Debate. Revised edition. Peabody: Hendrickson, 
1991. 
———. “Review of Solving the Romans Debate by A. Andrew Das.” Theological 
Studies 69 (2008): 189–90. 
471 
 
Downing, F. Gerald. “Legislation as Social Engineering in the New Testament World.” 
Pages 218-227in The Torah in the New Testament: Papers Delivered at the 
Manchester-Lausanne Seminar of June 2008. Edited by Michael Tait and Peter 
Oakes. London: T & T Clark, 2009. 
Dragona-Monachou, M. “Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire.” ANRW 
36.7: 4417-4490. Part 2, Principat 36.7. Edited by Wolfgang Haase. New York: de 
Gruyter, 1994. 
Dunn, James D. G. The Epistle to the Galatians. Black’s New Testament Commentaries. 
Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993. 
———. The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998. 
______. The Epistle to the Galatians. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993, 2002. 
Ehrenberg, V. Sophocles and Pericles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954. 
Ehrensperger, K. That We May Be Mutually Encouraged: Feminism and the New 
Perspective in Pauline Studies. New York: T&T Clark, 2004. 
Elliott, Neil. The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire. Paul 
in Critical Contexts. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008. 
______. The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul’s 
Dialogue with Judaism. Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement 
Series 45. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990. 
Elliott, N. and M. Reasoner, eds. Documents and Images for the Study of Paul. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011. 
Ellis, E. Earle. Paul’s Use of the Old Testament. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957. 
Engberg-Pedersen, T. “Introduction: Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide.” 
Pages 1-16 in Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide. Edited by T. Engberg-
Pedersen. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001. 
Engberg-Pedersen, T, ed. Paul Beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001. 
Engel, Helmut. Das Buch der Weisheit. Neuer Stuttgarter Kommentar Altes Testament 
16. Stuttgart: Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1998. 
Enns, P. “Expansions of Scripture.” Pages 73-98 in Justification and Variegated Nomism: 
The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism. Edited by D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, 
472 
 
and M. Seifrid. Vol. 1 of Justification and Variegated Nomism. Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2001. 
Eskola, T. “Paul, Predestination, and “Covenantal Nomism”—Re-assessing Paul and 
Palestinian Judaism.” JSJ 28 (1997): 390-412.  
Esler, Philip F. Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul’s Letter. 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003. 
Fears, J. Rufus. “The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology.” ANRW 17.2: 827-
948. Edited by Wolfgang Haase. New York: de Gruyter, 1981.  
Feldman, L. Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993. 
Ferguson, E. Backgrounds of Early Christianity. 3d ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003. 
Fisk, Bruce N. “Synagogue Influence and Scriptural Knowledge Among the Christians of 
Rome.” Pages 157–85 in As It Is Written: Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture. Edited 
by Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley. Society of Biblical Literature 
Symposium Series 50. Leiden: Brill, 2008. 
Fitzgerald, John T. and T. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, eds. Early Christianity and 
Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe. Leiden: 
Brill, 2003. 
Flower, Harriet I. “Introduction.” Pages 1-14 in The Cambridge Companion to the 
Roman Republic. Edited by H. Flower. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
Freudenthal, M. Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift über der Herrschaft der 
Vernunft (IV Makkabäerbuch), eine Predigt aus dem ersten nachchristlichen 
Jahrhundert. Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung, 1869. 
Furnish, V. “Pauline Studies.” Pages 321-50 in The New Testament and Its Modern 
Interpreters. Edited by E.J. Epp and G. MacRae. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989. 
Gabba, E. Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991. 
Gagarin, M. Early Greek Law. Berkley: University of California Press, 1989.  
Gagarin, M. and D. Cohen, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Gager, J. Reinventing Paul. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
473 
 
Galinsky, K. “Vergil’s Aeneid and Ovid’s Metamorphoses as World Literature.” Pages 
340-60 in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus. Edited by K. 
Galinsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Garlington, D. Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance: Aspects of Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994. 
______. In Defense of the New Perspective on Paul: Essays and Reviews. Eugene: Wipf 
and Stock, 2005. 
Gathercole, Simon J. “A Law Unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14–15 
Revisited.” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 85 (2002): 27–49. 
______. “Early Judaism and Covenantal Nomism: A Review Article.” EQ 76 (2004): 
153-62. 
———. Where Is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1-
5. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. 
Georgi, D. The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1986. 
_____. Weisheit Salomos. JSHRZ 3.4. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1980. 
Gilbert,M.  “Wisdom Literature.” Pages 283-324 in Jewish Writings of the Second 
Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, 
Josephus. Edited by M.E. Stone. Volume 2 of CRINT Section 2: The Literature of 
the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Telmud. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984. 
Goodenough, E.R. “Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity.” Pages 23-68 in Religions 
in Antiquity: Essays in Honor of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough,. Edited by J. 
Neusner. Leiden: Brill, 1968. 
__________. “Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity.” Pages 123-74 in Goodenough 
on the Beginnings  of Christianity. Edited by A.T. Kraabel. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1990. 
_________. By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1935. 
________. “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship.” Yale Classical Studies 1 
(1928): 53-102. 
Goodrick, A. T. S. The Book of Wisdom: With Introduction and Notes. Oxford Church 
Bible Commentary. London: Rivingtons, 1913. 
474 
 
Goodman, M. Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash of Ancient Civilizations. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. 
______. “Jewish Proselytizing in the First Century.” Pages 53-78 in The Jews among 
Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire. Edited by J. Lieu, J. North, and T. 
Rajak. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Grabbe, Lester L. Wisdom of Solomon. Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997. 
Green, Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. 
Grimm, C.L.W. Das Buch der Weisheit. Leipzig, 1860. 
Gruen, E. Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2002. 
_____. “The Polis in the Hellenistic World.” Pages 339-54 in Nomodeiktes: Greek 
Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald. Edited by R.M. Rosen and J. Farrell. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 
_____. Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998. 
Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962 – 1975. 
______. Orpheus and Greek Religion. London: Methuen, 1952. 
______. The Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. 
Hahm, D. “Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories.” Pages 457-76 in The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought. Edited by Christopher 
Rowe and M. Schofield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Hall, Jonathan M. Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002. 
Harris, William V. Ancient Literacy. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1989. 
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994. 
Hay, D. “Philo of Alexandria.” Pages 357-80 in Justification and Variegated Nomism: 
The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism. Edited by D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, 
475 
 
and M. Seifrid. Vol. 1 of Justification and Variegated Nomism. Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2001. 
Hengel, M. Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the 
Early Hellenistic Period. Translated by John Bowden. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1981. 
Hirzel, R. Agraphos Nomos. New York: Arno Press, 1979. Original: AGRAFOS 
NOMOS . Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1900. 
Hollander, H.W. and J. Holleman. “The Relationship of Death, Sin, and Law in 1 Cor. 
15:56.” NovT 35 (1993): 270-91. 
Horsley, R. “The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero.” HTR 71 (1978): 35-59. 
Inwood, B. “Natural Law in Seneca.” Studia Philonica Annual 15 (2003): 81-99. 
Jaeger, W. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Translated by G. Highet. 3 vols. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1944 – 45. 
Jedan, C. Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics. London: 
Continuum, 2009. 
Johnston, D. Roman Law in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Joslin, B. Hebrews, Christ, and the Law: The Theology of the Mosaic Law in Hebrews 
7:1-10:18. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2008. 
Klassen, W. “The King as ‘Living Law’ with Particular Reference to Musonius Rufus.” 
SR 14 (1985): 63-71. 
Klauck, H.-J. 4. Makkabäerbuch. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1989. 
Koester, Helmut. “Natural Law (No/moj Fu/sewj) in Greek Thought.” Pages 126-42 in 
Paul and His World: Interpreting the New Testament in Its Context. Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2007. 
_______. Koester, H. “fu/sij, fusiko&j, fusikw~j.” In Theological Dictionary of the 
New Testament. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated and edited by G. 
Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964: 9:251-277. 
Kolarcik, Michael. The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1–6: A Study of 
Literary Structure and Interpretation. Analecta biblica 127. Roma: Editrice 
Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1991. 
476 
 
———. “The Book of Wisdom: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections.” 
Pages 435–600 in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 5. Edited by Leander E. Keck. 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1997. 
______. “Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon.” Pages 289-301 in 
Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom: Festschrift for 
M. Gilbert. Edited by N. Calduch-Benages and J. Vermeylen. Louvain: Peeters, 
1999. 
Kümmel, Werner G. The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its 
Problems. Translated by MacLean Gilmour and H. Kee. Nashville: Abingdon, 
1972. 
Laato, Timo. Paul and Judaism: An Anthropological Approach. Translated by T. 
McElwain. South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism 115. Atlanta: Scholars, 
1995. 
Lampe, Peter. From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries. 
Edited by Marshall D. Johnson. Translated by Michael Steinhauser. Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2003. 
Larcher, C. Études sur le Livre de la Sagesse. Etudes bibliques. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969. 
———. Le Livre de la Sagesse ou La Sagesse de Salomon. Etudes bibliques 5. Paris: J. 
Gabalda, 1985. 
Levinskaya, I. The Book of Acts in Its First Century Setting, Volume 5: Diaspora Setting. 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996. 
Lichtenberger, H. “The Understanding of the Torah in the Judaism of Paul’s Day: A 
Sketch.” Pages 7-23 in Paul and the Mosaic Law. Edited by J.D.G. Dunn. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. 
Lincoln, Andrew T. “From Wrath to Justification: Tradition, Gospel, and Audience in the 
Theology of Romans 1:18-4:25.” Pages 130-59 in Pauline Theology, volume 3: 
Romans. Edited by David M. Hay and E. Elizabeth Johnson. SBLSymS 23. Atlanta: 
SBL, 2002. 
Linebaugh, Jonathan A. “Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between 
Wisdom of Solomon 13–15 and Romans 1.18–2.11.” New Testament Studies 57 
(2011): 214–37. 
Long, A.A. “Law and Nature in Greek Thought.” Pages 412-30 in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ancient Greek Law. Edited by M. Gagarin. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
477 
 
______. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Second Edition. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986. 
______. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. 
Longenecker, Richard N. Galatians. Word Biblical Commentary 41. Thomas Nelson: 
Nashville, 1990. 
______. Introducing Romans: Critical Issues in Paul’s Most Famous Letter. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011. 
Lucas, Alec J. “Unearthing an Intra-Jewish Interpretive Debate? Romans 1:18–2:4; 
Wisdom of Solomon 11–19; and Psalms 105(104)–107(106).” Annali di Storia 
dell’Esegesi 27 (2010): 69–91. 
MacDowell, D. The Law in Classical Athens. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. 
MacIntyre, A. A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the 
Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. Second edition. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1998. 
Malherbe, A.J. “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament.” ANRW 26.1:267-333. 
Edited by Wolfgang Haase. New York: de Gruyter, 1992. 
Martens, J. One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman 
Law. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 
Martin, Luther. Hellenistic Religions: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987. 
Martyn, J.L. Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. AB 33A. 
New York: Doubleday, 1997. 
Mason, Steve. Josephus and the New Testament. 2d ed. Peabody: Hendrickson, 2003. 
Matera, F. Galatians. SP 9. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992. 
McKnight, S. A Light among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second 
Temple Period. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991. 
Mead, G.R.S. Orpheus: The Theosophy of the Greeks. Theosophical Publishing Co., 
1896. 
Meeks, W. “Judaism, Hellenism, and the Birth of Christianity.” Pages 17-28  in Paul 
beyond the Judaism / Hellenism Divide. Edited by T. Engberg-Pedersen. Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2001. 
478 
 
Meier, John P. A Marginal Jew, Vol. 4: Law and Love. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009. 
Millar, A. “Following Nature.” The Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1988): 165-85. 
Miller, James C. “Review of Solving the Romans Debate by A. Andrew Das.” 
Interpretation 62 (2008): 211. 
Minear, Paul S. The Obedience of Faith: The Purposes of Paul in the Epistle to the 
Romans. Studies in Biblical Theology Second Series 19. London: SCM, 1971. 
Mitsis, P. “The Stoics and Aquinas on Virtue and Natural Law.” SPhA 15 (2003): 35-53. 
Moo, Douglas J. “Review Article: The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of 
Justification in Paul by Douglas A. Campbell.” Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 53 (2010): 143–50. 
Morris, Jenny. “The Jewish Philosopher Philo.” Pages 809-870 in The History of the 
Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. – A.D. 135). Vol. 3.2 of The 
History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. – A.D. 135). 
Revised and edited by G. Vermes, F. Millar, M. Black, and M. Goodman. 3 vols. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973-87.  
Myre,A. “La Loi de la Nature et la Loi Mosaique selon Philon d’ Alexandrie.” Science et 
Esprit 28 (1976): 163-81 
Najman, H. “A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: An Unthinkable Paradox?” SPhA 15 
(2003): 54-63.  
________. “The Law of Nature and the Authority of the Mosaic Law.” SPhA 11 (1999): 
55-73. 
Nickelsburg, G.W.E. Jewish Literature between the Bible and the Mishnah. 2d ed. 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005. 
_______. “Stories of Biblical and Early Post-Biblical Times.” Pages 33-88 in Jewish 
Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran 
Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus. Edited by M.E. Stone. Volume 2 of CRINT 
Section 2: The Literature of the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple 
and the Telmud. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984. 
Niebuhr, K.-W. Gesetz und Paränese: Katechismusartige Weisungsreihen in der 
frühjüdischen Literatur. WUNT 2. Riehe 28. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1987. 
479 
 
Ober, J. “Law and Political Theory.” Pages 394-411in The Cambridge Companion to 
Ancient Greek Law. Edited by M. Gagarin and D. Cohen. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
O’Neil, J. “Royal Authority and City Law under Alexander and His Hellenistic 
Successors.” The Classical Quarterly 50 (2000): 424-31. 
Ostwald, M. From Popular Sovereignty to Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics 
in Fifth-Century Athens. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
______. “Was there a Concept a!grafoj no/moj in Classical Greece.” Pages 70-104 in 
Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Presented to Gregory Vlastos. Edited by 
E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973. 
Paget, James C. “Jewish Proselytism at the Time of Christian Origins: Chimera or 
Reality?” JSNT 62 (1996): 65-103. 
Parke, H.W. Sibyls and Sibylline Prophecy in Classical Antiquity. Edited by B.C. 
McGing. London: Routledge, 1988. 
Pate, C. Marvin. The Reverse of the Curse: Paul, Wisdom, and the Law. 
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2/114. Tübingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2000. 
Pohlenz, M. “Paulus und die Stoa.” ZNW 42 (1949): 69-104. 
Rasimus, Tuomas, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg, eds. Stoicism in 
Early Christianity. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010. 
Redditt, P. “The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees.” CBQ 45 (1983) 249-70. 
Reese, James M. Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences. 
Analecta biblica 41. Rome: Biblical Institute, 1970. 
Reinhartz, A. “The Meaning of nomos in Philo’s Exposition of the Law.” SR 15 (1986): 
337-45. 
Remus, H. “Authority, consent, law: Nomos, physis, and the striving for a ‘given’.” SR 
13 (1984): 5-18. 
Renehan, R. “The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees.” Rheinisches 
Museum für Philologie 115 (1972): 223-38. 
Richards, E. Randolph. Paul and First-Century Letter Writing: Secretaries, Composition 
and Collection. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004. 
480 
 
Ridderbos, H. Paul: An Outline of His Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975. 
Roetzel, C. Paul: The Man and the Myth. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999. 
Rowe, C. Kavin. Early Narrative Christology: The Lord in the Gospel of Luke. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006. 
Sampley, J. Paul, ed. Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook. Harrisburg: Trinity 
Press International, 2003. 
Sandbach, F. H. The Stoics. New York: Norton, 1975. 
Sanders, E. P. “The Covenant as a Soteriological Category and the Nature of Salvation in 
Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism.” Pages 11-44 in Jews, Greeks, and Christians: 
Essays in Honor of William David Davies. Edited by R. Hammerton-Kelley and R. 
Scroggs. Leiden: Brill, 1976.  
______. Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Pattern of Religions. 
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977.  
Sandmel, Samuel. “Confrontation of Greek and Jewish Ethics: Philo De Decalogo.” 
Pages 163-76 in Judaism and Ethics. Edited by D. Silver. New York: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1970. 
_____. “Parallelomania.” Journal of Biblical Literature 81 (1962): 1–13.  
Schenck, Kenneth L. A Brief Guide to Philo. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005. 
Schiappa, E. Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric. 2d ed. 
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003. 
Schmeller, Thomas. Paulus und die “Diatribe”: Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation. 
Münster: Aschendorff, 1987. 
Schnelle, U. Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology. Translated by E. Boring. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003. 
Schofield, M. “Stoic Ethics.” Pages 233-56 in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. 
Edited by B. Inwood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Schürer, E. The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. – A.D. 
135). Revised and edited by G. Vermes, F. Millar, M. Black, and M. Goodman. 3 
vols. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973-87. 
481 
 
Scott, James M. “Exile and the Self-Understanding of Diaspora Jews in the Greco-Roman 
Period.” Pages 173–218 in Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian 
Conceptions. Edited by James M. Scott. Leiden: Brill, 1997. 
Segal, Alan. “Torah and Nomos in Recent Scholarly Discussion.” Studies in Religion 13 
(1984): 19-28. 
Seifrid, Mark A. “Unrighteous by Faith: Apostolic Proclamation in Romans 1:18-3:20.” 
Pages 105–45 in The Paradoxes of Paul. Vol. 2 of Justification and Variegated 
Nomism. Edited by D. A. Carson, Peter T. O’Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004. 
______. Justification by Faith: The Origin and Development of a Central Pauline Theme. 
Leiden: Brill, 1992. 
Shipley, G. The Greek World After Alexander: 323-30 BC. New York: Routledge, 2000. 
Shipley, Graham J. and M. Hansen. “The Polis and Federalism.” Pages 52-72 in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World. Edited by G. Bugh. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Skehan, Patrick W., and Alexander A. Di Lella. The Wisdom of Ben Sira: A New 
Translation with Notes. Anchor Bible 39. New York: Doubleday, 1987. 
Smith, M. The Role of the Pedagogue in Galatians.” Bib Sac 163 (2006): 197-214. 
Song, C. Reading Romans as a Diatribe. New York: Peter Lang, 2004. 
Spilsbury, P. “Josephus.” Pages 241-60 in Justification and Variegated Nomism: The 
Complexities of Second Temple Judaism. Edited by D.A. Carson, P.T. O’Brien, and 
M. Seifrid. Vol. 1 of Justification and Variegated Nomism. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2001. 
Stanley, Christopher D. Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters 
of Paul. New York: T & T Clark, 2004. 
———. “A Decontextualized Paul? A Response to Francis Watson’s Paul and the 
Hermeneutics of Faith.” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 28 
(2006): 353–62. 
———. “Paul’s ‘Use’ of Scripture: Why the Audience Matters.” Pages 125–55 in As It Is 
Written: Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and 
Christopher D. Stanley. Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series 50. 
Leiden: Brill, 2008. 
482 
 
Sterling, G. “Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish 
Ethics.” Studia Philonica Annual 15 (2003): 64-80. 
Stern, Menahem, ed. From Herodotus to Plutarch. Vol. 1 of Greek and Latin Authors on 
Jews and Judaism. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974. 
Stowers, Stanley K. The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Society of Biblical 
Literature Dissertation Series 57. Chico: Scholar’s Press, 1981. 
______. “Paul’s Dialogue with a Fellow Jew in Romans 3:1-9.” CBQ 46 (1984): 707-
722. 
Striker, G. “Origins of the Concept of Natural Law.” Pages 79-94 in Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 2. Edited by J. Cleary. New 
York: University Press of America, 1987. 
Swain, S. Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, 
AD 50-250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Tarrant, R.J. “Aspects of Virgil’s Reception in Antiquity.” Pages 56-72 in The 
Cambridge Companion to Virgil. Edited by Charles Martindale. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Tcherikover, V. “Jewish Apologetic Literature Reconsidered,” Eos 48 (1956): 169-93. 
Thesleff, H. An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period. Åbo: 
Åbo Akademi, 1961. 
Thomas, R. “Writing, Law, and Written Law.” Pages 41-60 in The Cambridge 
Companion to Ancient Greek Law. Edited by M. Gagarin and D. Cohen. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Thompson, James W. Moral Formation according to Paul: The Context and Coherence 
of Pauline Ethics. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011. 
Thorsteinsson, Runar M. Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study 
of Ancient Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Tobin, Thomas H. “Controversy and Continuity in Romans 1:18-3:20.” Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 55 (1993): 298–318. 
______. The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation. CBQMS 14. 
Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983. 
_____. “Logos.” ABD 4: 348-49. Edited by David N. Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 
1992. 
483 
 
Trebilco, Paul. Jewish Communities in Asia Minor. SNTSMS 69. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
Tripolitis, Antonia. Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2002. 
Untersteiner, M. The Sophists. Translated by K. Freeman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954. 
van der Horst, P. The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides: With Introduction and 
Commentary. SVTP 4. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978. 
______. “Pseudo-Phocylides Revisited.” JSP 3 (1988): 3-30. 
Vander Waerdt, P. “The Original Theory of Natural Law.” SPhA 15 (2003): 17-34. 
Vogt, Katja Maria.  Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early 
Stoa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Wallace, D. The Gospel of God: Romans as Paul’s Aeneid. Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2008. 
Wallace-Hadrill, A. “Mutatas Formas: The Augustan Transformation of Roman 
Knowledge.” Pages 55-84 in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus. 
Edited by Karl Galinsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Watson, Francis. Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith. London: T & T Clark 
International, 2004. 
______. Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective. Rev. ed. Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007. 
———. “Paul the Reader: An Authorial Apologia.” Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament 28 (2006): 363–73. 
———. “Review of Douglas A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God.” Early 
Christianity 1 (2010): 179–85. 
———. “The Two Roman Congregations: Romans 14:1–15:13.” Pages 203–15 in The 
Romans Debate. Rev. ed. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991. 
Weber, R. Das Gesetz im hellenistischen Judentum: Studien zum Verständnis und zur 
Funktion der Thora von Demetrios bis Pseudo-Phokylides. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2000. 
484 
 
______.  Das Gesetz bei Philon von Alexandrien und Flavius Josephus: Studien zum 
Verständnis und zur Funktion der Thora bei den beiden Hauptzeugen des 
hellenistischen Judentums. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001. 
Wendland, P. Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift vom beschaulichen Leben. 
Leipzig, 1896. 
White, John. The Apostle of God: Paul and the Promise of Abraham. Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1999. 
Whitmarsh, T. Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Willoughby, H. “Review of By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism.” 
Anglican Theological Review 18 (1936): 37. 
Wilson, W. The Mysteries of Righteousness: The Literary Composition and Genre of the 
Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994. 
Winston, David. The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary. Anchor Bible 43. Garden City: Doubleday, 1979. 
______. Review of P. Bizzete, Il Libro della sapienza: Struttura e genere letterario. CBQ 
48 (1986): 527 
______. “Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon.” Pages 83-98 in The Ancestral 
Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism: Essays of David 
Winston. Edited by G. Sterling. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001.  
Wolfson, H. Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947. 
Wright, N.T. Christian Origins and the Question of God, Volume One: The New 
Testament and the People of God. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. 
_____. “The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith,” Tyndale Bulletin 29 (1978): 61-
88. 
Young, Brad H. Meet the Rabbis: Rabbinic Thought and the Teachings of Jesus. 
Peabody: Hendrickson, 2007. 
Zeller, Dieter. Juden und Heiden in der Mission des Paulus: Studien zum Römerbrief. 
Second edition. Forschung zur Bibel 8. Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1976. 
 
 485 
VITA 
 
Kyle T. Fever was born in Des Moines, Iowa. He was raised in the Des Moines 
area and attended Wartburg College in Waverly, Iowa, where he earned a Bachelor of 
Arts in Religion in 1998. After marrying Laura Rohwedder in 1998, Kyle went into the 
business of coffee shop management at Friedrich’s Coffee in Urbandale, Iowa. Kyle 
attended Luther Seminary in St. Paul, Minnesota, earning his M.A. in Biblical Studies 
with an emphasis in New Testament in 2003, writing a thesis titled: The Commands of 
Jesus in Matthew 8-9: A Study of Jesus’ Significance in Relationship to God, Humanity, 
and the Cosmos. 
Kyle began study in the New Testament / Early Christian Origins PhD program at 
Loyola in the fall of 2003. He passed his comprehensive exams with Distinction in 2006, 
and received Loyola’s Fourth Year Fellowship in 2007-08 and the Arthur J. Schmitt 
Dissertation Fellowship in 2008-09. While working on his dissertation, Kyle received a 
position as Visiting Instructor in New Testament at Luther Seminary in 2008-09 and 
taught numerous courses online at Luther Seminary from 2009-11. He also began 
teaching at Wartburg College in 2010 where he currently serves as adjunct faculty in the 
Department of Religion. He remains involved in the Society of Biblical Literature and in 
campus and academic life at Wartburg College. He resides in Waverly, Iowa with Laura, 
his wife of fourteen years, their three children, Jaya (8), Tate (5), and Jude (2), and some 
bats. 
